HERE'S MY TRIAL BALOON REVISION OF DCID 1/11.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00623R000300050045-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: February 3, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/28: CIA-RDP87T00623R000300050045-1
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
3 February 1982
Here's my trial baloon revision of DCID 1/11.
Please review and comment back to
(re hasn't seen this). My objects in this draft are:
1. To draw sharp boundaries in the compart-
mented security area - we have nothing to do with
what gets compartmented; we have everything to
do with how to protect it once decision to compart-~
ment has been made.
2. To tighten up the language on leak
investigation consonant with White House and other'
senior level concern on this issue. (I think what
I have is appropriate notwithstanding Judge Clark;s
backing off on some NSDD 19 provisions.) ;
3. Adding a new charter for the "personnel
security subcommittee".c drafted
this - he will show it to his working group members
at next week's adjudicators' seminar.
4. To cut down on some of the verbiage -
your talented scapel can no doubt do more - inputs
welcomed.
INFORMATION
STAT
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/28: CIA-RDP87T00623R000300050045-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/28: CIA-RDP87T00623R000300050045-1
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
3 February 1982
Executive Secretary, SIGINT Committee
Attached is a strawman revision of the
SECOM charter, DCID 1/11. has not
seen it, so view it only as
baloon.
trial
Would appreciate your review, and that of
on those portions of this that pertain
to compartmented security. My object is to try
to get away from the overlapping (actual and/or
perceived) security responsibilities of the past
and draw a new, sharp boundary line between
those who recommend and determine what gets
compartmented (which is not our business), and
our responsibility (and no one else's) to develop
and recommend security measures to protect
that compartmented material. If this approach
is the right one, I would think it should be comple-
mented by corresponding revisions in the SIGINT
and COMIREX charters to make clear that, for
their areas of responsibility, they are the only
ones charged to address what should and should not
be compartmented, but that, by silence in their
charters, they do not address how to protect that
which they say needs to be protected.
SECOM Exec. Secretary
INFORMATION
STAT
STAT
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