BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR NSC MEETING ON STOCKPILES, GOALS, AND MOBILIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00759R000100200005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 19, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/06: CIA-RDP87T00759R000100200005-0
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC #07077-84
19 December 1984
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: David B. Low
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Economics
SUBJECT: Background Papers for NSC Meeting on Stockpiles, Goals,
and Mobilization
1. The NSC meeting on stockpiles, goals and mobilization will
review the various working group reports prepared by NSC looking at the
ability of the United States to fight a 3-front war--Europe, the Middle
East, and Korea--after a 1-year mobilization. The effort examines the
overall ability of the US economy to support such a war.
-- CIA's main contribution to the effort is a study on the
reliability of foreign suppliers of strategic minerals in
wartime. DIA supplied the main inputs for this effort.
-- The study concludes that of 26 key countries, all but
two--China and India--would be willing to continue to
supply us in time of war.
-- Three other countries--Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe--were
also judged unreliable suppliers because of the potential
for effective and prolonged disruption of supplies by
guerrilla or terrorist groups.
All portions Secret
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/06: CIA-RDP87T00759R000100200005-0
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2. The results of the study depend heavily on the assumptions that
sea lanes remain open and that we suffer a low attrition rate of ships
supplying the European theatre. These assumptions were mandated by
Congress and are only two of the many key assumptions in the larger
effort. Changes in only a few of these obviously could alter what is
essentially a positive outcome.
3. NSC may want to use the meeting to show that the US would not
have trouble coping with wartime mobilization. This would allow the
government to sell off some of its strategic mineral stockpiles next
year and allocate the funds realized in order to increase oil
stockpiles. In any case, I do not see the Agency as having a major role
in analyzing the potential for wartime disruption of strategic minerals
in the future. It seems mainly to be a domestic issue.
4. I have attached two memoranda by Maurice Ernst relating to the
stockpile study (Tab A) and our industrial mobilization capability
(Tab B), as well as the stockpile study itself (Tab C).
Attachments:
As stated
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/06: CIA-RDP87T00759R000100200005-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/06: CIA-RDP87T00759R000100200005-0
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NIC #07077-84
19 December 1984
SUBJECT: Background Papers for NSC Meeting on Stockpiles, Goals,
and Mobilization
DCI/NIC/A/NI0/Econ
09 Dec 84)
Dist:
Orig - DDCI (w/atts)
1 - C/NIC (w/o atts)
1 - VC/NIC (w/o atts)
1 - ER (w/o atts)
1 - DDI Reg (w/o atts)
1 - D. Low (w/atts)
2 - Asst NI0/Econ (w/atts)
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/06: CIA-RDP87T00759R000100200005-0