(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Soviet Naval Repair
Capabilities: Implications
for Naval Readiness
Secret
SOV 86-10021
April 1986
Copy 4 5 3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Intelligence 25X1
for Naval Readiness
Soviet Naval Repair
Capabilities: Implications
Industries Division, SOYA,
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Defense
This paper was prepared by
Secret
SOV 86-10021
April 1986
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Summary
Information available
as of 1 February 1986
was used in this report.
for Naval Readiness
Soviet Naval Repair
Capabilities: Implications
submarines.
During the past 20 years the Soviets have carried out a massive naval
construction program that has transformed their Navy from a coastal
defense force into a modern "blue water" fleet. Their newer surface
combatants are substantially larger than the older ones and have more
striking power, and they have constructed more than 200 nuclear-powered
facilities as a whole.
The growth of the fleet has led the USSR to greatly expand the size and
capabilities of the naval yards responsible for its maintenance and repair.
Shiplift capacity has increased as rapidly as the size of the fleet, and the re-
pair facilities of the Northern and Pacific Fleets are now able to
accommodate the largest Soviet naval units in operation or under construc-
tion. The floorspace of fabrication and instrument repair buildings-taken
together-has expanded more rapidly than that of shore-based repair
of operations.
This expansion has made it possible for the yards to better meet the
sophisticated repair needs of advanced propulsion systems, weapon sys-
tems, precision instruments, and electronics; has increased repair efficien-
cy; and probably has reduced dependence on Soviet civilian industry. To
date, however, Soviet repair facilities remain capable of supporting only a
short, hot war and-compared with Western standards-a low level of
peacetime operations. This is consistent with the Soviet philosophy of naval
readiness which continues to stress preventive maintenance, in-port readi-
ness, and in-port/in-area training, rather than extended at-sea operations
that would substantially increase repair requirements. The existing repair
facilities probably would be overloaded by a prolonged shift to a high level
pled.
Most of the maintenance and repair of Soviet surface combatants and
submarines takes place at 25 naval ship repair yards. Eight of these have
been built since 1965, and all but two of those built before then have been
expanded. Shiplift capacity-the total tonnage of ships that could simulta-
neously be removed from the water using all means available-has
increased by 2.5 times, and floorspace in shore-based facilities has more
than tripled. During the same period the tonnage of the fleet has nearly tri-
iii Secret
Sov 86-10021
April 1986
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9 1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
The expansion of maintenance and repair capabilities has included:
? Five new repair yards for nuclear-powered submarines and three for
surface ships.
? Five submarine repair halls, one of which may be usable for maintenance
of the Typhoon-class nuclear-powered ballistic submarine.
? Twenty-seven floating drydocks (FDDs), including some built and pur-
chased abroad, with a combined shiplift capacity of about 500,000 metric
tons. Of those acquired abroad, the two largest-one from Sweden and
one from Japan-have capacities of 80,000 tons each. These 27 FDDs
have provided almost the entire increase in Soviet shiplift capacity during
the 1966-85 period and the only means of lifting aircraft carriers in the
Northern and Pacific Fleets.
? Facilities-at selected naval repair yards-capable of supporting the
maintenance and repair of precision instruments and modern electronic
equipment.
? Modern housing facilities for about 42,500 shipyard employees and
family members.
We estimate that this 20-year construction program has cost the equivalent
of at least $7 billion (1983 US $) with outlays peaking at more than $500
million per year in 1980 and 1981. During the period 1981-85, investment
averaged about $375 million per year and was concentrated on the
completion of projects begun in the late 1970s.
Construction starts declined sharply after 1980 but resumed in 1985; this
resumption leads us to expect that major construction will continue into the
early 1990s in at least three yards that service nuclear-powered subma-
rines, probably at the level we witnessed in 1981-85. The nuclear-powered
submarine fleet, which, since the early 1960s, has been the major factor
driving the expansion of the submarine repair yards, has continued to grow.
We believe future expansion and modernization will emphasize qualitative
improvements that could further decrease reliance on Soviet civilian
industry for repair services-eliminating the time-consuming shipment of
equipment back to the production plants and, thus, decreasing the number
of spares needed.
- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Secret
Background
The Expansion and Modernization Program
3
Increase in Shiplift Capacity
5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Secret
Soviet Naval Repair
Capabilities: Implications
for Naval Readiness
Background
The Soviet approach to naval readiness differs mark-
edly from the approaches of Western navies. The
Soviets stress readiness to deploy for combat on
relatively short notice, rather than routine deployment
of large forces. Although the number of Soviet naval
ships at sea has increased in the past two decades,
only a small part of the Soviet Navy is still regularly
deployed away from home waters. Even Soviet naval
units deployed abroad spend much of their time at
anchor or in port.
To achieve a maximum force-generation capability in
times of crisis, the Soviet Navy emphasizes in-port/
in-area training, rather than extended at-sea opera-
tions. This emphasis sacrifices operational experience
and crew proficiency to achieve high weapon system
availability-a practice similar to that in Soviet fight-
er aircraft and armored forces. As a result of this
readiness philosophy, the Soviets probably would have
more than half of their submarines and major surface
combatants available for combat within a few days
and about 70 percent within two weeks
The vast majority of repair and maintenance of Soviet
naval vessels is carried out in 25 naval repair yards.'
At these facilities, ships and boats are maintained in
accordance with the requirements and regulations of
the Planned Preventive Ship Repair System (PPSRS),
which covers both civilian and naval vessels.' This
system contains historic files of ship repair records,
' PPSRS is an element of the national Planned Preventive Repair
System (PPRS), which covers the repair and maintenance of all
machinery and equipment in the Soviet Union.F__~
Repair Categories of the Planned Preventive Ship
Repair System
Voyage Repair. Normally carried out in home port by
crew, aided by shore service and a shipyard. Auxilia-
ry machinery and equipment, if they have been
removed, are usually overhauled in the yard, and
workmen are sometimes sent to the ship to perform
repairs that require special skills and equipment. F_
Small Overhaul. Carried out to maintain the opera-
tion of ship systems at acceptable levels until the next
shipyard repair. The frequency of such overhauls
varies from one to four years and can take up to four
months.
Medium Overhaul. Intended to bring a vessel's hull
and operating systems up to a level equal, or almost
equal, to those of a newly built ship. The frequency is
every four to eight years, and the duration three to
eight months.
Drydocking/Shiplifting. Ship is removed from the
water to inspect and repair underwater portion of hull
and ship systems. Conducted either separately or as
part of a medium overhaul. Frequency depends on the
area of operations and operating condition.
tion.
25X1
25X1
Midlife Capital Overhaul. Now used only on a
limited basis and only after a thorough economic
analysis because of its duration (a year or more) and
high cost (up to 70 to 80 percent of a vessel's 25X1
construction cost). When carried out, this category of
repair often includes modernization and modifica-
which are used as a basis for establishing lifetime
repair schedules for new ships and their equipment
(see inset)
Secret
Sov 86-10021
April 1986
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9 T
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
We have observed this system being applied to the
maintenance of SSBNs and several classes of maior
surface combatants.
Selected
ships from the Kotlin, Kanin, and Kashin classes of
major surface combatants were modified and modern-
ized during midlife capital overhaul 10 to 15 years
after they were delivered. The duration of Soviet
naval ship repairs is longer than that reported for
merchant ships; medium overhaul has averaged 24 to
30 months for Yankee-class SSBNs and 12 to 24
months for Delta-I-class SSBNs, while three to eight
months is typically planned for merchant ships. The
longer durations reflect the complexity of SSBNs-
their nuclear-powered propulsion plants, weapons sys-
tems, and associated electronics.
The use of PPSRS scheduling and standards enables
more efficient procurement of materials and equip-
ment and better allocation of limited manpower.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Secret
However, it demands graving docks, shiplift basins,
and floating drydocks (FDDs) sufficient to lift the
tonnage of ships scheduled for repair or maintenance
each year, with a margin for emergency or unplanned
repairs. The system also requires repair halls, machine
shops, and engineering and other buildings for fabri-
cation of parts and repair and maintenance of the
hulls, propulsion systems, armaments, electronics, and
other technical systems of surface ships and subma-
rines having both conventional and nuclear propul-
sion. How the Soviets have provided for the service
base necessary to meet the demands imposed by their
readiness philosophy and what it has cost them is the
subject of this report.
Growing Repair Requirements
During the past 20 years, under the leadership of
Admiral Gorshkov, the Soviet Navy developed from
mainly a coastal defense force into a modern "blue
water" navy operating the world's largest fleet of
nuclear-powered submarines. In 1966 the main strik-
ing force of the Soviet Navy consisted of about 112
major surface combatants (at that time ships with
displacements between 3,000 and 17,500 metric tons)
and 34 nuclear-powered Hotel- , Echo- , and Novem-
ber-class submarines.' By 1985 the number of surface
combatants-between 3,000- and 42,000-tons dis-
placement-had increased to about 132 (an 18-
percent increase), but the tonnage of these combatants
had increased by nearly 60 percent. The nuclear-
powered submarine fleet had grown to more than 200
ships by 1985, with a total tonnage of more than 1.2
million tons-450 thousand tons more than that of
major surface combatants.
Repair requirements have been determined by the
number and size of these ships, and even more by
their increasingly sophisticated shipboard weapons
and electronics, and advanced materials and propul-
sion systems. Some new classes demand repair yards
6 Minor surface combatants, patrol craft, amphibious craft, auxilia-
ries, and diesel-powered submarines, although numerous, have had
relatively little effect on the growth of repair facilities that are
described in this report, particularly because of the large reduction
in the number of diesel submarines and because many of the
smaller ships are serviced by minor yards not covered by our survey.
capable of machining and welding titanium and alu-
minum, as well as steel, and capable of refueling and
maintaining both pressurized water and liquid metal
nuclear reactors.
The Expansion and Modernization Program
Our analysis of the 25 major Soviet naval repair yards
indicates that the Soviets probably developed a long-
range plan in the early 1960s to accommodate the
increased repair and maintenance requirements of
their rapidly growing naval forces. The expansion and
modernization program was designed to:
? Increase the shiplift capacity at the repair yards to
handle the increasing number and size of both 25X1
surface combatants and nuclear-powered
submarines.'
? Construct enough new shops and fabrication build-
ings to carry out the expected maintenance needs of
a fleet that nearly tripled its tonnage in 20 years.
? Expand the capacity to refuel and maintain nuclear-
powered submarines in the Northern and Pacific
Fleets through expansion of existing yards and
construction of new yards in those areas.
? Develop the capability to service precision equip-
ment and electronics at repair yards near forward
operating bases.
The expansion and modernization program began
modestly in the last half of the 1960s, peaked during
the period 1976-80, and has since declined. One part
of the program concentrated on increasing the shiplift
capacity at repair yards-the ability either to lift
ships from the water and transfer them to land-based
facilities or to work on them in FDDs. This phase was
largely completed in 1981. The other part of the
program concentrated on expanding shore facilities at
existing yards and constructing eight new yards (see
figure 1). This phase appears to be nearing comple-
tion, although a limited amount of construction is
expected to continue into the early 1990s. We believe
6 Shiplift capacity, in thousands of tons, is a means of measuring the
capacity of a ship repair yard to lift ships out of the water for
maintenance. Total capacity (attainable only in theory) measures
the tonnage that could be lifted simultaneously with every facility
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Secret
Table 1 (continued)
the capabilities of the repair yards have increased
sufficiently to satisfy the peacetime operational re-
quirements of the fleet.
Increase in Shiplift Capacity. Although a limited
amount of emergency or diagnostic work can be done
by divers, the capability for lifting ships of all sizes
out of the water is an absolute necessity for ship
maintenance and repair. Bottom cleaning and paint-
ing are needed periodically to remove and inhibit
marine growth. Propellers, rudders, through-hull fit-
tings, and the hull must be inspected regularly to
ensure their proper operation; and damage from
grounding, collision, or combat must be repaired to
keep ships operational. F__1
The Soviets lift ships in FDDs, graving docks, and
shiplift basins (see figures 2, 3, and 4). FDDs can be
built more rapidly and are much less costly to con-
struct than graving docks or shiplift basins, and they
can be easily delivered to repair yards in the most
remote areas of the USSR. FDDs, however, are far
more vulnerable to conventional attack than massive
shore-based facilities, which cannot be sunk and are
25X1
25X1
25X1
' See inset, "Sources of Information on Soviet Naval Repair
Capabilities."__________
difficult to damage.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87TOO787ROO0200210003-9
Secret
5X1 1
We estimate that in 1966 the USSR had shiplift
capacity of 385,000 tons, of which about two-thirds
was provided by 15 graving docks.
the late 1970s, the Kiev-class carrier could be lifted
only at Sevastopol', which necessitated its return to
the Black Sea for out-of-water maintenance. Nearly
one-third of the shiplift capacity was provided by 16
FDDs with an estimated total capacity of 130,000
tons-the largest of which could accommodate only a
Kynda-class cruiser of 5,700 tons.
The remaining shiplift capacity was provided by two
The acquisition of additional FDDs provided almost
the entire increase in shiplift capacity at naval repair
yards after 1966 8 (see figure 5). The number of FDDs
acquired and their lift capacities were early indicators
of Soviet plans for large-scale naval expansion.
Through construction in their own yards and purchase
abroad, the Soviets acquired 27 additional FDDs-
the two largest could each lift 80,000 tons
Built in Japan and Sweden to Soviet specifications,
they were delivered in 1978 and 1980. The acquisition
25X1
25X1
25X1
2oA]
25X1
2 A11
25X1
shiplift capacities of about 11,000 tons and 9,000 tons,
respectively. They are used mainly for lifting SSBNs
out of the water to be repaired in adjacent repair
halls.
B One graving dock at Rosta Ship Repair Yard was lengthened by
75 meters, which increased its lift capacity by 10,000 tons. The
capacity of a graving dock is determined by the displacement of the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87TOO787ROO0200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
of FDDs for naval repair yards ceased in 1981,
indicating that the Soviets had approached their
desired shiplift capacity-an estimated 900,000 tons.'
Each has an onboard electric generating plant, ma-
chine shops, cranes, and quarters for the repair per-
sonnel. These FDDs provide the only means in the
Northern and Pacific Fleets of lifting the Kiev-class
vertical-takeoff-and-landing (VTOL) carriers and the
These 80,000-ton FDDs, among the world's largest, Kirov-class nuclear-powered cruisers. The shiplift ca-
carry the latest Western repair equipment and can pacity and size of these FDDs, however, were proba-
operate without support from shore-based facilities. bly dictated by the size of the large, nuclear-powered
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Figure 5
USSR: Estimated Shiplift Capacity
at Naval Repair Yards, 1965-85a
Floating
drydocks
Graving
docks
Shiplift
0 1965 70 75 80 85 basins
aircraft carrier now under construction r possibly by
plans for a larger carrier.10 The docks a e large
enough to handle even the - . s in
light condition (see figure 6
Construction of Shore Facilities. Concomitant with
the increase in shiplift capacity, the USSR expanded
and modernized shore facilities at naval repair yards.
Over a 20-year period, facilities with about 900,000
square meters of floorspace were constructed. Shore
facilities increased in area from 440,000 square me-
ters in 1966 to more than 1.3 million square meters in
1985. The commissioning of repair yard facilities
peaked during the first half of the 1980s with the
completion of numerous buildings begun in the late
1970s. The low level of construction starts since 1980
indicates that the repair yards may be nearing their
nned capacity.
Four types of buildings predominate at shore-based
repair facilities: engineering/shop buildings, fabrica-
tion buildings, repair halls, and instrument repair
buildings." The distribution of growth in floorspace
among these types of buildings reflects not only the
growth of the Soviet fleet but also the introduction of
modern repair methods (see figure 7). The continued,
but diminishing, dominance of engineering and/or
shop buildings indicates that growth of the fleet
requires major expansion of traditional machining
and metalworking capacity, while the emergence and
growth of fabrication buildings reflect the introduc-
tion of subassembly, prefabrication, and modular
construction. The construction of large repair halls
and instrument repair buildings-at yards carrying
out the medium overhaul of nuclear-powered subma-
rines-reflects the growing complexity of these ships
and the need for frequent repair of their instruments
and electronic equipment.
Engineering/shop buildings accounted for 92 percent
of total floorspace in 1966. By 1985, although their
floorspace had doubled, they accounted for only 64
percent of total floorspace. These buildings house the
basic repair processes: machining; repair of mechani-
cal and electrical equipment; plumbing and wiring;
and repair of major elements of propulsion plants,
including steam turbines, gas turbines, diesel engines,
and components of nuclear propulsion plants (see
figure 8).
" There are also a number of old-style foundries, forges, and
machine shops that total about 100,000 square meters of floorspace
at old repair yards serving major surface combatants. These
buildings were all built before 1966 but still appear to be in
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Secret
Figure 6. Swedish-built 80,000-
ton floating drydock during
construction.
Fabrication buildings, now the second most numerous
type, accounted for 8 percent of floorspace in 1966
and 21 percent by 1985. These buildings are located
at repair yards that service major surface combatants
and at the three yards that carry out medium over-
haul of nuclear-powered submarines (see figure 9).
They house metal-cutting, bending, welding, and re-
lated operations, including the preparation of sub-
assemblies and modules. They permit the Soviets to
carry out heavy metalworking operations-such as
construction of bulkheads and deck or hull sections-
in buildings with overhead handling equipment, prop-
er lighting, and ample space, rather than in the
cramped confines of a ship with hand tools, jacks, and
chain hoists for handling materials. These buildings
reflect the modernization of basic ship repair opera-
tions and reduce the time required for repair and
maintenance and, consequently, enhance the opera-
tional availability of Soviet naval units.
Five large repair halls have been constructed since
1966-at a cost of $25-80 million each, depending on
location (see figure 10).12 They account for only 8
percent of total floorspace but are the largest build-
ings in the repair yards and have been built only at
the three yards that carry out medium overhauls of
nuclear-powered submarines. Four have been dedicat-
ed to the overhaul of Yankee- and Delta-class SSBNs
since the mid-1970s. While not essential to the over-
haul process, these halls make it more efficient by
providing heavy bridge cranes for removal of hull
sections and internal components; protection from the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9 T
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Figure 7
Floorspace Completed at Naval Repair
Yards, by Type of Building 1965-1985'
Engineering/
shop
Repair
halls
Instrument
repair
storage areas have been kept intact (see figure 11)." If
true, this shift of precision-equipment repairs to yards
in the forward area represents a distinct change in
maintenance procedure. Up to now, the Soviets have
generally removed equipment needing maintenance
from a ship, replaced it from stock, and returned it to
t production plant for repair. The new practice
should shorten and simplify the logistic pipeline and,
thus, should reduce the number of spares needed. It
possibly has been adopted because of the increasing
cost of electronic equipment and instruments, a short-
age of such equipment, the need for increasingly
frequent repair, or a combination of all three.
Cost of the Program
We estimate that, from 1966 through 1985, the
USSR invested the equivalent of at least $6.8 billion
in the construction and expansion of naval repair
yards. A minimum of $3.5 billion was invested in the
yards themselves-including $3.1 billion for the con-
struction and equipping of shore facilities and about
$400 million for the construction and acquisition from
abroad of FDDs. An additional $3.3 billion was
invested in the construction of housing for repair yard
workers and their families. The program began mod-
estly in the late 1960s, peaked during the period 1976-
80, and appeared to be slowing during the period
1981-85. The program reached a high point of over a
half billion dollars a year in 1980 and 1981 (see
table 3).
weather; lighting; and indoor storage of to s, machin-
ery, and supplies. The allocation of resources for
construction of these buildings clearly reveals the
importance the Soviets place on the SSBN overhaul
program. Most other nuclear-powered submarines
have been overhauled outdoors.
We have identified what we believe are instrument
repair buildings at two forward-area repair yards that
service nuclear-powered submarines-at Pala Guba
in the Northern Fleet and at Petropavlovsk in the
Pacific Fleet. Their configuration suggests that they
are a modification of a Soviet single-floor production
building for precision-instrument production in which
the production areas have been reduced, but the
hermetically sealed assembly area and the testing and
cost to construct these facilities in the United States to Soviet
specifications. The estimates of construction at the yards were
based on a detailed cost estimate of each repair yard and were
arrayed by fleet. Likewise, the costs of housing areas were based on
a detailed study of the housing areas that could be clearly related to
an adjacent repair yard. We believe the estimates are accurate to
within ? 10 percent.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2bAl
-- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Secret
Evaluation and Outlook
The Soviets concentrated their expansion and mod-
ernization efforts on nine repair yards in the Northern
and Pacific Fleets. Seven of these yards serve nuclear-
powered submarines, and two are designed to serve
the largest surface combatants.
We believe the capabilities of the repair yards have
increased to satisf the peacetime operational require-
ments of the fleet.
loverall growth
in naval ship repair facilities has kept up with the
fleet's growth and the increasing complexity of its
units. The number of major surface combatants and
nuclear-powered submarines increased from about
146 units in 1966 to about 330 units by 1985, while
their tonnage nearly tripled. During the same period
the floorspace in the repair yards more than tripled
and the lift capacity increased nearly two and a half
times. Further, the buildings in the yards and the new
FDDs acquired to lift ships were sized to accomodate
the large size and tonnage of both nuclear-powered
submarines and surface combatants entering the fleet.
25X1 ;X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Table 3
USSR: Distribution of Capital Investment in
Naval Repair Yards and Associated Housing Areas, 1966-85
The Soviets have made qualitative improvements in
their repair capabilities commensurate with the in-
creasing complexity and technological sophistication
of their modern naval platforms, weapons, and sup-
port systems. These new and modernized yards are
better equipped than the older yards to perform the
full range of repair and maintenance functions. In
these yards, the engineering buildings, shops, and
fabrication buildings are large, layouts provide easy
access to the buildings, and-where appropriate-
transversers have been constructed to move ships or
ship sections in and out of repair halls. All of these
improvements expedite the repair process. The clear-
est indication of qualitative improvement is the recent
completion of instrument repair buildings at forward
area repair yards in the Pacific and Northern Fleets.
These buildings will allow the Soviets to repair preci-
sion instruments and electronics in the forward areas,
reducing the need to transport them thousands of
miles back to the production plants for repair.
The increasing tempo of work we have observed at the
most advanced of these yards, those which overhaul
SSBNs, indicates that expansion and qualitative im-
provement of the yards and their equipment is paying
off in more efficient repair operations.
been observed in the Pacific Fleet, although it oc-
curred about five years later and has not yet equaled
the best turnaround time in the Northern Fleet.
Moreover, the naval repair yards are probably becom-
ing less dependent on Soviet civilian industry, as
increasingly more complex repair work is being car-
ried out in them. These changes in naval ship repair
are consistent with changes we have observed in the
repair and maintenance of tanks and aircraft; they
probably reflect the Soviet intention to make military
theaters less dependent on extended supply lines to
civilian industry.
Nonetheless, the repair facilities, despite continuous
expansion, remain capable of supporting only a rela-
tively low level of peacetime operations, by Western
standards. The repair yards of the Northern and
Pacific Fleets, which directly support open-ocean
operations of both major surface combatants and
nuclear-powered submarines, are heavily used; other
repair yards in the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets are
poorly located to assist them. The Soviets have built
facilities capable of keeping a large share of the navy
in a high state of in-port readiness. However, they
have not given themselves the option of being able to
shift to a prolonged high level of operations without
rapidly overloading repair capabilities and encounter-
ing a serious decline in the operational capabilities of
their fleet.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Secret
In addition, the use of FDDs as the major means of
lifting ships for repair and maintenance has a negative
side. Although they are flexible in the way they can
be used and easily relocated, they can only be moved
slowly and are vulnerable to air attack with conven-
tional weapons
Further, we believe the program to improve repair
capabilities will continue on its present course. There
probably will be an increased emphasis on responding
to qualitative improvements in the Navy, but the
Soviets are unlikely to try to improve their repair base
to support greatly expanded peacetime operations.
The steady growth of the fleet suggests that construc-
tion starts will rise in the period 1986-90. The tonnage
of ships in the fleet increased during the period 1981-
85 by about the same amount as in the previous five
years, although fewer ships were built.
Ongoing construction activity and the need to over-
haul newly introduced classes of nuclear-powered
submarines suggest that additional construction will
be undertaken at yards servicing nuclear-powered
submarines.
? At Dunay, about 45 kilometers east of Vladivostok,
dredging, probably for a graving dock or shiplift
basin, has been under way since 1977. We believe
that additional onshore construction will be carried
out to develop Dunay into a major yard.
? At Olen'ya Guba-the only forward-area yard that
carries out medium overhauls of nuclear-powered
submarines-a limited amount of construction was
under way in 1985, and space is available for more.
Moreover, the amount of housing available there is
far more than at other yards with comparable
facilities and there is a 300-bed hospital, perhaps
indicating that additional repair facilities are
planned.
We correlated the timing of construction and, thus,
investment in the repair yards with increasing repair
demands as reflected in growth in tonnage of major
combatants and nuclear-powered submarines. For ex-
ample, a surge in ship deliveries in one five-year plan
was followed by a surge in investment in the
following plan (see figure 12).15 This relationship is
plausible in view of the requirements in the PPSRS
for the first medium overhaul to occur four to eight
years after initial operations." On the basis of the
relationship between tonnage increase and investment
that prevailed for at least 15 years, we estimate that
investment in repair yards during the period 1986-90
should remain at about the 1981-85 level-about
$800 million-despite the relatively few construction
starts we noted in the past several years.
Two-thirds of this increase in Soviet naval tonnage
during the period 1981-85 was accounted for by
growth of the nuclear-powered submarine fleet. On
" The increase in tonnage of the fleet is the total tonnage of new
major surface combatants and nuclear-powered submarines deliv-
ered in each five-year-plan period less the tonnage of vessels
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
LDA I
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9 i
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
the basis of the relationship between fleet tonnage and construction program. The largest ships in commis-
investment, we estimate the nuclear-powered subma- sion, as well as the aircraft carrier under construction,
rine repair yards will account for at least two-thirds of can now be maintained in both the Northern and
the total.0 Pacific Fleets. We see little need for much further
expansion under present Soviet operational practices.
We do not expect much further expansion of yards
serving the surface fleet and the diminishing fleet of
diesel submarines. Extensive repair facilities for die-
sel submarines and all but the largest major surface
combatants and carriers were present in all four fleet
areas in 1966 and have been expanded during this
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9 -
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Secret
Appendix
Construction Cost Estimates
for Soviet Repair Yards
Construction cost estimates are based on unit costs of
construction derived from the 1970 series of Soviet
handbooks used by the Soviets in revaluing the
USSR's fixed capital assets." We used Soviet data for
each type of building: structure, basic dimensions,
location, and climate.
f Finally, we esti-
mated ruble costs and converted them to dollars using
a ruble-dollar ratio of 0.267 1970 rubles per 1983
dollar." Construction cost estimates based on this
method have been checked by estimating the cost of
US military facilities and comparing the results with
the actual US costs. Estimates have been found
accurate to ? 10 percent.
Total capital investment was determined by the
construction-as-a-percent-of-total method. For new
projects or major expansion, construction's share in
total capital investment for the appropriate sectors of
the machine-building and metalworking industries
was about 55 percent in the late 1960s, decreasing to
about 45 percent in the late 1970s, according to Soviet
texts on the economics of industrial construction. The
machinery and equipment share of investment may be
understated in later years because of the increasingly
complex and costly machinery reported to be installed
in Soviet shipyards but not reflected in the texts
available. Thus, we estimate the accuracy of capital
investment to be about + 10/ - 15 percent.
Table 4 Million 1983 US $
Estimated Capital Investment in Repair
Yards of the Northern Fleet, 1966-85
45
639
25X1
25X1
25X1
a Yards serving mainly nuclear-powered submarines.
b If located in the arctic zone as are the other Northern Fleet yards,
Yagri Island would have cost $663 million.
Northern Fleet
Investment in the Northern Fleet repair yards began
modestly during the period 1966-70, more than dou-
bled during the next five years, and doubled again,
reaching nearly $200 million per year in the period
1976-80. From 1981 through 1985, investment ta-
pered off to about half of the previous level (see table
4).
Investment in the Northern Fleet was dominated by
the large-scale expansion of three yards that service
nuclear-powered submarines. Costs were very high
because all yards at the Northern Fleet-except
Yagri Island, Severodvinsk-are in the Arctic zone
where costs are three and a half times those in the
Moscow area. Within the Northern Fleet, repair
yards that service nuclear-powered submarines have
accounted for two-thirds of the capital investment.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Table 6 Million 1983 US $
Estimated Capital Investment in Repair
Yards of the Baltic and Black
Sea Fleets, 1966-85
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Capital investment in yards that service the surface
fleet was used mainly for expansion of the Rosta
Naval Base and Ship Repair Yard, Sevmorput, and
for purchase of the 80,000-ton FDD that is moored at
nearby Roslyakovo Shipyard. Rosta is the main repair
yard for major surface combatants in the Northern
Fleet and has been modernized and expanded signifi-
cantly. Roslyakovo, only a few kilometers away, is a
small yard whose major asset is the 80,000-ton FDD
that is used for minor repairs and shiplifting of many
types of naval vessels and in support of operations at
Rosta.
Pacific Fleet
Investment in the Pacific Fleet repair yards was
distributed over time more evenly than investment in
Northern Fleet yards. There was only a small surge in
the period 1976-80. Total investment in the Pacific
Fleet area was about half that of the Northern
Fleet-mainly because of the much lower construc-
tion costs in the latter area The physical
volume of the construction was nearly comparable.
Yards serving the nuclear-powered submarine fleet
received nearly 60 percent of the investment in Pacific
Fleet repair yards. The major repair yard at Pe-
trovka-the only yard in the Pacific Fleet to carry out
Tallinn/Kopli
68
Tallinn/Morskoy Zavod
7
Kronshtadt
29
Sevastopol'/Kilenbaloch naya
50
Sevastopol'/Panaitova Bay
78
Sevastopol' /Sevmorzavod
medium overhaul of nuclear-powered submarines-
was expanded, and two new yards were built-one at
Dunay near Vladivostok and the other on Kamchatka
Peninsula near Petropavlovsk
Yards serving surface ships and diesel-powered sub-
marines also were expanded substantially. Vladivos-
tok Shipyard Dalzavod and Sovetskaya Gavan' Ship-
yard 263, which had extensive facilities in 1966, were
expanded and modernized. Either of these yards can
lift and repair all classes of surface combatants except
for Kirov-class (CGN) and larger ships. In addition, a
major repair yard has been under construction at
Slavyanka since 1968. It has alongside mooring for
the largest ships, including the nuclear-powered air-
craft carrier now under construction. Shiplifting, how-
ever, would have to be done in the 80,000-ton FDD at
nearby Dunay Shipyard (see table 5).
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Secret
Baltic and Black Sea Fleets
Investment since 1965 in repair yards of the Baltic
and Black Sea Fleets amounted to only about $340
million, all in yards serving the surface fleet and
diesel-powered submarines. Most of the yards were
well developed by 1966. They are not located in areas
suited to support the open-ocean surface navy or the
nuclear-powered submarine fleet; moreover, there are
no repair yards for nuclear-powered submarines in
either fleet (see table 6).
Investment in Housing
Expansion of the repair yards was accompanied by an
expansion of the associated housing areas. Accommo-
dations for approximately 42,500 families were built;
apartment designs and layouts are typical of the time
they were built. They range from four- and five-story
apartments of the mid-1960s to elaborate nine- to 12-
story high-rise apartments of the late 1970s and early
1980s. These housing areas contain kindergartens,
schools, and social centers typical of urban housing
areas around major cities. Numerous private automo-
biles are present (see figure 13). The Soviets have
apparently provided significant inducements to bring
high-caliber civilian personnel to these often remote
areas.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
We estimated the construction costs of housing at all
Soviet naval repair yards by using our observations of
five yards where housing for repair workers could be
differentiated from other housing. Construction costs
for these housing areas approximately equaled the
investment in the associated repair yard within a
range of ? 8 percent. Two housing areas, Petrovka
and Chalmpushka/Roslyakovo, were excluded from
the average since the share of housing was very large
because of a condition not prevailing at other yards.21
Using the average of the five yards, we then estimated
total housing construction costs by applying the 95-
percent factor to the investment in each of the other
yards 0 The resulting housing investment
was distributed over time (1966-85) in accordance
with the observed pace of housing construction at all
seven yards.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP87T00787R000200210003-9