(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020039-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: February 11, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
11 February 1984
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USSR: The Transition Begins
Lebanon: Gemayel Holds On
France-Lebanon: Advocating a UN Force
El Salvador: Insurgents' Election Tactics
Contents
UK-US: Labor Party Leader's Visit
USSR-Eastern Europe: Oil and Gas Export Plans
USSR-Lebanon: Calls for Gemayel's Resignation
Europe: Conference on Balkan Cooperation
Japan-USSR: Talks in Moscow Scheduled
China-USSR: Annual Trade Agreement
Sudan: Attack on Construction Camp
Ecuador: Charges of Election Fraud
Special Analysis
Top Secret
USSR: Andropov's Legacy and the Succession 13
Top Secret
11 February 1984
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Top Secret
World Leaders To Attend Andropov's Funeral A
West Germany ................
France ..............................
Belgium ............................
Norway ............................
Finland ............................
Portugal ............................
Canada ............................
Japan... .............................
India ................................
Pakistan ............................
Cuba ................................
Chancellor Kohl
Prime Minister Mauroy
Prime Minister Martens
Prime Minister Willoch h
Crown Prince Harald
President Koivisto e
Prime Minister Soares e
Prime Minister Trudeau
Foreign Minister Abe
Prime Minister Gandhi
President Zia
President Castro
Information as of 0200 EST.
Attendance likely but not certain.
Top Secret
11 February 1984
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Top Secret
USSR: The Transition Begins
The appointment of party secretary Chernenko to head the funeral
commission makes him the front-runner to succeed Andropov as party
The initial reaction in Moscow to Andropov's death has been
outwardly calm. There have been no signs of extra security measures
being taken or unusual street or troop activity Somber music
dominates but does not monopolize the airwaves.
Comment: The appointment of Chernenko is the first clue that he
may already have been picked by the Politburo or is the leading
contender to become general secretary. Andropov was named head
of Brezhnev's funeral commission the day before the Central
Committee formally elected him general secretary.
Some powerful members of the Politburo, however, may be
opposed to the choice of Chernenko as Andropov's successor. The
selection will not be official until ratified by a meeting of the Central
Committee, almost certainly before the funeral.
The subdued public atmosphere in Moscow appears to be part of
an official effort to project an image of business as usual. These
public displays of calm, however, ma mask considerable infi htin in
the leadership and a power struggle.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
Top Secret
Present areas of control
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Druze
Druze and Shia
Christian forces
Lebanese Army forces
Lebanese Army brigade
11 February 1984
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Top Secret
LEBANON: Gemayel Holds On
President Gemayel and his advisers are continuing to seek
increased US or Israeli support instead of coming to terms with the
opposition's demands.
Druze militiamen who surround the US Embassy in Beirut did not
interfere with the partial evacuation of US citizens yesterday. The
Embassy reports that most Druze and Muslim fighters in West Beirut
do not appear hostile toward US citizens. Press reports, on the other
hand, say that radical Shias-who are vehemently anti-US--are
roaming the streets.
Comment: Gemayel and the Christian community have been
encouraged by US naval gunfire directed against their opponents.
They continue to hope that massive US or Israeli intervention will
prevent further gains by the Druze and Muslims.
Gemayel thus far has avoided making significant concessions to
the demands of his opponents. He refuses to accept that opposition
control of West Beirut requires him to take far-reaching conciliatory
action. He views the situation as essentially a security problem that
can somehow be solved by foreign intervention.
In the absence of US or Israeli assistance, Gemayel presumably
will continue to stall for time. He is reluctant to name a government of
national unity that includes opposition figures, because he knows that
it would undermine his authority and preclude military operations
against Druze and Shia positions. His freedom of action also may be
limited by his coreligionists.
The Druze and Muslims, however, will not allow him to temporize
indefinitely. They want their demands to be met, and they are growing
impatient with Gemayel's refusal either to act or to resign.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
FRANCE-LEBANON: Advocating a UN Force
The French are still promoting their idea to put a UN force in
Beirut, and they are publicly disassociating themselves from recent
French diplomats have told the US Embassy in Damascus that
they are working on a plan to insert an international force in Lebanon
to replace the MNF. Paris claims to have indications that Syria and
the USSR will support a UN-sponsored force under certain
conditions. The French also state, however, that Damascus and
Moscow will not accept the participation of troops from the
permanent members of the UN Security Council and that they want
the MNF to withdraw completely from Lebanon and its territorial
French diplomats in Washington, meanwhile, have asked for
assurances that the evacuation of US personnel from Beirut does not
presage US military operations in the city itself. They have told US
officials that Paris does not want to be associated in any way with
Comment: The French may launch an initiative in the UN Security
Council to establish a UN force in Beirut, even in the absence of much
support. The USSR probably will follow Syria's lead on the issue, but
planned US withdrawals may reduce Soviet interest in supporting
proposals for a UN force.
France may adopt an even more visibly independent position in
Lebanon and the Middle East. Paris probably believes that US
shelling of the Shuf may endanger French forces and civilians still in
The French also are likely to revive their efforts to find a broad
solution in the Middle East. They may consult with Egyptian President
Mubarak in Paris on a revision of the French-Egyptian initiative, which
calls for negotiations based on broad acceptance of the Palestinians'
right of self-determination.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
EL SALVADOR: Insurgents' Election Tactics
The guerrillas' latest peace proposal is part of their strategy to
The insurgent initiative contains 20 points designed to establish a
basis for negotiations with San Salvador and Washington, according
to press reports. Key provisions include guerrilla participation in a
provisional government and the reorganization of the military. The
insurgents also advocate economic and social reforms and take
positions on broad foreign policy issues, such as participation in the
Nonaligned Movement
Insurgent political leaders deny that the guerrillas will use military
action to disrupt the election. Nonetheless, some spokesmen have
stated that harassing attacks against cities and the transportation
network will continue both before and after the vote.
Comment: The guerrillas know that their demands for sharing
power and reorganizing the military remain unacceptable to all
elements of the government. Nonetheless, by promulgating a broader
and more detailed proposal, they probably hope to demonstrate their
political maturity, increase their international support, and cause
dissension in both Washington and San Salvador.
The insurgents remember their failure to block the election in
1982, and they may fear that a general offensive would not be
successful and would provoke adverse international reaction.
Nonetheless, they may attempt spectacular operations against some
cities, military garrisons, and public utilities. The guerrillas almost
succeeded in seizing a departmental capital in the east before the last
election, and they appear capable of making a stronger effort this
Top Secret
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Top Secret
UK-US: Labor Party Leader's Visit
Labor Party leader Kinnock, who arrives in Washington tomorrow,
wants to use the trip to improve his credibility as a potential prime
Comment: Kinnock has deep philosophical differences with
Washington's foreign and domestic policy, but he recognizes that a
British political leader has to demonstrate an ability to work with the
US. His visit is part of a systematic effort to improve his standing as a
statesman. Last month he visited France and Greece, and he plans a
trip to the USSR in the near future.
Kinnock has succeeded in portraying himself as a politician who
has persuaded his party to take a more moderate stance in domestic
affairs. Recent opinion polls have shown Labor regaining support,
largely at the expense of the Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance.
The Labor leader says he supports NATO and favors stronger
conventional forces, but he also advocates unilateral nuclear
disarmament. In his discussions in Washington, however, Kinnock
probably will play down moral objections to nuclear weapons and
emphasize that the UK can no longer afford a nuclear arsenal.
Although Kinnock will want to reassure US officials that he is not
anti-US, he continues to appeal to growing British suspicions of US
intentions. He has attacked "US-controlled cruise missiles" and
portrayed Prime Minister Thatcher as a US puppet.
In addition, Kinnock has told US officials in London that he does
not believe the British derive much benefit from their close
association with Washington. He apparently believes instead that the
UK should use its position as leader of the Commonwealth to bridge
Party leftists suspect that Kinnock, in order to be elected prime
minister, might compromise on defense issues. Nevertheless,
Kinnock's convictions and pressure from leftwing activists make it
unlikely that he would be able or willing to do much to accommodate
Washington's concerns.
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4fected
Gas Pipelines
Existing
Proposed
se"
11 February 1984
Top Secret
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Top Secret
USSR-EASTERN EUROPE: Oil and Gas Export Plans
The USSR evidently will not make substantial cuts in oil supplies
to East European countries this year as it did in 1982, but it plans
eventual increases in gas exports to offset reductions in oil deliveries.
The US Embassy in Moscow concludes that the Soviets did not
cut oil deliveries to the East European members of CEMA last year
and that no reductions are likely in 1984. Poland, however, reportedly
reached an agreement with the USSR that would gradually increase
Polish annual gas purchases from 6 billion to 11 billion cubic meters.
The agreement calls for construction of a new gas pipeline from the
The Soviets also are trying to increase gas sales to the Balkan
countries, including Turkey and perhaps Greece. A Turkish foreign
trade official, who headed a delegation to Moscow late last month,
said his country would purchase up to 4 billion cubic meters annually,
depending on the price. The gas, for consumption in Istanbul and
Turkish Thrace, would be delivered through a branch from the
existing Bulgarian pipeline.
Soviet trade officials in Bucharest said gas exports to Romania
would increase beginning in 1986. Athens has asked Soviet experts to
study the possibility of constructing a pipeline extension into Greece
from Bulgaria.
Comment: The Soviets have recently stressed the importance of
increasing economic cooperation within CEMA. The Soviet-Polish
agreement, however, and the addition of Turkey and possibly Greece
to the Balkan pipeline already supplying Romania and Bulgaria
indicate that the Soviets for practical reasons are favoring bilateral
arrangements over a new CEMA gas project.
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary could be supplied
from the second Siberian line to Uzhgorod, which also could carry
additional gas for West European customers if demand picks up later
in the decade. The Soviets are likely to reach agreements to increase
gas supplies that could compensate for cutbacks in oil deliveries to
Eastern Europe in a few years.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
USSR-LEBANON: Calls for Gemayel's Resignation
Soviet media for the first time are publishing demands by
Lebanese factional leaders that President Gemayel resign. The head
of the pro-Moscow Lebanese Communist Party claimed on
Wednesday that re Gemayel seems to be the key to resolving
Comment: The change suggests that Moscow believes Gemayel
will not remain in office much longer. The Soviets themselves are
unlikely to call for his resignation, in order to avoid the appearance
of interfering in Lebanese internal affairs. If Damascus were to decide
it can work with Gemayel, Moscow would support this course.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
EUROPE: Conference on Balkan Cooperation
Diplomats from Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and
Yugoslavia will reconvene in Athens on Monday to discuss regional
cooperation, including the possibility of creating a Balkan nuclear-
weapons-free zone. Turkey decided to participate fully in the
conference only after the other four countries agreed in a meeting last
month to relegate the nuclear issue to last place on the agenda. That
meeting was held under the auspices of Greek Prime Minister
Papandreou, who also is responsible for the impending session. The
first meeting was devoted entirely to accommodating Ankara's
Comment: There is a wide divergence of views on disarmament
among the participants, and a consensus on a nuclear-weapons-free
zone is unlikely. A consensus is also unlikely on less controversial
economic and political issues. The representatives, however, may
agree to hold future meetings on cooperation-possibly at a higher
diplomatic level.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
JAPAN-USSR: Talks in Moscow Scheduled
Japanese press reports say that Deputy Foreign Minister
Nakajima will hold working-level discussions in Moscow next month
with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa. Tokyo stated yesterday
that it does not expect Andropov's death to affect planning for the
meeting.
The Soviet party's senior expert on Japan took a conciliatory
line on several contentious issues in interviews with Japanese
reporters last week.
Comment: The talks in Moscow will be the fourth round of annual
consultations and-judging from the previous meetings-will focus
on international as well as bilateral issues. The recent Japanese and
Soviet actions indicate that both sides want to create a better
atmosphere for their relations, and they may work out an
understanding next month to facilitate the long-pending visit by
Foreign Minister Gromyko. No breakthrough is likely, however, on the
key issues of conflicting claims to the Northern Territories and
Japan's security ties with the US.
CHINA-USSR: Annual Trade Agreement
The trade accord announced yesterday in Beijing indicates that
Sino-Soviet trade this year is to increase by 60 percent over 1983-to
some $1.2 billion. The commodities to be traded--including steel,
timber, food products, and textiles-will be similar to those
exchanged in the past. China's treatment of the Soviet trade
delegation was more positive than in the past, with a Chinese vice
premier hinting at Beijing's interest in establishing a "long-term
trade program" with Moscow.
Comment: The new increase follows a doubling of trade last
year. It reflects continuing efforts on both sides to ease tensions
without compromising on basic security and political issues.
Top Secret
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Saudi
Arabia
Libya
Egypt
`Lake
Nasser
Adm istratrve
Bound ryr/
r J
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11 February 1984
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Too Secret
SUDAN: Attack on Construction Camp
The US Embassy reports that dissidents yesterday attacked a
compound of the French contractor that is building a canal to
increase the flow of the Nile River. The unidentified dissidents took six
French nationals hostage, and the remaining employees are being
evacuated. Meanwhile, Chevron officials were planning to talk to
President Nimeiri yesterday about the future of their company's
operations in Sudan following the attack last week on a Chevron base
camp.
Comment: The attack was the third in nine days on Western
companies operating in southern Sudan. The French contractor,
which suspended operations last November following the kidnaping
of nine workers, may decide to abandon the project. More attacks are
likely. The dissidents see both the canal project and Chevron's oil
exploration as developments that primarily will aid the north.
Top Secret
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ECUADOR: Charges of Election Fraud
Top Secret
Conservative presidential candidate Febres Cordero, who
finished a close second in the first round of the election last month, is
charging the government with fraud and is threatening to withdraw
from the runoff in May against a center-left rival.
Conservative candidate recognizes that he has strong military
support, and his threat probably is a tactical move designed to
solidify that support, put the government on the defensive, and
ensure that the runoff is honest. If he pulls out, however, the likelihood
of a military coup would greatly increase.
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
USSR: Andropov's Legacy and the Succession
When Yuriy Andropov died-only 15 months after he became
party general secretary and only six months after he became head of
state-he had accumulated more personal power than any of his
predecessors in a comparable period. Nevertheless, his tenure was so
brief, and his absences from the job so lengthy, that his regime will be
known more for what it set in motion than for what it accomplished.
Andropov has left his ultimate successor the same economic, social
military, and foreign policy problems that he failed to resolve.
Continuity was the main theme of both domestic and foreign
policies during Andropov's rule. His cautious approach in pushing for
major changes, the entrenched political opposition, bureaucratic
resistance to important policy changes, and his deteriorating health
made it impossible for him to have a significant impact on Soviet
politics or policy.
On domestic issues, Andropov tried to overcome the apathy of
Brezhnev's last year by concentrating his attention on the need to
rejuvenate the elite and revitalize the economy. Andropov chose the
discipline and anticorruption campaigns to set the tone for his regime
and to attain at least a short-term gain in productivity. He also
strongly endorsed party secretary Gorbachev's attempt to refocus
Brezhnev's food program on incentives rather than on organizational
measures.
Andropov's approach, however, was to try to make the system
function better rather than change it fundamentally. He insisted that
order and discipline were the prime prerequisites. Andropov's ability
to follow through with tough personnel actions suggests that this
approach was agreed to by a core of Politburo members and that it
might continue.
In the realm of foreign affairs, Andropov made no important
departures from Brezhnev's policies. He paid personal attention to
arms control measures, and, even after the beginning of his lengthy
illness, he assumed a major role in putting forth new Soviet proposals.
Under Andropov, the Soviets launched a propaganda offensive in
response to NATO's INF deployments.
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Top Secret
Despite Andropov's experience in foreign policy, however, the
USSR's international position did not improve during his time in
power. In some cases, such as the USSR's relations with West
European countries, he bequeaths to his successors a more troubling
set of problems than he inherited.
The Succession Process
The decision on a new general secretary will be made public in the
next day or so at a meeting of the Central Committee. The naming of
party secretary Chernenko to chair the funeral commission is a strong
indicator that the Politburo may have chosen him to replace
Andropov as party leader. Nevertheless, the probable opposition to
Chernenko from some of the powerful members of Andropov's team
still raises some questions about the certainty of such a move.
There is less political urgency to fill Andropov's largely ceremonial
Supreme Soviet post. After Brezhnev's death, the position remained
vacant for eight months. Although there is no formal requirement to
give this post to the new party leader, the precedents established by
Brezhnev and Andropov suggest that the Politburo is now inclined to
More important, it seems likely that the post of Defense Council
chairman also will be acquired by the new party leader. Indeed, while
these posts are formally separate, the jobs may be intended to go
together. Both Brezhnev and Andropov evidently acquired this
function when they became general secretary, although formal
announcement was not made for a year in Brezhnev's case and for six
months in Andropov's.
Emphasis on Collectivity
Chernenko's quick designation as chairman of the funeral
commission indicates the leadership's intention to demonstrate unity.
Nevertheless, the presence of strong political rivals from the outset-
something that Andropov did not have to face to the same extent-
may lead to considerable maneuvering in the Politburo no matter who
Under such circumstances, the new general secretary's position
could be more vulnerable. Moreover, rivalry among younger leaders,
such as party secretaries Gorbachev and Romanov, could become
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In addition, the progress Andropov made in consolidating his
team at the plenum in December has the potential of working to the
detriment of the new general secretary. The circle of Andropov's
closest supporters-Gorbachev, Defense Minister Ustinov, and
probably Foreign Minister Gromyko-was augmented by the
promotions of Politburo candidates Solomentsev and Vorotnikov to
full membership and of KGB chief Chebrikov to candidate status. If
this group is able to work together and agree on basic programs, it
could form the basis of a significant opposition to Chernenko.
Prospects for Policy Change
The economy rebounded in 1983, with GNP growth estimated
between 3.5 to 4 percent. Nonetheless, the key factors constraining
economic growth since the late 1970s-declining increments to the
labor force, slowing growth of capital stock, raw materials shortages,
and and transportation rtation bottlenecks-will persist throughout the decade. 25X1
Despite the need to take new approaches to deal with these
problems, their complexity will make it difficult for the leadership to
unite on a new approach. Moreover, any substantial reorientation of
economic priorities would involve painful and politically risky trade-
offs among investment, military spending, and consumption.
The existing consensus on foreign policy is stronger than that on
domestic issues, and major changes are even less likely in this area.
Gromyko played a major foreign policy role under Andropov, and his
influence probably will continue.
The commitment to sustain the global dimensions of Soviet policy
will endure. The new leadership, however, may want to renew an arms
control dialogue with the US. The price the regime is willing to pay
for this will depend on the priorities the new leadership establishes
and the degree of unit it can maintain in pursuing its goal.
F
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