NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 1 AUGUST 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000400020003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Cent--'
Intel
OCPAS/CIG
I
CY# .285
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
1 August 1984
Top Secret
CPAS NID 84-179JX
1 August-T984
Copy 2 8 5
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Tog) Secret
.4 Contents
Nicaragua: Worsening Financial Problems ................................
New Zeland-US: Ban on Ship Visits ..........................................
East Germany-West Germany: Summit in Doubt ....................
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Venezuela: Skyjacking ................................................................ 6
Japan: Tight Budget Set ..............................................................
Guatemala: New Assembly Opens ..............................................
Special Analyses
Pakistan-USSR: Zia's Response to Military Pressure ................ 11
Top Secret
1 August 1984
Uganda: Instability Increasing .................................................... 15
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Top Secret
NICARAGUA: Worsening Financial Problems
Living standards are continuing to deteriorate in Nicaragua, and
the government's growing insolvency suggests that even tighter
austerity is in the offing.
A source of the US Embassy in Managua reports that the junta has
already spent all the foreign exchange earned from the harvest last
l? spring. To finance immediate needs, the government has resorted to
selling-at a discount-crops that will not be harvested until
November.
Foreign bankers are becoming increasingly intolerant of the junta's
repeated late payments and attempts to rewrite debt reschedulin
agreements.
Mismanagement, coupled with military activity and labor shortages in
farm areas, has caused shortages of beans, rice, and other basic
foods to spread from urban areas to the countryside. A government
official told US Embassy officers that large-scale purchases of foreign
grain will be required soon. Shortages of foreign exchange to buy
parts and raw materials have forced some industrial firms to close.
The need to import more grain suggests that foreign exchange
allocations to Nicaragua's industrial sector will have to be cut back
further, which in turn will boost urban unemployment and make even
more consumer goods unavailable. Much of the populace appears to
lay the blame for its declining living standards primarily at the
government's doorstep, despite the regime's claims that economic
problems are the fault of US policy.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
NEW ZEALAND-US: Ban on Ship Visits
Prime Minister David Lange on Monday reiterated the Labor
Party's platform pledge to ban visits by US naval ships, but
Wellington's actual policy on the issue will evolve slowly over the
The ban reflects the party's concerns over nuclear propulsion and its
opposition to the longstanding US policy of not revealing whether
visiting US ships carry nuclear arms. Last week Lange also reiterated
the party's pledge to renegotiate the ANZUS alliance.
Comment: Lange is required by party policy to support Labor's
official platform, despite his personal support for ANZUS and his
reported eagerness to find a compromise policy on nuclear-armed
vessels. He may believe that reiterating the Labor platform will
undercut charges by the Labor Party's left wing that he is a "puppet"
of Washington.
Although elected with a strong parliamentary majority, Lange's
personal support within the party is spotty, and his ability to move it
along more moderate lines is still doubtful. He is viewed suspiciously
by Labor's left wing, including party president Jim Anderton.
Lange and party moderates will have an opportunity to change the
platform at Labor's annual conference in September. In the meantime
he probably is hoping to put ANZUS-and the issue of US ship
visits-on the back burner in order to tackle economic issues and to
consolidate public support for his government.
Lange has said that he will address foreign policy issues after dealing
with the economy-which may defer a policy debate on ANZUS until
early next year. His political position then-and his ability to control
Labor's left wing-will reflect his success at addressing New
Zealand's serious economic problems.
Top Secret
3 1 August 1984
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Top Secret
EAST GERMANY- Summit in Doubt
WEST GERMANY:
Disagreement between Bonn and East Berlin on protocol
questions-and Soviet misgivings-still may prevent the planned
visit to West Germany next month by East German leader
Honecker.
Pravda on Friday accused the Kohl government of using economic
leverage to meddle in East German affairs. The article emphasized
Bonn's failure to act on longstanding East German demands for fuller
recognition as a permanent and legitimate state. It did not mention,
however, the recently announced loan, East German travel
concessions, or the Honecker trip.
East German media replayed the Pravda article on Saturday but on
Monday printed a Hungarian article that lauded East Berlin's dialogue
with the West. The latter article discussed recent visits to East
Germany by Greek, Italian, and Swedish leaders as well as intra-
German relations.
Comment: The Pravda commentary probably has made it harder to
settle differences over the trip by emphasizing that a visit by
Honecker to Bonn would imply recognition of East German
sovereignty. East Berlin probably will cite the article to argue that
Kohl should make this symbolic but important concession.
Pravda's allegation that Bonn uses economic leverage will tend to
reduce East Berlin's flexibility, particularly in view of Bonn's explicit
linkage last week of its loan with travel concessions by East Germany.
The East Germans probably intend the replay of the Hungarian article
to indicate to Bonn that they still want the visit to go ahead but only if
the conditions are right.
Top Secret
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4 1-August 1984
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Top Secret
VENEZUELA: Skyjacking
The two terrorists killed yesterday morning when Venezuelan
commandos recovered a hijacked Venezuelan civil aircraft were
members of the Democratic Movement for the Liberation of the
Haitian People. The organization apparently was formed in Caracas
during 1982 and includes Haitians, Dominicans, Venezuelans, and
Colombians. It first came to public attention in December 1982 when
it attempted to smuggle firearms into Santo Domingo.
Comment: The stated goal of the Movement is the overthrow of the
Jean-Claude Duvalier regime in Haiti. It is a small part of a large
but disorganized Haitian exile community. These groups plot
continuously, but they have yet to mount a successful attack. Neither
the Movement nor any other Haitian exile Group appears to nose a
serious threat to the Haitian Government.
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6- 1 August 1984
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Top Secret
JAPAN: Tight Budget Set
The Japanese Cabinet yesterday approved budget ceilings for
FY 1985 that will allow an overall government spending increase of
less than 1 percent, with most ministries facing a 10-percent cut.
Defense, with a spending cap of 7 percent, and foreign aid-
11.4 percent-are major exceptions in the austere budget designed
to control persistent deficits.
Comment: The ceilings provide guidelines for budget planning, which
concludes in December with Cabinet approval of a final draft.
Although the Defense Agency may not get the full 7-percent increase,
Tokyo probably hopes the ceiling-double what the Finance Ministry
had pushed for-will win points in Washington. The high cap on
defense spending probably will touch off sharp domestic criticism
from the press and opposition parties. The persistent weakness of the
yen vis-a-vis the dollar-which is boosting Japan's exports and its
competitiveness in world markets-has aided Finance Ministry efforts
to hold down spending. Prime Minister Nakasone's political rivals,
however, probably will continue to blame his austere fiscal policy for
slower growth and trade friction with Japan's major trading partners.
GUATEMALA: New Assembly Opens
The Constituent Assembly will be installed today amid indications that
extreme. rightists will be unable to secure their demand for immediate
selection of a provisional president. Recounts have given two
additional seats to the ultrarightist National Liberation Movement,
which will have the largest single block of'votes with 23 seats. Centrist
parties, however, will still have a majority in the 88-member body.
Meanwhile, the US Embassy reports that the three major political
parties have agreed to share the presidency of the Assembly on a
rotating basis.
Comment: The parties are almost uniformly satisfied that the voting
on 1 July was conducted honestly and without interference from the
military. This, coupled with the failure of the right to control the
Assembly, suggests that most deputies initially will concentrate on
writing a new constitution in preparation for national elections next
year, as Chief of State Mejia has directed. Mejia's hand also appears
strengthened by distrust among the parties, as illustrated by their
apparent desire to prevent any one party from using the Assembly
presidency to strengthen its election prospects next year.
Top Secret
8 1 August 1984
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Top Secret
In Brief
intended to benefit insurgents.
- Angolan press reports East German and Angolan merchant ships
severely damaged in Luanda harbor by US-made mines ... UNITA
claiming credit, but South Africa ma be responsible for attack
Middle East - Israeli Prime Minister Shamir and Labor leader Peres meet today
to discuss government of national unity ... each still prefers to
form own coalition ... five key Knesset members, including former
Defense Minister Weizman, yesterday reaffirmed preference for
unity government.
... South Yemen received first SA-6 SAMs last year.
system will further improve Aden's growing air defense capability
(USSR's first delivery of SA-9
surface-to-air missiles to South Yemen ... widely exported mobile
- US Embassy reports Soviet Ambassador to Seychelles hinting
Moscow intends to seek military privileges at least equal to those
of US ... complaining to President Rene that USAF tracking
station receives military information from satellites targeted
against USSR.
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Top' Secret
? Afghan refugee camp
Not all camps are shown.
One symbol may.represent
multiple camps.
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Top Secret
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NOTE: Pakistans Fronfi r a + htly
armed paramilitary fore` dr. wn m e o
population in the Northst P o"fier an
Baluchistan . P, rovinces, has resp ? nsibit
the-priinaryysecurity of the counryjs bond
with Afghanistan. k
1 August 1984
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
PAKISTAN-USSR: Zia's Response to Military Pressure
The USSR's recent strong demarche charging Pakistan with
complicity in the Afghan resistance indicates that Moscow.may
undertake cross-border operations. In this event, Islamabad
could contain airstrlkes or brief shallow Incursions-the most
likely Soviet measures-and there would be little impact on
Pakistani support for the Insurgents. President Zia would
attempt to avoid broader military confrontation while cultivating
international support. If the Soviets persisted, however, he
probably would need both US diplomatic and military
assistance-short of US forces-to help him maintain his
resolve.
Soviet forces now in Afghanistan are capable of conducting limited
operations against Pakistan such as pursuing fleeing insurgents,
attacking suspected arms convoys approaching the border, and
undertaking air or artillery strikes on suspected insurgent camps.
- The Soviets could mount operations up to regimental size
using air assault teams or ground forces supported by fighter-
bombers and helicopters against insurgent bases In Pakistan.
The Soviets are more likely to resort to air operations than ground
attacks because they would cause fewer casualties and International
repercussions. Air operations, however, would be less effective.
Any sustained campaign would require sending additional forces to
Afghanistan or shifting the troops already there.
Pakistani Military Response
Zia would react to Soviet hot pursuit by directing Pakistani forces
to resist attack but not to seek engagement unless the intrusions
became more.than isolated incidents. He believes that the Soviets
cannot be appeased and that their presence in Afghanistan directly
threatens Pakistan's security, but he, nevertheless, wants to avoid a
military confrontation.
Pakistani ground units could inflict losses on small Soviet or Afghan
forces during chance encounters and, given warning, cause greater
casualties with planned ambushes. The Pakistanis lack the mobility,
however, to respond quickly to unexpected rapid raids into remote
areas.
continued
Top Secret
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Top Secret
Political Impact
Repeated Soviet incursions would renew debate among Pakistani
officials about policy toward Afghanistan. Zia could seek to satisfy
critics without surrendering any ground by making token concessions
to the Soviets such as restricting insurgent propaganda activities and
closing their more visible offices in Peshawar. He is already reported
to have ordered the resistance parties to move out of the city by
31 August. If true, this may well be a gesture responding to Soviet
demarches.
Zia would probably attempt to use the incursions to increase
international pressure on Moscow. He would reiterate that Islamabad
provides only safehaven to displaced refugees and that it is
demonstrating its commitment to a diplomatic solution by
participating in the UN's indirect peace talks in Geneva.
If the Soviets persist in cross-border operations, Zia would ask for
American diplomatic and military assistance although he would not
expect the US to send troops. The US response would influence
substantially his ability to withstand pressure within the government
for concessions to the Soviets.
Top Secret
12 1 August 1984
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Top Secret
Tanzania
Lake
Tanganyika
Lake
Rudolf
Milton Obote
Obote has been President, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, and Minister of Finance since
December 1980. He served as Uganda's first
Prime Minister (1962-66) and President
(1966-71) until he was ousted by Idi Amin. He
maintains a nonaligned foreign policy. He is 58
years old.
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1 August 1984
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Uga
Kampala }
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Special Analysis
UGANDA: Instability Increasing
Security in Uganda has deteriorated in recent months, raising the
specter of prolonged instability that could offer North Korea,
Cuba, or the USSR new opportunities to meddle in the country.
President Obote's grip is slipping although he is likely to survive
until the elections in December 1985, if only because his
opponents are weak. He, nevertheless, is likely to have to cope
with growing military lawlessness, government indecision, and
increasing economic desperation.
The government's control over the military has slackened badly since
the death of Chief of Staff Ojok, Obote's close ally. Lack of discipline
has left the Army ineffective against the several guerrilla groups
although they do not now pose a direct threat to the government.
Moreover, the Army's ineptitude and brutality toward civilians are
undermining popular support for Obote's regime.
Obote's rivals are building political bases of support, and relations
between him and some of his ministers are poor.
The improvement in the economy has been Obote's main
accomplishment since taking office in 1981, but deteriorating security
now threatens that progress. Prolonged violence would disrupt
agricultural production, transportation, and marketing. It also could
cause aid donors to cut their assistance, which has averaged
$275 million annually in the past three years.
Obote will ask the UK and the US for more military and economic aid.
If he believes his needs are not being met, he will not hesitate to
expand military ties with North Korea or turn to Cuba and the USSR.
All are likely to give only token aid.
A coup could push Uganda quickly to the left. Almost any successor
would be likely to establish closer ties with the Communist states..
This would cause new concern in Kenya, Sudan, and Zaire about their
borders and might prompt them to ask the US for increased military
Top Secret
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