NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 21 AUGUST 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000400020078-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 78
• Publication Date: August 21, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
21 August 1984
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Contents
Red Sea: Mine-Clearing Update ..................................................
Saudi Arabia: Hajj Disruptions ....................................................
USSR-OPEC: Increased Oil Supply Deals ..................................
Afghanistan-USSR-Pakistan: Border Incidents Increasing
UK: Flap Over Falklands War Incident ........................................ 7
India: Protests Over Minister's Ouster ........................................ 8
South Africa: Voting by Coloreds and Indians .......................... 9
Costa Rica: Cabinet Shuffle ......................................................... 10
Albania-West Germany: Seeking Better Relations .................. 10
Guyana: Cabinet Changes .......................................................... 11
Special Analysis
Mexico: Adjusting Policy on Central America .......................:.... 13
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RED SEA: Mine-Clearing Update
No confirmed mines have been discovered in the Gulf of Suez
after four days of US and British minehunting operations.
Five mine-like objects have been located by US personnel, but all are
in water too deep for divers to investigate. Egypt, meanwhile, has
indicated it would like to have the Suez Canal swept for mines.
Comment: Traffic in the Suez Canal would have to be stopped to
permit the minehunting operations. So far there is no indication of
mines there.
Libyan and Iranian Movements
Comment: Egyptian concern about Libyan and Iranian ships remains
high. Vessels of both countries continue to be thoroughly inspected
and then escorted by the Egyptian Navy through Egyptian waters.
Italian Participation
Italian Government officials reportedly expect no difficulty today in
gaining parliamentary approval for three Italian minehunters and a
support ship to participate in the Gulf of Suez mine-clearing
operations. A senior Italian official has told the US defense attache
that there is some dissatisfaction in Rome over the area the Italians
have been assigned to sweep.
Comment: Italy already has assembled the force necessary to
respond to the Egyptian request, and its ships could depart for the
Gulf of Suez as early as tomorrow. The Italians are dissatisfied
because they believe the areas they have been assigned to sweep are
of secondary importance:
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Manta Mine
The Manta mine operates at depths between
1.5 and 100 meters. It remains effective
underwater for more than one year. Its weight
and shape are such that it rests firmly on the
sea bottom even in running or tidal waters. The
mine is about one foot high and has a diameter
of about three feet.
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The most likely candidate for the Red Sea mines is the Italian
"Manta" anti-invasion mine. This mine has a warhead of about 100 kg
and is capable of operating in water up to 40 meters deep,,
characteristics that appear to match the light-to-moderate damage
ships have received from the mysterious explosions in the Red Sea.
Larger mines designed to sink seagoing ships are ruled out because
no ship has yet been sunk. The typical small-charge antiamphibious
mine is generally not effective in water over 10 meters deep.
A second, though less likely, possibility is that the mines are some
type of device constructed in a third world country, such as Libya,
using an unsophisticated design. A larger number of these less
sophisticated devices would have been required, however, to obtain
the same number of hits, thus increasing the chance that one or more
would have been recovered or at least detected by now.
Comment: Libya and Iran have both expressed strong interest in
acquiring the Manta mine in the past. Sources in the Italian
Government have emphatically denied that these mines have been
sold directly to either Iran or Libya. Iraq, Malaysia, and Indonesia
have purchased them in large quantities, however, and they probably
are readily available on the world market.
The nonmetallic construction of the Manta case makes it very difficult
to detect on the bottom, even with the advanced minehunting sonar
aboard the British, French, and Italian ships. Soviet minesweepers
operating in the southern Red Sea will be hard pressed to locate any
such mine without an advanced minehunting sonar.
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SAUDI ARABIA: Hajj Disruptions
A series of incidents over the past week have reinforced Saudi
suspicions that foreign powers are plotting to disrupt the Hajj-
Islam's annual pilgrimage to Mecca-and Riyadh will react by
even harsher treatment of suspect pilgrims.
Saudi customs officials discovered 2 kilos of a Czechoslovakian
plastique explosive in the false-sided luggage of a "pilgrim" with
Afghan documentation on a nonstop flight from Kabul on Friday,
according to Embassy sources. The Saudis suspect that the incident
reflects a Soviet-backed terrorism plan.
Meanwhile, the US Embassy in Jiddah reports that nearly 20,000
Iranians demonstrated in Medina last Thursday carrying pictures of
Khomeini and shouting religious slogans. Saudi security was tight,
and there was no violence.
Comment: The discovery of plastique explosives indicates the Saudis
face a more sophisticated security threat than in previous years.
Riyadh is better prepared to handle the traditionally staged political
demonstrations, which generally are nonviolent and involve only
placards and slogans.
Additional serious incidents are likely because only about one-fourth
of the pilgrims have arrived. Official ceremonies begin next week and
will continue through the first week of September.
Pro-Qadhafi extremists among the Libyan pilgrims are most likely to
attack Libyan dissidents in Saudi Arabia-as Qadhafi has publicly
urged them to do-and probably also will mount demonstrations to
embarrass Riyadh.
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USSR-OPEC: Increased Oil Supply Deals
Moscow is accepting larger amounts of petroleum from a
growing number of OPEC states under mutually advantageous
arrangements to settle commercial obligations.
The US Embassy in Moscow reports that Algeria is the latest state to
consider barter deals. According to the Embassy, Algiers wants to
follow Libya's pattern and establish an oil arrangement to resolve
payment obligations.
The Embassy estimates that Soviet imports of OPEC oil in the first
quarter of 1984 averaged about 285,000 barrels per day compared
with an estimated annual average of 218,000 barrels per day last year
and 162,000 in 1982.
Comment: The financial constraints faced by some OPEC states due
to a soft oil market makes guaranteed oil deliveries preferable to
Moscow rather than the uncertainties of cash payments despite the
extra inconvenience. These imports have been responsible in part for
the USSR's ability to increase its hard currency earnings from oil
sales since 1981.
Nearly 40 percent of this oil comes from Libya as payment for military
hardware. The Soviets also purchase an estimated combined total of
90,000 barrels per day from Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to help cover
Soviet oil contracts with India. Saudi oil shipments are credited
against Baghdad's military debt to the USSR.
Moscow has been unable to translate its oil supply relationship into
increased Soviet influence.
- Tehran has suppressed the Communist Party and has spurned
Soviet efforts to improve relations because of Moscow's
support for Iraq.
- Qadhafi has maintained his independent foreign policy despite
his large oil trade with Moscow.
- Baghdad's dependence on Soviet arms has not caused the
Syrians to grant political concessions to the USSR.
With no improvement in short-term market conditions likely, the
Soviets will continue to accept oil from OPEC members rather than
insisting on cash payments as a way of ensuring immediate receipts
from arms sales. The amount of OPEC oil being reexported, however,
is not large enough to have a major disruptive impact on world oil
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AFGHANISTAN-USSR-PAKISTAN: Border Incidents Increasing
Shelling and bombing from Afghanistan caused 52 casualties in
Pakistan over the weekend, according to a Pakistani official and press
reports. There have been four such incidents during the past week, all
within several kilometers of each other in an area where insurgents
Comment: The latest incidents probably occurred during operations
against Afghan insurgents and suggest that Soviet and Afghan field
commanders probably have been given greater leeway against them
in the border area. The operations probably are aimed at restricting
the movement of insurgents and disrupting their supplies.
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UK: Flap Over Falklands War Incident
Prime Minister Thatcher probably will be able to refute renewed
charges that the government lied to Parliament in connection with the
sinking of the Argentine cruiser Belgrano. A Defense Ministry report
leaked this weekend to a Labor MP said that the cruiser, sunk by a
British submarine on 2 May 1982 in the first major clash of the war,
was steaming away from the British task force when attacked.
Comment: Thatcher probably will be able to answer critics by
stressing that the decision to attack the Belgrano was taken after
military advisers told her that the Argentine force posed a direct
threat to British ships. She is not likely to face any extensive
questioning about the case until Parliament returns from its summer
recess in October, but the Labor MP-who has made the Belgrano a
cause celebre for over two years-is certain to raise the issue. The
Prime Minister will face major problems only if MPs are convinced
that she deliberately misled them.
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Reaction to Government Moves Against'Opposition
China
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The US Embassy reports that the national outcry over the ouster on
Thursday of the chief minister of Andhra Pradesh State is forcing
Prime Minister Gandhi's government to play down its role. The
dismissal has prompted five days of protests in Andhra Pradesh,
resulting in 23 deaths and sympathy demonstrations in.two
neighboring states. Opposition politicians are charging that the
replacement of the chief minister by a rival more acceptable to
Gandhi's Congress Party was unconstitutional. The opposition fears
that Gandhi plans similar maneuvers in Karnataka State.
Comment: Andhra Pradesh is the third state since May where a
governor appointed by Gandhi has dismissed a popular opposition
leader. The moves-designed to strengthen the ruling party's
position before the national election-are likely to encourage
opposition unity. If the protests force Gandhi to remove the new chief
minister in Andhra Pradesh, she may decide to place the state directly
under New Delhi's control rather than reinstate the former chief
minister.
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CHINA-PAKISTAN-INDIA: Views on Tensions
The Chinese military attache in Islamabad says Beijing believes
current Indo-Pakistani tensions are a result of New Delhi's
overreaction to domestic political problems. According to the attache,
China believes relations will improve following Indian elections to be
held by January. He says that last month China told Pakistani Foreign
Minister Yaqub that India does not want war and that it has urged
Pakistan to exercise restraint and maintain appearances of normalcy
in its military activities to avoid provoking a reaction by India.
Comment: The Chinese are urging Pakistani restraint to avoid further
deterioration of Indo-Pakistani relations. Beijing probably knows
Pakistan would be defeated in the event of an Indian attack.
Moreover, its ability to provide military support to Pakistan is limited,
and President Zia probably is realistic about the help he would
receive.
SOUTH AFRICA: Voting by Coloreds and Indians
Elections tomorrow and next Tuesday for the newly created
parliamentary chambers will test support among 3.5 million Coloreds
and Indians for the new constitution. According to official statistics,
1.3 million Coloreds and Indians have registered, and US diplomats
report that a large voter turnout is expected. Many nonwhite groups,
angered by the exclusion of blacks from the new parliament, are
calling for an election boycott.
Comment: The elections are important for the ruling National Party,
which crafted the reforms that were passed in a referendum by white
voters last November. The Nationalists have provided assistance and
advice to their Colored and Indian allies to assure a large turnout.
Election tensions are partly responsible for recent violence in the
Colored and African communities of several cities. Further violence is
possible between those urging a boycott and police, who have
recently promised quick action against any "anarchists" who try to
disrupt the elections.
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COSTA RICA: Cabinet Shuffle
President Monge's Cabinet shuffle is unlikely to solve the ideological
infighting plaguing his administration. After requesting the
resignations of all Cabinet and subcabinet officials, Monge relieved
only seven of their duties, including leftist Security Minister Solano
and rightist Government Minister Carro. According to the US
Embassy, the new appointments represent all factions of the ruling
party, including a rightist to the Security post and a leftist as Minister
of Government. The Embassy also notes similar tradeoffs in economic
areas.
Comment: The shakeup apparently was prompted, in part, by
intemperate remarks by Solano, whose generally pro-Nicaraguan
sympathies angered Monge. Nevertheless, the President's desire for
ideological balance leaves his administration with the same
contradictions that have caused ministers to work at cross purposes
during the past two years. The chances of more infighting may be
especially high in' the economic area, where some doctrinaire Social
Democrats will be expected to fit into a government that must curb
public sector spending.
ALBANIA-WEST GERMANY: Seeking Better Relations
Christian Social Union Chairman Strauss of West Germany made a
private visit to Albania over the weekend. Strauss is the highest level
Western politician to visit Albania since the end of World War 11. The
Albanian news agency reports Strauss met with Albanian Deputy
Premier Myftiu.
Comment: Albania's willingness to receive Strauss underscores its
interest in improving relations with the Federal Republic specifically,
and the West in general.
The visit also indicates that younger members of the
leadership, who are pressing for more contacts with the West, are
finding sympathetic supporters for such a policy in Tirane. For his
part, Strauss is anxious to build an image as an international
statesman, and his trip to Tirane captures headlines.
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GUYANA: Cabinet Changes
President Burnham has reshuffled cabinet and party assignments in
response to the retirement last week of ailing Prime Minister Reid. He
named party stalwart Desmond Hoyte as the new Prime Minister and
Hamilton Green as First Deputy Prime Minister, the third-ranking
official in the government. Education Minister Chandisingh moved up
to become one of four deputy prime ministers and assumed a senior
position in the party. Burnham transferred responsibility for economic
planning from Finance Minister Carl Greenidge to the Office of the
President.
Comment: The changes are aimed at maintaining uncertainty as to
the current favorite to succeed Burnham. Hoyte is a longtime
Burnham loyalist who, unlike the ambitious and ruthless Green, has
no independent power base. Greenidge may have been demoted for
advocating that Guyana seek IMF help for its bankrupt economy.
Chandisingh's appointment probably was aimed at attracting support
from the Indo-Guyanese community.
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Europe
In Brief
raise issue with Secretary Shultz next month.
- French President Mitterrand may visit Syria ... weighing Middle
East peace initiative to counter Soviet moves if US fails to
reactivate efforts after elections ... Foreign Minister Cheysson to
Lisbon should limit damage.
- Portuguese having misgivings about arrival of deported Romanian
war criminal Archbishop Trifa ... considering official protest for
alleged US failure to inform them of deportation ... August lull in
Americas - Canadian Prime Minister Turner has proposed meeting with
General Secretary Chernenko ... would focus on nuclear
disarmament ... hopes revival of Trudeau's popular peace
initiative will improve Liberals' election chances.
Middle East - Egyptian Ambassador to USSR to depart for Moscow on Thursday
... instructed to promote economic relations ... no word on when
Soviet Ambassador will arrive in Cairo.
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Special Analysis
M XOCO: Adjusting Policy on Central America
Mexico is gradually changing the emphasis of its policy on
Central America because president de la Madrid apparently
believes a more evenhanded policy can ease tensions in the
region and smooth relations with the US. Mexican leftists are
critical, however, and the government will be reluctant to go
much further to moderate its policies.
There have been increasing signs of a policy shift:
- Mexico's oil deliveries to Nicaragua are less than half the
volume of a year ago.
-De la Madrid last month for the first time openly urged
Nicaragua to loosen its ties to the Soviets and East Europeans.
- The President also last month publicly warned the USSR and
Cuba not to intervene in Central America. He had previously
urged only the US to refrain from such action.
- Mexico has reduced its diplomatic support for Salvadoran
rebels since the Duarte government came to power and has
tightened restrictions on rebel front groups and exile groups in
general in Mexico City.
- Mexico has improved traditionally poor relations with
Guatemala by moving Guatemalan refugees away from the
border area and making it generally more difficult for
Guatemalan insurgents to operate along the frontier.
De la Madrid apparently believes the policy adjustments he has made
will increase prospects for peace in Central America and prevent it
from becoming an arena of greater East-West tension. He wants to
avoid US military intervention in the region, which would present
Mexican leftists with an exploitable political issue.
The shift in emphasis also appears motivated by the considerable
importance de la Madrid gives to maintaining good relations with the
US. He probably hopes that efforts to achieve greater balance in
Mexico's foreign policy will encourage the US to do more to help his
country solve its pressing financial difficulties and economic
problems.
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Mexico City in the near term is likely to take some additional steps to
curtail its diplomatic, political, and economic assistance to leftist
governments and movements in Central America. Among other
things, it may further trim shipments of crude oil to Nicaragua, citing
Managua's continued failure to make required payments.
Nonetheless, there are limits to how far de la Madrid can go-or may
want to go-in adjusting policy. Like most Mexican nationalists, he
probably is sympathetic to the revolutionary aspirations of the
Sandinistas and other leftists in Central America.
De la Madrid also believes that cutting off all aid to radical leftists in
Central America would deprive Mexico of what leverage it has with
them and might drive them further into the Soviet and Cuban camps.
Domestic critics of the de la Madrid administration are likely to give
greater scrutiny to the government's Central American policy because
of the current US-Nicaraguan negotiations, elections this fall in
Managua, and a possible rebel offensive later this year in El Salvador.
A more conservative foreign policy would be highly unpopular
domestically.
Prominent leftists already have attacked de la Madrid's policy
adjustments in the media, and he will want to avoid the appearance
that Washington is dictating Mexico City's policies.
Mexico as a result will continue to defend the Sandinistas' interests in
future meetings of the Contadora group and at the UN, particularly on
such controversial issues as the fairness of Nicaragua's impending
election. Mexico also will continue to criticize US military assistance
to Central American governments and US military exercises in the
region.
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