NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000500020047-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: October 15, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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r' Central
it
National Intelligence) Daily
Monday
15 October 1984
OCPAS/CIG
CY'S 477-486
Tel, See et
15 October 1984
Copy
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USSR: Statement on Cruise Missile Programs...... .... ........ - 1
Spain: Strategy on NATO Resolution .......................................... 2
Greece-Libya: Military Training and Sales Agreements .............. 3
Iraq-US: Plans To Restore Ties... ................................................. 4
Bangladesh: Final Offer on Martial Law ...................................... 4
Morocco-Algeria: Guerrillas Conduct Major Attack....... ........ ..... 5
Saudi Arabia-Oman: Naval Exercise .......................................... 5
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! i op Secret
A statement on Saturday from the Soviet Ministry of Defense
accurately summarized the status of the USSR's air-launched
cruise missile program but overstated Soviet development of
The TASS announcement said, "The armed forces of the USSR have
begun to deploy long-range cruise missiles on strategic bombers and
submarines," and reported that they are "holding successful tests of
ground-launched cruise missiles." The statement explained these ,
activities as necessary "countermeasures" to the basing of ground-
launched cruise missiles in Western Europe and to the US
deployment of long-range cruise missiles on bombers, submarines,
Comment: The USSR normally does not announce the operational
status of new weapon systems, suggesting that the statement was
issued to influence the US elections and possibly to strengthen the
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 SPAIN: Strategy on NATO Resolution
Prime Minister Gonzalez is quietly trying to mobilize support
within his Socialist Party for a resolution that would minimize
broader Integration Into Western Europe.
Several prominent Catalonian Socialists recently told the US Consul
General in Barcelona that party leaders have instructed local party
bosses to keep their position on NATO ambiguous. According to a
party executive and parliament member, Gonzalez sees this as
essential to avoid dissension at the congress during 14-16 December
and to give him maneuverina room to ensure a pro-NATO outcome' of
Gonzalez, moreover, is likely to continue hedging his public
statements, and Spanish officials can be expected to hint at possible
tradeoffs concerni NATO membership and the US military
presence in Spain.
with Spain's accession to the European Community.
The same source insisted that the government has no alternative but
to hold the referendum and suggested that following Gonzalez's
strategy would be essential to win endorsement of NATO
membership. In his view, the issue of military integration into NATO
membership remains substantial.
Comment: Gonzalez has worked successfully behind the scenes to
bring top Socialist leaders on board, and he seems confident that his
strategy of ambiguity will eventually lessen opposition to NATO at the
grassroots level. He recognizes, however, that opposition to NATO
A poll published last week indicated that 30 percent of Socialist
supporters would now back Gonzalez's position, while 60 percent
would choose to withdraw from NATO. Only 10 percent would opt to
stay in the Alliance.
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Greece and Libya have apparently concluded two agreements
covering naval training and ammunition sales, which are likely to
boost Lib a's international standing and upset Greece's Western 25X1
allies.
Prime Minister Papandreou 25X1
agreed in Libya last month to sell unspecified types and quantities of
ammunition to the Libyans as part of their bilateral economic
agreement. In addition, Papandreou earlier this month ordered the
Greek Navy to provide operational and technical training to the 25X1
The two countries signed an agreement in principle in April 1984
on the repair facilities and technical training, but the question of
operational training reportedly was left open because some members
of the Greek Navy General Staff questioned the propriety of training
the Libyans in NATO tactics.
Comment: Libyan Navy students have trained in Greece for a number
of years. The training program Athens has agreed to provide is
unknown, but it certainly would address the serious inexperience of
Libyan naval crews, particularly in the use of their newer Western-
supplied equipment. Both Navies have French La Combattante
guided-missile patrol boats, and the Greeks could provide some
The Greeks probably do not consider the repair agreement to be any
different from the one they signed with the Soviets in 1982. Tripoli
long has had difficulty getting shipyards to service its Western-built
ships, and France. Italy, and the UK have refused to take on new
Libyan leader Qadhafi will contend that the agreement shows that he
is an accepted member of the international community and will press
other West Europeans to resist US efforts to isolate him. The other
Western allies are likely to be unhappy with these agreements,
particularly the operational training aspects. Papandreou, however,
probably will defend them as another source of revenue for Greek
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`Top Secret
President Saddam Husayn said in an interview published last week
that Iraq will consider restoring diplomatic relations with the US after
the elections in November. He claimed that Iraq had avoided such
action during the war with Iran because it might be misinterpreted as
a sign of weakness. Now, he said, Iraq has proved it can defend itself
Comment: Baghdad probably wants improved relations as a sign of
US support in the war and to increase Iraq's leverage in its military
and economic dealings with Moscow. Foreign Minister Aziz tried-
unsuccessfully-to hold highly visible meetings with senior US
officials in Washington earlier this month, probably in order to discuss
resuming ties. Saddam may also intend the announcement to prepare
President Ershad has offered to relax martial law gradually, if the
opposition parties agree to participate in the parliamentary elections.
He would end it entirely when the Parliament convenes. The
opposition alliances have reacted to the long-awaited announcement
with disappointment and held a protest demonstration yesterday.
Comment: Ershad probably is not willing to go any further to
accommodate the opposition parties, which had hoped for an early
end to martial law. If they still refuse to end their planned boycott, he
is likely to postpone elections, now scheduled for 8 December.
Although the major groups probably will try to avoid an all-out
confrontation with the regime, scattered violence by dissidents also
could derail the election rocess and provoke a security crackdown.
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Imp 0C61 Cl
North Atlantic Oce'an'-',
Canary Islands
J (Spain)
The berm, under construction since 1980, is about
1,000 kilometers long. Most sections are bulldozed
sand'about 3 meters high. There are more than
Western
Sahara
devices, and reconnaissance flights make it
extremely difficult to breach,the berm.
.Gib Ito
(0. Mediterra nean' Sea
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r e p e l l e d the attack. The 25X1
Moroccans claim to have captured five tanks and several prisoners,
including a guerrilla battalion commander. A Polisario communique
states that the attack is the be inning of its "Greater Maghreb"
offensive. 25X1
Comment: Heightened military activity near the border risks touching
off a clash between Moroccan and Algerian forces. The Polisario
probably hopes that increased military pressure on Morocco will stop
the planned extension of the defensive berm. During and after the last
extension of the berm, Algeria showed its anger by sending fighter ,
aircraft into Moroccan territory, by redeploying some of its forces in
the Tindouf area, and by ambushing a Moroccan patrol that had
crossed the border north of the Sahara. The Polisario is not capable
of sustaining battalion-size attacks for more than a few days without
The US defense attache in Riyadh reports that the Saudi and Omani
Navies will conduct their first combined exercise later this month. The
Saudis are to send three missile boats and a new replenishment ship
from their Red Sea flotilla. Attache sources believe that the
exercise-which coincides with air and ground maneuvers in Saudi
Arabia sponsored by the Gulf Cooperation Council-will be held off
the coast of Oman. The Saudi and Bahraini Navies may hold a similar
Comment: Riyadh's expanding Navy is gradually improving its
operational capabilities. Last month, two Saudi minesweepers sailed
from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea with an escort of missile boats.
Maneuvers with the British-trained Omani Navy, currently the most
effective naval force among the Arab states of the Gulf, will develop
Saudi skills further. The exercise is another step in the growing
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President Nimeiri's sponsorship of a series of conferences on the
future government of southern Sudan shows a new willingness to
seek reconciliation with the south. According to the US Embassy in
Khartoum, Second Vice President Joseph Lagu, a southerner who
dominated the first conference last week, proposed that the three
regional governments remain but that a new high executive council be
established to represent the entire south. Lagu said such an
arrangement would satisfy both proponents of decentralization and
those who want to see the south regain the unified, semiautonomous
Comment: Most southerners believe decentralization violated the
Addis Ababa accords of 1972 that ended the long civil war. The
limited scope of the current talks makes them more likely to succeed
than earlier reconciliation efforts. These had foundered over such
southern demands as restructuring the region's military forces,
redistribution of natural resources, and negotiations with the
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The USSR and Nigeria signed an agreement on Thursday for MIG-21
fighter aircraft and related equipment, according to Nigerian Radio.
Negotiations for the sale had begun in July. The US defense attache in
Nigeria reports Moscow initially offered Lagos the more advanced
MIG-23 instead of the MIG-21. This is the first major Soviet arms deal
Lagos may 25X1
see the MI -21s as a stopgap until it can -afford to buy more
satisfactory Western aircraft, a move that Moscow may have tried to
forestall by offering MIG-23s. Nigeria's decision to purchase less
expensive aircraft reflects its economic difficulties and is in line with
Lagos's traditional olic of buying weapons from both West and
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Sudan as possible terrorist target, according to US Embassy in
Khartoum ... further information and reliability of origi
nal source
- Western military attache observed large number of Soviets leaving
SA-5 complex at Horns, Syria ... suggests process of transferring
media into coordinated propaganda offensive during US
Presidential campaign ... part of broader push for more unified
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- This weekend Philippine President Marcos announced IMF
approval of $615 million balance-of-payments loan ... warned
Filipinos that economic program would require sacrifices ... noted
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 /Jordan
Armistice
Line
Iraq"Saudi Arabia
Neutral Zone Ku t
KUWAIT
Sau4i`arAl..abia
t ! Ii . Eastern Province
;:.(Ash Sh'argiyah)
r.-
~
. "I
I
People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen(
(S. Yemen)
ABEH
Gulf of Aden
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15 October 1984
Or
DOHA '
ABU DHABI
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Special Analysis
The government also is trying to mollify potential sources of
antiregime activity and reduce the likelihood of externally supported
Saudi Arabia's successful handling of the Hall last month
underscores the progress Riyadh has made in Improving Its
Internal security. The takeover of the mosque at Mecca by
radicals just after the pilgrimage In 1979 was the catalyst for
Riyadh's massive effort to expand and improve its internal
security forces. Serious weaknesses remain, however, and an
Incident similar to the seizure of the mosque would still prove
difficult for security forces to handle and could Jeopardize the
The regime faces a number of internal threats other than the annual
pilgrimage problem. These include discontent among Shias in Eastern
Province and Iranian attempts to exploit it, growing Sunni
fundamentalism, and the presence of some 3 million foreign laborers.
The royal family relies heavily on sizable internal security forces to
Answering the Threat
The Saudi Government has spent well over $1 billion since 1979 on
expanding its internal security forces. It has relied heavily on the US
and other Western countries for the most advanced equipment and
training. Riyadh's highest priorities
are improvin
installations.
Spending for development in Al Qatif-inhabited largely by Shias-
has increased dramatically since disturbances there during religious
ceremonies in 1979 and 1980. The Shia rites took place again early
this month without incident.
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The buildup of internal security forces has not corrected some
fundamental problems such as shortages of skilled manpower, poor i
comman and control. and lack of coordination am n the various
services.
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The US Embassy reports the government is concerned that the
security forces themselves one day might pose a threat and has taken
steps to limit their effectiveness. By extensively duplicating
responsibilities, the regime prevents any one service from developing
Saudi security forces can quell localized civil disturbances without
much difficulty. They probably would have trouble, however, dealing
with scattered antiregime violence anized campaign
of subversion and terrorism.
Under such circumstances, Riyadh probably would seek increased
but discreet intelligence cooperation with the US. Even so, the regime
is unlikely to ask for extensive US involvement, in view of its sensitivity
number of Americans in Saudi Arabia. Security around US diplomatic
posts is inadequate. and US business interests are highly visible.
Serious internal security problems probably would prompt the
government to make foreign policy moves that would complicate US
initiatives in the Middle East. Riyadh, for example, would be likely to
look for ways to demonstrate its opposition to US support for Israel
and to establish its Islamic, Nonaligned, and Arab nationalist
credentials. The regime probably would also turn inward, avoid
mediation in regional disputes, and intensify its efforts to conciliate
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