NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000500030059-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: November 19, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
InteIP.
oCPBS/CIG1.
Cyt s '477-_486
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
19 November 1984
4ep-s"ML
CPAS NID
19 November 1984
Copy
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Top Secret
Italy: Government Tensions .......................................................... 3
Bolivia: Siles's Options Narrowing .............................................. 4
Jamaica: Seaga Losing Support .................................................. 5
Notes
France-Libya-Chad: Growing French Concern ......................... 6
USSR: Chernenko Discusses the Economy ............................... 7
USSR-US: Chernenko Interview .................................................. 7
Chile: Mounting Opposition to Government Crackdown ............ 8
Austria: New Export Controls Planned ........................................ 8
Special Analyses
Philippines: Implications of a Leadership Crisis .......................... 10
West Germany: Commitment to Ostpolitik ................................ 12
Poland: Popieluszko Affair Continues.. ................................... .... 14
Top Secret
25X1
19 November 1984
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25X1
The congress opening today will be devoted largely to praising
President Ceausescu, and Its personnel and policy decisions are
unlikely to relieve-wand In fact could aggravate--growing social 25X1
and economic strains.
Some party officials believe a move may be made either to elevate
Ceausescu to a new position such as party president or to elect him 25X1
party leader for life, His controversial
wife would become his deputy. Many other high-level personnel
changes are rumored, including the promotion of Ceausescu's son
Despite reservations among some Romanian officials about current
economic policies, little change in direction is evident in the economic
plan for 1986 through 1990 that the. congress will ratify. It calls for
rapid reduction of foreign debt through increased exports, high
economic growth, and only marginal improvement in consumer 25X1
welfare. The congress. follows Romania's second consecutive below-
Comment: Ceausescu regularly changes top officials to prevent
potential rivals from building a power base. Further promotion of
his personality cult and his relatives however. will only heighten 25X1
resentment against him
Bucharest has been reducing its foreign debt since 1981 by arbitrarily
slashing imports. This in turn has contributed to bottlenecks in the
economy, slower growth, and a drop in consumer welfare. The targets
of the new plan are unrealistic because of poor prospects for growth
and exports, and Romania will face increasing difficulties in covering
its debt service payments. Continuing economic problems will add to
popular discontent.0 25X1
Ceausescu's problems, nonetheless, do not now appear serious
enough to threaten his position because of his control over the
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25X1
The coming vote on whether to lift Foreign Minister Andreotti's
parliamentary immunity may determine whether the Craxi -)sy1
The vote is expected to take place Wednesday or Thursday.
Andreotti, whose policies are unpopular with coalition Atlanticists,
could face criminal charges for allowing a major petroleum scandal
while Minister of Defense in 1974. The governing parties have told
their parliamentary delegations they are free to vote their 25X1
consciences, and last week the press reported that sentiment
against Andreotti was rising.
25X1
Comment:
Christian Democratic leader DeMita and
the heads of most of the other coalition parties are opposed to a 25X1
government crisis. If private soundings early this week suggest that a
vote will go against the Foreign Minister, DeMita and his colleagues
25X1
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Despite the government's announcement last Tuesday of a strongly
pro-labor economic package, the country's largest union has begun
an indefinite general strike. Union-supported price controls have
already caused food shortages. In addition, foreign economic support
has eroded since the government-responding to labor demands-
suspended servicing on its foreign debt and issued decrees that have
reduced profitability of foreign investments
Comment: Silas has depended on the loyalty of the leftist officers to
forestall coup attempts by conservative forces. Without this support,
and with growing dissension within his inner circle, the President may
decide to accept the recommendation that elections
be advanced to mid-1985.
Such a decision would relieve some of the pressure on Siles, but the
economic situation will continue to deteriorate if he fails to implement
austerity measures; Accelerating inflation, estimated to reach 1,200
percent by the end of the year, will decrease production and further
complicate business transactions. If foreign commercial bankers
become convinced that political disruption will be prolonged, they
25X1
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A recent poll Indicates that popular support for-Prime Minister
Seaga is all record low;. which probably will encourage
opposition leader Manle to move gradually toward more 25X1
confrontational tactics.
The US Embassy reports that a survey in September by Jamaica's
respected pollster Carl Stone shows 38 percent of the respondents
would vote for Manley's People's National Party and 26 percent for
Seaga's Jamaica Labor Party, with the remainder uncommitted.
Stone interprets this as providing a 59-to-41-percent lead for
Manley's party. The poll also revealed, however, that nearly half of the
respondents prefer waiting until 1987 or 1988 to hold new elections. 25X1
Seaga's victory last December entitled him to a new five-year term.
The opposition party boycotted that election and claims Seaga's right
Comment: The poll's results-especially the lack of pressure for
calling elections now-will stiffen Seaga's determination to stave off
the opposition's demands for a new vote, and he will continue to hope
for economic recovery to help his political standing. The outlook is
bleak,,however, for Jamaica's vital exports-bauxite/alumina, sugar, 25X1
and bananas.
receptive to an aggressive drive to force elections soon.
Manley's party, plagued by financial and organizational problems, so
far has placed a policy of restraint to regain. middle-class support
above pressing for a new election. Despite mounting demands within
By next spring, however, he probably will shift to more confrontational
tactics to avoid a loss of credibility and to exploit the deterioration in
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i
Elements of a Libyan tank company and a mechanized infantry
company, which have evaded detection since the Libyan withdrawal
was supposed to have been completed, deployed to the Fads area
over the weekend,
(Press reports say that the French
renewed reconnaissance flights over northern Chad yesterday and
that Defense Minister Hernu and Chief of Staff Lacaze have left for
Comment: The meeting last Thursday between French President
Mitterrand and Libyan leader Qadhafi apparently has had little effect
on Libyan resolve to keep a military presence in northern Chad. Hernu
and Lacaze may seek to persuade Mitterrand to take a stronger stand
against Libyan violations of the withdrawal agreement. They have long
been more suspicious of Qadhafi than Foreign Minister Cheysson and
others, who have recommended giving the Libyans the benefit of the
25X1
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Comment: Chernenko offered no new formulas for boosting
economic growth but again called for improvements in productivity,
better management practices, stricter conservation measures, and
more innovation and technological change. The stress on developing
ferrous metals and machine building, together with the decisions
already taken with respect to the food and energy programs, would
stretch scarce investment resources thin. His characterization of
defense needs is not unusual and does not indicate that any recent
leadership decisions have either boosted or slowed defense
capabilities would be strengthened.
General Secretary Chernenko told the Politburo last week that the
economy had grown more slowly than planned during 1981-82 but
had since developed "more dynamically." He said that targets in key
areas for next year had been set higher than the average growth for
the first four years of the current five-year plan. He stated that the fuel
and energy, ferrous metallurgy, and machine-building sectors were
being given priority. He emphasized the importance of a rising
standard of living to help increase labor productivity and said the food
program would be given top priority. He also said Soviet defense
In a written reply to questions from NBC News on Friday, General
Secretary Chernenko said that if Washington's professed desire to
seek solutions on arms limitations does not remain "just words," it
will be possible to begin normalizing relations. He emphasized the
need for "practical" steps such as an agreement to prevent the
militarization of space, a freeze on nuclear weapons, and the i 25X1
resumption of the Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations. While
endorsing a US-Soviet summit in principle, he said that at the present
time such a meeting would not yield the expected results.
Comment: Chernenko's responses echo the moderate tone of his
17 October Washington Post interview and apparently are intended to
press the US further to make concrete proposals on arms control
issues. The timing of the interview appears intended to supplement
private Soviet probes seeking clarification of Washington's proposal
for umbrella talks. Chernenko suggests that Moscow will hold a
summit in abeyance pending US moves on arms control that address
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CHILE: Mounting Opposition to Government Crackdown
Catholic Archbishop Fresno yesterday released a pastoral letter
strongly condemning the state of siege and urging participation in the
church-sponsored national day of prayer on 23 November. He also
told US Embassy officials that he is increasingly disenchanted with
Minister of Interior Jarpa, who has criticized church officials. 25X1
Meanwhile, opposition Christian Democratic leaders visited a slum
recently raided by government troops to encourage su ort for
antiregime demonstrations on 27 and 28 November.
Comment: The pastoral letter will further damage the, church's
relations with the Pinochet regime, as will the growing distance
between the Archbishop and Jarpa-the government's leading
moderate. The government so far has acted primarily against
suspected leftist agitators, but the Christian Democrats risk
provoking Pinochet if they too obviously organize antiregime protests.
Vienna plans to curb reexports by Austrian firms of US-controlled
equipment to the Warsaw Pact. Plans include negotiating an
extension of the current US-Austrian customs agreement and asking 25X1
Parliament to adopt amendments to the Foreign Trade Law to provide
for sanctions. Vienna also is considering adding computers to the list
of equipment that requires government permission for export. F--]:
Comment: This is Vienna's first major effort to stop illegal sales of US
technology to the Warsaw Pact. The key to its success will be the
measures it takes under an expanded customs agreement with the
US. It is questionable, however, to what extent Vienna will enforce
new measures to stem the substantial flow of equipment illegally
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 Middle East - Libyan leader Qadhafi made unexpected visit to Malta Saturday
... almost certainly related to role of Maltese-based Libyans in
aborted plot against former Libyan Prime Minister in Cairo last
week ... Qadhafi probably conducting personal investigation of
- Deputy Foreign Ministers of Iran, Syria, Algeria, and Libya
convene today in Tripoli ... Iranians hoping to secure agreement
to regular meetings at foreign ministers' level, but others,
especially Algerians, likely to resist such a commitment.
Senior Syrian officials, led by Vice President Khaddam, in Tehran
over the weekend for talks with Iranian counterparts ... focus
probably on bilateral frictions over developments in Lebanon, but
discussions may have included mutual problems posed by
improved Jordanian-Egyptian-Iraqi ties.
Sudanese President Nimeiri plans visit 25X1
to southern regional capital of Malakal today ... may announce
economic aid package ... part of r n conciliation effo rt
intended to undermine insurgents. 25X1
- Recently signed 15-year agreement between USSR and Cuba
stresses aid to Cuban sugar industry, energy, and mineral
development ... fails to satisfy Havana's desire to emphasize new
To~ 25X1
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If President Marcos becomes Incapacitated as a result of his
current health crisis, key members of his Inner circle will move
to protect their interests, tempting them to circumvent the
constitutional succession process. Imeida Marcos and others
may seek to align themselves with General Ver, whose loyalists-
despite his leave of absence as Chief of Staff-continue to
control the principal military commands In the capital. A coup
resulting from a succession crisis is unlikely in the near term, but
the military might act if senior officers become convinced that
In the event that Marcos dies or is incapacitated, the constitution
provides for the Speaker of the National Assembly-who is a close
associate of Imelda Marcos-to assume power for as long as 60 days
until a presidential election can be held. The mechanism is untried,
however, and Marcos's unwillingness to designate a successor makes
exuded period of time. In such a case, succession jockeying
probably would develop, as it did when Marcos was isolated in the
Presidential Palace for four months after his illness in 1983.~
Marcos's incapacitation could lead key members of his inner circle-
chiefly Imelda Marcos and Ambassador to the US Romualdez-to
conceal his condition in order to gain maneuvering room for a
succession struggle. Moreover, the close relationship between the
Speaker and Marcos's family increases the likelihood of tampering
with the succession process. If Mrs. Marcos determines that she
cannot win support from the inner circle and the ruling party, she
could try to seize power unconstitutionally-a move certain to spark
violent public protest.
On the other hand, if Marcos died, the succession mechanism would
be more likely to prevail. Rival members of the inner circle would likely
seek to build coalitions from among the ruling party and the
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
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 Members of the inner circle, however, might not be able to depend on
the support of the ruling party to deliver control of the government.
Discipline in the party has steadily eroded since the assassination of
Benigno Aquino last year, and many party leaders began to reassess
their loyalties to Marcos after the party's poor showing in National
Assembly elections last May.
The military traditionally has kept its distance in political affairs and
would be unlikely to oppose a legal successor unless peace and order
were seriously threatened.
25X1
military 25X1
commanders could declare an emergency. Widespread civil unrest
would almost certainly force the military to assume the role of 25X1
principal power broker.
The current unsettled state of the Armed Forces leadership is the 25X1
most unpredictable factor in a potential leadership crisis. I
His potential role in a succession struggle probably would
be influenced by the wishes of both opposition leaders and ruling
party officials; such as Prime Minister Virata. He is much less likely to 25X1
be influenced by Mrs. Marcos.
The prospect of military intervention'in defense of the constitution 25X1
probably would come from senior officers-possibly with the
blessings of Ramos. Less likely, but still possible, is that some
unknown group of junior officers might feel compelled to act,
especially if they believed that Mrs. Marcos intended to effect a
dynastic succession.
Top Secret 25X1
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19 November 198
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The visits by West German Foreign Minister Genscher to Warsaw
beginning Wednesday and to Prague next month are primarily an
attempt to keep momentum behind Bonn's dialogue with the
East. Since Chancellor Kohl's government came to power in
October 1982, It has sought to prove that.a conservative
government can work with the nations of the Warsaw Pact. It has
intensified these efforts following INF deployments. Bonn views
Genscher's trips as especially Important because of the
postponement of trips to West Germany by the East German and
Bulgarian leaders.
25X1
25X1
The Kohl government's Ostpolitik bears a strong resemblance to that
of Social Democratic governments in the past. This is evident
especially in its rationale that trade ties and dialogue help reduce
East-West tension while drawing Eastern Europe away from the
Soviets. By coming after the US election, the visits give the Kohl
government an opportunity to restate its own-and presumably the
common Western-interest in arms control.
Genscher's hosts have complained about occasional remarks by
West German officials questioning the postwar borders in Eastern
Europe and supporting ethnic German minorities in East European
countries. Bonn maintains that the borders are temporary until a
peace treaty officially ends World War II. On a more practical level,
however, West German officials-Genscher in particular-repeatedly
state that their country has no intention of forcing border revisions.
West German promotion of increased emigration by ethnic Germans
also has generated virulent reactions by Czechoslovakia and Poland,
especially when West German politicians promote the concept at
meetings of German expellees. Prague briefly recalled its
Ambassador after former Federal President Carstens addressed a
rally of Sudeten Germans in June. Warsaw threatened to cancel
Genscher's invitation after Kohl addressed a meeting of German
25X1
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Even so, preparations for the visits, particularly the one to Warsaw,
have been dominated b economic topics.
the Poles hoped that Moscow would be more
approving o e trip i i yielded concrete economic results.
Consequently, the Poles have pressed Bonn for progress on debt
talks by the Paris Club of creditors and on the Polish application for
membership in the IMF.
25X1
application and some compromises at the Paris Club talks, West
Germany and Poland have agreed thus far only to reestablish bilateral
economic commission meetings and to extend an agreement on
economic cooperation. The project to aid Polish farmers, sponsored
Although economic cooperation and trade are also likely topics in
Prague, bilateral trade is of less interest to Bonn. Czechoslovakia
accounts for less than 1 percent of West Germany's total trade.
West Germany has a much greater interest in environmental
cooperation. Although both countries agreed to establish a
commission on ecological cooperation, Bonn continues to express
concern over cross-border pollution by Czechoslovak industry.
The continued presence of East German refugees in Bonn's
diplomatic posts in Warsaw and Prague is unlikely to occupy much of
Genscher's discussions. In each case, the host government has
remained in the background, letting Bonn and East Berlin negotiate a
solution.
On the other hand, Genscher probably will attempt to assuage Polish
and Czechchoslovak concerns regarding intra-German relations.
Both countries have faithfully followed Moscow's lead in attacking
alleged German "revanchism" as the goal of Bonn's intra-German
policy.
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One month after the murder of Father Popieluszko, Polish
authorities are divided on whether to place responsibility solely
on a few members of the secret police or on a larger number of
conspirators Intent on weakening Premier Jaruzelski. If
Jaruzelski was the target-and many Poles seem to think he
was-his leadership role does not appear to have been shaken
by the Incident. But he is more vulnerable, and his efforts to
reach an accommodation with Polish society have been placed 25X1
on hold.
Even Foreign Minister Olszowski-generally thought to be part of the
pro-Soviet faction of the party-believes that the Popieluszko affair
was a device to challenge Jaruzelski. In a recent conversation with his
Finnish counterpart, Olszowski claimed the secret police knew that
Popieluszko would soon cease to be a problem because he was 25X1
slated for an assignment in the Vatican.)
Jaruzelski now is more vulnerable and open to recrimination from all
sides, but he still appears very much in charge. At the Central
Committee session on 26-27 October, he gained unanimous support
for a resolution condemning "terror tactics" by government
authorities and calling for a rapid, comprehensive investigation of the
murder. Subsequently, he assumed direct oversight of the party
organization within the security apparatus, undercutting hardliner
25X1
The visit of West German Foreign Minister Genscher this week will
help Jaruzelski show that his policy of improving ties with the West
25X1
The willingness to investigate the sacrosanct secret police appears to
have enhanced Jaruzelski's image as a moderate among some church
and Solidarity leaders. His continued pursuit of the investigation,
however, poses some delicate choices. Efforts to purge opponents
will evoke resistance from domestic hardliners and probably the
Soviets, while stopping short would erode whatever public credibility
he has gained.0 25X1
Jaruzelski's recent visits to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East
Germany gave him an opportunity to present his case, to give
assurances about the Polish party's leading role, and perhaps to seek
continued
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25X1
Many church leaders believe that the murder was aimed at Jaruzelski
and his policy of establishing a dialogue with the church. The affair,
however, may sharpen differences between Cardinal Glemp, who
seems even more committed to working with Jaruzelski, and younger
priests, who seem inclined to become more involved in antiregime 25X1
Glemp, whose handling of the affair also has been criticized by some
in the episcopate, may press for a goodwill gesture by the
government to bolster his moderate approach. Top-level episcopate
25X1
The Popieluszko affair has invigorated opposition activity but has not
resolved differences among Solidarity activists over strategy and
tactics. Lech Walesa apparently hopes that the murder of the priest
has created an atmosphere that improves the chances that the
government will reopen a dialogue with Solidarity. Radical elements in
the Solidarity leadership disagree and are advocating more active 25X1
antiregime measures.
Meanwhile, Walesa has given only grudging support to the self-
proclaimed human rights monitoring groups that have sprung up in
three cities, arguing that their focus is too narrow for Poland's needs.
25X1
Jaruzelski will be walking a political tightrope for the next several
months. He wants to retain the image of a moderate to encourage
better ties with the West and put church-state relations on a better
footing. He will feel compelled, however, to restrict the activities of the
new human rights groups and other opposition activists who seek to
embarrass the government. 25X1
The more vigorous the response of the opposition, the more
Jaruzelski will feel the need to emphasize control, which in turn will
undercut his effort to purge the security apparatus. His rivals would
argue that they had been correct all along in demanding tough
measures against the opposition and would press Jaruzelski on other
25X1
Top Secret
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