NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP87T00970R000600010007-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
20
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 15, 2010
Sequence Number:
7
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 29, 1984
Content Type:
REPORT
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Body:
Director of
Central
Intelligence
~TB-secrei-
National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
29 November 1984
OCI' AS/CIG
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CPAS NID 84278JX
ovem er
ropy 4 8 6
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Top Secret
Contents
Belgium: Growing Risks for INF .................................................. 1
India: Opposition Trying To Unite ................................................ 2
USSR-Philippines: Cosponsoring Peace Conference ................ 3
OPEC: More Price Problems ........................................................ 3
South Africa-US: Reaction to Protests ......................................
Saudi Arabia-France-UK: Shopping for Weapons .................... 6
Turkey-Western Europe: More Strains ...................................... 6
France-USSR: Requirements for Gas .......................................... 7
Mexico: Imports of Military Equipment ........................................ 7
Tunisia: More Belt Tightening Ahead .......................................... 8
Special Analyses
EI Salvador: Dialogue Tactics ...................................................... 11
Western Europe-Middle East: New Peace Initiative .................. 13
Grenada: Election Prospects ........................................................ 15
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29 November 1984
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Top Secret
BELGIUM: Growing Risks for INF
Prime Minister Martens will attempt to limit the impact of his
party's call for postponement of cruise missile deployment, but
the prospects for INF in Belgium have dimmed.
Opponents of INF are calling the Flemish Social Christian statement
a victory, while the Liberals-junior partners in the center-right
coalition-have accused the Social Christians of going back on a
NATO commitment.
The US Embassy in Brussels reports that the Cabinet will meet
tomorrow to try to formulate a statement on INF acceptable to the
four coalition parties. The Belgian representative to NATO,
meanwhile, warns that strong pressure from the Allies will be required
to overcome Social Christian nervousness about deployment.
Comment: Although Martens supports INF, his principal goal at this
time is to avoid a Cabinet crisis that would force an early election. He
probably can pacify the Liberals but only by promising to decide early
next year whether to proceed with initial deployment.
Martens probably will point to the forthcoming meeting between
Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, and to
Martens' own Washington visit in January, as the time to review arms-
control prospects. He also may emphasize that technical preparations
at the Florennes base site remain on schedule.
In addition, Martens probably will have to convince his party that he
can hold off an election until late next year, in the hopes that INF will
not be a major election issue by that time.
Prospects for INF would be badly damaged if an election were held
before deployment begins and the Social Christians and Liberals were
to lose their current parliamentary majority. The Flemish Socialists
remain adamantly opposed to INF, and the Walloon Socialists would
find it difficult to endorse INF deployment. At the least, INF would
again become subject to bargaining between Belaian parties. and
deployment could be put off indefinitely.
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29 November 1984
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Top Secret
INDIA: Opposition Trying To Unite
Efforts by India's opposition parties to unite against Prime
Minister Gandhi's Congress Party in the national election next
month are foundering on longstanding diNerences and as a result
of the short deadline.
The press reports that so far key non-Communist opposition parties
have tentatively agreed to pool their votes in only 200 of the
514 constituencies being contested on 24 and 27 December.
can i ates to re ister and tomorr will be the deadline for their
withdrawal.
Comment: Rajiv's decision to hold the election before the 20 January
deadline has caught the opposition off balance, and Indira Gandhi's
death has deprived it of its only unifying objective-her defeat in the
election. The formation of a new political party that includes parties
from both existing non-Communist opposition alliances has disrupted
existing ne otiations an relations among opposition
leaders.
Opposition leaders are likely to engage in intense bargaining through
tomorrow as the tr to reduc er of competing opposition
candidates.
Top Secret
Yesterday was the last day for
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USSR-PHILIPPINES: Cosponsoring Peace Conference
the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council is
cosponsoring a peace conference with the Philippines Peace and
Solidarity Council at the University of the Philippines early next
month. Representatives from peace groups throughout the region, as
well as from Soviet-front organizations, are expected to attend. The
conference, whose major theme will be to warn against the danger of
nuclear war, in Asia, will be the first of its kind organized in the
Philippines.
Comment: The Soviets are hoping to capitalize on the political and
economic turmoil that has prevailed in the Philippines since the
assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino last year. The
conference will give them an opportunity to broaden their limited
contacts with students, journalists, leftist intellectuals, and labor
officials throughout the region. Moscow may also believe that the
convention will provide momentum to the antinuclear movement in
the Pacific, which enjoys wide support in New Zealand and Australia.
Oil output in November evidently will top OPEC's ceiling of 16 million
barrels per day by as much as 1 million barrels per day, despite the
decision by the cartel last month to reduce production quotas to
restore stability to the market. Nigeria, Iraq, Indonesia, and the UAE
have been the principal violators, and most other members are paying
only lipservice to newly assigned quotas. As a result, spot prices for
most crudes have fallen 25 to 75 cents per barrel in the past week.
Comment: Unseasonably warm weather, overproduction, and price
discounting continue to undermine OPEC's official price structure.
Persistent price weakness already has forced several major US oil
companies to reduce posted prices, and North Sea oil producers may
be forced to cut official prices unless spot prices strengthen
appreciably soon. Any further price cuts by non-OPEC producers will
probably spur additional reductions by Nigeria or other OPEC
members.
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Pretoria has responded angrily to protests by black Americans
outside the South African Embassy in Washington as it proceeds with
further actions against internal opponents. The South African
Ambassador to the US sharply criticized Washington for allowing
protesters to enter the Embassy last week and compared that
incident to the takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979.
Comment: The South African Government may hope to use the
growing activity by antiapartheid groups in the US as a pretext for
urging Washington to align itself with Pretoria's program of gradual
racial reform. South Africa's crackdown against internal black
activists, which has prompted the recent demonstrations in the US, is
likely to continue and may even become, more severe. leading to
added international censure of Pretoria.
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SAUDI ARABIA-FRANCE-UK: Shopping for Weapons
a French sales team
arrive in audi Arabia on Tuesday at the request of King Fahd to
discuss the sale of 40 Mirage 2000s. Last week, both British Defense
Secretary Heseltine and the Royal Air Force Chief met with the Saudi
Defense Minister in Riyadh. The US Embassy says Heseltine also met
with King Fahd. The talks included discussions of a possible Saudi
purchase of Tornado aircraft and Challenger tanks.
Comment: The Saudis are courting the French and the British before
Secretary Weinberger's visit to Riyadh next week in order to
emphasize that Riyadh has acceptable alternatives if its request to the
US for 40 more F-15s falls through. In view of this bargaining position,
Riyadh probably will rebuff any efforts to link the F-15 sale with other
forms of security cooperation or with Saudi flexibility on regional
political issues. Although the Saudis prefer US weapons-especially
combat aircraft-Riyadh has grown less tolerant of the complex US
Congressional review process.
A decision by the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers to defer
until spring a Turkish bid for the chairmanship is causing new tension
in Ankara's relations with the West Europeans. This action, which is
linked to European concerns about Turkey's democratic credentials,
parallels the refusal of the European Parliament last week to name a
delegation to a joint commission. The Turkish Foreign Minister has
withdrawn from the Committee of Ministers, and Prime Minister Ozal
has warned that Turkey may withdraw from the Council of Europe.
Various press reports indicate that the Turks may consider other
actions, such as reversing their decision to purchase the European-
produced airbus.
Comment: Ankara suspects ulterior motives on the part of some
West European governments-particularly Greece-in rejecting its
bid. Council consideration next week of a human rights complaint that
was filed against Turkey by five nations last year could further
complicate relations. Nevertheless, Turkey will hesitate before taking
any precipitate actions, lest it jeopardize potential EC aid funds and
the political progress it achieved earlier this year when the
agreed to seat a Turkish delegation after afour-year hiatus.
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FRANCE-USSR: Requirements for Gas
Limited French demand for Soviet natural gas may reduce France's
interest in the further development of Soviet resources, at least for
the next two or three years. Officials of Gaz de France have told the
US Embassy that the French Government will not allow gas supplies
from any single foreign country to account for more than 5 percent of
total French energy demand. They claim that Soviet deliveries under
present contracts will meet French requirements for the remainder of
the 1980s and that the ruling effectively bars any new Soviet gas
contracts. The Embassy also reports that French officials are
disappointed with their failure to renegotiate the price of Soviet gas
under current contracts.
Comment: France's inability to negotiate a better deal and its
unwillingness to expand Soviet imports limit any direct benefits from
cooperating with the Soviets on a new pipeline. If Moscow were to
insist on linking the purchase of French equipment and technology to
signing new gas contracts, there would be little incentive for France
to support construction of a second pipeline. Nonetheless, France
almost certainly would not support any embargo in view of its past
opposition to embargoes and its other commercial interests with the
USSR.
MEXICO: Imports of Military Equipment
Defense officials appear to be succeeding in resuming substantial
imports of equipment in 1985, despite the country's serious economic
problems. Mexican officers recently told the US defense attache that
plans are proceedin for a new order of US F-5 'ets to cost more than
$150 million.
Up to now, fiscal restraints have
limite or ers to sma er, more practical items, such as ammunition,
spare parts, and mobile communication gear.
Comment: Deliveries of expensive equipment, largely unsuited to
current internal security needs, would be the strongest indication to
date of the armed forces' unusually favorable standing under the
de la Madrid administration. The military has already been granted
supplemental appropriations for force expansion and pay raises that
far outstrip civilian wage gains. The purchase of showy equipment
would worsen budget overruns that are already complicating IMF
consultations and would reduce funds available for social
expenditures before next year's elections.
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TUNISIA: More Belt Tightening Ahead
The US Embassy in Tunis says that government officials are putting
final touches on an austerity budget for next year. Spending is to drop
about 5 percent in real terms from this year. Price increases will be
phased in for all subsidized goods, including food and petroleum, and
wage levels will remain frozen for the third year. These adjustments
will boost inflation from the current annual rate of 10 percent to about
14 percent in 1985 and will require an additional, $320 million in
foreign borrowing to cover the projected deficit.
Comment: Price increases on cereal products and cooking oil-those
considered most likely to cause domestic unrest-will be delayed
until July. Nevertheless, riots may be provoked by the combination of
inflation and no wage increases, as the purchasing power of the poor
and unemployed continues to erode. Prime Minister Mzali's handling
of the wage and price issues will have a substantial impact on his
ros ects for succeedin the ailing President Bourguiba.
IRAN-IRAQ: Economies Facing Mounting Problems
The special analysis in the Daily on 28 November should have stated
the war-related price discounts and a weak market probably will
cause oil earnings to be only about $16 billion in 1984, compared with
$19 billion in 1983.
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In Briet
Toc Secret
Libya to open People's Bureau in Suriname
soon ... mo erates in Surinamese Government are opposed .. .
Army Commander Bouterse may decide Libyan offers of economic
aid justify the risks.
- Military crackdown controlled second day of protests in Chile .. .
scattered bombings, some violence by slumdwellers, and clashes
with university students resulting in - ss
participation reduced from Tuesday.
- Communist-controlled labor confederation in Peru leading
nationwide strike today ...refusal by democratic labor groups to
participate probably will limit effectiveness ...government has
declared 30-dav state of emergency to minimize possible violence.
continued
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Eastern Europe
Western Europe
Africa
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Moscow's concern about relations with new government.
followed Premier Tikhonov's visit by only a month ...reflects
- Soviet media highlighting unscheduled visit by Politburo member
Dolgikh to India last week ...meeting with Prime Minister Gandhi
UK Labor Party leader Kinnock says Chernenko indicates USSR
has dropped insistence INF missiles be withdrawn from Europe .. .
TASS account of meeting does not repeat this assertion .. .
implies continued US deploym n will m h by further
Soviet "counterdeployments."
- Hungary reportedly outraged by Czechoslovakia's decision not to
sell it automobiles next year ...Hungary has no auto industry .. .
Prague selling all it can in the West ... Praoue's desire for hard
currency outweighs CEMA cooperation.
- Norway's Parliament probably will approve $44 million defense
budget supplement tomorrow ...would enable Oslo to exceed
NATO goal of 3-percent real growth in defense soendina for 1984
...key readiness programs still being cut.
...might set off widespread military unrest.
Buhari to resign soon,
General Babangida, a moderate, apparently hoping to replace him
- Dissension within Nigeria's militar council ma lead Head of State
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Special Analysis
EL SALVADOR: Dialogue Tactics
The second round of talks tomorrow is unlikely to produce any
breakthrough on substantive issues, as neither the government
nor the insurgents appear to have clearly defined strategies.
Both sides, therefore, are likely to focus largely on procedural
matters governing subsequent talks while also probing for some
propaganda or other advantage. At the same time, the
government-and to a lesser extent the guerrillas-may be
increasingly wary of the attitudes of their respective hardline
supporters, who view the talks with growing skepticism.
The government will be represented by three of President Duarte's
top political advisers and by Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel
Lopez Nuila, who has supported Duarte's policies more than many in
the officer corps. The insurgents have stated that, in Duarte's
absence, they will send only second-echelon representatives.
The absence of moderate rightist civilian and other opposition groups
from the government delegation is likely to reinforce perceptions at
home and abroad that the initiative remains largely Duarte's. His
efforts to suggest broad unity were also recently undercut by the
public withdrawal of support from conservative private-sector
leaders.
For their part, insurgent leaders probably will want to avoid the
tactical disagreements and recriminations that reportedly surfaced in
their hierarchy following last month's talks at La Palma.
Evolving Strategies
Both sides continue to view the military situation as a way to
demonstrate their strength and buttress their bargaining positions.
The government is, therefore, maintaining aggressive o erations
throughout much of the country against the insurgents.
The insurgents' political tactics are likely to focus on issues they
believe will bring propa anda ains and ossibl also sow dissension
in government ranks. hese may
include an offer of a cease- ire, a eman or amnes y or all guerrilla
combatants and sympathizers, and freedom for all political prisoners.
Top Secret
continued
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Too Secret
Concerned that a negative reaction to such proposals would offset
the political gains Duarte made by initiating the talks, government
representatives probably will counter with stipulations they know the
insurgents will reject.
these would include a an on a guerrilla operations against
economic targets and recognition of the government's rioht to
maintain order throughout the country.
Pitfalls for Both Sides
Both sides will strive to appear sufficiently conciliatory to meet
increasing domestic and international pressures for a peaceful
settlement, but neither can afford to make commitments at this point
that might alienate its military colleagues. Insurgent negotiators are
aware that rebel military leaders will reject any agreement short of
power sharing. Nevertheless, these same leaders probably would
support a temporary cease-fire because it would give them time to
regroup and resupply and possibly would halt the Army's momentum.
Senior Salvadoran officers continue to be anxious over how to
achieve a cessation of hostilities that guerrillas.
Although Duarte had
won an a n or an insurgen cease- ire proposal from his
senior commanders last week,
many military leaders remain suspicious of any such government or
The President probably continues to believe that the potential
political and psychological gains of a cease-fire outweigh the tactical
risks that concern his military officers. Nevertheless, recent press
reports suggest Duarte, despite the acquiescence he has won from
the military, may not insist on an early cease-fire. He probably
appreciates the intensity of the military's reservations and fears
rovokin a confr ith his key commanders at this point.
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Special Analysis
WESTERN EUROPE- New Peace Initiative
MIDDLE EAST:
The EC Summit in Dublin on 3 and 4 December is likely to
approve a modest initiative to reinvigorate the Arab-Israeli
peace process and to protect West European interests in the
Arab world. EC members, nonetheless, continue to believe that
the US is better able to promote a settlement and that the EC
should limit itself to complementary action. The Summit will
therefore reiterate established EC policies on a Middle East
settlement and authorize a factfinding mission to the region early
next ear but will not ro ose any independent EC mediation
role.
Several EC members, including the UK, Italy, and West Germany,
have proposed that the Community take a more active role in the
Arab-Israeli peace process. They want to highlight their concern
about the Palestinian problem in order to safeguard important
economic interests in the Arab world. They also worry that a
continuing stalemate might prompt moderate Arab countries to resort
to military confrontation or to turn to the USSR and encourage the
Palestinians to return to widespread terrorism.
Almost all EC members, including the French, particularly want the
US to resume active efforts to carry out the US plan and wish to avoid
actions that might jeopardize US chances for success. EC members
believe that the US is uniquely capable of promoting progress toward
a settlement because Washington enjoys close ties with both Israel
and the moderate Arab countries.
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EC Foreign Ministers already have agreed that the Summit will issue a
brief statement urging renewed progress toward an Arab-Israeli
settlement and reiterating the principles of the Venice Declaration of
1980. The Declaration calls for Palestinian "self-determination" and
the association of the PLO in the peace process.
The new initiative is to call on the EC to mount a diplomatic mission to
the Middle East early next year in order to ascertain current views on
a settlement. The mission would refrain from active mediation
actions would be coordinated with the US.
EC leaders are likely to approve the initiative and to reject a possible
proposal by Greek Prime Minister Papandreou that the Community
devise a more ambitious peace initiative. Because the Summit
statement will not be announced as a "declaration" of policy, EC
members hope to avoid raising Arab expectations that they regard
the initiative as an alternative to the US plan.
Nonetheless, they almost certainly hope that the statement and the
ensuing factfinding mission will demonstrate EC sympathy for the
Palestinian cause and remind the US of the Community's desire for
renewed peace efforts.
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Special Analysis
GRENADA: Election Prospects
The New National Party-the three-party centrist coalition led by
Herbert Blaize-probably will win at least 12 of the 15 les~islative
seats at stake in the election on Monday.
Former Prime Minister Gairy's rightwing Grenada United Labor Party
is unlikely to win more than three seats. The leftist Maurice Bishop
Patriotic Movement has fielded 13 candidates, and five members of a
small centrist party and four independents also are running, but
public o inion olls indicate th ese candidates will not win any
seats.
The polls show that Grenadian voters are primarily concerned that the
election produce a strong government capable of maintaining political
stability and solving the country's severe economic problems. The
New National Party has emphasized the themes of peace, stability,
and prosperity more effectively than has its principal rival. The
centrist coalition apparently has been able to overcome
organizational and financial problems, and its campaign has
generated strong enthusiasm among voters, according to the
Embassy.
The new government will face several challenges after assuming
office. Differences among the moderates over power sharin are likel
to resurface after the election, undercutting coalition unity.
The new government also will have to move quickly to revitalize the
economy, a process that will require substantial foreign investment.
Grenada, however, will have difficulty competing with larger, more
economically developed Caribbean nations in attracting foreign
If the centrist coalition wins but is unable to achieve visible success in
resolving Grenada's problems, Gairy's party or the Maurice Bishop
Patriotic Movement is likely to benefit. Each would exploit popular
dissatisfaction and encourage opposition to the new government.
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