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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 atE~"~FN~~ Directorate of ~~ ~I Intelligence ~, ~~ _~>: Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Organization and Capabilities GI 85-10149 June 1985 COPY 1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 ~,~~.~E~ucepe I)IreCtOrate Of ~eCCet ~~ ' ~ Intelligence Iw n ~I Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Organization and Capabilities (u) This paper was prepared b~ Office of Global Issues. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations and reviewed by the US Embassy in Manila Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Instability and Insurgency Center, OGI Secret GI 85-10149 June 1985 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Organization and Capabilities Key Judgments The Communist insurgency in the Philippines now presents a formidable I~tf'ormation available challenge to the Marcos government and US strategic and political as of 30 May 1985 interests in Asia. Moreover, the insurgency is capable of growing more was used in this report. rapidly in the next two years than at anytime in the past. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New People's Army (NPA), have seized the initiative in the countryside and are preparing to bring their revolution to Manila. The insurgents have not, however, been seriously contested militarily or politically by the govern- ment. This absence of sustained counterinsurgent pressure has allowed the Communists a free hand in many areas of the country and has left their po- tential vulnerabilities unexploited. Party leaders are pursuing a dual military and political strategy aimed at achieving a stalemate on the battlefield while forming a broad political alliance with the anti-Marcos opposition. The party is in a strong position to gain politically from the malaise now prevalent throughout Philippine society and the government's unwillingness to undertake political and economic reforms. Party leaders hope to seize power by joining with the moderate opposition in amost-Marcos coalition government they intend to dominate. To this end, they plan to participate in the 1986 nationwide elections and support candidates whom they can co-opt. The Communists have assembled an extensive and sophisticated clandes- tine political/military organization over the last 16 years that is waging protracted guerrilla war along 56 to 60 fronts nationwide, effectively controlling villages inhabited by at least 5 million people, and contesting control of villages inhabited by another 5.5 million: ? The CPP-nearly 30,000 to 45,000 strong-is a tightly knit organization with a coherent ideology, centralized and cohesive leadership, an effec- tive propaganda apparatus, and the discipline and patience required for a protracted struggle. The National Democratic Front (NDF), through its organizing and propaganda activities, has been in the forefront of the Communists' legal effort to form a broad alliance of Filipinos opposed to the Marcos government. The government estimates that there are almost a million members in party-controlled and NDF-initiated village associations and that the Communists have infiltrated more than 500 legitimate organizations. iii Secret GI 85-10149 June 1985 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 ? The NPA-with 15,000 to 16,500 regulars and 15,000 to 20,000 irregulars-has become a credible military force that is rapidly gaining experience and confidence and is capable of fielding guerrilla battalions in many parts of the country. NPA attacks against the government are characterized by effective command and control, secure communications, good intelligence, sound guerrilla tactics, and effective adaptation 'to the Philippine environment. The Communists are sensitive to the misgivings of many Filipinos about uniting with Marxist revolutionaries. Consequently, their propagandaa clever mixture of Marxism, Catholic liberation theology, and traditional Philippine values-is careful to emphasize the nationalist aspects of their struggle. They frequently cite Nicaragua as an example of a revolution in which Marxist-Leninists combined with a moderate opposition to success- fully overthrow a dictator. Popular support for the Marcos government is at an alltime low, and party propagandists are exploiting this to their advantage. Despite its formidable organization and successful performance, the CPP/NPA has weaknesses. A charismatic leader capable of galvanizing popular support for the revolution has yet to appear, its anti-American rhetoric rings hollow with many Filipinos, and the party's emphasis on nationalism over Communism has drawn to its banner many individuals lacking in ideological commitment. However, the most serious CPP/NPA liability is the absence of a reliable logistic pipeline to provide arms, ammunition, and other war materiel to the guerrillas. Although a small number of weapons are now being smuggled into the Philippines by the NPA, we believe the guerrillas lack the equipment to sustain an offensive of even a week's duration and the combined-arms capability required to attack well-defended military targets. The Communists have so far eschewed foreign support, and the isolated character of the Philippines severely complicates establishing a reliable logistic network or foreign sanctuary. he CPP has established contacts with the Soviets probably to obtain their assistance. Although extensive cooperation between the Communists and the Muslim Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) could help ease this problem, we believe there is little prospect for more than token cooperation between them. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 IJC:t ^ V 6 Key Judgments Scope Note Introduction -- - - -- The Overall Strategy of the Insurgency Communist Short-Term Intentions The Insurgent Organization and Capabilities ----- - _ - - -The Party Regular Units-Armed City Partisans Irregular Units-People's Guerrillas Irregular Units-People's Militia Key Insurgent Strengths Key Insurgent Vulnerabilities The Performance Record -- NPA Military Performance The Rural Control Situation Projecting Near-Term Capabilities Threat to US Military Facilities Threat to US Personnel A. Operation of a Guerrilla Front Chronology of Key Events Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 oca,~ c~ Scope Note This assessment is intended to serve as a model for analyzing the organization and capabilities of a politically organized insurgency. In this case, we examine awell-developed insurgent organization, the Communist Party of the Philippines; its military arm, the New People's Army; and united front activities that attempt to mask the radical nature of the movement and broaden its appeal. The paper does not systematically compare the performance of the insurgents against the Philippine military, nor does it examine the Muslim insurgency of the Moro National Liberation Front. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Figure 1 CPP/NPA Communist Administrative Areas, 1985 First-order administrative boundary Second-order administrative boundary 0 50 100 150 Kilometers 1~ I~ 0 50 100 150 Statute Miles l r~ Northern L ~ ~~ uzon , )NLLRPC `-~ Commission 1 ~ 1. Zambales PPC 2. Tarlac PPC 3. Nueva Ecija PPC d. Pampanga 5. Bulacan PPC Malaysia "~ -._.~~ ~f~ ~. .u Indonesia z,,~ / c~ ~~` jf L:,~or, Srrait ?PC (POD" Hong Kong (U.K.) \Yietnam- Thailand _ - South j ~1 Cambodia ~ ChiRg ~ - - - Brurie~s fut~ a ~ a v ~spa ~h ~,~,Inpa~o~e \,I d o n e-? i G~ ;Central Luzon zf Commission _a ia~' -~oeePC Southern Luzon /' ~ ,;;~-c~~r`-"~\ , _ Commission Phi 1' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~, ~~'. ~~a~, ~ ~ ~ _ ~ , r.a. ;~ . tPc Visayas ~' ~i j8ae4f` ~ ~ s-" ' ~ ` ~ ' sJ~u r ~ Commission _ ~ j~ 1;~ n; d S II Cebu PC, fPC ~~- ~ j~ T~ Caga n ds Oro, ~WMRPC Mindanao `~ ~v~fC_`` ~~SEMRPC( ,' ` LMnndanao '' oeY??;~ Zemhganp~` ~r-_COmmlSSfon, SMRPC ` . 25X1 i Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Organizati?n and Capabilities since its founding in 1968, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military element, the New People's Army (IPA), have consistently demon- strated slow but steady growth. During the past two years, they have taken advantage of increasing popu- lar discontent with the Marcos government to swell their ranks. The NPA now aggressively attacks the government's Armed Forces, increasing both the number and sophistication of tactical operations, while the party maneuvers to seize political power in a post-Marcos government. This paper reviews the par- ty's political and military strategy and examines currant insurgent organization, capabilities, and per- formance. Yenan; they believed to do so was only to invite government offensives that the CPP~NPA could not hope to repel. Instead, guerrilla fronts were initiated throughout the Philippines-especially on the larger islands that would provide easy escape and conceal- ment (appendix A).~ In 1981 party leaders decided that with the lifting of martial law the time was ripe to reactivate the urban underground that had been decimated by government security forces. Urban guerrilla units, dormant since 1972, were reactivated in Mindanao to assassinate government supporters and demonstrate the perva- siveness of the CPP/NPA. Urban united front activi- ties, whose purpose is to broaden the base of support for the revolution, have since mushroomed in an attempt to win over the Philippine middle class, largely alienated from the government following the The CPP~NPA has most closely followed the political and guerrilla strategy of protracted revolutionary warfare developed by Mao Zedong and articulated by party founder Jose Maria Sison in documents still used in teaching all party members. As in Mao's revolution, the Communist insurgency in the Philip- pines emphasizes the importance of building a base of support in the countryside among the peasant popula- tion. It also has an urban component, however, that is increasing in size and importance. All NPA military activity is controlled by the Communist Party's politi- cal leadership, which has generally stressed organiza- tion and recruitment over direct military action. The Communists' military strategy is complemented by a political program in which party members and front groups work to undermine the Marcos government and legitimize their own organization. Party documents and actions reveal that the Commu- nist leaders have also demonstrated an ability to adapt Maoist strategy to the geography and politics of the Philippines. Following setbacks in 1972 in the Caga- yan Valley, the leadership decided not to establish permanently liberated zones in imitation of Mao in Aquino assassination. The party's Central Committee recently claimed at a meeting for cadres to be testing a "new and higher form of struggle" by fomenting "people's strikes" in major urban centers to cripple industries, transport, education, commerce, and the government bureaucra- cy. Such strikes, in theory, are intended to contribute to the development of a revolutionary situation in the cities to prepare them for popular uprisings that would occur before the seizure of power during a final Communist offensive. These uprisings would be coor- dinated with the intensification of guerrilla warfare in the countryside. The success of people's strikes in Mindanao last fall-several cities were paralyzed for several days at atime-probably presages more wide- spread use of this tactic in the future. Another of the Communists' strategies is to achieve political power by presenting themselves as national- ists and joining with the moderate opposition in a post-Marcos coalition government. This is now evi- dent from Embassy reporting and the public state- ments of party-controlled front organizations that Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 JCLICI now actively promote this concept. To broaden its popular appeal, the party frequently cites Nicaragua as an example of a revolution in which both Marxist- Leninists and a moderate opposition successfully united to overthrow a dictator. The Sandinista regime is portrayed as a state where the Christian plea for social justice has been realized. In our judgment, this analogy particularly appeals to many Filipino Catho- lics who oppose the Marcos regime but have misgiv- ings about uniting with Communist revolutionaries. The newly formed organization, Bayan (the Nation), is the Communists' latest attempt to portray party willingness to join forces with moderates in a coalition. The party's consolidation plan is another aspect of CPP strategy, which though not well publicized is taught to all cadres. According to Sison's writings, once the Communists come to power they plan a subsequent "socialist revolution" to consolidate Com- munism in Philippine society. Although united front tactics and coalition government proposals are expedi- ent now in forging a broad alliance, once the People's Democratic Republic of the Philippines has been established the party alone will be responsible for transforming the society into a "proletarian dictator- ship." Presumably, at this time the "blood debt to the people" owed by the landlord class will be avenged, Party strategists maintain that theirs is an "unfin- ished revolution." The Communists insist that the Philippine people were never really liberated-not in February 1945 or July 1946 nor, for that matter, in 1898. They were simply transferred from Spanish, to American, to Japanese, and then, following the grant- ing of nominal independence, to neocolonial domina- tion. The United States is now identified as the principal enemy of the Philippine people, and Presi- dent Marcos is depicted as a puppet carrying out the mandates of Washington. We believe the anti-Ameri- can rhetoric may ring hollow with many Filipinos, but the appeal to nationalism and independence from foreign dictates does not. ~~ We believe the Communists recognize that they lack the capability to defeat the government militarily and would settle for a stalemate on the battlefield. A guerrilla commander recently told a Manila journalist that the NPA expects a standoff with the military in three years. Ahigh-ranking CPP cadre echoed this theme when he announced at a recent party meeting that the CPP expects to reach a strategic stalemate with government forces in several regions in 1986. It is in the political sphere that we believe the Communists now see their most advantageous pros- pects. Our analysis of Embassy reporting leads us to believe that, to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Marcos regime, the CPP is skillfully maneuvering for a role in any government that might be formed should the President die in office and is actively promoting the concept of a coalition government in which it would legally participate. In a switch from its previous position advocating a boycott of elections, the CPP/NPA also intends to actively participate in the areas where the party is strong the new People's Democratic Coalition will field candidates. Where the party is weak but allies are present, the CPP/NPA will campaign for the ally and harass competitors. In other areas, the party will attempt to disrupt the elections through military actions. The Insurgent Organization and Capabilities To implement their strategy, the Philippine Commu- nists have assembled an effective, clandestine politi- cal-military organization that wages protracted guer- rilla war along 56 to 60 fronts nationwide, effectively controls villages inhabited by at least 5 million people, and contests control of villages inhabited by another 5.5 million. For the purpose of this paper, we use the term Communist-controlled village to mean areas where: ? A Communist "shadow government" has been established. ? Communist peasant, women, and youth associations are functioning. ? Most of the population is sympathetic and gives material support to the insurgents. ? At least 50 percent of the population can be mobi- lized for protest actions. ? NPA militia units may be present Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Figure 2. This poster publicizing the new CPP-dominated united front. "Sayan"(The NationJ, is now plastered on walls throughout Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Secret Figure 3. Communist propaganda attempts to equate party mem- bers arrested or killed with opposition leaders such as Ninoy Aquino, murdered at Manila airport in 1983. At this protest in Manila, radical students carried a billboard picturing leading cadres-including Central Committee members Johnny Escandor The CPP-about 30,000 to 45,000 strong-is a tight- ly knit organization led by professionals who are well trained and highly disciplined. The National Demo- cratic Front (NDF), the party's main united front organ, is in the forefront of the Communists' legal effort to form a broad alliance of Filipinos opposed to the Marcos government. the party has already infiltrated almost 500 organizations. The New People's Army-with 15,000 to 16,500 regulars and 15,000 to 20,000 irregulars- has become a credible military force capable of fielding guerrilla battalions in many parts of the The Communists' organizational model-with its par- allel party, united front, and military echelons-is very similar to other Communist insurgent organiza- tions we have seen during the last 50 years. Neither the party organization itself, the distinctive organiza- tional practices it follows, the subsidiary organizations it has set up, nor the conceptual framework it has pursued in evolving its forces and in contending with the government is unique. Rather, the Communist organization in the Philippines is a synthesis of orga- nizational principles and operational procedures evolved in China, Vietnam, and elsewhere. The Party As with all Communist parties, the CPP/NPA is under the firm control of a small number of highly dedicated leaders, or cadres, who make all important 25X1 decisions regarding ideology, strategy, and manage- ment of the party. These cadres form the Central Committee, the Executive Committee, and the Polit- buro 0 We base this judgment on the 25X1 analysis of more than a decade of party decisionmak- 25X1 ing and leadership behavior as documented in Embas- sy reporting. This committee structure is duplicated from the national level down to the village, called a barangay or barrio, and is illustrated in figure 4. Central Committee directives are interpreted and implemented by barrio committees, the NPA at each level is under the command of both the local party Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Estimating Party Membership Membership in the CPP is restricted to a select group of dedicated individuals who have been tested and trained for six months to two years before being admitted to the party. Under the direction of the Central Committee, party members carry out the party's program in the villages, the NPA, the urban underground, and the various united front organiza- tions. Last fall, a senior party cadre announcedC that there were nearly 60,000 party members nationwide. We believe this estimate is high, the actual number of CPP full members being closer to 30,000 to 45,000. Dur estimate is based on the number of party mem- bers we believe serve on village committees, in the New People's Army, and in the urban underground. Barrio Party Committees are functioning in at least S,S00 villages. The party mandates at leastfive but no more thgn 10 members for these village committees. As- suming an average of,~ZVe party members in each yields 27,700 members scattered in CPP/NPA-con- trolled villages nationwide. Zf'20 percent of NPA regulars are party members-those equivalent to officers and noncommissioned of,~cers-there are at least 3,300 members now leading the guerrillas. the party now has 5,800 members working in the urban mass movement sector nationwide includ- ing those working in labor organizing in Metro Manila. These figures may be overstated. Neverthe- less, they probably constitute the majority of party members in the urban underground and legal united front organizations. committee and higher level NPA commands, and united front activities are directed by a similar inter- locking command structure. Such a system of com- mand and control provides local flexibility in imple- menting orders from above The CPP is organized along both territorial and functional lines and, since 1984, by rural and urban responsibilities as well. Six Regional Commissions, each headed by a Central Committee member, were created in the 1980s to cope with the geographic spread of the party and to ensure that all subordinate committees operate in accordance with the party line set by the Central Committee. Five functional com- missions oversee party activities in the areas of propa- ganda, military affairs, united front activities, and "mass movement" organizations. In 1984 the Central Committee split responsibility for rural and urban activities between two leaders, Rodolfo Salas and Rafael Baylosis, giv- ing Salas command of the NPA and rural operations and Baylosis supervisory responsibility for party activ- ities in Metro Manila and other urban centers throughout the Philippines under the newly created National Urban Center Commission (NUCC). Since its founding, the CPP has stressed organization- al efforts and recruitment in rural areas rather than military activities. We know that the Communists use well-estab- is el -h d tactics. After preparing a thorough investiga- tion of social conditions in a village or barrio, cadres establish a Barrio Liaison Group, made up of three to seven members who may be of any social class. This group is then tasked to recruit new members, solicit food supplies for the guerrillas, do intelligence work, prepare in-depth social investigations, and conduct limited propaganda. New recruits form the Organizing Groups, whose membership is strictly limited to lower-middle peas- ants, poor peasants, and farmworkers. Basic party doctrine and principles are studied, and potential leaders are assessed for party membership. The most promising recruits-but not more than 10-eventual- ly form a Barrio Revolutionary Committee. This committee-the highest political unit in the village- constitutes the "shadow government" that directs and controls party activities in the barrio. The party has strict criteria for membership. A person becomes a candidate member upon the recommenda- tion of at least two party members with three years of continuous good standing in the party. The party member who makes the recommendation must pre- pare an appraisal of the ideological, political, and personal history of the candidate. Advancement to 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1': 25X1'. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 ~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Figa~re ~ S~ruaeta.tre glad Channe9~ ~ff Cor~rnanal faa aQkierd s .~~ ~r"~odaak PoPikicaq d 1ti9iPary L!nitct6 Front ,Youths/Students Religious ? gntclligence ?Traini!'ig a;iNadical ? finance/ LogiSkiCS aGrdnance w Cammo Main Rzgianti) Guerrilla Unit ? Regional Partisan Gait iSparraw lJnit) ISermrdary Regional Guerrill~~t Unit) ~Sub~Regional Guerrilla Unit) ~ ?ArmedCityi'artisan Unit (Sparrow CniQ f~ropa&R~cl ch U'oinrnit~ ?District Laval Guerrilla Unit ? Annad Propaganda Team ? Section Locai Guerrilla Unit * Awned Propaganda Teams elhgent~Carwin ,t, uetttioti Comm! w Trade Unions Youth arrd !v9idtllc Farce L,alxrc > 6ougeoisie RaPormists Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011!03!03:CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Figure 5 CPP/NPA Organizational Stucture Central Committee RodolfoSalas RodclfoSalas Ignacio Capegsan Rafael Baylosis Jose Lamangan Juanita Rivera Loretta Rosales Benito Tiamzon International Liaison National Commission Commission (Europe) For Mass Movement Luis Jalandoni Gerry ACUna Rodolto Salas Benito Tiamzon Juanito Rivera Benjamin De Vera Rafael Baylosis Ignacio Capegsan General Secretariat Rafael Baylosis Central Committeeout (Chios) Ericson Baculinao Security Defence Corps (Counterintelligence) National Military Northern Luzon Central Luzon Southern Luzon Visayas Mindanao National Urban Commission Commission Commission Commission Commission Commission Center Commission Rodolfo Salas Ignacio Capegsan Francisco Pascual Roberto Tacbad Manuel Calizo Romulo Kintanar Rafael Baylosis National Commission National United For Propaganda Front Commission Antonio Zumel Domingo Anonuevo Politico-miGmry Training Department National Democratic Front National Alliance Regional Alliance Special Sectors Abet Bahena Sonny Pagador Markel Sarmiento Zambales PPC L Bohol PB Oscar Estrada EDIIaC10 Ramirez NW PAMP DC Pablo Santos L_ E PAMP DC Felixberlo Macalino Legend: Central PH Central Publishing House NEL RPC Northeast Luzon Regional Party Committee NWL RPC Northwest Luzon Regional Party Committee PPC Provincial Party Committee NW PAMP DC Northwest Pampanga District Committee E PAMP DC Eastern Pampanga District Committee STRPC Southern Tagalog Regional Party Committee BRPC Bicol Regional Party Committee QBBPC Quezon Bicol Border Provincial Committee IPC Island Party Committee PC Provincial Committee PB Party Branch WMRPC Western Mindanao Regional Party Committee SMRPC Southern Mindanao Regional Party Committee NCMRPC North Central Mindanao Regional Party Committee NEMRPC Northeast Mindanao Regional Party Committee SEMRPC Southeast Mindanao Regional Party Committee 9 I I 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011!03!03:CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 secret full membership varies, depending on the candidate's class background: six months for those from peasant/ labor and urban sectors; one year for those from the middle class; and two years for everyone else. Those who make it through the selection process undergo rigorous training, as revealed by captured training materials. We believe nearly all party members are highly motivated and dedicated to the revolution; few cadres have defected. Parallel to the party structure for full members, but separate and distinct from it, is the party youth organization, the Kabataang Makabayan (KM).` In a developing nation like the Philippines, where a major- ity of the population is under 18, captured documents reveal that party leaders believe it is essential to allow for the participation of youth in the revolution even though they may not yet be mature enough for full party membership. The KM serves as a training school for future party members and allows the party access to the enthusiasm and dedication of young radicals. Some as young as 13 are admitted to the KM after a careful assessment acrd become eligible for party membership at age 18 The United Front In our view, united front organizing has heretofore been the weak link in this Communist insurgency. The party's efforts to form a broad alliance of Filipi- nos opposed to the Marcos government have suffered setbacks repeatedly. In addition to an ideological bias favoring rural organization and a reluctance of many Filipinos to join a Communist movement, the long period of martial law (1972-81) made all overt opposi- tion activities very difficult. Since 1979, government security forces have captured or killed many key cadres connected with these efforts: Sixto Carlos, Horacio Morales, Isagani Serrano, Edgar Jopson, and Mila Aguilar Roque.~~ ' The KM is distinct from the League of Filipino Students, the CPP's legal mass organization for youth, which appeals, with little Marketing Nationalism, Not Commuuism The unofficial national anthem of the CPP/NPA is Sayan Ko (My CountryJ, which conveys a strong sense of nationalism and antieolonialism with a subtle blend of anti-Americanism while omitting any mention of Communist ideology. The song originated during the Philippine-American war, but the party has changed the words and popularized this version. Today it can be heard at most moderate and radical opposition gatherings, always sung in Pilipino: Sayan Ko (My Country) In my golden land of Philippines filled the morning breeze. Loving fingers built a paradise,. A resting place for humankind. One day foreign ships and strangers came, Seeking out our wealth and beauty. Left our people bound in chains, Our hearts in misery. Birds go winging freely through the sky. Try to cage them and they surely cry. Take away a people's liberty, Sons and daughters live to set them free. Soon one day our trials will be done. Night will fade and golden morning come. Now, my life and love I give to set my country free. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Figure 6 CPP/NPA Flagsa C: Flag of [he hoped-for People's Democratic Republic of the Philippines. The same flag is used by the Maoist Sendero Luminoso insurgents in Peru. 'CPP=Communist Party of the Philippines. NI'A=New People3 Army. party leaders realize this weakness and are now concentrating their attention on united front activities to ensure a role for the party in any successor government. The CPP/NPA has begun to scatter party cells, infiltrating the leadership of some organi- zations, forming new ones seemingly independent of the party when necessary, and establishing alliances throughout Philippine society in support of the party's revolutionar ob~ectives. n t e stu ent sector, t ere are 25 i enti e CPP front groups and 114 infiltrated organizations: in the labor field, there are 10 front organizations and 251 infiltrated. Embassy reporting from awell-informed source, indi- cates that the party now has about 5,800 members working in urban united front activities nationwide, with 2,800 active in Manila. The same source asserted that there are now 38,600 urban activists in the National Democratic Front-a claim that the Embas- sy believes may be exaggerated. The party's control over the activities of the NDF is accomplished by clandestine cells of three to five persons who work together to broaden the base of support for the CPP/NPA revolution. Cadres use as a guide the 12-point program contained in the NDF manifesto of 1 January 1973. In urban areas, the cadres are to forge links with labor federations and unions, teachers associations, student organizations, and professional and civic organizations. In rural areas, the cell is to conduct social investigations among peasants and farmworkers and eventually help 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Secret Figure 7 Philippines: Mass Protest Activities by Sector, 1982-84 Percent 1982 Multi-sectoral 16.1 Students /youth 32.3- 55% CPP-initiated 1'ota1=467 protests 38% CPP-initiated Total=719 protests Professional- 40-60% CPP-initiated Total=1,451 protests recruit NPA guerrillas. A captured internal party guide to building NDF cells also directs them to: ? Disseminate propaganda among friends, relatives, and sympathizers by distributing underground pub- lications, writing chain letters, and holding discussions. ? Give direct support to the NPA and the under- ground by providing material support and services. ? Form additional cells from among trusted asso- ciates, friends, and relatives. ? Actively participate in legal institutions with the aim of making them support the CPP~NPA directly or indirectly. ? Foster close relations with sympathetic groups and individuals. In villages controlled by the party, united front activi- ties take the form of mass organizations run by village cadres with members drawn from the village popula- tion-farmers, women, youth. Membership in these associations is voluntary, but the Village Party Com- mittee makes every effort to involve every family; fear undoubtedly contributes to association ranks. How- ever constituted, this is the "mass base" that grows food for the NPA and, at times, can be mobilized to support protests. this base now exceeds 1 million persons. We believe their numbers are seriously underestimated because, most of the estimated 5 million persons in CPP NPA- controlled areas actively support the guerrillas the CPP/NPA directly initiated 40 to 60 percent of all major protests in 1984, and, when party-controlled front organizations are included, the party was proba- bly responsible for the majority of all major protests throughout the Philippines. As illustrated in figures 7 and 8, the party has steadily increased the number of Communist-initiated marches, strikes, and boycotts. However, the party's efforts have failed to keep pace with the general rise in activities protesting against the Marcos government. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 ~c~.i ca The New People's Army The NPA is a military organization characterized by effective leadership and operational security, sound command and control, and strict discipline. The NPA is made up of both full-time regulars and part-time irregulars. We estimate that there are now probably about 15,000 to 16,500 regulars organized in infantry battalions and urban guerrilla units. Local guerrilla units and village militia make up the irregulars, which between 15,000 and Regular Units-Regular Mobile Forces. The Regular Mobile Forces are the best trained, equipped, and organized guerrillas. These uniformed forces are re- sponsible for most of the newsworthy raids and am- bushes. NPA regulars operate at three levels-dis- trict, guerrilla front, and regional-under the full-time direction of the respective party committees. District Local 15 combatants (9 Guerrilla Unit militia + 6 NPA (DLGU) regulars) Section Local 15 combatants (9 Main Re Tonal Guerrilla Units MRGUs and Sec- Guerrilla Unit militia + 6 NPA g ( ) (SLGU) regulars) ondary Regional Guerrilla Units (SRGUs) are each Irregular Village Militia squad- to platoon- equivalent to a regular company of the Armed Forces part-time size units; 15 to 20 of the Philippines and normally confine operations to combatants the 56 to 60 guerrilla fronts now active throughout the country. According to Embassy reporting, the MRGU is a mobile force that can link up anytime with an SRGU, forming a combined force to conduct guerrilla operations in the latter's area. Within the past two years, the NPA has frequently combined such forces to successfully attack poorly defended government targets. MRGUs in Mindanao can now field 200 to 300 men (and in Northeast Mindanao, an additional squad armed with four M60 machineguns), but units of this size are still in their formative stages in most regions. Operations involving 100 to 200 guerrillas are the norm throughout the rest of the country. Regular Units Armed City Partisans. The NPA uses classic urban guerrilla tactics to bring the war to four-to-seven-member guerrilla teams specialize in the cities. Table 2 Organization of the New People's Army Regular Region Main Regional 5 per Regional Com- Guerrilla Unit mittee; undersize to (MRGU) regular size company (100 to 300) Regular Front Secondary 21 per Front; regular Regional size platoon to un- Guerrilla Unit dersize company (SRGU) (50 to 150) Regular Urban Armed City 10 to 15 teams in Partisan Unit various cities, with 4 (ACPU) to 7 persons in each killing police, other government employees, and in- formers whom the party identifies in its propaganda as responsible for abuses of the. people. Commonly called sparrow units, these assassins attack like spar- rows, diving in pairs for food one after the other, so that if one misses, the second does not. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Figure 12 The Communist Urban Underground: Example of the Butuan City White Area Committee Political Military ~~~32^cT rtt~s ~_~ ~iHi~tt-_= -_' Armed City Partisans Operational Organizing Cell Cell ~outt~ttt~ ~Jg~[~ - - _ - = 1R~tmis ? Education ? Peasants Committee ~ ?Semiproletariat ? Jeepney drivers ?Out-of-school youth ? Paramilitary ? Patriotic ? Professionals Peasants' ? Private Association employees ? Government employees ?Out-of-school youth ? Semiproletariat ? Sectoral mass movement ? Destination force Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 ~ecrer The party is now making a concerted effort to establish a covert urban infrastructure in cities throughout the Philippines, including illanila.a during 1984 urban- Urban guerrillas were active in Manila setting time bombs and killing opponents before the declaration of martial law in 1972. They resumed these acts of terrorism in 1981 in small cities and in Mindanao but were hardly noticed. the recent effectiveness of urban guerrillas in based CPP Central Comn~tittee members focused their efforts on building a clandestine network in the cities to garner ,support for the party among various .rectors of society, to provide logistic support to NPA activities in the countryside, and to initiate urban Cadres assigned to work in urban "White Areas" controlled by the government are tasked to form covert political and military cells. I~olitical cadres working in urban areas do not, however, normally interact with the NPA urban guerrillas, except on political and financial matters. The NPA maintains its own safe- houses and acquires its ownfirearms and other support services. White Area Committees modeled on the success of Davao-where whole areas of the city are now governed by the CPP/NPA and where hun- dreds were assassinated in 1984-are now known to fie functioning in n~tost cities throughout Mindanao and in Manila, The recent capture of an important guerrilla organiz- er in Manila, however, demonstrated what could prove to be a key organizational weakness, the failure to maintain strict compartmentation. To carry out their mission in cities where the government's intelli- gence and security assets are strongest, urban guerril- las must operate in small independent cells. U a guerrilla unit is compromised, this compartmentation impedes government efforts to neutralize the entire organization. For example, we believe the creation of the National Urban Center Commission (NUCCJ in 1984 presages an attempt to bring the revolution to Mnnila as the Marcos era draws to a close. Davao-where in 1984 nearly 700 people were assas- sinated-has convinced most party leaders that the time is ripe to intensify urban guerrilla operations and to initiate them in Manila, Cebu, and other cities. the NPA has been organizing for combat in Manila since 1980 and activities in the capital To date, however, these urban guerrillas have been largely inactive, In addition, now has about 300 to 600 people involved in these 25X1 operating in cities throughout Mindanao, and cap- tured documents reveal that in Manila the NPA has organized an extensive logistic network involving several hundred people to support urban guerrilla operations. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Irregular Units-People's Guerrillas. In municipal- ities and barangays where the party is contesting control or is already firmly entrenched, local guerrilla squads of 10 to 20 irregulars are formed by the NPA, both to support regular insurgent military forces and to operate independently. these local guerrilla squads operate in or close to their home villages, sometimes in conjunction with much larger guerrilla units. They are usually poorly armed and may play only a supporting, rather than a combat, role in large NPA operations. By day, a guerrilla in such a unit works at his normal job; at night, or in emergencies, he is available for assign- ment by his party superiors. the formation of a militia unit is the final stage of party organization at the village level. These units of about 20 persons operate directly under the village committee rather than the NPA. The militia members are villagers, male and female, who are covertly recruited and given the critical responsibility for defense of villagers in CPP- controlled areas against government reprisals and protection of resident or visiting cadres. A secret unit within each village militia is responsible for enforce- ment of party discipline, including assassinations. Although they have few firearms and receive only limited military training, members of the village militia are the eyes and ears of the insurgent move- ment within the village, providing tactical intelligence on all aspects of the local scene, according to Embassy reports. Training for the militia emphasizes political indoctrination. The village militia also supports NPA operations by playing a part in the flexible insurgent logistic system. The militia members provide a labor force for the transport and storage of food and equipment, serve as guides for guerrillas traveling through the area, and are a source of recruits for regular NPA units. Arms and Ammunition. Embassy reporting indicates that nearly all firearms used by the NPA have been purchased, stolen, or captured from the Philippine Armed Forces. We believe that the insurgents now have about 10,000 high-power rifles and an unknown but limited quantity of grenade launchers and ma- chineguns. Although we know very little about their logistic system, the insurgents seem to be able to transfer their weapons between units scattered throu hout the Philippines. In Mindanao for exam le (nearly all guerrillas in large units now use M 16 rifles. In regions where guerrilla warfare is less advanced, guerrilla units may have as many as 10 or 15 different firearms that use different caliber ammunition. It is assumed that the NPA uses every means possible to supply its guerrillas, including reloading spent shell casings. A safehouse containing a weapons repair facility and several ammunition reloaders was discovered recently in Cagayan de Oro, a city in Northern Mindanao Apparently, ammunition shortages are not a major problem for the NPA at this time. In an increasing number of encounters, Philippine military officers report that NPA firepower outweighed that of the military. However, should military action increase, maintaining weapons and supplying adequate ammu- nition would become an important problem for the NPA. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03!03:CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Figure 13 NPA Military Organization in Manila ~? 300 persons) Netiooal Military Commission I National Operatiortel Command Special Operations Staft ?Detention-Interrogation Group ? Liaison Group ? Intelligence Records and Research Group ? Radio Scanning Group ? Mapping/Illustration/Mock-Up Group ? Photo LaboratoryForgery Legal Papers Group Com(~t Focea" C',utajrat 7"eani:- Coadtaj Team (3?S Persons) ? Team Leader (C.O. and Political Officer) ? ViceTeam Leader ? Finance Officer ? Intelligence Officer Nafiomtl DenneareE liti9m Group' Iiaisoa Graep ' 'i%T~it~! ~+ Military Research/ Politico- Logistics Training Department Department Special Project Group Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03!03:CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Anti-American rhetoric. Party propaganda portrays the United States as an imperialist nation and the sole prop supporting the Marcos government. But we believe America and Americans are favorably regarded by most Filipinos, and this propaganda rings hollow the CPP now downplays the anti-US rhetoric in rural areas to avoid alienating people and uses it only with students and intellectuals. ? Non-Communist elements in the NPA. In the at- tempt to stress nationalism over Communism, the party appears to havc accepted under its banner many individuals who havc a grudge against the government but lack ideological commitment to Communism. In Kalinga Apayao, several hundred guerrillas belonging to an ethnic minority recently defected from the lv PA but continue to war against the government. Similarly, in Palawan the CPP~NPA has not been able to establish a front because of the activities of a renegade NPA band, according to Embassy reports. No combined-awns capability. The NPA has dem- onstrated an ability to use small-unit guerrilla tac- tics e13~ectively but to date has not used combined arms---the coordination of different types of mili- tary units-in its operations. Should the Commu- nists decide to attack well-defended military instal- lations, they will find it necessary to use direct and indirect fire from machineguns and mortars to support their assault force. NPA Military Performance Analysis of CPP~NPA-initiated actions from 1973 through January 1985 reveals that the level of insur- gent activity has increased steadily over the last decade with a significant upsurge in 1984-80 per- cent of the more than 5,000 violent incidents were initiated by the NPEi in 1984. Last year there were 12 times more violent incidents than l0 years earlier and 107 percent more than in 1983. Much of this sudden increase last year occurred during two months-in January, when there was a national plebiscite, and in May, when parliamentary elections were held. NPA units nationwide now regularly attack military targets, and, in our judgment, the guerrillas have gradually gained the combat experience and confi- dence necessary to sustain the revolution's momen- tum. In 1984 NPA raids and ambushes involving 100 to 200 guerrillas became more common in most regions of the Philippines, especially in Mindanao and other areas where the NPA is strong. Raids, which net the guerrillas favorable publicity and firearms, increased by 53 percent in the past year-216 were carried out in 1984. For such operations, NPA com- manders now combine part-time local guerrilla units with district, front, or main regional guerrilla units, 13y attacking weakly defended targets in such numbers, the NPA is virtually assured a tactical and propaganda victory. Mapping the distribution of these raids and ambushes reveals that most CPP/NPA front commands sched- ule at least one per month; in Mindanao, two per month (figure 22). Most guerrilla initiated military activity is focused on assassinations and assaults upon individuals to acquire weapons. Such incidents now occur nationwide. In 1984, govern- ment and civilian casualties as a result of these incidents totaled 2,600 killed and 1,400 wounded. The insurgents' casualties totaled 1,321 killed and 266 captured. Insurgent losses are increasing but at a much smaller rate than might be expected given their more aggressive posture. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 oc~i c~ Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) as a mid- dleman.' NDF cadres were reportedly dispatched to Europe for this purpose. with the help of MNLF leader Nur Misuari these cadres may have succeeded in purchasing arms, ammunition, and communications equipment from Libya or Syria and in arranging for covert shipments to MNLF bases in Sabah, Malaysia, for transshipment via coastal freighters to various parts of the Philippines he formation of NPA units trained in clandestine arms infiltration techniques using stnall boats. These units were report- edly being used in 1983 to transfer war materiel from freighters off the coast of Mindanao. At this point, however, we have no corroborating evidence. the CPP/NPA is looking for new sources of foreign assistance and has estab- lished contacts-through NDF offices and European Communist Parties-with Soviet officials in Stock- holm, Rome, and the Netherlands. claimed further that a "reconciliation" between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the CPP/NPA is now being tested in joint efforts in the labor sector between World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)-affiliated unions and the CPP/NPA's labor front, the Kilusang Mayo Uno Beyond the absence of a reliable logistic pipeline to support a guerrilla war, other CPP/NPA weaknesses include: ? No foreign sanctuary. The Philippines is geographi- cally isolated-a situation almost unique in the world-and neither Malaysia nor Indonesia, the nearest countries, will permit Communist insurgent bases on their soil. The CPP has so far used the island's environment to their advantage by forcing the government to confront them on several fronts and by establishing bases in remote mountainous terrain found throughout the Philippines. However, should the government's counterinsurgent effort in- tensify, the Communists-like the Huks of 30 years ago-could find their lack of sanctuary a serious liability. ? Penchant for paperwork. The Communists keep detailed records and files that are regularly discov- ered when cadres are captured at their homes or safehouses. When compromised, such information provides government security forces with a better understanding of the insurgent organization, mem- bership, and plans. ? No charismatic leader. The CPP/NPA has no one of the stature of Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, or Fidel Castro. The Central Committee and senior cadres in prison are virtually unknown to the public. Were a popular non-Communist leader-with the charisma of Magsaysay-to emerge in the post- Marcos era, he might attract considerable popular support away from the Communists. 2 MNLF leader Nur Misuari, who is supported by Libya and Syria, has been advocating a tactical alliance between his guerrillas and the CPP/NPA for some time, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1= 25X1 1X1 25X1 k 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Despite their extensive organization and the strengths their performance has shown, the CPP~NPA has a number of current and potential vulnerabilities. In combination, these shortcomings have hindered insur- gent expansion and provided the government with several key targets for exploitation The lack of foreign support is the key weakness of the CPP~NPA. On the basis of all available evidence, we do not believe the Communists now receive any sizable foreign assistance. In the past, Beijing provid- ed arms, training, and money, but we believe Chinese assistance was terminated in 1975. Captured mem- bers of the Central Committee have admitted under interrogation that the party's most significant foreign financial support has come from unnamed US organi- zations. Additionally, Libya-through the Palestine Liberation Organization-is known to have provided 150 AK-47 rifles, which were smuggled into Manila harbor in 1981 In November 19841 the CPP leadership was reassessing~i itar~gle and had concluded that foreign arms purchases were necessary if the Communists were to take advantage of the deteriorating domestic situation and rapidly escalate guerrilla warfare how- ever, that the CPP wanted to maintain an indepen- dent foreign policy-following Mao's concept of self- reliance-and would, therefore, probably not turn to the Soviet Union. Instead, it would attempt to pur- chase arms from Middle Eastern countries using the 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 secret ? Good intelligence. the NPA usually is better informed on government operations than the government is on the insurgents. the NPA in Bataan is now forewarned of all military operations by informants within every military unit in the province. ? Sound guerrilla tactics. The NPA effectively uses classic guerrilla tactics and demonstrates a good military combat capability. Over the last several years, the NPA has cautiously escalated the number of operations to provide combat experience for guerrillas with minimal risks. ? FJ.fective use of environment. The CPP/NPA has focused guerrilla activity in areas where the terrain provides cover and escape. As early as 1974, Sison saw the insular nature of the Philippines as a potential asset for the insurgents. He realized that the growth of guerrilla fronts on all the larger islands would stretch thin the capabilities of the Armed Forces while making it almost impossible to defeat the CPP/NPA in any one campaign. ? Popular support. Both the party and the NPA have demonstrated an ability to recruit and to mobilize the population in support of their cause. While coercion is sometimes used, many people voluntarily cooperate with the insurgents at considerable risk of government retribution. ? Ffjective propaganda. The CPP has infiltrated many opposition organizations-including Catholic human rights groups and the media-to secure favorable coverage for its cause and discredit the Marcos government and the Armed Forces. This covert propaganda campaign has been effective both in the Philippines and abroad. Analysts are divided over the degree of commitment to Communism of NPA guerrillas, party sympathiz- ers, the rural population living in areas now con- trolled by the CPP/NPA, and the population at large. Some analysts believe that many, ij~not most, of these people may be cooperating with the insurgents be- cause of human rights abuses by the military, griev- ances against the Marcos government, or the lack of improvement in rural standards of living. The issue is central to US concerns because, like the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the commitment to Marxist-Leninist- Mao Zedong ideology will largely determine whether the Philippines would become a Communist state should the revolution succeed. It also ctfjects the effort required to dissipate support for revolution and defeat the insurgency. All available evidence indicates that hardcore CPP/NPA members are ideologically committed Communists who are determined to bring a Marxist government to power-even l1'they have to impose it ,from the top. Moreover, in areas controlled by the party, there are indications that some people cooper- ate voluntarily, not just out of,fear. Although we cannot gauge the attitudes of most rural dwellers, we believe that the longer an area is under Communist control-and we estimate that at least 5 million people now live in CPP/NPA-controlled areas-the stronger the popular commitment to the party and the revolution is likely to become. However, the party is sensitive to the lack of strong commitments to any ideology on the part of most Filipinos and the peasants' almost exclusive concerns with local issues. Thus, the party stresses anti-Marcos themes, nation- alism, land reform, and abuses by the military while downplaying Communist rhetoric (appendix CJ. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1;. 25X1 25X11 ? Momentum. The CPP/NPA has gradually built a momentum-a combination of its own initiative and government inaction-that could take years to re- verse Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Figure 16 NPA Camps Established During 1980 --~.~ the locations of 16 new base camps and 44 new training camps established by the NPA during the year. As shown in figure 16, these new insurgent camps were spread throughout the country, which indicates the signifi- cant training and logistic capability five years ago when the guerrilla forces were estimated at less than one-third their present strength. Embassy reporting of CPP/NPA activities and our analysis reveal strengths in a number of key areas that combine to make these insurgents a formidable opponent: ? Coherent ideology. The party has a coherent, well- articulated ideology that emphasizes nationalism and anti-imperialism. First articulated by Jose Ma- ria Sison, the CPP through its publications and courses presents a program that combines Marxism- Leninism and Catholic liberation theology, all in the guise of traditional Philippine nationalism. ? Effective political leadership. Through the Politbu- ro, the Executive Committee, and the Central Com- mittee, the CPP provides strong direction to subor- dinate cadres nationwide. Effectiveness can be judged by the absence of factionalism and-with one exception-high-level defections, and the mini- mal effects on operations caused by the capture of senior cadres. ? Patience. Aware of the Huk's premature switch to conventional warfare, party literature repeatedly stresses the protracted nature of this revolution to prepare followers for an indeterminate period of guerrilla warfare. We believe the party is quick to learn from mistakes and has been content to work slowly but steadily at establishing a popular base of support in the countryside. ? Strong command and control. The CPP/NPA fol- lows the standard Marxist-Leninist policy of "Dem- ocratic Centralism." This policy provides consider- able autonomy to local leadership as long as they adhere to Central Committee directives. Senior cadres are frequently reassigned, and there has not been even a hint that either they or their subordi- nates question command decisions. Party discipline is strict and very effective. ? Secure and effective communications. The party and the NPA rely on a courier system for most communications The CPP~NPA organizational infrastructure is now firmly in place and growing. Moreover, its perfor- mance over the past several years has been impressive. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Secret Training. Two recently acquired NPA training man- uals-one published in 1978 in Mindanao and the other in 1982 in the Visayas-show that the guerrillas are taught tactical operations from the US Army's Ranger Handbook, the Malaysian Jungle Operations Manual, and the writings of Mao Zedong. The docu- ments describe tactics applicable to team, squad, and platoon operations and emphasize the political aspects of guerrilla warfare. They do not, however, mention fire and movement, rally points, and security for night field positions-all tactical essentials in combat. Some former Armed Forces noncommissioned officers have joined the NPA and serve as training instructors, according to press reports. Training generally takes place at base camps located in remote areas and, in several cases, includes an obstacle course that meets US Army specifications. If the NPA follows classic guerrilla procedures, new recruits will be quickly included in combat operations-albeit in minor, less dangerous capacities-to acquire on-the-job training and boost their confidence. Figure I5. A captured NPA training/propaganda manual explains in detail proper ambush tactics. Note the variety of weapons being Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Secret Figure 19 Philippines: Violent Incidents Involving the New People's Army, 1973-84 Number of incidents 5,500 Assassinations/ kidnapings Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03 :CIA-RDP87T01127R000100040007-6 Figure 20 Philippines: Monthly Trends in Military Casualties Involving the New People's Army, 1981-84 Number Government Casualties Ilvll~ll 111 ll'I ll lllil~lll ltll IIII lilllllli IIIII IIII1111111111~1~11 1111111 1111111 111111 0 1981 82 83 84