POLICY SUPPORT TO STATE DEPARTMENT ON US-SOVIET QUALITY OF LIFE COMPARISONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01145R000200270030-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: October 21, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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SovietActive Measi~y~es end DisinfoY~~~~c~tl~~~z Foree~~st
FALL '85
CAMPAIGN
AG~I~rsT SDI
lthuugh [ht~re are signs th~,.t
~~loscuw might mute it:~ demand
fur an outright ban on the L'S
Strate~~c Defense Initiati~-e (SUIT.
S~wiet leaders are nunethc;ess nr~unt-
ing amaj~r active nviet
pr~licy tc ~dav.
F~orEV?ast ~,~~ill single out the Soviet
I~nicm for attention. The values of the
Soviet elite, their deci ionn;aking, cen-
tral c~xn-dir~atir,n, control of media,
fr~~rt~. res~~urces, and disinformation
technique-Moscow's obiectives
and car~abt ties- are- f;ndament-
ally di~fere-tt from US values and
pracaices. `~ bile other states regularly
e~lgage it propaganda and public rela-
tions, and sornetirnes covert action, no
other cunt~~mporary state appears to
utilize glcibal active ir;easures as a maj_
or instrument, or devotes the resources
and the full panoply of active mea-
sures and disinformati~,m techniques
-FURf~'C.-1sT io~rtiur~ed ort p~i~rc, 9
Unilateral Soviet moratorium ~oi?
deplo}~ment of SS-20's expires - a
bargaining and propaganda opport~;-
nity just before the Summit, just after
the Belgian elections, and coinciding
with the Dutch decision on Lti'F
deployment.
-CA L.E?~~DAR cnratin~rwr~on pa~~~ Ir)
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-SIJ/~-runlintcFdtrorn h?A'n 1
own Cabine*.s and parties.
In ~b'estern Europe. where there is
already considerable neutralist senti-
ment. Moscow is pressuring West.
Germany and is also trying tv ensure
that France, Italy. Japan and Canada do
not support the L ~ initiative. Over the
summer, !~I~:~scow intensified its pres-
sure and activities. For example,
Leonid Zanivatin, Head of the Interna-
tional Infurrnatinn Department of the
CPSi~, told the ~'~~est Germans that by
supporting the SDI, Ch,_rncellor Kohl
was upsetting the detente relati~~nship
that had been established between the
FKG and Moscow. (Other commenta-
tors reiterated this messa,+~e, as did
Gorbachev in his warm reception in
'Moscow f~ ~r the west German opposi-
tiun leader. Johannes Rau. in early
September, and in a telegram to ~1~illy .
Brandt, Chairman of the SDP and t};~
main leader of the Suciah;t Interna~
tir~nal. S~wirt-influenced dem~,nstra-
i~1ns and pr~~t~~~ts in Germany also
emphasized that the opposition
SPD, which. is gaining in support and
which opp~ uses SDI. way less likely to
upset Muscn~~: than Rr~hi. European
leaders sue`~~ asltalian Prirne Minister
Bettiru> Cr,~i and French President
?~Iitterand are als~~ being encouraged to
play the role of intermediaries bet~~reen
Eallnt~, t; ti
aCtIVltleS, :~'IoSL'ow is likely tip gaiYl neat
total control of this b~,dy wheu Soviet
fronts ar:d organizations that are: snb-
stantialyinfluenced by Mosco~~~ are
elected to COtiGU~s B?rard this f~+ll.
Some Indications of how :~I+,scow will
exploit its contr~ii n.ay- come at a majr;r
CONGt~ conference focusing on the
IYP planned for January L)S6, ~,vhich
will include major non-communi_~t inter-
national NGO's.
Later in the year, the major int~;~rna
tional ~iGOs' meeting to celebr~,~t~~ I~-P
will be the''V4'orld Peace Cong;re~s'
in Denmark. This function will b-.
organized by Soviet: international
fronts, coordinated by t}~le V~urld Pe.lce
Councill. As th,~ majorinter national
NGO activity, however, it will ultra+~t
much broader supp~.~rt. Like the
rec,~ntivconcluded ~~orld ~i~utll Fe~ti~al
in P~fo: ~~,,w (accord'r,g to ples~ rehor'-s
attend+ud by more than ~?,{)U~! the-
Soviet leaders may not be able to c~~n
trol all aspects of the meeting. At the
moment, however, the agenda cunsi~ts
of top Soviet priorities including:
"prevention of an arms race in c>utr~r
space,and effective m~easurr~s to stop it
on earth; halt t+~ the deployment of
mis:~iles; nucl+ .r test ban; mlclear
weapon-free zones, freeze of strategic
weaponry ..."
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THE Moscow
MACHINE AND
THE sUMMIT
Quiet leaders would like to achieve
:i major change in t?S defense pri-
orities t-y November, but Moscow
is positioning it:.~~lf to exploit the
Summit not only to achieve specific
objectives this fall, but also to influence
US and European decisions in 198Ei and
beyond-whatever happens in Geneva.
In their discussion about the Summit,
they allow fur three possibilities. Their
preferred outaxr~e would be the type of
major and specific agreements which
they claim vrF~re achieved in the Nixon-
Brezhenev meetings in 1972. Even at
times of great tension they maintain
that it is possible to reach important
agreements on weapons. The situ,:rtion
is tense now, "explosive" as Gorbachev
put it, but this they argue is the time to
save humanity from another deadly
round of the arras race and the likeli-
hood of war.. Moscow will focus atten-
tion on the great opportunity and the
necessity for achieving a major agree-
ment in November or soon thereafter.
Soviet leaders will seek to keep the
agenda of the meeting a~,vay from
human rights, Afghanistan and other
regional problems which tend to put
Moscow on the defensive. Moscow will
focus on these issues only If the United
States forces them onto the table. Then
of course, just as Moscow has begun to
do in retaliation to the British for the
expulsion of Soviet intelligence p~:~r-
sonnel, the US will be blamed for all
major global problems, particularly
denying basic human rights even to its
own people.
A second type of Summit, which they
consider as less useful, would be mod-
eled on tl-~e Itenxedy-Ithruschev meet-
ing in Vienna in 1961, where the leaders
got toknow one another but where no
forrrral document was signed. This, a
leading Soviet commentator said in
September, probably will be the pat-
tern in Geneva. Gorbachev would use
the meeting not only to make his own
assessment. of Reagan, but also to
improve chances for travel and cultural
agreements with the US, interrupted
by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
and events iin Poland in 1951, and which
Moscow badly wants to see resumed.
Gorbachev then will be in a position to
propose another meeting and to use
negotiation with an admixture of active
measures to derail SDI anti other US
priorities in 1986 and 1987.
~ third possibility, remote at this
point, is that Moscow will cancel the
Summit, and blame the US for endan-
geringworld peace. So far Moscow has
not threatened this. But Soviet leaders
have been turning up the negative vul-
umelately and claiming that the US is
not serious about the meeting. This is
designed to put maximum pressure on
the US in November. Gorbachev, for
example, in his interview with Tinre
professed "di appointment" and "con-
cern," stating that the US was not
preparing seriously for the meeting
and that. success depended ~~n serious
preparations. "...actions today largely
determine the scenario for our
Moscow seeks to create
the impression that
the new Soviet leader
is open to new patter~zs
of international
relations and new
initiatives
November discussion..." But. if
Moscow believes that not even
increased trade and travel with the U`_~~
will result from the Summit, or there
is a major international incident,
Moscow will claim, as it has been doing,
that Reagan. is inciting the American
people to "hate" the Soviet people, that
the US is using the meeting as a smoke-
screen for space weapons tests and
hence no discus~~~~n is useful in such
an atmosphere.
If the Summit produces some
results, even if only increased travel,
cultural, and trade agreen~ients with the
US, Gorbachev will be presented both
as a great statesman-and a domestic
reformer. He will be called a "new type
of Soviet leader' who has been able to
improve rela`ions with the US, even at
a time of great tension. And domesti-
cally his diplomatic initiative will have
paid off just as he is replacing many
CPStJ leaders and preparing for the
Twenty-Seventh Party Congress and a
new Party platform in February.
If Moscow decides to maintain the
Summit is a failure, because there are
no agreements at all and no shift in US
'defense priorities, the blame will be
placed on militaristic, unreasonable
advisers in the Reagan entourage (prin-
cipally Weinberger, McFarlane, and
Perle), who are not taking advantage of
a historic moment and ignoring the rea-
sonable and realistic positions of the
Soviet Union. Indeed, in IiF;lrt of the
Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing.
Soviet proposals to ban chemical weaip-
ons, and other Soviet "initiatives,"
Reagan will be called negative and
dangerous. To bolster their propaganda.
Moscow almost certainly will cite
European wind particularly American
', politicians and journalists who are criti-
~~ cal of Reagan. Both overtly and covertly
they will feature quotes and recycle
statements from the American press
and Congressional critics who may
believe Reagan did not take adequate
advantage of titre opportunii,~ to
improve US-Soviet reiatioias.
A new Soviet tactic-the courting of
US and Eu~~ropean media-has been rec-
ognized and widely reported ir. the
West. In anticipation of thr Summit,
according to a former Soviet active mea-
sures specialist, agents-of-influence in
the UK, France, Germany, ,japan, and
Austria, both in political c`ircies and
the media, are now being tasked to
spread the word that Soviet positi~ms
on the key Summit issues are reason-
able and provide a basis fur "com-
promise" with Washington. Soviet
meetings with Western European polit-
ical leaders and the media before
November will provide Gorbachev and
other Soviet leaders with further oppor-
tunities to ~"float" negotiating positions,
and. pressure the Europeans and
Japanese.
Inaddition tupre-Summit press brief-
ings,the "x,000 media personnel
expected in Geneva fur the Summit can
expect to find Soviet spokesmen more
accessible than in the past.ltiloscow
will make available to Western media
Soviet "journalists," "scholars," and
commentators both in Geneva and in
Western capitals, seeking to obtain air
time on ~~~estern television and radio in
news programs and talk shows, as vvc~ll
as providing special "backgrounders"
for the print media. These Soviet com-
mentatorsare not, of course, indepen.-
dentindividuals, but will be selected to
appear in \~-estern media t,y the active
measures apparatus, and they will
receive guidance if not outright instruc-
tion onthe themes they are to prorrn_rte
in their media ~~ppor-tunities. ^
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Yannis Yannikos. the veteran Communist publisher- entrepreneurarrd current
EU1nos publisher George Bobolas (center); and Yasiiy Sitnikov (right) sign pub-
lishing agreerraents in Moscow in June 197~~. Behind therm stands Alexander
Filippoporclos, now the editorol Ethnos.
THE, ETHNO~
CASEIN
GREECE
n Papandreou's Greece there is con-
siderable evidence that the hugest
daily newspa, ~~r Ta Ethnos, which
is pro-government, and which fre-
quently replays Soviet disinformation
and forgeries, was created and financed
by the Soviet Unicm. Yaul Anastasi, for
years a reporter for the London Daily
Telt~graph and a stringer for the New
York Tirnes, provides substantial docu-
nu~ntation for the Soviet connection in
his 31 i-page b~>uk, Take the Nation
in Y"our Nandy published in Greece
in 1983.
F,ihru~s reappeared in September
1951 after a centrist paper bearing the
same title was closed down by the
Colonel's regime which ruled Greece
from 196'1-1974. Ta Ethnos (Th.e
I/ationl, emerged with a slick profes-
sic~nal tabi'~oid format, and quickly grew
to a peak daily circulation of about
180,000. Alexander Filippopoulos,
editor of Ethnos, said the paper
was designed to be "profoundly anti-
imperialist, profoundly democratic,
free, truly objective...we have chosen
our journalists to be progressive peo-
ple. commenting properly on events."
In his book, Anastasi. traces the
backgrounds of those who launched
the publication. Yannis Yannikos and
George Bobolas, were to be joint
oA~ners. Yannikos and Bobolas, prior to
creating Ethnos, had substantial and
long-standing Soviet political and busi-
nessconnections, according to Anastasi.
Ethnos employed Constantin
Tsakotelis as foreign editor and Carl
Marzani as American con-espondent.
Tsakotelis had previously worked in
Czechoslovakia for Telepress, a news-
paperused for Soviet Bla: propaganda
in the 1950's. Marzani was failed in the
US in 1947 for perjury-lying about
his communist party membership
while working for US intelligence
(OSS) and the State Department. The
paper's British correspondent, Stanley
Harrison, was until 1981 sub-editor of
the British Communist Party's Alorning
Star, and the Cypriot correspondent,
Akis Fa `~ ,, is a member of the pro-
Soviet Co~:munist Party ~.if Cyprus and
editor of one of its publications.
Yannikos is a communist whose
death sentence for wartime activities
lead been commuted. After he was
released from jail in 1955, he appar-
entlvcontacted the Russia~a and
became a principal editor and publisher
of Soviet publications in Greece. Vl~hen
democracy was restored in Greece in
1975, Y~mnikos developed a close rela-
tionship with the Soviet copyright
office V,AAP. Anastasi charges that
VAAP was being run by two men who
had been senior KGB officers, Boris
Pankin and Vasily Sitnikov. (Sitnikkov
has been identified by at least two
KGB defectors as having been a senior
official in the KG$'s active measures
and disinformation section. )
Anastasi broke the story of the
Soviet connection when the Ethnrrti
deal tunned sour for Yannikos. The
Anastasi bask tells how Yannikos was
encouraged by Sitnikov to join fames
with George Bobolas, who also bald
extensive financial dealings with
Moscow, to reestablish Efhru~s. They, in
turn, hired Filippopoulos as Editor- for
the Greek daily. Yannikos, apparently
pushed out by Bobolas and Sitnikov,
told the story to Anastasi.
Bobolas and Filippopouios sub-
sequentlysued Anastasi, and he was
curvicted of libel in Greek court. I~ut
Anastasi countersued for defamation
and wiretapping, and a two year court
battle is coming to an end. In addition,
Ethnos has brought suits against
L'Express and The F.con~rmist whiich
also wrote about the link with Mosc;ow.
Ethnos stories that echo Suviel:
active measures themes include:
? KAI_ Flight 007, shot down by the
Soviets, was a deliberate provocation
by the CIA, and Moscow was justified
in shooting it down.
? Poland's Solidarity works fur the
CIA and. the "Mafia-backed Vatican."
? The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
is justifiable to protect it from "con-
questand panic." The Afghan res:is-
tancefighters are "bandits and paid
murderers who enter from Pakist~-~n
and commit hoe-rendous crimes.....'
? The murder of Indira Ghandi wes
reported as if the CIA were respunsi-
ble, and an editor described the a~,sas-
sinat;on as "an imperialist move."
An article appearing in the Kill
Street Journal, in June 1984 concluded,
"Whatever the role of the KGB, tt~ere
is no controversy about the follow; ng:
that Mr. Bobolas got an agreemera
from the Soviet copyright office to pub-
lish the Soviet Encyclopedia in a profit
seeking venture, that he is also t}ce cre-
ator of F.thr;os, and that t:he paper
unashamedly adheres to apro-Soviet
anti :American line:' 1~
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OCABULARY:
CTIVE
MEASURES
~~
wive Measures" (activny_ve
rneropriycztiya~ is a Soviet
germ which came into r.rse in
the late 1950s and early 1960x, to
describe overt and covert techniques
for influencing events and behavior in,
and the actions of, foreign countries.
Active measures may entail influen-
cing the policies of another goven~cment,
undermining confidence in its leaders
and institutions, disrupting relations
between other nations, ~md discredit-
ing and weakening governmental and
non-governmental opponents. This fre-
quently involves attempts to deceive
the target (foreign governmental and
non-governmental elites or mass audi-
encesl,and to distort the target's per-
ceptions of reality to affect decisions
that- serve Soviet interests. Although
active measures are principally politi-
cal in nature, military maneuvers and
paramilitary assistance to insurgents
and terrorists may also be involved.
There is no equivalent term in the
V`w'est describing the intent, scope, inten-
sity, centralisation, and sophistication
of active measures. Active measures
go far beyond the well-known practices
of propaganda or psychological warfare
which seep; to propagate particular
viewpoints and -are aimed at affecting
attitudes a~:~d only indirectly behavior.
Thev are al.ible to
test them, partially at least, by forecast-
ing a~pect> of future behavior.
[~~cs~~~ l un Stuili~'; of past S~,virt
activitie~~ it may be possible to identify
at an earty~ sty-cge Soviet active measure
campaign.; and to anticipate some
asi~~~cts of their evr~lution.
"i~his publicatirm is devoted to this
endeav,~r. "h,~ acc~~mplish this, w,:~
will reg~_~lr~.:~ monitor: (D The public
statement; of Soviet leaders and daily
prE~ss of the Communist Party of the
Suviet [ ~_~on (CPSI'), and particularly
ti`1t~ overt publicati,ms of the organs
responsible for active measures;
(21 Related activities and statements of
Communist Parties in the Soviet Bloc
and Western Europe, the US, Asia and
Latin America; ('s) Related activities,
statements, seminars, and press of the
I'3 major and several lesser Soviet front
groups regularly receiving instructions
from the Soviet Union; (4) Exposed
agent-of-influence operations designed
to support Soviet policy objectives;
(5) Documented instances of dis-
infcrmation designed to deceive and
manipulate, such as forgeries or
covertly placed media articles that are
later uncovered.
Academic specialists on Soviet for-
eign policy, former senior active mea-
sures practitioners, and experts on
Communist Party political campaign,
activity in Europe, Asia and Central
America will serve on our tldvisorv
Board and as consultants, providing
their informed analysis of what we can
E:spect from the Suviet leadership.
among those who have already agreed
to serve on the Advisory Board are
Professors Uri Ra'aaan and Kichard
Shulta of the International Security
Studies Program of the Fletcher School
of Law and Diplomacy, who specialize
in Soviet decisionmaking and use of
active measures and disinformation.
Three ft,r,~~er Soviet Biex active rnea
sores practitioners also will serve on
the Advisory Board: Ladislav Bittman,
who served as a Czech intelligence offi-
cerand deputy director of the Czech
intelligence see ice Disinformation
Department; Itva Dzhirkvelo~-, who
served in the hBG's First and Second
Chief Directorates, and w-as Deputy
General Secretary of the Soviet Orga-
nization of Journalists; and Stanislav
Le~~chenko, w ho worked with the
CPSU's International Department and
as an active measures specialist in the
KG 8's First Chief Direc orate. The edi-
tor of F~~r,>cu~t is Rov Godson, profes-
sor t~f Government at Georgetown
University who studies and teaches
auuut international security affairs, and
propaganda, active measures and
disinformation as elements of statecraft.
Foreca~ ~ will not attempt to refute
Soviet themes or prescribe Western
countermeasures- Some will maintain
that by failing to do so we are giving
further currency to Soviet disinforma-
tion and propaganda. Others may take
the opposite view and infer that we
are suggesting that anyone in, the West
who shares the Soviet interpretation
of events or who shares the Soviet view
is being manipulated by Moscow.
We are mindful of these criticisms,
but we do not believe that readers who
are alerted to anticipated Suviet active
measures will have difficulty recogniz-
ing therr,~ as such. On the contrary? being
forewarned is to some extent being; fore-
armed. PJor do we mean to imply that
everyone or anyone who shares Suviet
views on a given issue or reaches i.on-
clusionsdesired by Moscow, has been
influenced or manipulated by there. We
are postulating that Mo~s::uw continues
to use active measures and we area
attempting to project how these will be
employed to achieve Soviet objectives
in the near future.
FORI'~1AT
Featured sections will include:
pAnticipated .4ctire afc?ascn~c~s. A
description of themes, program;, a.nd
targets u7 the coming months.
? Caie,n~dar ~>: Sternru~artt Dates.
Times. places and dates of upcoming
everts likely to be exploited thr~~ut;h
acti~; e measure. Activities of commu-
nist parties, fnmt organizations, ar;d
independent bodies where the Scwi~ts
can be expected to seek strong influ-
ence will. be included. Key Wester~~
elecaions and guverntnent decisi~~ns
likely to be targets w~al be highlighted.
?Doeumented Act~r>e alE~asurc?s.
Althoagh Moscow goes to consid~.~rable
length to hide major aspects of its active
measures campaigns, o^ occasion 1~~'est
ern governments, scholars and journal-
istsare able to dcx:ur.;ent substanti:_tl
elements ref these covert activities.'This
section will feature new;lucument~~~tiu^
of past Soviet active measures that
sheds light cm current and future Sc,viet
campaign; and tactics.
p tii~ca~5u?an. One or more key ~tF~rns
and concepts us_fui in understanding
active measu~e~. will be defined.
Forecasting of any kind is extremely
difficult. L.'ndoubtedly we will nut he
able to anticipate ail rna;or active n~ra.
sores campaigns. Moscow also may
change course in ligh` of unexpected
international develupme?nts, or thf~
e::posure of aspects of its covert
activities. W'e ~ ill be ref?~ring our tt ;.h
piques constantly, and we welconr,e
readers' comments and suggestion~~;.
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-~:I LL,.~~1>.~~ K -c~~tttittnrd fn~rrr prt,~~~ I
C~ Peace Council's Fourth '~alional
Confemnce -~ tiuyen~ber ~-ill i :Vc ~.y
H,i~~en, Conne?cticut-the meeting of
this Soviet front operation tidentified
as such by the F(31 ~ may proeide indi-
catiuns of Soyiei priorities in thy- US
during 1~1~>E~.
Reagan-(.~orbachev Summit --
lNuyember 19-20) Genera,
Switzerland.
186
L.'N International ~~ear of Pea~.~e -
~yill he exploited worldwide by Moscow
through t}i~~ [`N s-; stem, and m~ re
effectively through their array of inter-
nationa] fronts and agents of-influence
in non governmental organizations.
~~rtttt~ty -
CPSL' Secretariat to appro~~e :annual
So~~iet .~cti~~e Measures Plans -
furmal approvals for year-long t}~iemes
an~I budgets.
C~nilateral Soviet moratorium on
nuclear testing expires.
S:aLT II Treat' expires-[ S ne, er
ratified the "hrcaty but hay endorsed it.
Hu~~ ~Iu:~cow ;~la~'~ this will ~]cpend to
s~~me extent on the Summit.
Global Conference of ~on-
Governmental Organizations-
~January ?0-24) Genera. Switzerland-
pru-Soviet organizations will predomi-
nate: theme ""hogether for Peace."
-~('hi"Ilrl)'1'
T?-enty-Seti~enth CPSL~ Congress-
1~Ioscuw codifies five-year foreign pol-
io., defense, and economic plans.
Gorbachev policy institutionalized.
~Iaj%~r decision on CPSU Program tthe
Party's most fundamental ducumenti
which has been revised only three
times previously in the Party's history.
.~Iurch -
Parliamentan~ elections in France-
Socialist government vulnerable, espe-
cially to pro-Soviet Con'imunist party
activities.
.11u~ ------------
Parliamentar~~ elections in I (olland
-Christian Liberals in troul;l~~; I_~~i-~~r
Party is closer to S~wiet deft~n~e
priorities.
---.SE~Jtfe?rhr?~ -
llth World "Trade Onion Congress,
~ W~~rld Federation of "G,~-de I'nin~n ;
Soviet intt.~rnational 1ab~>r front~-
Berlin. GI)IZ tSeptember'. -1ntt~r
natinna] Clay of "Trade [_'n~i~~n Actio~~
fc~r Feace.t
Summit of ~;on-:aligned }-leads of
State-Harare, i',imbahwe-- Oper lttt)
leaders e~~pected to cony-entrate u~i
anti-imperialism, as well as is~ur~
which di~~ide the non-aligned.
- Ortnbc'r --
~'orld Peace Congress-(()ctube?~ 15-
19) Copenhagen. Denmark--~ bti~~n ld
Peace Council function in cooperat i. u~
with other Soviet fronts. Likely t~ ~
attract broader based support as the
major conference in celebration of the
Uiv International Year of Peace. ^
THE KGB AND
SOti~IET 1)ISIN-
FORMATION:
A~ INSIDER'S
VIEW
I_ru/islrtt~ Rithtntrt
,'~',?u ~~>rk: Pt~rnarrtun f3rasst,ti~'s', {~1~5
21f~t>h. ~Ir~.~)::
he arrth~.r{ a member of this, publi
canon's advisory Cun,mittee,
~~pen? f~~urteen years in the service
of G>nununist intelligence, including
serving as depi;ty cornmandrr ~~f the
Cze~?h into?Ili~~~~nce and securit} ~er-
~~ice~s disinfnrnuition department. He
defected ~~o the 1'4'est in L)68, and his
first buol: Thc~ L~cref~ti~trt GctrrtF~ was
published in 19 ~ 2.
In this ne~,v volume, I~i[tman pro-
yidesspecific names, dates and places
in descri}-ling Soviet and Czech opera-
tiunsdesigned to influence Western
be~haviur. He discusses how Soviet
active neasures have e:~panded dra-
matically over the last decade, and how
the Soviet apparatus supporting these
effects is n~~w "undoubtedly- the largest
and most effective system in the world."
1 ie describes in detail Soviet techniques
designed to influence the Western
peace movement and argues that
Muscov: used similar active measures
during the Iranian hostage crisis to
foment general confusion and anti-
The
ti G B'~~and'~O~'I1-:1~
Ani Insider's t~T~~~~
~.~ldiS~~l~" ~~3>>ined art
So~~iet schemes fur ubtainin,k ~ti~e~tern
science and technuingy. I->ittman ~~on
eludes that Sovietactiy~~ mea~ur~f~~~
have become more arnb ti.ous and tl~~t~ir
impact much broader in the 3a~t dt~c acl~~.
and that the Soyiet~ ~,vill continue h.
wield disinformation as a p~nyerful
political instrument. `~~ he used ag;~inst
the ~~'est.
in
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP87T01145R000200270030-4