GORBACHEV ADJUSTING HIS US GAMEPLAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01145R000300390006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 20, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/15: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000300390006-7
NI0/USSR
20May 1986
Gorbachev Adjusting His US Gameplan
Gorbachev appears to be in the process of setting himself two benchmarks
for coming to a US summit this year: the test ban moratorium, which will
Where does Gorbachev go without a summit, or by early fall knowing there
isn't going to be a summit? First, he will attack the Administration
hard for "forcing" the USSR to rebegin nuclear testing. This will be the
preliminary round for the major event--an all-out public diplomacy, peace
campaign assault following US breakout from SALT II aimed at destroying
the Administration's credibility at home and with the allies.
Gorbachev is modestly adjusting his US gameplan because of a series of
unexpected US actions adverse to Soviet interests and increased
resistance to his internal plans, which have raised the risks of his US
policy. In a nutshell, Washington is not playing the game according to
the script and Gorbachev's room for maneuver has been crimped. Third
area developments hostile to Soviet interests may be further pressuring
him to play more cautiously.
Soviets goals continue to be to make new asymmetric gains in the arms
control arena, reduce the Administration's broad challenge to Soviet
security interests (US defense programs and the Third World), and gain
breathing space for the revitalization of the Soviet economy. Gorbachev
has sought to do this by recreating an atmosphere of detente which would
lead the Administration to change its posture and positions because of
heightened domestic and allied pressures. The Soviets hoped to generate
these pressures by reengaging the US on a score of fronts and a public
diplomacy campaign involving arms control teasers, the appearance of
reasonability, and the appeal of a new team in the Kremlin who seem more
Western and pragmatic. The plan was to use these winds to bash
Washington against a shoal of summits before which the Administration
would find it increasingly desirable to alter course.
Gorbachev has achieved much political consolidation during his one year
in power, but this past fall he began to run into some bedrock as well as
a lot of mush. Getting rid of Grishin turned out to be not so easy, and
Kunayev is still in the Politburo. At the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev
got the biggest Central Committee turnover since 1961, but many of the
newcomers do not have longtime ties to him or otherwise owe him special
allegiance. Most important, the Party and Government are now wrestling
with a number of anxiety creating issues, including the status and
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priveleges of the elite, and the degree of structural economic change
that is to be made. The time for words is now past and some of the
proposed actions, notwithstanding their modesty to Westerners, are
creating a lot of resentment and anger. In year two of the Gorbachev
era, tension is replacing excitement.
Gorbachev did not expect to have achieved already a dramatic US arms
control concession, such as on SDI. This was something to be attained
gradually if at all during this Administration's tenure. By now, though,
he probably hoped the US would have bitten on some element of his 15
January proposal, his test ban moratorium, or come around on CDE, or in
some other forum. Even without this, he probably would have continued
his course and gone through with a Summer summit, his thought being that
eventually the US would begin to soften. The key to such a strategy was
patience and perseverence. If significant new gains couldn't be obtained
from this Administration within a year or so, then Moscow would turn
against it "in sorrow" and some anger, setting the stage for getting what
it wants out of the next Administration.
Kto-kovo (who is manipulating whom) many old guardists are asking
meanwhile; not because they have lost patience, but because they probably
were initially skeptical about the strategy, are now on their haunches
over domestic developments, and see a series of developments in the game
which lend credence to the view that Moscow is being snookered and which
can be used to undermine Gorbachev's domestic plans.
These developments by now probably are a litany comprising the
UN reductions, Black Sea incursion, and Libya. US media
articles relating US smugness about its hand and tactics may be
adding more fuel.
At the same time, the last several months have seen a series of headline
grabbers and other events detrimental to Moscow, which in their
cumulation may have sucked further wind out of Gorbachev's sails: Spanish
referendum on NATO, perhaps the French elections, Soviet mishandling of
developments in the Philippines, the mess in the PDRY, the oil price
decline, and most recently Chernobyl. At a minimum, these kinds of
developments don't buy credit. Nor have Soviet policies aimed at
altering China's policies, getting back in the Arab-Israel game, or
making things easier in Afghanistan begun to pay off.
Gorbachev likely failed to anticipate that Washington not only might not
act according to script nut might write its own music. He has also had a
run of bad luck. And he may have underestimated his domestic
opposition. Because he is smart though, if still inexperienced in
dealing with the US, -Fe is altering course somewhat; not dramatically,
though, because like a year ago, his options remain poor. He is
reassessing and adjusting because it makes good sense as concerns his
policy goals and because it makes good political sense, not because he is
being driven against his good judgment by a gang of know-nothings.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/15: CIA-RDP87T01145R000300390006-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/15: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000300390006-7
Almost certainly, Gorbachev is not going to break off his policy of
reen a ement and dialo ue. In the atmosphere of the past year, Moscow
has watched the US defense budget come under increasing attack,
assistance to the Contras be curtailed, SALT II remain in force, and US
Middle East policies falter. Trade with the West has been limited by
COCOM and Moscow's hard currency position, but a weakening of the former
and expanded Western credits probably can be obtained if Moscow
moderately behaves itself. The Soviets also now have greater hopes for
improved relations with Western Europe, Japan, and China than they did
two years ago, which could be undermined by breaking off the dialogue.
To keep the dialogue going, Moscow is continuing to engage in a broad
range of bilaterals with the US as well as the allies, most recently
sending deputy foreign minister Bessmerytnikh to Washington. Between the
US and USSR, new air links have just been established, innumerable
delegations are going back and forth, and a whole series of exchanges are
being worked out. This bilateral safety net will allow Moscow to keep the
environment tolerable enough to continue getting various benefits of
reengagement. Almost certainly, moreover, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
will meet with Secretary Shultz in New York in September at the UN.
Whether Shevardnadze comes to Washington probably will be up to the
President.
Where a does Gorbachev go without a summit, or by this fall knowing there
isn't going to be a summit? In essence, he will look beyond this
Administration, which he surely is doing to some extent already. But
more than this, he will see US intransigence on the above issues as
giving the USSR some real ammunition for the first time in a while.
First he will attack the Administration hard for "forcing" the USSR to
retie in nuclear testing. This will be the-preliminary round for the
major event--an all-out public diplomacy, peace campaign assault
following US breakout from SALT I aimed at destroyin the
TN'inistration's credibilit at home will hope that this wil lcumulatewithna major tRepublican deThe feat oinethe
November elections and will influence and snowball with the early 1987
West German elections. From success on these fronts, the Kremlin would
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hope to roll on with a defeat for the Conservatives in the 1988 British
elections and election of a less ideological opponent than President
Reagan in 1988. This should come as no surprise as we have foreseen a
probable increase in Soviet hostility toward the Administration in 1987
for some time. The difference is that the odds are increasing that it
might come earlier if the Administration pursues a particular policy line.
Meanwhile, Moscow will work over Western Europe and Japan thoroughly, to
make the US pay and teach the lesson that Moscow can't simply be given
the back of the hand. The US will be charged with destroying the fruits
of twenty years of arms control at the same time Moscow probably makes
pronouncements that it is being forced to go ahead with weapons programs
that will further endanger Western security. The political goal would be
to use the moment to separate Western Europe and Japan from the US and
dramatically strengthen hostility toward Washington.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/15: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000300390006-7