MONTHLY FORECAST AND WARNING REPORT -- USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01145R000300390010-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 28, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/15: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000300390010-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/15: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000300390010-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/15: CIA-RDP87T01145R000300390010-2
The Director of Central Intelligence D/SOVA
Washington, D.C. 20505 4E 58
National Intelligence Council
NIC #01027-86
28 February 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for the USSR
SUBJECT: Monthly Forecast and Warning Report -- USSR
1. Afghanistan
A. Discussion:
Although Soviet propaganda on Afghanistan is designed to give
the impression of flexibility on a political settlement--at the
27th Party Congress, Gorbachev indicated a willingness to withdraw
from a country he called a "bleeding wound"--the Soviet condition
for a withdrawal continues to be a settlement which guarantees the
survival of the puppet government in Afghanictan_
In the view of the NIO/USSR, the Soviets would not be
likely to bargain with their adversaries within or outside
Afghanistan in reaching such a major strategic decision. Rather
they would decide on the basis of all factors, particularly their
view of the likelihood of winning by their current strategy, and
then proceed to implement their chosen strategy, perhaps dickering
with their adversaries about the marginal costs of attaining their
aim, whether it be withdrawal at least cost, or -- as at present --
a Soviet victory at least cost.
25X1
L~.)A I
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There are, however, uncertainties and some dissenting views
about this judgment within the Community. It is necessary to keep
our evidence and our assumptions under constant critical review.
C. Warn inn :
The USSR is in a difficult situation because a convincing
signal of intent to withdraw and alter its conditions for
withdrawal risks undermining the moral of Kabul. Nevertheless,
there is a fair chance that over coming weeks the Soviets will make
some gestures, at least rhetorical and possibly including some
token troop withdrawals, aimed at gaining credibility for their
political actions and "peace offensive" that are intended to cut
support for the resistance.
2. Iran-Iraq War - Implications for the Soviets
A. Discussion:
Although there has been some normalization of commercial
relations between Moscow and Teheran, there is not much agreement
on anything else: both capitals agree to disagree on Afghanistan
and on the war. The Korniyenko visit did not move matter forward
much.
The Soviets are concerned that an Iranian victory in the war
would propel Teheran to dominance in the Gulf, severely undercut or
destroy Moscow's relationship with Iraq, and cause the Arab
countries of the Gulf to invite in a greater US presence to deter
further Iranian expansion. Moscow does not want the US to achieve
the mantle of "the primary guarantor of security in the Gulf."
As a consequence, if Iran were to make significant advances on
Iraq's territory or if these are signs that the regime in Baghdad
is crumbling, the Soviets would probably put military pressure on
Iran's northern border, cut off remaining weapons deliveries to
Iran from Eastern Europe, and sharply increase weapons deliveries
to Iraq. But Moscow almost certainly would not deploy its own
ground forces to Iraq (to avoid subsequent capture).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/15: CIA-RDP87T01145R000300390010-2
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In the interim, Moscow is seeking to broaden its relations in
the Middle East.
-- It is expanding relations with Iraq and Kuwait and
probably assuring Gulf countries that the new regime in
South Yemen will not seek to export revolution across its
borders.
-- It desires to broker a reconciliation between Syria and
Libya--to further isolate Iran as the "culprit in the
war".
Should Iraq somehow crumble rapidly and Iran emerge a clear
victor, the Soviets would probably seek to come to terms with a new
reality and put more energy into an improvement of Soviet-Iranian
relations.
C. Warning:
While the combined probabilities may be low, there is some
chance of Iranian success leading in turn to a more interventionist
Soviet posture toward Iran and the region.
3. PDRY
A. Discussion:
Prior to the revolt in January the Soviets were following the
USSR's standard operating procedure in South Yemen that they use to
maintain control of Third World clients. They:
-- kept the government on a short leash with their
deliveries of economic aid (mainly oil) and weapons,
-- tried to curb President Hasani's overtures to the West
and other Gulf states by bringing back his prececessor
(as a clear threat to Hasani's leadership).
Moscow however, did not calculate the depth of tribal hatreds
and was probably surprised at the outbreak of fighting.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/15: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000300390010-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/15: CIA-RDP87T01145R000300390010-2
Even though there was an initial delay in Soviet commitment to
the rebels, the new leadership will be indebted to Moscow for its
commitment, its rapid supply of military aid, its tolerance of
PDRY's debt, and the pressure it exerted against Ethiopia and North
Yemen to curb these country's assistance to Hasani in his effort to
retain power.
Although the Communist government in Aden remains something of
a veneer over tribal factionalism, the Soviets will be able to
continue to use air, naval, and communications facilities there, to
maintain a government with some sense of stability, and to curb
Aden's actions which could jeopardize other Soviet goals in the
region. But Moscow has no guarantee against future tribal
conflicts.
It is presently unclear whether and how Moscow will rebuild
the PDRY military. There is a severe shortage of trained and
educated leadership.
C. Warning:
The Soviets may seek to use the weaknesses of the new regime
to expand their access to military facilities there.
4. The Soviet Cultural Scene
A. Discussion:
The Gorbachev regime is marginally loosening up the political
strictures on Soviet art, culture, and intellectual life,
ostensibly in the interest of "glasnost'll (openness) and honesty.
Other purposes are to enhance the persuasiveness of official
propaganda, win more political support from the intelligentsia, and
simply to make life more interesting for a grumpy and critical
Soviet population.
Gorbachev has not spoken very explicitly on cultural policy
(his congress speech warned against Western corruptions); Ligachev
has said more, but on both sides of the issue: He says the
cultural bureaucrats should not interfere with talent, but talent
must serve the party.s and a rise in dissident behavior.
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Given the importance of cultural policy and life in a country
where everything is politicized, managing this front will be nearly
as important to Gorbachev in the long run as is managing the
economy. He is not a cultural liberalizer. But his efforts to
restore popular optimism will shift the limits of cultural policy
and tempt the intelligentsia to test what they can get away with.
This is likely to stimulate new tensions within the leadership and
between rulers and ruled.
C. Warning:
As he gropes for some formula for economic reform in the
months after the congress (as of now, little new seems likely to
emerge from the congress itself), Gorbachev may feel a political
need to show a tough face on the cultural front. But this could
cost him some support from the intelligentsia on which real
economic pro
resc d
g
epends
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/15: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000300390010-2