THE AQUINO CABINET: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-00434R000400970006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 4, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
4 April 1986
The Aquino Cabinet: A Preliminary Assessment
Summary
President Corazon Aquino's Cabinet is an amalgam of disparate elements
with one common denominator: their repudiation of Ferdinand Marcos.
Made up of successful businessmen, veteran politicians, and activist pro-
fessionals who differ widely in background, ideology, and political style,
the Cabinet emerged from two unlikely alliances formed out of political
necessity: the teaming up of Aquino and now Vice President Salvador
Laurel in December 1985 and their last-minute acceptance of former Mar-
cos associate Juan Ponce Enrile into the anti-Marcos movement.
Because the Cabinet includes such former antagonists as Defense Minister
Enrile and Labor Minister Augusto Sanchez (an activist lawyer with past
ties to the Communist Party), the new team will be able to function
smoothly only if Aquino can downplay their differences and force them to
cooperate. Power plays by Laurel and Enrile pose the most serious threats
to unity. The latent radicalism of some individual Cabinet members may
also create a problem for Aquino if she fails to develop and implement an
effective reform program. The Cabinet is generally well disposed toward
This memorandum was prepared by I Asia Near East Division, Office of Central
Reference. Information available as of 4 April 1986 was used in its preparation. Com-
ments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Asia Branch, Asia
Near East Division, OCR,
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the United States, but its collective support for Aquino's "options open"
policy on the issue of US bases conceals the attitudes of several Cabinet
members- who believe that the bases should eventually be dismantled.
Dividing the Spoils
Since assuming office on 25 February, Corazon Aquino has named 22 people to Cabinet
positions. In addition, the local press refers to three other appointees as members of
her Cabinet; they were named to positions not previously of Cabinet rank. They are:
Central Bank Governor Jose B. Fernandez (who was carried over from the Marcos gov-
ernment), Presidential Spokesman Renito Saguisag, and General Services Administrator
Victor We have considered them Cabinet members for the purposes of this paper.
Most of the Cabinet members belong to either Aquino's or Laurel's personal following.
We believe the distribution of portfolios between the two camps probably is a result of
a deal Aquino and Laurel worked out in December 1985 when they agreed to run on the
same ticket. Aquino's group, which comprises more than half of the Cabinet, consists of
idealistic, democratic activists, many of whom were among her inner circle during the
campaign. They include:
? Finance Minister Jaime Ongpin, a highly respected businessman.
? Trade and Industry Minister Jose Concepcion, another businessman.
? Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo, Aquino's personal lawyer.
? Presidential Spokesman Renito Saguisag, a human rights lawyer.
? Labor Minister Augusto Sanchez, a radical human rights lawyer.
? Justice Minister Neptali Gonzales, a former law professor.
? Information Minister Teodoro Locsin, Jr., a journalist and Aquino's speechwriter.
? Tourism and Environment Minister Jose Antonio Gonzales, a businessman with
close ties to the Aquino family.
? Agriculture Minister Ramon Mitra, a cattle rancher and former Congressman.
? Local Government Minister Aquilino Pimentel, a popular grassroots politician.
? Education Minister Lourdes Quisumbing, head of an elite Catholic women's col-
lege.
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? Social Services and Development Minister Mita Pardo de Tavera, a physician to
the poor.
? Political Affairs Minister Antonio Cuenco, an opportunistic lawyer with close ties
to the Aquino family.
? Good Government Commission Chairman Jovito Salonga, a lawyer and former
Senator.
Laurel's group consists of old-style, patrician politicians who have generally supported
his political ambitions in recent years. They include:
? Government Reorganization Commission Chairman Luis Villafuerte, a former
Marcos Cabinet member.
? Natural Resources Minister Ernesto Maceda, another former Marcos associate,
who fled the country in 1978.
? Public Works Minister Rogaciano Mercado, an ultra-nationalist lawyer.
? Transportation and Communications Minister Hernando Perez, a law professor.
Because of a dearth of information, we are unable to determine the political loyalties of
four other Cabinet members. They are:
? Budget Minister Alberto Romulo, a lawyer and accountant.
? General Services Adminstrator Victor Ziga, a lawyer and businessman.
? Economic Planning Minister Solita Monsod.
? Health Minister Alfredo Bengzon.
Enrile, whom we classify as an independent, is the black sheep of the Cabinet because
of his extremely close ties to Marcos. Aquino appointed Enrile because of his last-min-
ute repudiation of Marcos and the key role he played in the military rebellion that
brought her to power. By naming him, she displayed her gratitude to and garnered the
support--at least for the time being--of the military reform movement. According to
US officials, most of the military reformists view Enrile and Gen. Fidel Ramos as heros;
Ramos, who led the rebellion with Enrile, now serves as Armed Forces Chief of Staff.
We believe Aquino retained Fernandez, also an independent, as Governor of the Central
Bank because of his pivotal role in dealing with the nation's serious financial problems.
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He was appointed by, but always remained independent of, Marcos, and his experience
and expertise are respected by the international creditors with whom he has worked in
recent years to renegotiate the country's debt. Ongpin
insisted on Fernandez's appointment as a condition for his acceptance of the Finance
portfolio.
In our judgment, the key players in the Cabinet are Laurel, Enrile, Ongpin, Concepcion,
Fernandez, Pimentel, Mitra, and Arroyo. Enrile and the economic team hold portfolios
that must be handled effectively if the new government is to counter the Communist in-
surgency and rescue the country's battered economy. Pimentel and Mitra will play cru-
cial roles in establishing the new government's credibility and legitimacy in the country-
side. Arroyo, as Aquino's chief of staff, will probably exercise significant influence in
coordinating the Cabinet's overall activities.
Idealism Tempered With Pragmatism
Aquino's personal Cabinet choices fortify her popular image as the "moral alternative to
Marcos." They include several activist professionals who share the ethical and religious
principles that were the basis of her campaign. Sanchez, Arroyo, and Saguisag, for ex-
ample, are all outspoken civil libertarian lawyers. Ongpin, Concepcion, and Quisumbing
are--like, Aquino--deeply religious individuals with close ties to the Roman Catholic
Church.
At the same time, Aquino has brought in individuals with a solid grasp of economic and
political realities. Ongpin and Concepcion, for example, have each headed extremely
successful businesses; they are well qualified
to confront the serious economic challenges they face.
veterans of hardball Philippine politics.
Some Past Links to the Communist Party
Mitra, Pimentel, and Salonga are
Most of the members of Aquino's Cabinet are outspoken anti-Communists. However, at
least five--Sanchez, Saguisag, Arroyo, Mercado, and Ziga--have been allied in the past
to groups that the Communist Party of the Philippines has infiltrated. In our judgment,
each of these five appears typical of the activists who during the early 1980s allied
themselves to leftist groups because they were dissatisfied with the progress of the
moderate opposition and saw participation in radical groups as the only viable anti-Mar-
cos alternative available to them. Many of those activists rejoined the moderate camp
when its prospects improved in early 1984. The participation of Sanchez, Mercado, and
Ziga in the 1984 National Assembly elections and the early support of Saguisag and Ar-
royo for Aquino suggest that each has distanced himself from the CPP--which boycot-
ted both the 1984 elections and the Aquino campaign.
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How Will the New Team Begin?
We believe that the Aquino Cabinet will formulate and attempt to implement its reform
program cautiously. On the basis of their backgrounds and previous activities, we be-
lieve that the key players are intelligent and deliberate decisionmakers who are unlikely
to act rashly and who will attempt to rein in the demands for rapid change that may be
made by the public. The economic team (Ongpin, Concepcion, Fernandez, and Romulo)
is US trained, fiscally conservative, and generally free market oriented. US Embassy of-
ficials report, however, that the members of this group do have their differences; for ex-
ample, Concepcion may be the only one inclined to push for some protectionist meas-
Because of her inexperience with military matters, Aquino has publicly claimed that she
is allowing Enrile and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Ramos to take the lead in confronting
the military's serious personnel, logistics, and morale problems. However, Embassy offi-
cials say that in reality she has effectively excluded Enrile from the; chain of command
and hopes to remove him from the Cabinet. She is relying primarily on Ramos--who is
not a Cabinet member--to implement military reform and develop a counterinsurgency
program. Ramos has already replaced most of the Marcos loyalists in the officer corps
with reform-minded professionals.
Potential Trouble Spots
We believe that internecine squabbles are virtually certain to impair the Cabinet's func-
tioning and jeopardize its plans for political, economic, and military reform. Laurel and
Enrile, both of whom harbor longstanding presidential ambitions, will present the most
serious challenges to Aquino's authority. Both politicians have long-established, formi-
dable power bases. Although Laurel has been concurrently appointed Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister, he probably thinks that Aquino is still indebted to him because he
made a political sacrifice in agreeing to run under her and because it was his political
machine that ran their campaign. Enrile retains strong ties to the remnants of Marcos's
party, a well-entrenched political machine with a leadership gap that Enrile could at-
tempt to partially fill. He might try to co-opt some of the party into his power base and
use it as a political bloc in the Aquino government. Because of his hero status and
longtime connections to the military, he might have the support of some of the officer
corps.
Aquino, who trusts neither Laurel nor Enrile, will have to keep close
tabs on each and try to counter their moves or play them off one another in order to
remain in charge. Whether she is politically astute enough to beat them at their own
game is unclear. For the time being, however, her popular mandate has allowed her to
set the rules. she often makes decisions independently of
Laurel and excludes him from many policy planning sessions.
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The latent radicalism of some Cabinet members poses a potential threat to Cabinet
unity. If those members who were once involved with CPP-linked groups become dis-
satisfied with Aquino's leadership, they might again see radical action as a viable alter-
native. In that event, they could decide to align themselves with the left--which has
been largely isolated by Aquino's victory--and try to take some of Aquino's base of
support with them.
As a whole, the Aquino Cabinet appears to be generally well disposed toward the United
States. Embassy officials report that most of the members of the new team are long-
time contacts who have been friendly with them. However, nearly all of the new Cabi-
net members are strong nationalists who have at one time or another made public
statements attacking US support for the Marcos regime. Most 9f them--especially
those from Aquino's camp--have also publicly criticized either the presence of the US
military bases in the Philippines or the terms of the bilateral agreement that maintains
them. Some Cabinet members, including Arroyo, Ongpin, Saguisag, Sanchez, and Salon-
ga, appear to have tempered their criticism of the United States because of the positive
role this country played in facilitating the removal of Marcos. They have also down-
played opposition to the US bases in deference to Aquino's wish that the issue be sub-
ordinated for the time being.
We believe anti-US sentiment could reemerge if the strident nationalists in the Cabinet
think that the United States is either patronizing or not supporting the Aquino govern-
ment. In particular, the Cabinet could back away from its current support for Aquino's
"options open" policy on the bases: several of its members, including key players such
as Arroyo, Ongpin, and Pimentel, have often stated in the past that the bases should
eventually be dismantled.
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SUBJECT: The Aquino Cabinet: A Preliminary Assessment
Original - OCR/AN/Asia
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