REQUEST BY DIRECTOR WICK ON 19 MARCH 1985

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-00733R000200180014-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: March 22, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP88-00733R000200180014-9
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
P. O. Box 2604
Washington, D. C. 20013
MEMORANDUM FOR: William Eames
U.S. Information Agency
SUBJECT:
FBIS Comment on Soviet Media Expansion with Suggested
Videotape Material
REFERENCE: Request by Director) on 19 March 1985
1. Attachment A includes some FBIS observations on Soviet efforts
to use television in reaching Western and Third World audiences as well
as their continuing program to upgrade television broadcasting in the
Soviet Union. I'm sure much of this information is already available to
you but thought you would want our views in any case.
2. Attachment B lists several videotapes we have on hand that might
be useful in preparing the visual you are planning. The Ogarkov and
Gromyko press conferences illustrate the Soviet attempts to use meetings
with the press to explain or argue their positions. The docudrama is an
example of using feature material to put the United States in a bad light.
If you want any of the tapes mentioned, give me a call.
3. Let me know if I can do anything further.
STAT
cc: Gerald Campbell, Asst to Director USIA
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP88-00733R000200180014-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP88-00733R000200180014-9
SUBJECT: FBIS Comment on Soviet Media Expansion with Suggested Videotape
Material
DDS$T/FBIS/
22 Mar 85) STAT
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee (w/atts)
1
- Gerald Campbell, Asst to Director USIA (w/atts)
1
- DDS$T (w/atts)
1
- C/MOD (w/atts)
1
- C/AG (w/atts)
1
- D/FBIS Chrono (w/atts)
1
- JDC Corres file (w/atts)
1
- USIA file (w/atts)
1
- FBIS Registry (w/atts)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP88-00733R000200180014-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP88-00733R000200180014-9
EXPANSION OF SOVIET MEDIA EFFORT
1. Soviet public statements have consistently pictured a war
between two opposing ideologies, in which the West has heavily invested
in an effort to spread its repertory of "dirty tricks"--from designer
jeans to rock music--and uses shortwave broadcasting to sway the minds of
listeners in the Soviet Union and the Third World. The top Soviet
leadership has in effect rationalized the heavy outlay of resources for
foreign broadcasting operations on grounds that the West--in the words of
Konstantin Chernenko in June 1983--is attempting to launch "an
information-propaganda intervention against us." Chernenko continued:
We must increase the persuasiveness, timeliness, attractiveness,
and interest of our materials intended for foreign audiences,
effectively revealing the concrete substance of our peaceloving
international policies.
2. The Kremlin's strong interest in expanding Soviet television
capabilities, however, is focused chiefly on an effort to upgrade TV
aimed at the Soviet domestic audience. Soviet media's report on an
August 1984 politburo meeting noted that the Politburo expressed its
interest in "the development of multi-channel color broadcasting and the
significant elevation of its quality." A front-page editorial in PRAVDA
on 19 October elaborated on shortages and poor quality of television
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP88-00733R000200180014-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP88-00733R000200180014-9
equipment in the Soviet Union and lamented that "many regions, mainly
remote rural areas" of the country, were still unable to receive
television programs.
3. Moscow's primary strategy for getting its message across to the
international television audience appears to lie in an effort to use
Western television rather than to expand its own international
capabilities. Illustrations of the strategy are (1) widespread use of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference as a new forum for
expressing Soviet views to the foreign press in Moscow and (2) the use of
American television reporters as channels for publicizing "interviews"
with the top Soviet leaders:
Since July of last year the Foreign Ministry has held 30 press
conferences, heavily focused on arms control issues and
obviously aimed at the Western press, since they were given
little play in Soviet domestic media. Moscow's appreciation
of the press conference as a vehicle for spreading its
message was exemplified in 1983 after the KAL shootdown when
General Ogarkov used a televised briefing to make the Soviet
case.
In November 1984 and February 1985, Moscow released replies
by then General Secretary Chernenko to questions from two
American television correspondents--Marvin Kalb of NBC and
Stuart Loory of Cable News Network.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP88-00733R000200180014-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP88-00733R000200180014-9
4. Another manifestation of this strategy is Moscow's readiness to
make its spokesmen available for appearances on American newspanel
discussions programs. Just last Sunday (17 March), for example, S.
Menshikov, an advisor to the Central Committee, appreared on one of the
major networks' Sunday discussion shows. Joe Adamov was a commentator
for NBC during Chernenko's funeral, as he had been during Andropov's
funeral, and Vladimir Pozner is a fairly frequent participant on ABC's
"Nightline."
5. In the Soviet Union itself, there is a continuing effort to
upgrade and expand domestic radio and television facilities. One problem
being addressed is the matter of making Soviet television and other media
available to Soviet citizens in the many remote areas of the country.
This effort is continuing, although the Soviets are at the point where
additional progress is difficult and costly. Indications are that
currently more than 90 percent of the population receives the first
television program and close to 50 percent receives the second (with the
latter figure continuing to climb).
6. The variety of programs available, at least in the more
populated areas, is expanding. Within the past 6 months, for example, a
number of major transmitting towers have either been commissioned or are
nearing completion. Soviet reports note that inhabitants in the expanded
coverage areas will be able to receive "four radio and six TV channels"
in Kazakhstan's capital, Alma-Ata, or "five TV and four radio programs"
in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent, to name only two recent examples.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP88-00733R000200180014-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP88-00733R000200180014-9
7. The delivery of domestic television programming via satellite is
also developing and expanding. For example, the Soviet Union has an
EKRAN satellite system operational designed for direct transmission to
home receivers. Moscow has plans to launch a satellite system known as
LUCH which more closely resembles a true Direct Broadcast by Satellite
system. This satellite is to operate in the Ku band with enough power to
permit the use of small receiving dishes. The program is behind schedule
and no satellites have yet been launched.
8. Current Soviet open media reporting of telecommunications
activities suggests the USSR will continue for the foreseeable future
using a variety of methods to expand domestic radio and television
coverage, all the way from building traditional broadcasting towers
(although higher and with more powerful transmitters), to building micro-
wave and cable networks, to expanding their satellite network and mix.
9. INTERSPUTNIK, an international telecommunications organization
formed by Moscow and its East Bloc allies originally, has now expanded to
14 signatory members, including Afghanistan, Laos, Vietnam, South Yemen,
North Korea, and Cuba. INTERSPUTNIK actively seeks outside business,
particularly in the Third World. INTERSPUTNIK uses transponders on three
Gorizont satellites, which with the acquisition of the use of the third
satellite in late 1984 gives it virtually worldwide coverage. All
traffic goes through ground stations in the Soviet Union; thus no
transmissions direct from one user to another are possible.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP88-00733R000200180014-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP88-00733R000200180014-9
10. A major user of INTERSPUTNIK is INTERVISION--the East Bloc
counterpart to EUROVISION. INTERVISION distributes television program-
ming offered by INTERSPUTNIK members among the various network users.
Some Third World and even U.S. customers have used the system. India
used INTERSPUTNIK for the better part of a year after a U.S.-built
satellite failed on launch. Ted Turner's Cable News Network took relays
of the Bloc's 1984 Friendship Games in Moscow.
11. INTERSPUTNIK's charges to users are less than INTELSAT's. It
remains to be seen over the long run what impact that may yet have,
particularly in view of the increased coverage INTERSPUTNIK now enjoys.
12. The Soviet Union's international radio broadcasts are
transmitted in 80 languages and dialects. Outside the Soviet Union,
Radio Moscow uses transmitters in Bulgaria, Cuba, East Germany, and
Mongolia to relay certain programming. It is also known to transmit
programs over local radio facilities in some of the target countries.
13. As of May 1984, TASS transmitted an international service in
Russian radioteletype to unspecified recipients, as well as a trans-
mission to Hanoi and one destined for XINHUA in Beijing. These
transmissions have not been observed recently, however, and it is
possible they have gone to satellites. Only a few TASS transmissions
remain on shortwave. These include Arabic transmissions to the Arab
world; English to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and West Africa;
French to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and West Africa; and in
Portuguese to unspecified recipients.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP88-00733R000200180014-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP88-00733R000200180014-9
VIDEOTAPE EXAMPLES OF SOVIET TV PROPAGANDA
The following videotapes in the FBIS collection may be useful in
demonstrating Soviet television efforts to (1) reach foreign television
audiences and (2) attack the United States in the international arena.
Tape No. 1 - General Ogarkov's press conference on the KAL
shootdown (Moscow TV 1225 GMT 10 September 1983)
Tape No. 2 - Gromyko press conference (Moscow TV 1500 W
13 January 1985)
Tape No. 3 - Feature program, from the series "TASS Is
Authorized to State," docudrama on fictitious CIA effort to
overthrow African government (18 tapes in all) (Moscow TV 30 July-
9 August 1984)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP88-00733R000200180014-9