FBIS RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO. 1 IN THE HELMS 2 OCTOBER LETTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-00733R000200250032-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: October 18, 1985
• Content Type: MISC

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FRO EXTENSION NO. FBIS-0429/85
erector, Foreign Broadcast
DATE
Information Service 18 October 1985
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
DATE
building)
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Deputy Director for
Science and Technology
Room 6E45, Headquarters
Evan:
2.
Attached is the memo from
Senator Helms. SOVA has the
3,
action on question #1 which
FBIS is helping
with. (F 16 input is attached.)
4.
Also note the criticism on page
one of Senator Helms' letter
concerning the Avis Boutell book
5,
review.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS
1_79 EDITIONS
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FBIS Response to Question No. 1 in the Helms 2 October Letter
FBIS from its inception, when it successfully applied propaganda
analysis techniques to Nazi broadcasts, has engaged in the systematic
analysis of tightly controlled media, particularly Soviet and Chinese
media. The premise underlying this methodology is that such media are
highly controlled, purposive, and sensitive instruments. Close and
rigorous examination of changes and anomalies in the behavior of these
instruments has over the years yielded significant insights into the
policies and politics of the countries involved. These insights provide
both heuristic and corroborative evidence for use in all-source
analysis. The kind of rigorous scrutiny of the media that is.required is
a full-time, specialized occupation that cannot be diffused among
all-source analysts.
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STAT
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
2
DDCI
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
S
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OLL
14
D/PAO
15
VC/NIC
16
17
C/ACIS
18
NI0/USSR
X
19
NIO SP
20
D/SOYA/D
X
21
22
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WASHINGTON. O.C. 20510
1L
October 2, 1985
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
In the past we have written to you seeking information about the long-
standing problem at the Central Intelligence Agency regarding an apparent
analytical bias which continuously under-estimates Soviet intentions and
capabilities. Some have even characterized this bias as "pro-Soviet." We
posed a:series of questions, the answers to which would assist us in
reviewing this problem, on April 25, 1935; to date no response has been
received.
Now the problem has surfaced in public again. According to a recent
newspaper article, the CIA's internal publication Studies in intelligence,
recently published a book review of a volume by two distinguished academic
scholars on the topic of Soviet Disinformation. Soviet Disinformation is a
very serious intelligence and political problem to which you, Mr. President,
have personally called world-wide attention. Soviet Disinformation
techniques are part of a larger intelligence problem which entails Soviet
"Active Measures"-the so-called Maskirovka techniques of Camouflage,
concealment and Deception.
Yet according to the article attached, the review by CIA's
publication reads as though it were written in Moscow. Instead of
criticizing the analysis of the authors, it attacks the very concept that
Maskirovka actually exists. Indeed, according to the information available,
the CIA review reads like a piece of disinformation itself, and appears to
serve Soviet foreign policy interests. Of course, we do not have the actual
text, so we ask that you supply the text to us: The article we seek is an
unclassified review by Avis Boutell in Studies in Intelligence of the book
Dezinformatsia by Richard H. Shultz and Ray Godson.-
It seems strange for the CIA to be attacking the serious analysis of
Soviet Disinformation, when the CIA should be taking the lead in unmasking
Soviet Disinformation. This appears to be part of the well-documented, much
larger problem at CIA--the long-standing habit of the CIA of under- a
estimating Soviet intentions and military capabilities. America is now
faced with the dangerous implications of Soviet military supremacy, as you
have confirmed by at least eight statements you have made since 1982, and by
the numbers and trends in coq:)arative U.S.-Soviet armaments.
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Tie President
October 3, 1985
Page 2
In the most important measures of military power, the gaps between
Soviet capabilities are growing larger, not smaller, despite your
vg. ous ram. We are still losing ground to the
vigorous D De efense Modernization Prop
Soviets--ate these gaps will continue to widen over the next five years. In
fact, we are over 38 billion dollars behind President Carter's Five Year
Defense Program, as you pointed out on March 22, 1985. Thus the
"correlation of forces" has indeed decisively shifted against the United
States, as Soviet political and military leaders frequently assert.
The bias of the CIA for under-estimating Soviet intentions and
capabilities over the last 25 years has already had a deleterious effect on
U.S. national security. But the recent implications of information
resulting from KGB defections suggests that we should inquire further into
the problem of this bias. Accordingly, we therefore request answers to the
following additional questions as soon as possible:
1. Why does the CIA produce single-source analysis of Soviet and
Corrununist Chinese open publications such as is done by Foreign Broadcast
Information Service?
2. Is there an internal CIA review process to identify possible pro-
Soviet bias in published unclassified or classified analytical products?
3. Was the attached article mentioned above screened to detect its
possible pro-Soviet bias? if not, why not? If so, why was it published
under the official imprimatur of the CIA?
4. is there a possible pro-Soviet bias in many CIA products over the
past 20 years?
5. Is there any evidence of the influence of possible pro-Soviet
penetrations, moles or bias in the preparation, analysis and dissemination
of intelligence products on the Soviet Union over the past -20 years?-.-
6. Has any important-intelligence analysis or evidence related to-
the Soviet Union ever been withheld or suppressed within or by the CIA? Did
any of this intelligence evidence or analysis reveal Soviet deception? What
is the Counterintelligence significance of the suppression of intelligence
on Soviet deception?
7. Could a possible pro-Soviet bias have played a role in thee
prolonged and worsening CIA under-estimates of Soviet strategic forces in
the 1960's and 1970's?
8. We have recent reports that the CIA:
a.) Has further down-graded Soviet Backfire bomber range
PA'3 #I , 1:tt (I
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.The President Jr
October 3, 1985 ~~
Page3
0
estimates;
b.) Is negatively reassessing evidence of Soviet Biological and } ~'~ s(,v~
Chemical Warfare arms control violations;
c.) Is trying to change seismic verification methodology to make. GIS
Soviet violations of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty disappear,
d.) Has down-graded the accuracy of the Soviet SS-19 ICBM in a
belated attempt to disprove the B Team;
e.) Is denying and down playing evidence of Soviet Camouflage, W(0,f5?
~. Concealment and Deception (Maskirovka);
Mh f.) Is denying the possibility of Soviet mole penetrations and ~~ rJ
deception in humint espionage channels;
g.) Has finally corpleted National Intelligence Estimate 11-11 on
Soviet Strategic Deception after three years, but continues to
deny Soviet SALT I negotiating deception on the size of the
Soviet SS-19 IC1, the range of the SS-N-8, the number of
Soviet SLaMs in 1972, the "geographical asymmetries" rationale
for Soviet SLBM superiority, Brezhnev's pledge not to build
mobile ICS's, Brezhnev's Backfire bomber pledge, Soviet-
supplied Backfire bomber range data, and the Soviet SALT II
Data Base.
Are these recent reports correct? Are they best explained by an
under-estimative analytical bias, a possible pro-Soviet bias,
bureaucratic incompetence, or all of the above?.
IJ) I
10. Are reports that CIA has regressed into continued under-estimation
of Soviet military spending correct? -?--
11. Did the CIA miscount both the Soviet ICBM and SUM totals, the-
main limitations, during SALT I? Did Soviet Camouflage, Concealment and Deception play a role in causing these miscounts?
Have traces of other CIA moles ever been detected?
9. Was John Paisley likely to have been a Soviet KGB mole inside the
CIA, who may have been assassinated by the KGB in order to protect other CIA
moles? What is the best assessment of Paisley's full career and death?
12. Did the CIA also fail to'project either the heavy threw-weight of
the SS-19 or the long range of the SS N-8 at the time SALT I was signed in -
1972? Was Soviet Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception involved in-these
under-estimates? -? .-
13. Has the CIA consistently under-estimated Soviet global objectives
and misunderstood Soviet arms control objectives?
Of r
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October 3, 1985
Page 4.
14. Can at least five years of the 10 year 1980-1990 U.S. "window of
vulnerability" be attributed to under-estimates by CIA of Soviet ICBM
accuracies?
In sum, we strongly agree with CIA Director Casey's initial assessment
of the CIA's analytical track record made on February 13, 1981:
"The most frequent criticism is that our [CIA's] interpretations and
assessments have shown a tendency to be overly optimistic, to place a
benign interpretation on information which could be interpreted as
indicating danger. It's our obligation to present conclusions which
emphasize hard reality undistorted by preconceptions or by wishful
thinking...i found in SALT I, for example, that some of the [CIA]
judgements were soft. They leaned toward a kind of benign
interpretation rather that a harder interpretation of assessing or
viewing a situation as being more dangerous." (gnphasis added.)
We fear, however, that despite Director Casey's best efforts, the
CIA's performance has not improved.
Thank you for your prompt response to these important questions. We
also again request belated answers to our April 25, 1985 questions (letter
attached.)
Sincerely,
Copies to:
Director, CIA
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director CIA Counter-Intelligence --
National Intelligence Officer for Deception
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff
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The President
October 3, 1985
Page 5
National Intelligence officers for U.S.S.R. and Strategic Forces
Director, DIA
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Chairman, Intelligence Oversight Board
Chairman, Senate Intelligence Committee
Attachments:
Washington Times Article "Misinformation on Disinformation" (July 16, 1985)
Unanswered Symms -11allcp-Helms letter to the President of April 25, 1985
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A=HINC-TON. r >c. ,C,10
April 25, 1985
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President;
As you know, we have long been concerned about improving U.S.
capabilities to verify arms control treaties with the Soviet
Union. In addition, we have long been concerned with enforcing
Soviet compliance, now that multiple Soviet violations have been
confirmed.
As strategic arms control negotiations resume in Geneva, we have
some additional concerns about U.S. ability to verify existing
and proposed arms control treaties. We have a series of
questions on arms control verification for which we request
expedited answers:
1. In 1983, the CIA published a National Intelligence
Estimate entitled "Soviet Arms Control Objectives."
This NIE reportedly concluded that the Soviets would
never sign an arms control treaty with the U. S. with
the intention of violating it, but that the Soviets
would merely exploit loopholes and ambiguities. This
conclusion, however, contradicts the Defense- Department
Annual Report for FY 1985, which states: -.
"Several of these violations must-have- been
planned by Soviet authorities zany years ago, in
some cases perhaps at the very time the- Soviet
union entered into the Agreements."
The NIE also contradicts- your own Presidential Reports
to Congress on Soviet Arms Control Violations of January
23, 1984, October 10, 1984, and February-
was the Chief of CIA's Arms Control Intelligence.Staff
and the National Intelligence Officers for Strategic
Programs and USSR when this NIE was written? CIA's view-of Soviet arms control objectives chHas th
angedenow
that multiple- Soviet violations have been confirmed?
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The President
April 25, 1985
Page 2
2. In March, 1982, CIA Director Casey was interviewed by
U.S. News and World Report on the Kennedy-Khrushchev
Agreement ending the 1982 Cuban Missile Crisis. Casey
stated that the Soviets had been violating this
agreement since 1962 by deploying offensive weapons in
Cuba. The Chief of CIA's Arms Control Intelligence
Staff then, however, reportedly refused to admit that
the Soviets had made any commitments under the Kennedy-
Khrushchev Agreement. Did the State Department allow
the CIA access to the diplomatic history of the
Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement? Who was CIA's Chief of
ACIS at that time? Has his view changed, in light of
your own two public charges that the Soviets have
violated the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement? - -
3. In September, 1981, the Soviets failed to give pro er
notification of their Zapad 81 military exercise under 9C~S
the terms of the Helsinki Agreement. Did CIA
officially notify the Arms Control Agency of this fact,
so that ACDA could make a Derwinski Amendment (Section
37 of ACDA Act) Re
port to Congress at the time? Who
was CIA's ACIS Chief at the time?
4. In 1976, the Soviets sent their first Kirov class
aircraft carrier through the Turkish Straits. Did CIA
report this to ACDA at the time, so that ACDA could
report it to the Congress as a Soviet violation of the
Montreux Convention? Who was in charge of CIA's arms
control intelligence at the time? Has CI
A ever
reported Soviet Montreaux Convention violations to _
ACDA?
5. The Soviets have reportedly been engaged in a -.
continuously expanding pattern of Camouflage,=.,
Concealment; and Deception (CCD) since the SALT I
negotiations began in November
196
,
9._Yet the February
1978 Carter_Administratibn White Paper--on Soviet-Arms-
Control
Control Compliance state
th
s
at when the O.S. brought
this expanding pattern of Soviet. Camouflae _
Concealment, and Deception to the attention of the
Soviets in the SALT Standing Consultative Corrunission in
the Spring of.1975, the pattern ceased to expand. The
1978 Carter White Paper was incorrect, however. The
1979 Molander report to Congress on the verifiability.
of SALT II-confirms- that- the pattern
f
o
Soviet CCD -- - -
continued to expand. The pattern' continued to expand
since 1979, and has continued to expand through today.
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..The President
April 25, 1985
Page 3
This Soviet CCD is a violation of SALT I and SALT II,
because it constitutes deliberate interference with
U.S. National Technical Means of Verification. Soviet
CCD has not been mentioned in either the January 23,
1984 or February 1, 1985 Presidential Reports On Soviet
SALT Violations. Why? Who was CIA chief of arms
control intelligence in 1978 and in 1984? Why has
Soviet CCD not been reported to Congress as a SALT
violation?
6. Has CIA at any time contradicted the judgement of the
1978 Carter White paper that Soviet CCD did not violate
SALT? If so,-then why was this judgement not part of
the two Presidential Reports to Congress on Soviet
Violations? If not, does CIA believe that Soviet CCD
is consistent with the provisions of SALT I and SALT
II? Who was CIA's chief of ACIS at the time of the
1984 and 1985 Presidential Reports?
7. Did CIA do a report that the Soviet SS-16 mobile ICBM
was probably deployed in violation of SALT II prior to
ACDA's "Sorrells" report in April 1982? Who was in
charge of CIA's ACIS at that time?
8. The Conventional Weapons Convention entered into force
on December 2, 1983. Yet since then there have been
public reports that the Soviets have used booby traps
designed to look like toys and cluster bomb anti-
personnel munitions to maim and kill countless Afghan
women and children--in violation of the_ Conventional
Weapons Convention.... Has CIA reported- these atrocities
to ACDA, so, that'.they. could be reported to Congress-
under the Derwinski Amendment? '_.Who was in. charge of
CIA's ACIS in:1983?
9. Has CIA's ACIS ever.furnished- to ACDA an Intelligence
Report on the-veri_fiability_of. -the Outer- Space..Treaty_.._.
?
of 1967, so-that ACDA could make a Section 37 report- to
Congress? Who.has_been in charge of arms control ? -
intelligence_at CIA since 1967? -
10. The Soviets- have- reportedly been testing surface-to-air.
missiles and radars in an Anti-Ballistic missile mode
since SALT :I _was -ratified. in.' 1972. _ Did CIA ever report -
- this Soviet:testing_of.S;Ms in a-prohibited AB`i mode-to.
ACDA, so. that a report. to Congress could -be made? Who - ?
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The President
April 25, 1985
Page 4
has been in charge of CIA arms control intelligence
since 1972?
11. Has CIA issued a report to ACDA on Soviet arms shipments
into the Western Hemisphere which may have violated the
Rio Pact of 1947? Was the Marxist-Leninist government
of Nicaragua a recipient of these contraband Soviet
arms? Who is in charge of CIA's arms control
intelligence?
12. Soviet Air Force Backfire bombers have reportedly been
staged and based at Arctic bases beginning in 1983. Did
CIA report this to ACDA so that a report could be made
to Congress? Who was in charge of CIA's arms control
intelligence? --
13. In April, 1984, a salvo of multiple Soviet SS-20's was
reportedly fired on a northerly azimuth aimed at the
O.S. Did CIA report this to ACDA so that ACDA could
report to Congress? Did this affect the CIA's
assessment of whether the SS-20 might be a covert ICBM,
and did this affect the CIA's assessment *of the Soviet's
SALT II Data Base? Who was in charge of arms control
intelligence at CIA at this time?
14. Soviet Biological Warfare facilities reportedly
continued to expand after the Biological Warfare
Convention was signed in 1972, and they reportedly
continued to expand after the Convention was ratified by
the Soviets- in 1975. Did CIA-report these. expansions to
ACDA? How -many innocent people-have been killed since_
1972 by Soviet' Biological Warfare agents?_ Did. CIA-.
oppose the _-c-stablishment of a BW. Verification:_'_:_-.;
Interagency Group in the- spring of 1976? Who Vas in-.--.--
charge of arms-control intelligence-then at CIA?
15. Have Soviet:subrnarine tunnels' impeded-0S verification of
SALT I and SALT II?-- Are they' completed? -.:Did-CIA report
their hindrance of verification and' their completion to -
ACDA, so ACDA could report to Congress? Who.was in
charge of CIA's arms control intelligence at this tire?
16. Has the Under- Secretary of_Defense for Policy .just
turned down a RAND Corporation- proposed -study. of Soviet
- Camouflage, Concealment- and. Deception?- Why?-:
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The. President
1-pr,i 1 25, 1985
:P,age 5
Mr. President, these are all serious questions, which we request
answers for as soon as possible. We are planning to request
Senate hearings on the issues covered by these questions, as well
as on the Constitutional aspects of arms control treaty making.
With warmest personal regards,
Sincerely,
Copies to:-
Secretary of State_ --f
Secretary of Defense-
Director,
CIA
Chairman,
JCS =_,._-- -
Director,
ACDA -_-._
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
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