INTERVIEW WITH DR. OSAMA EL-BAZ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000100310003-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO N REPORTS, ~N~.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
STATION WDVM-TV
CBS Network
~A~ August 1, 1982 11:30 A.M. C~IY Washington, D.C.
Interview with Dr. O~ama El-Baz
GEORGE HERMAN: Dr. E1-Baz, yesterday Yasser Arafat told
his PLO forces to tighten up their defenses in Beirut. And
during the night, as you know, Israel attacked in force and took
Beirut's airport. As the counselor to President Mubarak of
Egypt, how do you evaluate this? What is going on in Beirut?
OSAMA EL-BAZ: What is going on in Beirut is very
dangerous, as a matter of fact. It is an Israeli operation, an
Israeli attempt to storm the city, to capture it, to eliminate
the PLO as a political force after weakening it as a military
force. And they believe that by this way they'll be solving the
Palestinian question or getting rid of it. Which is not the
case. The encirclement of the city of Beirut is not going to --
and the storming of it and the continuous bombardment of the city
of West Beirut is not going to contribute at all to a peaceful
solution in the region, to the country. And this is apt to
increase the degree of tension and instability.
ANNOUNCER: From CBS News, Washington, a spontaneous and
unrehearsed news interview on Face the Nation with the political
counselor and director of the political office of Egyptian
President Mubarak, Osama El-Baz. Dr. E1-Baz will be questioned
by CBS News diplomatic correspondent Robert Pierpoint; by Karen
Elliott House, diplomatic correspondent for the Wall Street
Journal; and by the moderator, C8S News correspondent George
Herman.
HERMAN: Dr. El-Baz, your first answer sounded as though
you think what is happening in Beirut now is the beginning of the
final battle for that city. Is that correct?
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EL-BAZ: Yes, sir. We believe that this is the
beginning of the final battle. It reminds me very much of what
happened in Warsaw during the Second World War. And I believe
that it is most dangerous. We are afraid of the consequences,
what will happen throughout the region. And whatever happened in
that sensitive region will affect other regions of the world,
including this country and its own interests in the area.
KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE: If the Israelis are indeed
launching the final siege on West Beirut, what are the political
consequences in the region of that act?
EL-BAZ: First of all, you fill find an inevitable
radicalization of the Palestinian movement, as well as the Arab
movement. Second, you'll not be able to solve the Lebanese
questions, let alone the Palestinian question.
The interest of this country in the region will suffer
tremendously because the perception of the people there is that
the U.S. has acquiesced, one way or the other, to the Israeli
operation. The Israeli actions and statements have not done much
to dispel this impression. In fact, Premier Begin, the other
day, said that he received messages from Washington that the U.S.
was not opposed to the bombing of Beirut and bombarment, and so
on.
And it is this for this reason that we believe that the
consequences will be very grave.
ROBERT PIERPOINT: Dr. El-Baz, despite what some of the
Arabs seem to believe, I think the rest of the world recognizes
that we really cannot control our friends and allies, the
Israelis, that they seem to do what they want to do when they
want to do it. As you suggest, we now face a very serious
situation in West Beirut.
Do you, as Arabs, have any influence on the
Palestinians? Have they not been stalling, and could you not
persuade them to leave?
EL-BAZ: The question is not to persuade them to leave.
The question is to persuade them that a political solution is in
the coming, that the political solution is possible, that this is
much better than resorting to violence, and so on. This is our
-- the thrust of our effort toward the Palestinians.
We believe that we've been having some success with
them. We have succeeded in getting some statements from Chairman
Arafat, even though he has not been forthcoming enough. But
still, the mere fact that he made these commitments to an
American delegation -- out of all delegations, he did not do it
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to an Arab delegation, to a Soviet delegation, European
delegation, or a Third World delegation. He made it to an
American delegation. And that he made it very clear that he
prefers a political solution.
PIERPOINT: But that statement that he made did not
really say that the PLO recognizes Israel's right to exist in
peace. Why can you not persuade Arafat to do that and end this
bloodshed?
EL-BAZ: We've been trying to .persuade him to that. His
argument -- and I think it is not without validity -- is that he
cannot do this gratis, he cannot do it unilaterally while Israeli
is not doing anything on its part. But if he does this in
exchange for a dialogue with the U.S., then what is he going to
give in exchange when he sits down with Israel on the negotiating
table? He will have to give something. There must be a quid pro
quo. And he will be willing to do this in exchange for Israeli
recognition of the Palestinian people's right to
self-determination.
HOUSE: If you're right and this is the final Israeli
assault on the city, then it's too late to talk about what the
PLO can do to get itself extracted from the situation. Why do
you think -- what is it about this Israeli move that makes you
think this is really it, the long-awaited invasion, quote?
EL-BAZ: The invasion might not take the shape of
occupying the entire city. It could take some other forms. It
could take what they call carpet bombing over a certain part of
the city, and then attacking selected areas of the city, until
they destroy the will of the resistance over there, or until the
local population gets sick and tired of that.
HOUSE: What is it about this particular Israeli move
that makes you think this is unlike the bombardments that have
been going on in recent weeks, that this is it?
EL-BAZ: Because there has been -- there have been some
indications that the Israelis will get impatient. They feel that
time is running out and that time is not in their favor, on their
side. The opposition to the Israeli operation is building up,
not only internationally, but inside Israel itself. And so many
people are questioning the wisdom of the whole operation. They
are questioning Sharon's policy. They are questioning the basic
premises underlying this policy.
It is for this reason that we believe that they might be
tempted to finish it abruptly like that.
HERMAN: You mentioned that you in Egypt are afraid of
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the consequences. Can you lead me sort of step-by-step through
your scenario of the consequences, what will happen, first, to
the leadership of the PLO, then to world relations?
EL-BAZ: Sure. If the leadership of the PLO, the
present leadership of the PLO is eliminated or weakened, humili-
tated and weakened -- I mean pushed, forced to surrender or to
depart under these humiliating terms, then most -- the movement
itself will not disappear. Most likely, it's going to be
replaced by a radical leadership that will not accept the
proposition of peace. A radical leadership will advocate
violence as a means of dealing with Israeli violence, because
they will say that Israel is determined to eliminate, annihilate
the Palestinians, and so on.
So, they will find much support within the ranks of the
Palestinians because so many Palestinians are now questioning.
There's a soul-searching movement inside the Palestinians, in
general.
HERMAN: You're referring to the Palestinians who are in
other Arab countries.
EL-BAZ: Exactly. Because you have Palestinians spread
all over the Arab world. You have over 30-50 thousand in Kuwait.
You have over a million in Jordan. You have more than a quarter
of a million in Syria. You have a big number in Lebanon, in
Egypt, in other countries of the Gulf, and so on.
So, it is really dangerous to force the Palestinian
movement to become radicalized. And this radicalization will
have a snowballing impact on the Arab movement in general. The
Arab movement will tend to be radicalized, because this will be
the catalyst for radicalizing the Arab movement in other
countries. Then the U.S. will be viewed as an accomplice.
The argument for that is that the U.S. could have
prevented the Israeli action, they could have moderated, they
could have asked Israel to stop when they reached the 25-mile
limit, Because Israel's only legitimate claim would be to ask
for security guarantees or security measures, an arrangement in
the southern part of Lebanon. But to do it this way, to encircle
the city of Beirut, to attempt to force a solution to the
Lebanese question and to arrange all the political map of Lebanon
and to decide the fate of the Palestinians in Lebanon, not only
the Palestinians under Israeli control on the West Bank and Gaza,
this is all seen and viewed by most Arabs and other people in the
region as receiving some kind of an American green light.
PIERPOINT: Dr. E1-Baz, what if your pessimistic
appraisal is incorrect? After all, the Israeli government, we
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understand, has already informed our government that this is not
an attempt to take all of West Beirut, that this is, apparently,
just a tightening of the noose of the Palestinians. So let's
assume the opposite, that -the Israelis are not yet ready to move
in, that there is still time to work out some kind of a
settlement.
Under what conditions could the Palestinians be
evacuated? And how many of them, for instance, would Egypt take,
and what kind of Palestinian?
EL-BAZ: The Palestinians, in my opinion, are not going
to depart from Lebanon unless they know what is going to happen
next. They cannot leave just to move from one country to the
other. It is not a question of dispersed in a diaspora or
creating a new exodus like that. Because what happens after it?
Suppose that they are distributed among three or four or
five Arab countries. Then what happens to the leadership, what
happens to the cadres, to the fighters, to the average
Palestinians living in this area? What is going to happen if
.they are left to an unknown destiny? Then the situation is going
to be worsened, is going to deteriorate progressively.
The important thing is to give them hope. One way to
give them hope is to get a commitment, at least from the U.S.,
that there's going to be a serious effort to solve the
Palestinians problem in all its aspects on the basis of
recognizing the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.
HOUSE: Have we given you that commitment? Have we
given the PLO or anyone else that commitment?
HOUSE: Or the Egyptians?
EL-BAZ: No. They are still hoping and they are
striving for it. They are fighting and they want to do
everything to get it. That's why Yasser Arafat made this
commitment to the American delegation. But they have not been
able to get any commitment yet. They are still hoping.
HOUSE: Suppose they don't get the commitment and the
Israelis go in. I mean how long? You say the PLO is not going
to leave without that commitment. And you also said earlier that
the Israelis, you fear, are going to go ahead and run out of
patience and go on in.
So, what -- how long do you have to get that kind of
commitment out of the U.S. before the whole ballgame is over and
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EL-BAZ: They have to get some signals, at least, that
the U.S. is moving in this direction. Because, hopefully, you
could have asked for an Israeli commitment. But the Israelis are
most uncooperative when it comes to that. It is very unlikely to
get an Israeli commitment. And it is for this reason that we're
asking for an alternative, for a substitute for this Israeli
commitment. The substitute would be an American commitment.
We need a commitment from the U.S. not to deliver an
Israeli position, but to take a certain position that is
consistent with the American values and the American way of life.
HERMAN: In support of what Bob was saying a moment ago
about your view being rather pessimistic, I am informed that
Beirut radio has now announced a new cease-fire will take place
within the hour. Now, that would give all parties a little time
to maneuver.
What should be the first thing done, in the case of such
a cease-fire?
EL-BAZ: The first thing that should be done is to
persuade the Israelis to stop tampering with the flow of water,
electricity, food supplies and medical supplies, and so on, to
West Beirut. The besieged city cannot live without water,
without electricity, without power, and without the essential
foodstuff, and so on. It reflects very badly.
HERMAN: You're aware that the PLO stopped some of the
foodstuffs from moving from the U.N. warehouse out into the PLO
sections of the city.
EL-BAZ: I think this is a misinformation, because what
happened is that some people wanted to transport from foodstuff
and medical supplies from Beirut to southern Lebanon. And that's
exactly what the PLO objected to. The PLO did not object to
moving any stuff to the city. But they objected to moving it
from the city. And that's logical. A city under siege like this
is not likely to allow the cutting off of a certain supply that
exists already within the city. And it is really burdened by
half a million people, not only the Palestinians, but the
Lebanese as well.
HERMAN: We're stuck on the first step, That should be
the first step, concluding the blockade. Then what can be done
to put forward the process of peace?
EL-BAZ: Then the Palestinians should get some signals
that the Americans are responsive to their demand, to their
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aspirations, to their rights, because they would like to know
exactly what's going to happen. And [unintelligible] if they
know, if they get some assurance, or some signals, at least, that
the U.S. is moving in this direction in stages, certain steps, in
due course, then they will...
HERMAN: ...you've come to the United States to find out
what the American intentions are. Do you think that is what the
American intention is? Is it willing to give the Palestinians
such a signal?
EL-BAZ: I believe that the U.S. Government is very
concerned, and I think the general public is very concerned also.
They cannot be indifferent to the suffering and to the damage
and the devastation that has been inflicted on the people there
in Beirut and in Lebanon, both Palestinians and Lebanese
children.
HERMAN: But did Secretary Shultz give you the feeling
that he was willing to send such a signal?
EL-BAZ: The feeling, the impression we got is that they
open-minded about it, but they believe that this kind of move
needs time and it cannot be forced in a short period of time.
They should have their own time. And, of course, we believe that
this is legitimate.
We have here to emphasize between certain different
considerations. On the one hand, we would like to prevent the
storming, an Israeli attack on the city, an all-out attack on the
city. But on the other hand, we would like to -- we should not
concentrate solely and exclusively on the question of Beirut,
because the problem is much broader and wider than that.
Suppose we succeed in preventing that, averting an
Israeli attack on Beirut. We will still be left with the
Lebanese overall question, the Israeli occupation there, the
friction that is generated by this occupation, and the setback
that is caused to the cause of peace. We have also the overall
question of the Palestinians. What's going to happen to the
Palestinians? Are the Palestinians going to take -- how are the
Palestinians going to respond to that, if they disperse under the
present circumstances in different Arab countries?
HOUSE: What is it that you're looking for from the
U.S., this signal? What is it you want us to do?
EL-BAZ: We would like the U.S. to endorse the right of
the Palestinians to self-determination, to say that in the final
settlement the U.S. is going to support the Palestinian people's
right to self-determination, as they have supported every
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people's right to self-determination. The Palestinians should
not be deprived of this God-given right.
PIERPOINT: Didn't the United States do that at the Camp
David agreement? I mean that's a part of the whole Camp David
framework.
EL-BAZ: Yes, but the language of the Camp David
framework is not clear enough on this point. The preponderance
of it, the weight of this in the Camp David agreement is there.
However, due to the genius of our American friends, there is also
what they call constructive ambiguity, as we all know, and the...
EL-BAZ: They do it in a different way. We all do it.
But the provisions are not very clear. They are still
ambivalent and ambiguous at times. What we need is a forthcoming
statement here.
And also, we should not forget the fact that the
policies, actions, statements of the Israeli government after the
signing of the Camp David framework created a wrong impression,
because the settlement policy, the practices, the oppressive
practices in the West Bank and Gaza, the statements by Prime
Minister Begin and his colleagues that there will never be
anything on the West Bank and Gaza other than the provisional
regime, the transitional regime of then autonomy, and soon, has
shed some doubt in the minds of many Palestinians.
What we are trying to do now is to remedy this
situation.
PIERPOINT: Would you favor the United States coming out
openly for an independent state for the Palestinians on the West
Bank? Is that what you're really asking?
EL-BAZ: That's not required at this stage because, in
fact, they might opt for a federation or a confederation with
Jordan, with Israel, with more than one country or two or three
countries in the region. We cannot decide this, otherwise it
would be prejudging the issue.
What we should -- what we're asking for is an American
commitment to the right of the Palestinian people to
self-determination.
HOUSE: Can you tell us where we are in this whole West
Beirut process? Have the Arabs come up with an agreement among
themselves to take the various PLO factions to different
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countries and does that agreement exist?
EL-BAZ: No. No, this agreement does not exist. The
Arabs have reached some sporadic principles and general ideas as
to the circumstances under which the Palestinians leadership and
cadres could leave West Beirut. This does not say that they will
accept their going, their departure from Lebanon to other Arab
countries. But there are certain sporadic -- you don't find a
solid Arab position on that yet.
HERMAN: Even inside Egypt you've had a little
vacillation. Didn't the president invite the PLO in June and
disinvite them in July?
EL-BAZ: No, no, no. To the contrary. We are not
vacillating on that point. We invited them in June. We invited
-- we asked them to form a provisional government in exile and we
offered them a headquarters in Cairo, and we're still offering
that. We'll never withdraw this invitation.
However, we are not willing to take the Palestinians who
are forced by the Israelis, because that's not a Palestinian
request. Had it been a Palestinian request for us to accept any
Palestinians, we would do it gladly. But this is an Israeli
demand. And under certain circumstances, without a certain.
commitment as to what's going to happen next, we believe that
we'll be doing the cause of peace a disservice.
PIERPOINT: Dr. E1-Baz, would you at this stage favor
the United States dealing directly with the PLO leadership, and
did your U.N. -- Foreign Minister urge President Reagan to do
that?
EL-BAZ: Yes, sir. Because we believe that it will
serve a good purpose. This will help the peace process. The
important thing is the purpose of these talks with the PLO. The
purpose will of course be to persuade the PLO leadership to be
more forthcoming, to accept 242...
HERMAN: What did the President say? Or Secretary
EL-BAZ: Well, as I said, they were willing to -- they
were listening very attentively, they were willing to think, and
they're open-minded. We got the impression that they're
open-minded. They didn't make any commitment. And they said
that they have to take their time. They'd like to examine
everything. Their impression was that what Chairman Arafat did
was inadequate, it needed some reinforcement, it needed some
confirmation or reaffirmation for the U.S. to move in this
direction. They said that there's a certain American commitment
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and they stand by it.
HOUSE: Do you detect a change in this country's Middle
East policy with the change of Secretaries of State from Haig too
Shultz?
EL-BAZ: I'm not sure. I would not place any bets on
that. The change, I think, will come as a result of the
realization of the American public that what is happening in the
Middle East now is not in the interest of this country, is not in
the interest of Israel, is not in the interest of the ,Middle
East.
HERMAN: Well, let me put it another way. Did you
detect a change from what you once called a haphazard,
disconnected moves here and there by the United States revealing
a certain lack of direction? Do you detect a change from that?
HERMAN: Explain.
EL-BAZ; We believe that the State Department or
Secretary Shultz are much more organized, and their approach
might be more scientific to foreign policy and they're much more
systematic.
This impression, as I said, is a very premature
impression because you cannot form an opinion in a matter of a
few hours. But we get the impression that they are studying each
point scientifically and they are doing research, they are trying
to be objective about it and they take their time. But they are
going -- at least in terms of the approach or procedure.
HERMAN: Thank you very much, Dr. E1-Baz, for being our
guest today on Face the Nation.
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