SENATOR DODD INTERVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000100650013-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 10, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
Face the Nation STATION WDVM-TV
CBS Network
DATE April 10, 1983 11:30 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
Senator Dodd Interview
GEORGE HERMAN: Senator Dodd, you're one of the Foreign
Relations Committee's leading experts on Central America. Let me
ask you this: What is the Reagan Administration trying to do in
Nicaragua? What is its ultimate aim? And is it breaking the law
trying to do it?
SENATOR CHRISTOPHER DODD: Well, let me take the second
part first. I think they clearly are breaking the law, the
Bolden Amendment, as adopted in the continuing resolution last
fall, clearly and explicitly prohibits the kind of activities
that the Reagan Administration is engaged in in Nicaragua and in
Honduras. Clearly, the Administration, beginning at the Re-
publican convention, if you will, in 1980, has as its central aim
and goal in Central America the destabilization and the overthrow
of the Sandinista government.
ANNOUNCER: From CBS News, Washington, a spontaneous and
unrehearsed news interview on Face the Nation with Senator
Christopher Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut and a member of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Senator Dodd will be questioned by CBS News State
Department correspondent Bill McLaughlin; by Don Oberdorfer,
diplomatic correspondent for the Washington Post; and by the
moderator, CBS News correspondent George Herman.
HERMAN: Senator Dodd, you say the Reagan Adminis-
tration's goal in Nicaragua is to overthrow the government. The
Administration, at least in off-the-record conversations, says
that is not so, that its aim is simply to stop or hamper the flow
Material supplied by Radio N Reports, Inc. may be used for file and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited.
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of supplies through Nicaragua to the rebels in El Salvador.
SENATOR DODD: Well, first of all, it was interesting
the other day before the Foreign Relations Committee, one of
Secretary Enders' deputies appearing before the committee with
regard to the question of how much arms are moving from Nicaragua
to El Salvador, in open testimony, the Administration cannot
quantify. They don't have any idea whether it's a very small
amount or a moderate amount or a large amount. And yet, over and
over and over again, words "substantial, "massive" are used to
describe that assistance, when in fact the Administration, by its
own account, has no idea what -- in fact, the last real cache of
arms was several years ago that they discovered.
So there's a basic fallacy, based on the Admini-
stration's own testimony, as to the justification for the support
of the guerrillas or insurgents in Honduras and in Nicaragua.
DON OBERDORFER: Senator, you say that the Admini-
stration is clearly breaking the law. And some of your col-
leagues on the Intellilgence Committee, both in the Senate and
the House, in a little less forceful terms, have suggested that
perhaps they're breaking the law.
If you believe the Administration is breaking the law,
what do you think that Congress will do about it? Do you think
they'll do anything about it?
SENATOR DODD: I believe we will. It's always hard to
predict, given the timing of things. But let me suggest two
things.
One is, of course, that law runs out on September 30th
of this year. So we're going to have to either reauthorize that
language or do something similar to it. I offered an amendment,
or offered the original amendment, which was then subsituted by
the Boland amendment. My amendment would have prohibited any
funding by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Defense
Department for any paramilitary group operating in Central
America. I think that would have been tighter, for the simple
reason that you could make an argument, as the Administration has
done, that even though it is our policy -- not, as they've stated
-- it is not our policy to overthrow the government of Nicaragua.
The fact that we may be providing assistance to some group who
has as its goal the determination to overthrow the Nicaraguan
government could be perceived, in a very legalistic way, as a
loophole. I would suggest that you tighten it right now, and I
intend to offer that language. That's number one.
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Number two, I don't normally like to see secret sessions
of the Senate. But I think the events of Central America are
reaching the point where I think it becomes extremely important
that we have that kind of a session for the entire Senate so we
can find out exactly what our government is doing, who we are
supporting, how far we intend to go. And I would hope to make
that suggestion this week.
BILL MCLAUGHLIN: Senator Dodd, your colleague Senator
Moynihan, who's on the Intelligence Committee, has expressed his
fears that we're breaking the law in Nicaragua. But he's also
suggested that it's a bad law and that perhaps this country
should change the law, because the Sandinista regime is not in
the interests of U.S. policy.
SENATOR DODD: Well, the question is, how do you want to
deal with that problem? Are we going to deal with it, as the
Administration seems determined to do, in a military way or in a
political way? I happen to believe that if you were to try and
synthesize the Administration's policy with regard to Central
America, it would come down to this: Get rid of the Sandinista
government in Nicaragua. They believe that if that could be
achieved, then all the other problems in Central America would
disappear.
You may recall back in early 1981 then-Secretary of
State Haig said we must go to the source. He identified the
source as being Cuba. I think since then the Administration has
moderated that identification of source and it includes Nic-
aragua. They happen to believe that: Get rid of Nicaragua, get
rid of the Sandinistas, rather, and you will solve all the
problems; and do that in a military way. That has been, basi-
cally, what they've been doing since '81, the spring of '81.
I think that's fundamentally wrong. I don't think, one,
that you're going to get rid of the problems of Central America
by getting rid of the Sandinistas. The revolution in Guatemala
and El Salvador predates the problems in Nicaragua.
And secondly, the inherent problems, the social,
economic, political problems. The Administration refuses to
recognize that those exist.
And for those two reasons, I think their approach --that
is, a military approach, supporting paramilitary groups to
overthrow that government -- is just categorically wrong and is
going to create far more problems in the months ahead.
MCLAUGHLIN: Well, then, what should our approach be, an
approach that would succeed in keeping out Soviet influence in
the area?
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SENATOR DODD: Well, why don't we -- I think it would be
so important if we were to listen to other voices in Nicaragua:
Alfonse Rabella; Archibishop Obando y Bravo; for instance;
the Chammoro family that ran La Prensa, the well-known news-
paper there; spokespeople for the human rights groups, for
instance. All have suggested that this Administration's policy
of a military overthrow, if you will, of the Sandinistas is
absolutely destructive of their efforts, which they perceived as
somewhat successful in moderating the government of Nicaragua.
I'm talking now about opposition groups inside Nicaragua,
opposition to the Sandinistas.
MCLAUGHLIN: Senator, but what can opposition groups do
in a regime that refuses to hold elections?
SENATOR DODD: Well, first of all, I'm not going to
defend the Sandinistas. They've done some things that run
directly contrary to their revolutionary effort. But it seems to
me there's a far greater chance of success by pursuing that
course than it is to support the old Somoza National Guard
troops.
People in Nicaragua are obviously not happy with the
Sandinistas. If there's one thing they fear more than the
Sandinistas, however, it's a return of the old Somoza forces.
And by the United States supporting the National Guard forces
under the Somoza regime, we're clealry allying ourselves with
repressive forces that they lost -- the Nicaraguans lost a lot of
blood in trying to and successfully removing from their country.
HERMAN: But history does not have a very good record of
moderate elements gaining control in a communist-led, communist-
inspired government.
SENATOR DODD: Well, I think it's early enough...
HERMAN: The whole path of history is the opposite
direction entirely.
SENATOR DODD: Well, in fact, it's early enough in
Nicaragua, I believe. You don't have any clear single leader.
You have a junta together. It's in a very unstable state at this
point. The private sector is needed. The other influences that
are still in Nicaragua are prominent individuals. The church is
very strong in Nicaragua, still.
I'm not suggesting that that course will work. I'm just
suggesting to you that it's a better course to follow than the
one which supports paramilitary groups that we're not necessarily
going to follow through with in a military takeover. It violates
all the treaties, by the way, the Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter,
which we're signatories to, clearly violates non-intervention.
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Now, if we want to follow what the Cubans and the
Soviets are doing in a Poland or in an Afghanistan, I don't want
to use that as our model, quite frankly. I think we ought to
follow the law. I think we ought to encourage moderate elements.
We ought to be supportive of them. We can provide assistance to
them without having to go through government sources. That, with
all of its risks and all of the problems associated with it, is,
to me, a far better course to follow than another Bay of Pigs, in
effect, in Nicaragua.
HERMAN: Should we put pressure on economically? Should
we cut the sugar quota from Nicaragua? Should we make it
difficult for the government to continue?
SENATOR DODD: I think those are certainly better
options than support of a paramilitary group. I would also
suggest that we might have tried a different approach in Nic-
aragua, and that is to offer some assistance and to try and build
a working relationship with that government. I think by writing
it off, as this Administration did early on -- and they did write
it off -- they virtually forced Nicaraguans, moderate elements
particularly, to follow one path. They could not make an
argument internally in Nicaragua that there were alternatives
that the government should follow, in terms of support either
from the Cubans or from the United States. We elimiated that
option for them.
OBERDORFER: I'd like to go back a little bit to the
secret war. You say, clearly, the government is violating the
law. How do you know that the United States Government is
violating the law, that it's supporting a secret war down there
in Nicaragua?
SENATOR DODD: Well, you can only listen to the in-
terviews of the insurgents, themselves. They claim they're
getting assistance and training from the United States. The
Boland Amendment clearly prohibits even advisers, counseling.
The words clearly cover that situation.
Now, you can -- the reports of others who have been
there. I'm not revealing information from any secret sessions.
There's enough public information, including the testimony of the
recipients of that aid, that in fact they're getting support from
the United States.
OBERDORFER: Well, then let me go on to the next part of
it. If the United States is doing this, the question is: What
may it lead to? Yesterday, or in the past several days, some-
time, the Defense Minister of Nicaragua, Humberto Ortega, gave an
interview in which he said that if this war continues, supported
through Honduras, that Honduran revolutionaries, as he
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term them, may start attacking the Honduran military within
Honduras.
If that happens, or if Nicaragua attacks Hondruas, its
base camps that are supporting this war, what will the United
States do, and what would the United States Congress do as these
events continue down the road?
SENATOR DODD: Well, that's the $64,000 question, and
one of the reasons why I oppose the support of these paramilitary
groups, because I think that's a very legitimate question to ask:
What would we do? And I don't think the Administration has asked
itself that question.
I frankly don't think Congress, given the general mood
and the concerns about Central America, would be willing to
support, certainly, the injection of U.S. troops into Central
America, even in Honduras, were that situation to arise.
The Administration, I think, would probably then try to
create a scenario where we had to intervene militarily, using U.S.
forces because an ally was under attack. And that's exactly the
kind of scenario that I think becomes more feasible and more
likely, if you will, with the pursuance of the present Admini-
stration policy. We're going to inflame that entire region.
OBERDORFER: When you say "create a scenario," I mean I
don't quite -- those are interesting words, but do you mean they
would deliberately try to get us into a war down there?
SENATOR DODD: I think they're certainly, indirectly,
creating that situation. The Nicaraguans are going to look
terribly justified. For instance, their arguments of building up
a huge military machine. A lot of people outside of the United
States were highly critical of that effort. Now they look
legitimate. They're under attack. They've got guerrillas in the
South and guerrillas in the North. They could go, I presume,
before international forums and say, "Look. We have to deal with
a threat. What nation would not deal with that threat?"
HERMAN: Senator Dodd, it's all very well for you to sit
there and say that the Administration is violating a law. It's a
law that Congress passed. What can Congress do? What will
Congress do about what you claim is a violation of congressional
law?
SENATOR DODD: Well, one, I presume we're going to have
to either reauthorize it or tighten it up, as I mentioned
earlier. Clearly, I'm sure, the Administration is going to make
the argument that this is designed, if they're willing to admit
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even that, to cut off this massive supply of arms that's coming
from Nicaragua to El Salvador which -- I mentioned a moment ago
the Administration, in its own testimony, said...
HERMAN: Congressional action. Let me get back to the
congressional action.
SENATOR DODD: There, I think, we'll tighten up the law.
And we may, in fact, even go further in terms of cutting off
military assistance to El Salvador, or threaten to do it.
Certainly in Honduras, we may decide to moderate the request from
that country if the Administration doesn't back away from what
everyone knows is their present policy.
MCLAUGHLIN: Senator, what about the Soviet connection?
There's a report in today's New York Times that the Soviet Union
is considering putting intermediate-range ballistic missiles in
Nicaragua if we deploy Pershing and cruise in Western Europe.
The Soviets have said that sort of thing before, they've had the
threat of a new deployment.
What should our reaction be if that does happen?
SENATOR DODD: Well, of course, it would be a -- I saw
the same quote, and it was sort of floated out. There was no
--it wasn't an exact commitment to do it. Obviously, it would
escalate the situation far beyond what any of us are imagining.
To all of a sudden be confronted with Soviet strategic missiles
in our own hemisphere would be in clear violation of under-
standings that were reached two decades ago. And clearly, it
should be -- I'm sure this President or any President would make
it clear that if the Soviets were to do that, that would bring us
right to the brink, in terms of confrontation, again.
MCLAUGHLIN: But are we seeing a growing Soviet in-
fluence, and are, in fact, our policies encouraging it?
SENATOR DODD: Well -- in terms of Central America,
you're talking about.
SENATOR DODD: Well, I think we are. I think that we've
defined Central America as a confrontation between East and West.
This is how it has been characterized for the past two years.
Again, I think that confuses cause and effect. The Admini-
stration believes that if Fidel Castro and the Soviets were not
around, there wouldn't be any problems in Central America. I
happen to believe, and I think most of our allies do in the
region, that it's been the absence of economic, political and
social reforms in those countries that have created the
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situation. Castro and the Soviets may be taking advantage of
it, and I think they are, but they didn't create the situation.
And it's that basic misunderstanding that I think has led the
Administration to the policies it's been pursuing.
If we can get them away from that thinking and have them
understand that these are indigenous problems and they've got to
be dealt with through the reform mechanism, the political
process, then I think we can minimize the kind of rhetoric we're
getting even out of the Soviet Union, suggesting that they'd even
place missiles in Nicaragua. We've got to lower that debate, to
move away from that East-West confrontation, that, in fact, El
Salvador is the great confrontation between East and West. I
think the rhetoric is making it so.
HERMAN: Senator Dodd, let me break you out of the
Central American problem and switch you all the way across the
world. Just before we came to the studio, the government of
Jordan said King Hussein would not take part in any peace talks
with Israel, either on Jordan's behalf or on anyone else's.
Presumably meaning, quite deliberately, the Palestinians. What
does that do to President Reagan's entire Middle Eastern peace
plan?
SENATOR DODD: Well, it's a question we'll have to look
at a bit more carefully the next several days to determine why
and whether or not this is an absolute refusal or whether or not
there's some conditionality associated with that refusal. So I'd
want to be cautious about suggesting what this means definit-
ively.
But clearly, if in fact it is that, I think it pretty
much scuttles the Reagan peace proposal. It's so vitally
important that Hussein be involved, that Jordan be involved in
settling the West Bank-Gaza problem that without his partici-
pation, I don't know how we can anticipate moving forward,
unless, of course, Arafat or the PLO were to turn around and
decide tomorrow that they will recognize the right of Israel to
exist. Then you might create a whole new scenario. That is very
unlikely.
So, at this point, I would guess, if in fact they're out
-- that is, Hussein is out for the indefinite future -- then the
Reagan peace proposal is going to have to be rethought.
OBERDORFER: Do you think that the Administration failed
to pursue the President's peace proposal sufficiently? Was there
a lack of energy on the part of the Administration in pushing it
forward enough, or did they lack something in their approach?
SENATOR DODD: I think it was more the approach. I
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think too much of an effort was made to link the events in
Lebanon with a determination to resolve the West Bank and Gaza
issue. It was a nice idea, but I think trying to, in effect,
deal with both of those problems simultaneously meant there would
not be enough attention on the latter -- that is, on the West
Bank-Gaza situation.
OBERDORFER: Well, with the troops in Lebanon, with the
Israeli troops, it seems to me they didn't have much choice.
They had to deal with that, surely.
SENATOR DODD: Clearly.
OBERDORFER: And Hussein wasn't going to join up if that
problem wasn't dealt with. So, would you think they should have
just postponed any approach...
SENATOR DODD: I would have held off a while rather than
absolutely insisting upon an answer on this, one while we're also
dealing with the Lebanese situation. I would have delayed a
little bit. I realize that that would have made problems -- or
made them a bit more difficult to grope with, in terms of the
future. But it seemed to me trying to do both simultaneously,
trying to create that linkage made the likelihood of getting a
resolution of the West Bank and Gaza problem less likely as a
result of that.
MCLAUGHLIN: Senator, the Israelis have complained that
all the pressure in the Middle East has been put on them by the
United States, no American pressure on the Arabs. Do you think
that's a fair complaint?
SENATOR DODD: I think fairly so. I mean, you know, in
Lebanon you have a number of -- it isn't just the Israelis who
are there. The Syrians are there as well. And to suggest that,
as the Administration has, that by Israeli withdrawal from
Lebanon that things could move along rapidly, I think that's a
mischaracterization of the problem.
I would certainly like to see the Israelis withdraw and
to give the Lebanese a chance to fashion their government. But
to suggest that, as the Administration has by delaying delivery
of the F-16s, that this is going to provoke some movement on the
part of the Israelis, I think is a poor way to treat an ally.
It's like the pop clutch. I mean we don't seem to be consistent
in our dealings with them, to delay delivery, to put that kind of
pressure on when there are other elements involved, I think,
lacks a sense of balance and fairness.
HERMAN: Is the whole Middle Eastern peace idea falling
apart? I call you attention to the fact that a moderate
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Palestinian, a moderate PLO leader was assassinated today by a
rebel -- well, I don't want to call it a rebel, but an extremist
Palestinian and Arab group, who said this is revenge on behalf of
all Arabs for this moderation.
SENATOR DODD: Yeah. I believe that the individual
assassinated had repeatedly called for dialogue and negotiations,
and so forth.
HERMAN: Are the extremists in the saddle? Are things
going steadily downhill for peace in the Middle East?
SENATOR DODD: Well, it would appear that way. I don't
know the reason why Arafat did not -- I frankly anticipated that
Yasser Arafat would give King Hussein the signal to go forward.
I was sort of surprised that he didn't, quite honestly. And it
may be a reflection of a polarization, again, of the elements
there in the Middle East and extremists having a more dominant
position than they appeared to have over the past several months.
It would appear that way. Hussein, obviously, is not going to
participate without support and approval from the PLO.
MCLAUGHLIN: If the Reagan plan is dead, and it sure
does look dead this morning, what should be our new approach? We
must have one, apparently.
SENATOR DODD: Well, that's why I'd like to see what the
rationale was, why King Hussein would not go forward. It may be
that there were a number of things that he would have liked to
secure first. And if that's the case, we'd have to analyze them.
MCLAUGHLIN: Do you agree with the Administration,
Senator, that the Israeli settlements on the West Bank are a
major obstacle to peace?
SENATOR DODD: I think they are an obstacle. And that's
been a problem all the way along. I think they would become far
less an obstacle if King Hussein had decided to participate. I
don't think we would have needed to exercise leverage or pressure
on Menachem Begin to reverse that policy. I think had King
Hussein decided to participate in those negotiations, the West
Bank settlement issue would have evaporated.
Now that -- I believe, at least, based on the informa-
tion we have -- that the Reagan peace proposal appears dead this
morning, then I think it's going to be extremely difficult to get
the Begin Administration to change that policy.
OBERDORFER: Why would the settlements problem eva-
porate? Because it seems to me that the Begin government has
made it very clear they're going ahead with those settlements, no
matter what.
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SENATOR DODD: I think had Hussein joined that peace
process, I think you would have seen a substantial change. I
think the internal pressure inside Israel would have been so
significant on the West Bank settlement issue that it would have
-- I say evaporate. There are many there already. They're not
going to destroy them overnight. But in terms of continuing or
building new ones, I think that would have stopped, without any
question. And I agree it has been an obstacle.
HERMAN: Let me take you down a quick shopping list of a
couple of other items. Is the nomination of Mr. Adelman dead?
SENATOR DODD: Deep, deep trouble. I saw a vote count
that shows it dead even.
HERMAN: So it's still a possibility.
SENATOR DODD: Very much a possibility that he'll either
be rejected -- if he is, it's going to be a narrow, narrow vote.
HERMAN: Go down my list one further. The MX missile,
which President Reagan wants to put in the Minuteman silos to
replace what the Administration calls our aging missiles, the
Minuteman and Titan, and so forth. Will it be voted in?
SENATOR DODD: That has a greater chance of success than
what was being proposed earlier. I would think it might get by.
That new basing mode is going to have more votes, more support
than certainly any suggestions that have been made earlier.
HERMAN: And one further one in my list. Has the
Administration, as Don Oberdorfer put it to me before we went on
the air, has it thrown away the China card by poor policy towards
China?
SENATOR DODD: Not necessarily. I think it's a question
where you could expect these kinds of confrontations to occur
between the People's Republic of China and ourselves -- that is,
over this recent case of the defection. My hope would have been
that the Administration would have worked with the Chinese more
closely rather than let it stretch out over seven months. That
was too long a period of time.
And I'd also suggest that if we're going to be con-
sistent in these policies, that we're going to have to apply
those same standards around the globe, and we haven't done that.
So, I don't see the relations falling apart over this,
at all. There's going to be a period of strain.
HERMAN: Declining?
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SENATOR DODD: Decline a little bit. I think it comes
back. There are too many of the larger issues that are important
to the Chinese. They're not going to allow those to go down the
drain over this single case. I don't believe they're that
foolish.
HERMAN: Okay. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd, for
being our guest today on Face the Nation.
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