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April 24, 1983
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Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-01070R000100670006-6 RADIO TV REPORTS, INC. 4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068 This Week with David Brinkley DATE April 24, 1983 11:30 A.M. The CIA And Nicaragua STATION WJLA-TV ABC Network Washington, D.C. DAVID BRINKLEY: ...We'll have today's news since the morning papers, and the American involvement in Central America, particularly in Nicaragua. Is the CIA trying to overthrow its Marxist government? If so, should it be? Is it violating the law? In any case, should the U.S. allow Cuba and the Soviet Union to expand into Central America? If not, what should we do about it? Our guests: Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, who has strong views on this; and two members of Congress, Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut and Representa- tive Wyche Fowler of Georgia, who have other views of their own. The background on all this from James Wooten. And our discussion here with George Will, Barbara Walters, and Hodding Carter. BRINKLEY: On Wednesday, President Reagan speaks to Congress and tries to persuade it to support his policies in Central America. He'll be talking to an audience heavily skeptical. In the meantime, the CIA and the State Department invited several Congress members to fly to Central America and to see firsthand what is happening there and to decide if they can support it. They left from Washington's Andrews Air Force Base this morning, as ABC News correspondent Anne Garrels reports. ANNE GARRELS: Secretary of State Shultz and CIA OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D,C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES 0 CHICAGO 0 DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES Material supplied by Radio N Reports, Inc. may be used for tile and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited. Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-01070R000100670006-6 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100670006-6 Director Casey failed to reassure the House Committee on Intelli- gence after two days of intense briefings. So they offered the congressmen a three-day whirlwind tour of Honduras and El Salvador, courtesy of the CIA. Committee member Mineta left with doubts, though he said his mind could be changed. REP. NORMAN MINETA: I have some skepticism about what the Administration is doing. And I think I want to make sure that the Administration has the opportunity to put their best case forward about the whole issue. It seems to me we're conduc -- the Administration is conducting a covert operation in an overt manner. CARRELS: Meanwhile, Conqressman Clarence Long left for El Salvador on a separate trip this morning to tell the Salva- dorans Congress holds the purse strings. REP. CLARENCE LONG: But I would hope to tell them the difficulties that they're having with Congress on this whole thing. CARRELS: Long's subcommittee says it will stop $60 million in military aid unless El Salvador improves its human rights record and agrees to protect the guerrillas in El Salva- dor's forthcoming elections. Salvadoran officials call this interference in El Salvador's internal affairs. Seeing its Central American program nibbled to death, the Administration is gambling these trips will make converts of congressmen. Come what may, President Reagan will make a major pitch for his policies after the congressmen return when he speaks before a joint session of Congress on Wednesday. BRINKLEY: There are wide differences of opinion about what the United States is doing in Central America. But on a few points there is general agreement. A hard-line right-wing government in Nicaragua, after an armed revolution, was replaced by a hard-line left-wing government tied to Cuba and calling itself Marxist. While in El Salvador, there is a legally elected government under assault by left-wing guerrillas with the help of Nicaragua. The argument is about what the United States should do, if anything. Some background and detail on all this from our Sunday regular, James Wooten. Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100670006-6 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-01070R000100670006-6 3 JAMES WOOTEN: We begin today, David, with this assess- ment of the problem. PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN: The specter of Marxist-Lenin- ist-controlled governments in Central America with ideolo-gical and political loyalties to Cuba and the Soviet Union poses a direct challenge to which we must respond. WOOTEN: And how has the President responded? Well, in El Salvador, with guns for the government. An in Honduras, with guns for the government. And in Guatemala, with guns for the government. And here in Nicaragua, with guns for those who would bring the government down. The end result is that there's a lot of guns in this part of the world. Most of them were made in America. Like these, for instance, taken from guerrillas trained in Honduras by the CIA and killed or captured here in Nicaragua, where they're trying to overthrow the Sandinistas. But not all the weapons here come from the United States. These Libyan planes stopped in Brazil last week were loaded with arms and headed to Nicaragua for use in the Sandinis- ta's nasty little war with the CIA insurgents. Daniel Ortega, who heads the Nicaraguan junta, blames Ronald Reagan for his newest problem. DANIEL ORTEGA [translated]: I think he's involved in an action designed to topple our government, that he is repeating a mistake, a historical mistake by the United States. WOOTEN: Commandante Ortega says his country is ready now to sit down and talk about differences. ORTEGA [translated]: We have always been ready to discuss or negotiate with the United States, discussions, negotiations that would result in a settlement with the United States. It's a policy that we still maintain, despite this invasion, this aggressive invasion, aggression by the United States. REP. MICHAEL BARNES: The Sandinistas have become tougher, not more responsive to their opposition in the last couple of years. They've used the external threat, which many of us used to think was illusory, but now realize is there, as an excuse for clamping down on their citizens. WOOTEN: If that sounds as though Congressman Barnes supports the White House policies on Central America, he doesn't. And he, along with others on Capitol Hill, have been instrumental Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100670006-6 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100670006-6 in frustrating the President's plans to put additional money into the region, specifically 110 million new dollars into El Salva- dor. Although most of Mr. Reagan's critics recognize the potential military threat posed by Nicaragua's army and its ties to Havana and Moscow, they're dubious of Mr. Reagan's approach to the problem here and elsewhere in Central America. MAN: There is an active effort underway now by the foreign ministers of our major friends in the region to try to find political solutions. I wish that we were putting more of our emphasis on that effort and less of our emphasis on covert and overt military policies. MAN: The focus that this Administration has put on mililtary solutions to the region's problems has naturally led to an increase in tension in the region, an increase in the level of conflict in Salvador between Nicaragua and Honduras. WOOTEN: And that, he says, could eventually be very, very dangerous. MAN: As long as the covert war continues, there is always the possibility that at any moment an attack by counter- revolutionaries from Honduras will spark a full-scale war between Honduras and Nicaragua. WOOTEN: Nicaragua's sputtering economy couldn't support that full-scale war without more and more help from Cuba and the Soviets. And the Honduras army, already bolstered by millions of American dollars, would need still more and more, as well. The possibilities are complex and grim. MAN: You may have noticed that the Minister of Defense of Nicaragua said the other day that he would accept Soviet missiles on Nicaraguan soil if they were offered. PRESIDENT REAGAN: We are cooperating with the other Central American countries in the region to try and bring democracy and peace to Central America. MAN: There's a tremendous danger right now. And there will continue to be a tremendous danger of wider war in Central America until the United States resolves that it is willing to pursue negotiated solutions, real negotiated solutions, that may have results that don't meet all our expectations. ORTEGA [translated]: This is a very critical situation in the region that could be solved either politically or could lead to increased war or the regionalization of fighting. Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100670006-6 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-01070R000100670006-6 5 WOOTEN: So, as another day begins here in the Sandinis- ta revolution, another set of problems presents itself to the government here in Managua. Not the least of which is this: This country is at war again, and the enemy is being bankrolled by America. BRINKLEY: Coming next, Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut and Representative Wyche Fowler of Georgia; and shortly, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. BRINKLEY: Senator Dodd and Representative Fowler, we are thankful to you for coming in to talk with us today, de- lighted to have you. Here with me, with questions, are George Will, ABC analyst; and Barbara Walters, ABC News correspondent. Now, first, I'd like to be sure that we're all talking about the same thing. Do the two of you accept the Reagan view that Cuba, directly, and the Soviet Union, indirectly, are setting up communist outposts in Central America? Do you accept that? SENATOR CHRISTOPHER DODD: Well, I think they're talking advantage of the situation. Clearly, they're involved. There's no doubt about that whatsoever. So I would accept that. Their presence is there. They want to be involved. There's no question about that. BRINKLEY: Mr. Fowler, do you accept that description of the situation down there? REP. WYCHE FOWLER: David, I would accept more closely Senator Dodd's description and point to the Linowitz-Plaza Commission report and many other commissions who have studied the situation, that though there are unquestionably hostile influen- ces in the region, the primary problems are economic in Nicarag- ua, El Salvador, throughout Central America. And certainly there would be internal problems continuing because of the economic conditions, even if there were no other influences in the area. GEORGE WILL: Gentlemen, the Boland Amendment, passed, I guess, a year ago, says that no money can be spent by the United States Government for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua. You, Senator Dodd, say you know that that is the intention of the money being spent by the United States. Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-01070R000100670006-6 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-01070R000100670006-6 6 Congressman Fowler, you have, I believe, stated it less forcefully. You say you have doubts that the law is not being fully complied with. I'd like the two of you to explain what differences there are between you on this matter, and how, if you would, you would change the Boland Amendment to remove what seems to be an ambiguity. SENATOR DODD: Well, if I can, let me -- I'm not sure how much difference there is. It seems to me quite clear. I'm relying on the National -- the Somoza National Guard insurgents in Honduras and Nicaragua. They've clearly said, the President has said we're supplying aid, advisers, assistance, and so forth, to them. Now, clearly, these former National Guard people have as their intention -- they've stated it over and over and over again that their intention is to overthrow the Sandinista government. Now, it seems to me that if they're saying that, we're supplying the aid, the Boland Amendment says don't supply aid to any paramilitary forces for the purpose of overthrowing the Sandinis- ta government, it's quite clear that the language of the Boland Amendment is being violated. WILL: But, Senator... SENATOR DODD: ...any doubt about it. WILL: If I could interrupt. Isn't this question about a judgment you're making about the state of mind of the American government, not of the insurgents? SENATOR DODD: Well, that's a nice little legal loophole to jump through, in effect, where we say, "Well, we don't know what their intentions are." We clearly know what their inten- tions are. Their intentions have been well stated from the very, very beginning. And to avoid the language of the law by suggest- ing we don't care or don't really know what their intentions are is just to belie the facts. The facts are right there in front of us. REP. FOWLER: George, I'd like to add to that that it seems to me a bit disingenuous that once we have now seen on television over and over again many of the guerrillas in Nica- ragua publicly thanking the people of the United States for supporting their attempts to overthrow the government of Nica- ragua, that to argue the mens rea, as the Administration contin- ues to do, as to what our intention is and try to separate that from the intention of the guerrilla forces, when we know that their intention is to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-01070R000100670006-6 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100670006-6 7 that that's a distinction without a difference, that it's just not going to be accepted by the American public. WILL: But, Congressman Fowler, isn't there a distinct- ion with a difference in the fact that the mathematics simply is implausible. There are so few of the insurgents up against the largest military machine in Central America. REP. FOWLER: Well, I would dispute that, without --certainly not revealing any classified information. I think the Administration is grossly overstating the size of the Sandinista army. They are counting in all the militia, which is every campesino that may or may not have a rifle. But I remind you what, of course, you know, that the forces, the Sandinista forces that overthrew the Somoza regime were very few, in comparison with the 10,000-man National Guard that Somoza had at the time. BARBARA WALTERS: Gentlemen, I'd like to ask you a broader question. I think there's so much confusion in this country as to just what we should do and what our philosophy should be. If indeed it is our desire, eventually, to stop the spread of Marxism in Central America, if indeed we may even want to see the downfall of the Sandinist government, then why shouldn't we try to aid the insurgents, or the Contras, as they are called? And beyond that -- it may be the same question -- how can you control the spread of communism in Central America if you don't aid the opposition? SENATOR DODD: Well, first of all, understand that by supporting the former Somoza National Guard insurgents, we've chosen again the wrong crowd. There are other forces in Nica- ragua that are far more responsible and were being far more successful in building a base of popular support against many of the policies of the Sandinista government. I'm talking now about the Catholic Church, the opposition parties, the private sector, the human rights groups, even former Sandinista commanders. Without exception, every one of them find our policy of now supporting the old Somoza National Guard as being not only contrary to their interests, but probably doing more for the Sandinistas, in terms of crystallizing their support inside Nicaragua, than anything they would have been able to do for themselves. And there's a fundamental error. We've chosen the wrong Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100670006-6 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-01070R000100670006-6 people to support in Nicaragua as a group of opposition forces. If you really want to thwart the expansion of communism and Marxism in the region, then you've got to get to the cause. I said at the outset that the Marxists are there. They clearly are. But the Administration, I think, believes that if Fidel Castro were not around, if the Politburo did not exist, there would not be revolution in Central America. That is a fundament- al error. That's to confuse cause and effect. The cause of the unrest or revolution in Latin America is the economic, social and political problems that go back decades. The Soviets and the Cubans take advantage of it. In countries where those conditions do not exist or where there's a sense that the government cares about those things, the Marxists, the Fidel Castros of the world are not successful at all. And that's the way to approach thwarting communism, unless you want to become the Soviet Union of the Western Hemisphere, and have Polands and Hungarys or Czechoslovakias or Afghanistans, and deal with the problems through military means alone. WALTERS: Let me just broaden that, which was part of my original question, and not just talk about Nicaragua. You do say that the Soviet Union, Cuba, so forth, are trying, by means of arms or other aid, to help their side. Okay. You also say -- and, Senator Dodd, you said we should solve the social, economic and political problems that cause the unrest. That could take years and years and years. In the meantime, do we cut off any aid? And under what conditions would you let the United States get involved militar- ily? SENATOR DODD: Well, I want to give Congressman Fowler a chance to respond. But my feeling is that it isn't so much us trying to dictate what these governments want to do. Using the case of El Salvador, what we're saying is, "Look. You've received, in economic and military aid over four and a half years, over a billion dollars. The situation hasn't improved at all. You in El Salvador can do what you please, but do not expect the largesse of the United States to continually support you militar- ily, when in fact you do have a disastrous human rights situa- tion, your economic reforms are not going anywhere at all. You've got to do those things if you're going to maintain some popular support in your country so that you can thwart insurgen- cies, of one kind or another." Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-01070R000100670006-6 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-01070R000100670006-6 And that's what I'm suggesting. I'm not saying, in effect, that El Salvador has to do what we want. In fact, the Administration is playing a far heavier -- having a far heavier hand. We're picking generals. We're setting election dates. We're virtually becoming the proconsul of El Salvador. That's a fundamental error. That's a mistake we've made in the past, and we shouldn't be doing it again in our own hemisphere. BRINKLEY: Mr. Fowler, do you want to respond to that? REP. FOWLER: David, I think it's important to say that certainly I, and I think the majority members of the House Intelligence Committee, support the Administration's objectives in Central America. Clearly, we have a role to play in Central America and in the Americas, of which we are a part. The question is whether or not the methods and the tactics, the policies that we have set upon, as Senator Dodd described, is the most effective way of going about it. And that is where the differences occur. I think we've got to have a multinational, multilateral approach. We've got to find a way to demilitarize these con- flicts and move from the battlefields to the conference tables, and then the ballot boxes. That's the only way to have a long-term stable solution, which is the objective of our country in Central America. WILL: Senator Dodd, you speak of using the moderate elements in Nicaragua to try and moderate that government. Can you cite a single example of moderate elements ever moderating a Stalinist government anywhere around the world? SENATOR DODD: Well, I would use the example, George, of the most recent one, say, in Zimbabwe, where we did find, through support of more moderate elements, that we didn't end up with a Marxist government. And I would further suggest to you that it seems to me that we ought to be listening to the people who are on the ground there, who have dealt with these people more intimately than we have over the years. We're talking about, for instance, Aden Pastora (?), who was their top field commander, or an Arturo Cruz (?), the Sandinist ambassador, and others who've suggested that if we pursue that policy that I've suggested, there's a far greater chance of success for U.S. interests and peace in that region than by supporting what the Nicaraguan people fear more than anything else, even more than the Sandinis- tas, and that is a return of the old Somoza National Guard to their country. That's the quickest way I know of of building up popular support for the Sandinistas and of destroying the ability of these other groups that I've just described of building a base of popular support for themselves in that country. Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-01070R000100670006-6 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100670006-6 BRINKLEY: Senator Dodd, Representative Fowler, thank you again very much for coming in and giving us your views today. Coming next, our questions for Jeane Kirkpatrick, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. BRINKLEY: Ambassador Kirkpatrick, we're delighted to have you with us today. Thank you for coming in. First let me ask you a question that we hear all the time, and I'm sure you have heard, particularly on campuses --that is, where they will allow you to talk. The question: Do you see any way this could become another Vietnam? AMBASSADOR JEANE KIRKPATRICK: Well, if by that you mean a war in which there are thousands of American troops, or any American troops engaged in a war, in combat, no, I do not. Not at all. And nobody in our government does, let me say. That's not even a possibility that anybody talks about, except --because it's so remote. It just couldn't be. No. BRIKLEY: But the question does arise, particularly among younger people who are concerned about having to get into such a war, as you were aware. Well, my second question. If the danger is as de- scribed, why do the Mexicans, who are closer to it than we are, why do they fail to see it? AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Well, I'm afraid that an adequate answer to that question would involve an analysis of the Mexican government. The Mexican government has, unfortunately, pursued a foreign policy for several years which is very, let's say, understanding of the Cuban and Nicaraguan position, rather more than any of the governments in the region. I think that the Mexican government is very worried, frankly. I think they worry a lot about their own future. I think they do, in fact, seek very much a solution to the problems in Central America. So do the governments, of course, of Panama and Venezuela and Colombia, and so do we all. And we're all looking for a peaceful solution all the time. WILL: Madam Ambassador, you just heard Senator Dodd say that the proper tactic in dealing with Nicaragua is to encourage moderate elements to moderate within Nicaragua the Nicaraguan regime. What's your estimate of the chance of that working? AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Well, it was very interesting. Actually, the people that Senator Dodd mentioned are out of Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100670006-6 Approved For Release 2007/05/21 CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100670006-6 Nicaragua. He mentioned Arturo Cruz and Aden Pastora, both of whom were originally associated with the government of Nicaragua, and both of whom have gone into exile because of the strength of their opposition to that government. And I think that that's probably the best commentary on their estimate of the chances of persuading the government of Nicaragua to moderate from inside. Archbishop Arando Bravo (?) is, of course, a marvelous man who continues to work very hard inside Nicaragua to persuade the government to moderate. Our government has tried in every way we know how, in fact, to try to encourage and persuade the government of Nica- ragua to moderate, and not to make -- you know, not to make war on its neighbors, if I may say, and not to repress its own people. WALTERS: Mrs. Kirkpatrick, I asked a question of the two gentlemen. I'd like to ask you something that's similar that seems to disturb this country, not Just in Central America, but really all over the world, and that is the two points of view: one, that we must contain communism -- we're talking here of Central America -- lest it spread and become a great threat to us; versus the opinion that if we continue to back, let's say, the military dictatorships or the unpopular insurgents -- we always seem to be on the wrong side -- that we will have the undying hatred of each country if and when they throw the tyrants out. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: You know, the problem is, of course, that in Central America we're backing the democracies. And it's very clear who are the tyrants and who are the democra- cies. The governments of Costa Rica and Honduras and El Salva- dor, all of Nicaragua's neighbors, are democracies, and those are the governments that we're trying very hard to support. So far as the -- we're supporting the good guys, actually, in every sense of the word. And Nicaragua, itself, has, of course, become a really very repressive tyranny, a military dictatorship, a very harsh military dictatorship. So, while I think that question, Barbara is a good question for the world in general, it doesn't apply in Central America. WALTERS: Do you think it's understood in this country that we are supporting the good guys? Do you think that's something that the people and the Congress understand? Approved. For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100670006-6 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-01070R000100670006-6 AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I don't know about the Con- gress. Unfortunately, I think there's a very great deal of propaganda, actually, about that in this country. And I think we have to try harder. It can't just be the Administration, though. You know, it has to be the Congress and it has to be the media and it has to be everybody has to try harder to help inform the American people, really, and ourselves, and keep informed, about who is who in Central America, who are the democrats and the forces for democracy, and who are the dictators and the forces of tyranny, and who is tied, in fact, to the Soviet Union and Cuba, and who is sending tons and tons, hundreds of tons, thousands of tons of arms into the region, and who's trying to bring peace by a political solution, by negotiation. You know, we're working very hard all the time, in fact, to try to promote negotiations in that region. And I think that anybody who follows the situation knows that. But we've got to have some help, in fact, in getting the facts across. BRINKLEY: Ambassador, that's an interesting point. If the danger of communism spreading through Central America, and perhaps even beyond that, is as great as described, why is there so much opposition to our doing something about it? AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: You know, I don't really know, frankly. I think that anti-communism, taking a position against the spread of communism any place has become very unfashionable in our country. I think that's a very great success, by the way, for the Soviet Union and for the communists. And I think that we somehow have to find a way to get through that and to get over it. Because this is not -- you know, there isn't something going on here that's a struggle of ideas or of doctrines that we can debate about. The fact is that the Soviet Union is the world's, probably, largest military power today, and they are shipping thousands of tons of very heavy weapons into our hemisphere. They are right now threatening, in fact, to station nuclear missiles in our hemisphere five minutes from the United States. The Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister made that threat only last week. And so we've somehow got to -- got to face facts about BRINKLEY: If I may interrupt here for a moment. BRINKLEY: ...George, you have a question you want to put about the missiles? Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100670006-6 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100670006-6 13 Ambassador, you referred a moment ago to the Soviet threat, I guess it was, to put intermediate-range missiles in this hemisphere, perhaps in Nicragua. Can you give us some sense of what the American response would be if that occurred? AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: No. Actually, I can't. I could just say that it's serious, it's very serious. It would be serious for our national security. We're not accustomed, in fact, to being targeted, of course, and least of all from close to home. We've never had to defend ourselves in our hemisphere in our whole national history. And we not only would have a serious response, but we need to take it seriously right now. WILL: Are you prepared to say that to the Reagan Administration the placing of such missiles in this hemisphere is unacceptable? AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I don't think that's quite my appropriate role in the Administration, frankly. I think that's more appropriate to the President or the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense or somebody besides me, frankly. WALTERS: The President is going before a joint session of Congress this week. That happens very rarely. Only nine times, as I understand it, in the past quarter of a century. Suppose he isn't successful. Suppose he comes out of there and Congress tightens the Boland Amendment even more. Suppose they inhibit his actions even more. What will happen? AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: You know, I mean, we're a government of laws. And our government, the Reagan Administra- tion, of course, not only is obeying the law, we will obey the law. And Congress is a partner in that. But just as Congress shares the power, Congress shares the responsibility, of course. And what we very much hope is that Congress will share the responsibility in helping find constructive solutions. I think we have to find a solution. I think that the consequences would be really quite catastrophic if we don't. And I think the Congress will, frankly. WALTERS: In speaking of solutions, are you in agreement with the position of the inter-American dialogue that Sol. Linowitz has headed, that the basic problems in Central America have to deal with security, political, social and economic issues, rather than military; and if so, that we should negotiate with both sides? AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Barbara, I think that the Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100670006-6 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-01070R000100670006-6 14 economic problems have to have economic solutions and the political problems need political solutions. I think, for example, in Nicaragua we need a political solution, in fact. What we need is an elected government and democracy and respect for human rights and civil rights in that country. We have -- and unfortunately, when people hold guns to your head, you need defense. And for the military attacks on El Salvador, for example, on Salvador's democratic government, unfortunately, they need some military defense. You can't really fight howitzers with improved land reform. You can fight economic injustice and social injustice with land reform, but you can't fend off people who have heavy weapons pointed at you just with improved social and economic measures. I very deeply believe, by the way, in social and economic assistance to that area. And so, let me say, does the Administration. And we, of course, have given three times as much economic aid in the region as we have military aid, just as the previous Administration did. BRINKLEY: In the case of El Salvador, Ambassador, there is a government freely elected, about a year ago, now trying to defend itself, but seemingly, from this distance, not very effectively. Is the Salvador army really fighting? AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Oh, yes. Of course it is, you know. And I think it's -- frankly, it's just very ungraceful of us and inappropriate of us to criticize the army of El Salvador for not fighting when it is fighting, and Salvadoran soldiers dying all the time. What we should be doing is criticizing the guerrillas who make implacable war against the government of El Salvador. It's very hard to fight a guerrilla war. You know, nobody knows very much for sure about how to defeat guerrilla wars. And I think they're doing a very good job under very difficult conditions. You know, the -- did you know that the command and control and communications equipment of Salvador's guerrillas, which have all been provided by the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc, are a lot better than those of the government of Salvador? And frequently they have better weapons than the government of El Salvador. The guerrillas are just getting better help. That's a fact. And we're going to have to help the government, I think -- we're going to have to continue to help the government, economic- ally and -- but, unfortunately, also militarily -- unless we can persuade the guerrillas in El Salvador to lay down their guns, in fact, and accept a political solution and join in free elections. Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100670006-6 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100670006-6 I was thinking as I read some speeches by the leaders of that guerrilla movement, they always end their speeches, "Revolu- tion or death. We will win." You know, they don't talk about political solutions. And unfortunately, so far they've refused to join in democratic elections. WILL: Ambassador, the help that the rebels are getting that you say is superior to the help that our side is getting is coming, much of it, the Administration insists, from Cuba. The Administration began with Secretary of State Haig saying that we had to go and deal with the problem at the source, and the source referred to Cuba. How is it that Cuba is not Finlandized? That is, Finland is called Finlandized because it must act in a way very circumspect because of its proximity to the Soviet Union. Why is the United States seemingly powerless to make Cuba be more circumspect? AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I don't think we've tried very hard, actually. WILL: What should we do? What would constitute trying AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I'm not sure, but I don't think we've tried very hard. I don't think we -- we really haven't used American power, economic power, for example, in a very systematic way at all against Cuba, or political power. We haven't for many, many, many years, in fact. We've just sort of stood by, and while the Soviets spend -- do you know that the Soviets spend about nine million dollars a day in aid to Cuba, most of that military aid? And, of course, they have built a very major military -- very major military force in this hemi- sphere which is a threat to us. And we really just have stood by and let it happen. BRINKLEY: Ambassador Kirkpatrick, thank you. Thanks very much for coming in and talking with us. Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100670006-6