THE CIA AND NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000100670006-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 24, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
This Week with David Brinkley
DATE April 24, 1983 11:30 A.M.
The CIA And Nicaragua
STATION WJLA-TV
ABC Network
Washington, D.C.
DAVID BRINKLEY: ...We'll have today's news since the
morning papers, and the American involvement in Central America,
particularly in Nicaragua. Is the CIA trying to overthrow its
Marxist government? If so, should it be? Is it violating the
law? In any case, should the U.S. allow Cuba and the Soviet
Union to expand into Central America? If not, what should we do
about it?
Our guests: Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations, who has strong views on this; and two members of
Congress, Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut and Representa-
tive Wyche Fowler of Georgia, who have other views of their own.
The background on all this from James Wooten. And our
discussion here with George Will, Barbara Walters, and Hodding
Carter.
BRINKLEY: On Wednesday, President Reagan speaks to
Congress and tries to persuade it to support his policies in
Central America. He'll be talking to an audience heavily
skeptical.
In the meantime, the CIA and the State Department
invited several Congress members to fly to Central America and to
see firsthand what is happening there and to decide if they can
support it. They left from Washington's Andrews Air Force Base
this morning, as ABC News correspondent Anne Garrels reports.
ANNE GARRELS: Secretary of State Shultz and CIA
OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D,C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES 0 CHICAGO 0 DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
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Director Casey failed to reassure the House Committee on Intelli-
gence after two days of intense briefings. So they offered the
congressmen a three-day whirlwind tour of Honduras and El
Salvador, courtesy of the CIA.
Committee member Mineta left with doubts, though he said
his mind could be changed.
REP. NORMAN MINETA: I have some skepticism about what
the Administration is doing. And I think I want to make sure
that the Administration has the opportunity to put their best
case forward about the whole issue.
It seems to me we're conduc -- the Administration is
conducting a covert operation in an overt manner.
CARRELS: Meanwhile, Conqressman Clarence Long left for
El Salvador on a separate trip this morning to tell the Salva-
dorans Congress holds the purse strings.
REP. CLARENCE LONG: But I would hope to tell them the
difficulties that they're having with Congress on this whole
thing.
CARRELS: Long's subcommittee says it will stop $60
million in military aid unless El Salvador improves its human
rights record and agrees to protect the guerrillas in El Salva-
dor's forthcoming elections. Salvadoran officials call this
interference in El Salvador's internal affairs.
Seeing its Central American program nibbled to death,
the Administration is gambling these trips will make converts of
congressmen.
Come what may, President Reagan will make a major pitch
for his policies after the congressmen return when he speaks
before a joint session of Congress on Wednesday.
BRINKLEY: There are wide differences of opinion about
what the United States is doing in Central America. But on a few
points there is general agreement. A hard-line right-wing
government in Nicaragua, after an armed revolution, was replaced
by a hard-line left-wing government tied to Cuba and calling
itself Marxist. While in El Salvador, there is a legally elected
government under assault by left-wing guerrillas with the help of
Nicaragua. The argument is about what the United States should
do, if anything.
Some background and detail on all this from our Sunday
regular, James Wooten.
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JAMES WOOTEN: We begin today, David, with this assess-
ment of the problem.
PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN: The specter of Marxist-Lenin-
ist-controlled governments in Central America with ideolo-gical
and political loyalties to Cuba and the Soviet Union poses a
direct challenge to which we must respond.
WOOTEN: And how has the President responded? Well, in
El Salvador, with guns for the government. An in Honduras, with
guns for the government. And in Guatemala, with guns for the
government. And here in Nicaragua, with guns for those who would
bring the government down. The end result is that there's a lot
of guns in this part of the world. Most of them were made in
America.
Like these, for instance, taken from guerrillas trained
in Honduras by the CIA and killed or captured here in Nicaragua,
where they're trying to overthrow the Sandinistas.
But not all the weapons here come from the United
States. These Libyan planes stopped in Brazil last week were
loaded with arms and headed to Nicaragua for use in the Sandinis-
ta's nasty little war with the CIA insurgents.
Daniel Ortega, who heads the Nicaraguan junta, blames
Ronald Reagan for his newest problem.
DANIEL ORTEGA [translated]: I think he's involved in an
action designed to topple our government, that he is repeating a
mistake, a historical mistake by the United States.
WOOTEN: Commandante Ortega says his country is ready
now to sit down and talk about differences.
ORTEGA [translated]: We have always been ready to
discuss or negotiate with the United States, discussions,
negotiations that would result in a settlement with the United
States. It's a policy that we still maintain, despite this
invasion, this aggressive invasion, aggression by the United
States.
REP. MICHAEL BARNES: The Sandinistas have become
tougher, not more responsive to their opposition in the last
couple of years. They've used the external threat, which many of
us used to think was illusory, but now realize is there, as an
excuse for clamping down on their citizens.
WOOTEN: If that sounds as though Congressman Barnes
supports the White House policies on Central America, he doesn't.
And he, along with others on Capitol Hill, have been instrumental
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in frustrating the President's plans to put additional money into
the region, specifically 110 million new dollars into El Salva-
dor.
Although most of Mr. Reagan's critics recognize the
potential military threat posed by Nicaragua's army and its ties
to Havana and Moscow, they're dubious of Mr. Reagan's approach to
the problem here and elsewhere in Central America.
MAN: There is an active effort underway now by the
foreign ministers of our major friends in the region to try to
find political solutions. I wish that we were putting more of
our emphasis on that effort and less of our emphasis on covert
and overt military policies.
MAN: The focus that this Administration has put on
mililtary solutions to the region's problems has naturally led to
an increase in tension in the region, an increase in the level of
conflict in Salvador between Nicaragua and Honduras.
WOOTEN: And that, he says, could eventually be very,
very dangerous.
MAN: As long as the covert war continues, there is
always the possibility that at any moment an attack by counter-
revolutionaries from Honduras will spark a full-scale war between
Honduras and Nicaragua.
WOOTEN: Nicaragua's sputtering economy couldn't support
that full-scale war without more and more help from Cuba and the
Soviets. And the Honduras army, already bolstered by millions of
American dollars, would need still more and more, as well. The
possibilities are complex and grim.
MAN: You may have noticed that the Minister of Defense
of Nicaragua said the other day that he would accept Soviet
missiles on Nicaraguan soil if they were offered.
PRESIDENT REAGAN: We are cooperating with the other
Central American countries in the region to try and bring
democracy and peace to Central America.
MAN: There's a tremendous danger right now. And there
will continue to be a tremendous danger of wider war in Central
America until the United States resolves that it is willing to
pursue negotiated solutions, real negotiated solutions, that may
have results that don't meet all our expectations.
ORTEGA [translated]: This is a very critical situation
in the region that could be solved either politically or could
lead to increased war or the regionalization of fighting.
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WOOTEN: So, as another day begins here in the Sandinis-
ta revolution, another set of problems presents itself to the
government here in Managua. Not the least of which is this:
This country is at war again, and the enemy is being bankrolled
by America.
BRINKLEY: Coming next, Senator Christopher Dodd of
Connecticut and Representative Wyche Fowler of Georgia; and
shortly, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick.
BRINKLEY: Senator Dodd and Representative Fowler, we
are thankful to you for coming in to talk with us today, de-
lighted to have you.
Here with me, with questions, are George Will, ABC
analyst; and Barbara Walters, ABC News correspondent.
Now, first, I'd like to be sure that we're all talking
about the same thing. Do the two of you accept the Reagan view
that Cuba, directly, and the Soviet Union, indirectly, are
setting up communist outposts in Central America? Do you accept
that?
SENATOR CHRISTOPHER DODD: Well, I think they're talking
advantage of the situation. Clearly, they're involved. There's
no doubt about that whatsoever. So I would accept that. Their
presence is there. They want to be involved. There's no
question about that.
BRINKLEY: Mr. Fowler, do you accept that description of
the situation down there?
REP. WYCHE FOWLER: David, I would accept more closely
Senator Dodd's description and point to the Linowitz-Plaza
Commission report and many other commissions who have studied the
situation, that though there are unquestionably hostile influen-
ces in the region, the primary problems are economic in Nicarag-
ua, El Salvador, throughout Central America. And certainly there
would be internal problems continuing because of the economic
conditions, even if there were no other influences in the area.
GEORGE WILL: Gentlemen, the Boland Amendment, passed, I
guess, a year ago, says that no money can be spent by the United
States Government for the purpose of overthrowing the government
of Nicaragua.
You, Senator Dodd, say you know that that is the
intention of the money being spent by the United States.
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Congressman Fowler, you have, I believe, stated it less
forcefully. You say you have doubts that the law is not being
fully complied with.
I'd like the two of you to explain what differences
there are between you on this matter, and how, if you would, you
would change the Boland Amendment to remove what seems to be an
ambiguity.
SENATOR DODD: Well, if I can, let me -- I'm not sure
how much difference there is. It seems to me quite clear. I'm
relying on the National -- the Somoza National Guard insurgents
in Honduras and Nicaragua. They've clearly said, the President
has said we're supplying aid, advisers, assistance, and so forth,
to them.
Now, clearly, these former National Guard people have as
their intention -- they've stated it over and over and over again
that their intention is to overthrow the Sandinista government.
Now, it seems to me that if they're saying that, we're supplying
the aid, the Boland Amendment says don't supply aid to any
paramilitary forces for the purpose of overthrowing the Sandinis-
ta government, it's quite clear that the language of the Boland
Amendment is being violated.
WILL: But, Senator...
SENATOR DODD: ...any doubt about it.
WILL: If I could interrupt. Isn't this question about
a judgment you're making about the state of mind of the American
government, not of the insurgents?
SENATOR DODD: Well, that's a nice little legal loophole
to jump through, in effect, where we say, "Well, we don't know
what their intentions are." We clearly know what their inten-
tions are. Their intentions have been well stated from the very,
very beginning. And to avoid the language of the law by suggest-
ing we don't care or don't really know what their intentions are
is just to belie the facts. The facts are right there in front
of us.
REP. FOWLER: George, I'd like to add to that that it
seems to me a bit disingenuous that once we have now seen on
television over and over again many of the guerrillas in Nica-
ragua publicly thanking the people of the United States for
supporting their attempts to overthrow the government of Nica-
ragua, that to argue the mens rea, as the Administration contin-
ues to do, as to what our intention is and try to separate that
from the intention of the guerrilla forces, when we know that
their intention is to overthrow the Nicaraguan government,
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that that's a distinction without a difference, that it's just
not going to be accepted by the American public.
WILL: But, Congressman Fowler, isn't there a distinct-
ion with a difference in the fact that the mathematics simply is
implausible. There are so few of the insurgents up against the
largest military machine in Central America.
REP. FOWLER: Well, I would dispute that, without
--certainly not revealing any classified information. I think
the Administration is grossly overstating the size of the
Sandinista army. They are counting in all the militia, which is
every campesino that may or may not have a rifle.
But I remind you what, of course, you know, that the
forces, the Sandinista forces that overthrew the Somoza regime
were very few, in comparison with the 10,000-man National Guard
that Somoza had at the time.
BARBARA WALTERS: Gentlemen, I'd like to ask you a
broader question. I think there's so much confusion in this
country as to just what we should do and what our philosophy
should be.
If indeed it is our desire, eventually, to stop the
spread of Marxism in Central America, if indeed we may even want
to see the downfall of the Sandinist government, then why
shouldn't we try to aid the insurgents, or the Contras, as they
are called?
And beyond that -- it may be the same question -- how
can you control the spread of communism in Central America if you
don't aid the opposition?
SENATOR DODD: Well, first of all, understand that by
supporting the former Somoza National Guard insurgents, we've
chosen again the wrong crowd. There are other forces in Nica-
ragua that are far more responsible and were being far more
successful in building a base of popular support against many of
the policies of the Sandinista government. I'm talking now about
the Catholic Church, the opposition parties, the private sector,
the human rights groups, even former Sandinista commanders.
Without exception, every one of them find our policy of now
supporting the old Somoza National Guard as being not only
contrary to their interests, but probably doing more for the
Sandinistas, in terms of crystallizing their support inside
Nicaragua, than anything they would have been able to do for
themselves.
And there's a fundamental error. We've chosen the wrong
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people to support in Nicaragua as a group of opposition forces.
If you really want to thwart the expansion of communism
and Marxism in the region, then you've got to get to the cause.
I said at the outset that the Marxists are there. They clearly
are. But the Administration, I think, believes that if Fidel
Castro were not around, if the Politburo did not exist, there
would not be revolution in Central America. That is a fundament-
al error. That's to confuse cause and effect.
The cause of the unrest or revolution in Latin America
is the economic, social and political problems that go back
decades. The Soviets and the Cubans take advantage of it. In
countries where those conditions do not exist or where there's a
sense that the government cares about those things, the Marxists,
the Fidel Castros of the world are not successful at all.
And that's the way to approach thwarting communism,
unless you want to become the Soviet Union of the Western
Hemisphere, and have Polands and Hungarys or Czechoslovakias or
Afghanistans, and deal with the problems through military means
alone.
WALTERS: Let me just broaden that, which was part of my
original question, and not just talk about Nicaragua.
You do say that the Soviet Union, Cuba, so forth, are
trying, by means of arms or other aid, to help their side. Okay.
You also say -- and, Senator Dodd, you said we should solve the
social, economic and political problems that cause the unrest.
That could take years and years and years.
In the meantime, do we cut off any aid? And under what
conditions would you let the United States get involved militar-
ily?
SENATOR DODD: Well, I want to give Congressman Fowler a
chance to respond.
But my feeling is that it isn't so much us trying to
dictate what these governments want to do. Using the case of El
Salvador, what we're saying is, "Look. You've received, in
economic and military aid over four and a half years, over a
billion dollars. The situation hasn't improved at all. You in
El Salvador can do what you please, but do not expect the
largesse of the United States to continually support you militar-
ily, when in fact you do have a disastrous human rights situa-
tion, your economic reforms are not going anywhere at all.
You've got to do those things if you're going to maintain some
popular support in your country so that you can thwart insurgen-
cies, of one kind or another."
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And that's what I'm suggesting. I'm not saying, in
effect, that El Salvador has to do what we want. In fact, the
Administration is playing a far heavier -- having a far heavier
hand. We're picking generals. We're setting election dates.
We're virtually becoming the proconsul of El Salvador. That's a
fundamental error. That's a mistake we've made in the past, and
we shouldn't be doing it again in our own hemisphere.
BRINKLEY: Mr. Fowler, do you want to respond to that?
REP. FOWLER: David, I think it's important to say that
certainly I, and I think the majority members of the House
Intelligence Committee, support the Administration's objectives
in Central America. Clearly, we have a role to play in Central
America and in the Americas, of which we are a part. The
question is whether or not the methods and the tactics, the
policies that we have set upon, as Senator Dodd described, is the
most effective way of going about it. And that is where the
differences occur.
I think we've got to have a multinational, multilateral
approach. We've got to find a way to demilitarize these con-
flicts and move from the battlefields to the conference tables,
and then the ballot boxes. That's the only way to have a
long-term stable solution, which is the objective of our country
in Central America.
WILL: Senator Dodd, you speak of using the moderate
elements in Nicaragua to try and moderate that government. Can
you cite a single example of moderate elements ever moderating a
Stalinist government anywhere around the world?
SENATOR DODD: Well, I would use the example, George, of
the most recent one, say, in Zimbabwe, where we did find, through
support of more moderate elements, that we didn't end up with a
Marxist government. And I would further suggest to you that it
seems to me that we ought to be listening to the people who are
on the ground there, who have dealt with these people more
intimately than we have over the years. We're talking about, for
instance, Aden Pastora (?), who was their top field commander, or
an Arturo Cruz (?), the Sandinist ambassador, and others who've
suggested that if we pursue that policy that I've suggested,
there's a far greater chance of success for U.S. interests and
peace in that region than by supporting what the Nicaraguan
people fear more than anything else, even more than the Sandinis-
tas, and that is a return of the old Somoza National Guard to
their country. That's the quickest way I know of of building up
popular support for the Sandinistas and of destroying the ability
of these other groups that I've just described of building a base
of popular support for themselves in that country.
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BRINKLEY: Senator Dodd, Representative Fowler, thank
you again very much for coming in and giving us your views today.
Coming next, our questions for Jeane Kirkpatrick, the
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.
BRINKLEY: Ambassador Kirkpatrick, we're delighted to
have you with us today. Thank you for coming in.
First let me ask you a question that we hear all the
time, and I'm sure you have heard, particularly on campuses
--that is, where they will allow you to talk. The question: Do
you see any way this could become another Vietnam?
AMBASSADOR JEANE KIRKPATRICK: Well, if by that you mean
a war in which there are thousands of American troops, or any
American troops engaged in a war, in combat, no, I do not. Not
at all. And nobody in our government does, let me say. That's
not even a possibility that anybody talks about, except --because
it's so remote. It just couldn't be. No.
BRIKLEY: But the question does arise, particularly
among younger people who are concerned about having to get into
such a war, as you were aware.
Well, my second question. If the danger is as de-
scribed, why do the Mexicans, who are closer to it than we are,
why do they fail to see it?
AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Well, I'm afraid that an
adequate answer to that question would involve an analysis of the
Mexican government. The Mexican government has, unfortunately,
pursued a foreign policy for several years which is very, let's
say, understanding of the Cuban and Nicaraguan position, rather
more than any of the governments in the region. I think that the
Mexican government is very worried, frankly. I think they worry
a lot about their own future. I think they do, in fact, seek
very much a solution to the problems in Central America. So do
the governments, of course, of Panama and Venezuela and Colombia,
and so do we all. And we're all looking for a peaceful solution
all the time.
WILL: Madam Ambassador, you just heard Senator Dodd say
that the proper tactic in dealing with Nicaragua is to encourage
moderate elements to moderate within Nicaragua the Nicaraguan
regime. What's your estimate of the chance of that working?
AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Well, it was very interesting.
Actually, the people that Senator Dodd mentioned are out of
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Nicaragua. He mentioned Arturo Cruz and Aden Pastora, both of
whom were originally associated with the government of Nicaragua,
and both of whom have gone into exile because of the strength of
their opposition to that government. And I think that that's
probably the best commentary on their estimate of the chances of
persuading the government of Nicaragua to moderate from inside.
Archbishop Arando Bravo (?) is, of course, a marvelous
man who continues to work very hard inside Nicaragua to persuade
the government to moderate.
Our government has tried in every way we know how, in
fact, to try to encourage and persuade the government of Nica-
ragua to moderate, and not to make -- you know, not to make war
on its neighbors, if I may say, and not to repress its own
people.
WALTERS: Mrs. Kirkpatrick, I asked a question of the
two gentlemen. I'd like to ask you something that's similar that
seems to disturb this country, not Just in Central America, but
really all over the world, and that is the two points of view:
one, that we must contain communism -- we're talking here of
Central America -- lest it spread and become a great threat to
us; versus the opinion that if we continue to back, let's say,
the military dictatorships or the unpopular insurgents -- we
always seem to be on the wrong side -- that we will have the
undying hatred of each country if and when they throw the tyrants
out.
AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: You know, the problem is, of
course, that in Central America we're backing the democracies.
And it's very clear who are the tyrants and who are the democra-
cies. The governments of Costa Rica and Honduras and El Salva-
dor, all of Nicaragua's neighbors, are democracies, and those are
the governments that we're trying very hard to support.
So far as the -- we're supporting the good guys,
actually, in every sense of the word.
And Nicaragua, itself, has, of course, become a really
very repressive tyranny, a military dictatorship, a very harsh
military dictatorship.
So, while I think that question, Barbara is a good
question for the world in general, it doesn't apply in Central
America.
WALTERS: Do you think it's understood in this country
that we are supporting the good guys? Do you think that's
something that the people and the Congress understand?
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AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I don't know about the Con-
gress. Unfortunately, I think there's a very great deal of
propaganda, actually, about that in this country. And I think we
have to try harder. It can't just be the Administration, though.
You know, it has to be the Congress and it has to be the media
and it has to be everybody has to try harder to help inform the
American people, really, and ourselves, and keep informed, about
who is who in Central America, who are the democrats and the
forces for democracy, and who are the dictators and the forces of
tyranny, and who is tied, in fact, to the Soviet Union and Cuba,
and who is sending tons and tons, hundreds of tons, thousands of
tons of arms into the region, and who's trying to bring peace by
a political solution, by negotiation.
You know, we're working very hard all the time, in fact,
to try to promote negotiations in that region. And I think that
anybody who follows the situation knows that. But we've got to
have some help, in fact, in getting the facts across.
BRINKLEY: Ambassador, that's an interesting point. If
the danger of communism spreading through Central America, and
perhaps even beyond that, is as great as described, why is there
so much opposition to our doing something about it?
AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: You know, I don't really know,
frankly. I think that anti-communism, taking a position against
the spread of communism any place has become very unfashionable
in our country. I think that's a very great success, by the way,
for the Soviet Union and for the communists. And I think that we
somehow have to find a way to get through that and to get over
it. Because this is not -- you know, there isn't something going
on here that's a struggle of ideas or of doctrines that we can
debate about. The fact is that the Soviet Union is the world's,
probably, largest military power today, and they are shipping
thousands of tons of very heavy weapons into our hemisphere.
They are right now threatening, in fact, to station nuclear
missiles in our hemisphere five minutes from the United States.
The Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister made that threat only last
week.
And so we've somehow got to -- got to face facts about
BRINKLEY: If I may interrupt here for a moment.
BRINKLEY: ...George, you have a question you want to
put about the missiles?
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Ambassador, you referred a moment ago to the Soviet
threat, I guess it was, to put intermediate-range missiles in
this hemisphere, perhaps in Nicragua. Can you give us some sense
of what the American response would be if that occurred?
AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: No. Actually, I can't. I
could just say that it's serious, it's very serious. It would be
serious for our national security. We're not accustomed, in
fact, to being targeted, of course, and least of all from close
to home. We've never had to defend ourselves in our hemisphere
in our whole national history. And we not only would have a
serious response, but we need to take it seriously right now.
WILL: Are you prepared to say that to the Reagan
Administration the placing of such missiles in this hemisphere is
unacceptable?
AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I don't think that's quite my
appropriate role in the Administration, frankly. I think that's
more appropriate to the President or the Secretary of State or
the Secretary of Defense or somebody besides me, frankly.
WALTERS: The President is going before a joint session
of Congress this week. That happens very rarely. Only nine
times, as I understand it, in the past quarter of a century.
Suppose he isn't successful. Suppose he comes out of there and
Congress tightens the Boland Amendment even more. Suppose they
inhibit his actions even more. What will happen?
AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: You know, I mean, we're a
government of laws. And our government, the Reagan Administra-
tion, of course, not only is obeying the law, we will obey the
law. And Congress is a partner in that.
But just as Congress shares the power, Congress shares
the responsibility, of course. And what we very much hope is
that Congress will share the responsibility in helping find
constructive solutions.
I think we have to find a solution. I think that the
consequences would be really quite catastrophic if we don't. And
I think the Congress will, frankly.
WALTERS: In speaking of solutions, are you in agreement
with the position of the inter-American dialogue that Sol.
Linowitz has headed, that the basic problems in Central America
have to deal with security, political, social and economic
issues, rather than military; and if so, that we should negotiate
with both sides?
AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Barbara, I think that the
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economic problems have to have economic solutions and the
political problems need political solutions. I think, for
example, in Nicaragua we need a political solution, in fact. What
we need is an elected government and democracy and respect for
human rights and civil rights in that country.
We have -- and unfortunately, when people hold guns to
your head, you need defense. And for the military attacks on El
Salvador, for example, on Salvador's democratic government,
unfortunately, they need some military defense. You can't really
fight howitzers with improved land reform. You can fight
economic injustice and social injustice with land reform, but you
can't fend off people who have heavy weapons pointed at you just
with improved social and economic measures.
I very deeply believe, by the way, in social and
economic assistance to that area. And so, let me say, does the
Administration. And we, of course, have given three times as
much economic aid in the region as we have military aid, just as
the previous Administration did.
BRINKLEY: In the case of El Salvador, Ambassador, there
is a government freely elected, about a year ago, now trying to
defend itself, but seemingly, from this distance, not very
effectively. Is the Salvador army really fighting?
AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Oh, yes. Of course it is, you
know. And I think it's -- frankly, it's just very ungraceful of
us and inappropriate of us to criticize the army of El Salvador
for not fighting when it is fighting, and Salvadoran soldiers
dying all the time. What we should be doing is criticizing the
guerrillas who make implacable war against the government of El
Salvador.
It's very hard to fight a guerrilla war. You know,
nobody knows very much for sure about how to defeat guerrilla
wars. And I think they're doing a very good job under very
difficult conditions.
You know, the -- did you know that the command and
control and communications equipment of Salvador's guerrillas,
which have all been provided by the Soviet Union, the Soviet
bloc, are a lot better than those of the government of Salvador?
And frequently they have better weapons than the government of El
Salvador. The guerrillas are just getting better help. That's a
fact. And we're going to have to help the government, I think --
we're going to have to continue to help the government, economic-
ally and -- but, unfortunately, also militarily -- unless we can
persuade the guerrillas in El Salvador to lay down their guns, in
fact, and accept a political solution and join in free elections.
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I was thinking as I read some speeches by the leaders of
that guerrilla movement, they always end their speeches, "Revolu-
tion or death. We will win." You know, they don't talk about
political solutions. And unfortunately, so far they've refused
to join in democratic elections.
WILL: Ambassador, the help that the rebels are getting
that you say is superior to the help that our side is getting is
coming, much of it, the Administration insists, from Cuba. The
Administration began with Secretary of State Haig saying that we
had to go and deal with the problem at the source, and the source
referred to Cuba.
How is it that Cuba is not Finlandized? That is,
Finland is called Finlandized because it must act in a way very
circumspect because of its proximity to the Soviet Union. Why is
the United States seemingly powerless to make Cuba be more
circumspect?
AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I don't think we've tried very
hard, actually.
WILL: What should we do? What would constitute trying
AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I'm not sure, but I don't think
we've tried very hard. I don't think we -- we really haven't
used American power, economic power, for example, in a very
systematic way at all against Cuba, or political power. We
haven't for many, many, many years, in fact. We've just sort of
stood by, and while the Soviets spend -- do you know that the
Soviets spend about nine million dollars a day in aid to Cuba,
most of that military aid? And, of course, they have built a
very major military -- very major military force in this hemi-
sphere which is a threat to us. And we really just have stood by
and let it happen.
BRINKLEY: Ambassador Kirkpatrick, thank you. Thanks
very much for coming in and talking with us.
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