THE SITUATION IN CHAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000200830004-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 15, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
STATION WTTG-TV
DATE August 15, 1983 12:00 Noon CITY Washington, D.C.
MAURY POVICH: We're going to talk, first of all, about
the country of Chad. We have heard about Chad recently. If you
were in this town last week, you know that there was a lot of
jitters going on. Some people felt that the United States of
America, for a moment, in the last couple of weeks, would
dispatch military weapons and military people to Chad. Not just
those couple of AWACS, but that the garrison would begin.
Well, apparently France has filled the bill there.
We'll find out what happened.
Please welcome two people who know a lot about what is
going on in Chad, particularly about the outside influence, first
from Libya and then from France, which apparently is about to
react.
On my left is Alex Rondose, who is the former correspon-
dent for the London-based specialty magazine Western Africa, now
director of the recently formed Commission on U.S.-
African Relations. It's a project for the Center for Development
Study. And also, Cord Meyer, syndicated columnist for Field
Newspapers, teaches at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service,
and at one time -- I think a member of the CIA at one time.
CORD MEYER: Right.
POVICH: Now then, let's ask why -- why, all of a
sudden, should the United States be involved in the affairs of
Chad?
MEYER: Well, I think the main reason is the fact that
the Libyan leader, Muammar Qaddafi, launched his forces into this
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internecine civil war. I think if it had remained a civil war
between the two rival parties, there would have been very little
concern, and certainly no inclination to get involved.
POVICH: As I understand it, Cord, it started out as
more or less of a tribal war.
MEYER: Well, it started out as a tribal war, but that
was settled by the victory of Habre. And he was in charge of the
government of Chad. The loser in that tribal war, Goukouni, was
taken to southern Libya. Forces from the rest of Africa were
transported to southern Libya, and a mercenary army was built
there that included Libyan NCOs in charge. And this force, which
was partially Chadian but partially from other African tribes and
partially Libyan, was then launched, with Qaddafi's approval and
support, into the attack that really created the crisis and the
problem.
POVICH: And we know, of course, from past experiences
that Muammar Qaddafi likes to beat his chest. He's had problems
with the Sudan. He's had problems with Egypt.
MEYER: He hasn't had problems with the Sudan. He
attempted to overthrow the Sudanese government on a number of
occasions, and came pretty close to doing it.
POVICH: Does that mean, just because Muammar Qaddafi,
Alex, is interested in Chad, that we should be interested in
Chad?
ALEX RONDOSE: Well, this Administration's chosen to
make Qaddafi public enemy number one. And he nourishes many
prejudices, as it were. And so -- I happen to disagree with the
way the Administration's gone about it. I think the Administra-
tion jumped in feet-first into an area about which it knows very
little. And it didn't even prepare properly, I think, the whole
diplomatic configuration that was needed.
RONDOSE: Well, I think, first of all, the evidence, as
Cord suggested -- we all know that Libya was behind and backing
the forces of Goukouni Oueddei in the North. I happen to think
he also -- Goukouni Oueddei does have his own independent force
[unintelligible] it's backed a lot by Libya. But I think the
United States should, with all the warning it's had, and it's
been worried about Chad for a year now, should have spoken to a
number of its allies in Africa. We're talking about Egypt,
Sudan.
POVICH: Could it have talked to the French, or not?
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RONDOSE: It has been talking to the French. And the
interesting thing is that the French have the whole time been
very, very reticent.
POVICH: Now, the reason why the French are involved is
because Chad was at one time a colony of France. And France had
a military presence there until, what, two or three years ago?
POVICH: So it's a -- and the President said yesterday
it is a sphere of influence in terms of the French.
RONDOSE: Right. But I think there's a slight complica-
tion here. There've been changes in France itself. To just
suggest that because France has been involved in Chad for 20
years, or whatever, that suddenly they should step back in, it's
easy to make that leap. In fact, there's been a lot of
--there've been changes in France domestically. There are changes
in French attitudes to how to deal with Africa, which is a very
peculiar relationship that France has with that part of the
world.
POVICH: It's kind of a withdrawal attitude, isn't it?
RONDOSE: Certainly it amounts to that at the moment.
And it has all sorts of implications for other aspects of U.S.
policy in Africa. But it is amazing that given, as the President
said, this was the French sphere of influence, that two-three
weeks after the Libyans had really upped the ante in the war,
that the French took so long to get involved, and she sent
troops. And even now that they've sent troops into Chad, it is
-- this is, effectively, a holding operation. I mean if the idea
was to really bang Qaddafi over the head, that hasn't happened
yet.
MEYER: Well, I think I would undertake to defend the
Administration's policy in this situation. I think Chester
Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, and his
colleagues have done a good job on this one. They followed it
very closely, as far as the intelligence was concerned. As soon
as they identified the fact that the Libans were involved -- and
that information came in by bits and pieces -- they went to the
France, as the responsible party, to present the evidence. And
they tried to say to Mitterand, the President of France, in
effect, "Look, you have a problem here. We are anxious to help
you solve it. We can't act for you. You have to act for
yourself."
As soon as the French put in 400 tons of equipment to
help Habre in the first step, we upped the ante ourselves by
suporting that move with $25 million worth of military equipment.
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In effect, what the U.S. Government in this situation
has done all along the line is to encourage the French to move,
to support them whenever they do move, and they have wished very
strongly for the French to have moved more decisively sooner.
POVICH: Even if the French didn't want to move. I
understand -- Alex is trying to make the point -- it's not French
policy to move back into Africa.
MEYER: No. It's really the result of the fact the
Socialist Party in France came to power with a policy that, in
effect, ruled out French direct intervention in the Third World.
And the Socialist Party, the ideological, doctrinaire wing of the
party, was opposed to any action in this case because it would so
clearly go against what their ideological position was.
RONDOSE: Well, I think that's certainly the case. In
which event, how come this Administration wasn't prepared for the
French reticence? It's as though...
RONDOSE: I think it should have been predicted. I
think there was evidence building up from a long way back that
the French -- the French relationship with Chad is, in itself, a
very peculiar one. The French have had their fingers burnt there
too many times. So there's a broader issue and a very particular
one.
POVICH: We don't have too much time left, but let me
throw this out. Is it the Administration policy that whenever
Qaddafi makes a move, some kind of grandiose move of his or some
expansionist move, that we seem to react immediately? He seems
to be the burr under the Reagan Administration's saddle.
MEYER: Well, I think he is a very dangerous individual.
The country is a small one, but Qaddafi is a big gambler. And he
has a great deal of money at his disposal and he has caused a
great deal of trouble and can cause a great deal more.
We have not talked about the real reason why both the
French and ourselves are acting in this situation.
POVICH: Well, give me the real reason.
MEYER: And that is because the rest of the Francophone,
French-allied African states in the area feel that they are very
much endangered by Qaddafi's move into Chad, that he can use the
adjoining boundaries to overthrow them, to organize dissident
tribes against them. This is true of all the adjoining states,
whether it be the Niger, the Central African Republic, Cameroons,
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the Sudan. They're all endangered by this move.
POVICH: There is a domino theory?
MEYER: There is definitely -- indeed there is.
RONDOSE: Well, I think that's a false assumption
really. First of all...
MEYER: That's not the way they think.
RONDOSE: I'm sure. But I would argue that...
MEYER: That they're not in danger?
RONDOSE: Chad is -- the issue here is the Adminis-
tration is saying that Qaddafi wants to control Chad. To control
a country like Chad, which is just in complete tatters, requires
a hell of a lot of money. Qaddafi right now doesn't have too
much money.
POVICH: Well, I hear he's bulging with military
RONDOSE: Yes. Yeah. And he's paying through the nose
for it to the Soviet Union. Okay.
To control Chad is in itself a major task for Qaddafi.
He tried that in 1981. His forces, many more than are present
now in Chad, were in Chad in 1981. And that whole...
MEYER: Try to tell that to Houphouet-Boigny. Try to
tell it to the President...
POVICH: Who is he?
MEYER: He's the head of the Ivory Coast government.
POVICH: Okay.
MEYER: They feel very strongly.
RONDOSE: I'm sure they feel very strongly.
MEYER: They're on the phone all the time to Paris
saying, "When are you going to act?"
RONDOSE: Of course. Now we'd better ask another
fundamental question about Africa. We're talking about govern-
ments that are a little worried about how they stand. I don't
mean just the government of Ivory Coast, but a whole lot of
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governments which have not had the right type of policies, and
therefore are open to any type of subversion.
And this is where Qaddafi -- Qaddafi doesn't need
frontiers to subvert people.
POVICH: There have been recent reports that maybe
Qaddafi now wants to tone down the fighting and maybe talk about
withdrawing the troops and talk about peace. Do you believe
that?
MEYER: Well, I think he's quite capable of going just
as far as he can get, and then he's crazy like a fox and he's
inclined to pull back a little. I wouldn't be surprised, once
the French have moved these paratroopers in -- and I understand
there are planes backing them up -- that he's got the message.
RONDOSE: Well, I think Qaddafi pushed as far as he
would be allowed to push.
POVICH: It would be like the old Gulf of Sidra menta-
lity, is that you challenge and then you pull back. He doesn't
even feel embarrassed by it, apparently.
RONDOSE: No, no. And again, I'm surprised people don't
appreciate that. You know, it's the old issue: either you're
pregnant or you're not. Now, if the United States and France
were really concerned about Qaddafi, why didn't they get stuck in
there a lot earlier when there was all the evidence...
MEYER: ...the United States was trying to persuade the
French to do. The French should have come in and saved Faya
Largeau, in my opinion. But they didn't do it because they moved
-- they were in the internal dispute among themselves as to
whether they should do it.
POVICH: Very good. A good discussion.
If we have another big day on this, would you come back
and talk about it again, because both of you seem to be very
knowledgeable about it?
RONDOSE: Oh, gladly.
POVICH: Thank you. And I think that your points are
very clear and you do contrast.
Thank you, both, very much.
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