MISSING PLANE/JAPAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000200850002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT
1 September 1983
MISSING PLANE/ JENNINGS: Good evening. Everyone but the Soviet Union says
JAPAN that the Soviets did shoot down a Korean 747. Two hundred
sixty-nine passengers and the crew were on board, and in the
absence of any wreckage we can only assume their fate. One of
the passengers was Congressman Larry McDonald of Georgia. The
attack on a commercial airliner, whether the Soviets knew it was
that or not, has caused an outrage. ?????
MCWETHY: American intelligence sources say what was left of the
plane ended up in the northern part of the Sea of Japan. The
debris is within the 12-mile territorial limit of the Soviet
Union. The Russians contend that they repeatedly tried to
signal the aircraft to land by radio and by visual signals.
U.S. sources confirm that the Soviets did radio the Korean
airliner but got no response. The extreme detail with which
Secretary of State Shultz laid out what the U.S. knew about this
incident was, according to intelligence sources, only a fraction
of the material which the National Security Agency and the CIA
had compiled. Nonetheless, it was considered unprecedented in
its precision. STANSFIELD TURNER (Former Director CIA): What
the secretary of state said surely tells the Soviets how good
our capabilities are. It doesn't tell then necessarily how we
got that information.
MCWETHY: Intelligence sources say *Elint spy satellites plus
heat-detecting satellites and listening posts in South Korea and
Japan were all used to gather information on what happened. But
why the Soviets fired at the Korean jetliner still remains a
mystery. TURNER: They don't have to be suspicious. They're
paranoid about people penetrating their air and sea space and
have been over all the years. They have shot down planes
before, but only military planes.
MCWETHY: There are two other theories still unconfirmed. One,
that the Korean plane was somehow fitted with spy cameras and
was deliberately over-flying sensitive Soviet military
installations, and two, that the Russians used an electronics
device to confuse instruments in the Korean plane and draw it
off course. Neither of those theories are confirmed. Despite
all the tough talk today by the Reagan administration, Pentagon
sources say there is to be virtually no military show of force
in response., A few F-15 fighters have been moved from Okinawa
to Japan, but as yet nothing else has been ordered, even though
there are two American aircraft carriers at sea in the Pacific.
John McWethy, ABC News, the Pentagon.
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ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT
1 September 1983
MISSING PLANE/ JENNINGS: Good evening. Everyone but the Soviet Union says
JAPAN that the Soviets did shoot down a Korean 747. Two hundred
sixty-nine passengers and the crew were on board, and in the
absence of any wreckage we can only assume their fate. One of
the passengers was Congressman Larry McDonald of Georgia. The
attack on a commercial airliner, whether the Soviets knew it was
that or not, has caused an outrage. ?????
MCWETHY: American intelligence sources say what was left of the
plane ended up in the northern part of the Sea of Japan. The
debris is within the 12-mile territorial limit of the Soviet
Union. The Russians contend that they repeatedly tried to
signal the aircraft to land by radio and by visual signals.
U.S. sources confirm that the Soviets did radio the Korean
airliner but got no response. The extreme detail with which
Secretary of State Shultz laid out what the U.S. knew about this
incident was, according to intelligence sources, only a fraction
of the material which the National Security Agency and the CIA
had compiled. Nonetheless, it was considered unprecedented in
its precision. STANSFIELD TURNER (Former Director CIA): What
the secretary of state said surely tells the Soviets how good
our capabilities are. It doesn't tell them necessarily how we
got that information.
MCWETHY: Intelligence sources say '`Flint spy satellites plus
heat-detecting satellites and listening posts in South Korea and
Japan were all used to gather information on what happened. But
why the Soviets fired at the Korean jetliner still remains a
mystery. TURNER: They don't have to be suspicious. They're
paranoid about people penetrating their air and sea space and
have been over all the years. They have shot down planes
before, but only military planes.
MCWETHY: There are two other theories still unconfirmed. One,
that the Korean plane was somehow fitted with spy cameras and
was deliberately over-flying sensitive Soviet military
installations, and two, that the Russians used an electronics
device to confuse instruments in the Korean plane and draw it
off course. Neither of those theories are confirmed. Despite
all the tough talk today by the Reagan administration, Pentagon
sources say there is to be virtually no military show of force
in response., A few F-15 fighters have been moved from Okinawa
to Japan, but as yet nothing else has been ordered, even though
there are two American aircraft carriers at sea in the Pacific.
John McWethy, ABC News, the Pentagon.
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PBS MACNEIL-LEHRER REPORT
1 September 1983
MACNEIL: A Soviet fighter shoots down a Korean airline, apparently killing 269
people, including Americans.
'AACKEIL: Good evening. The United States today accused the Soviet Union of shooting
down a Korean Airlines jumbo jet carrying 269 people. Those on board included
Democratic Congressman Lawrence McDonald of Georgia and, according to Korean Airlines,
as many as 30 other Americans. There were no reports of survivors. Korean Airline
Flight 007 was on its way from New York to Seoul, Korea, with a stop at Anchorage,
Alaska. According to the U.S. government, it was tracked by Soviet jet fighters and
shot down by a missile fired from an SU-15 over the Soviet island of Sakhalin. The
Soviet news agency Tass said only that Soviet fighters intercepted an unidentified
plane that intruded over Sakhalin but it did not respond to signals and continued
towards the Sea of Japan. Moscow did not acknowledge shooting down the airliner.
Tonight, the reaction and the implications. Jim?
LEHRER: Robin, because of the airliner tragedy, President Reagan will cut short his
California vacation, returning to Washington on Saturday to meet with top national
security advisers on the airliner tragedy, as well as the situation in Lebanon, where
he today also ordered an additional amphibious force to go. Earlier today, White
House press spokesman Larry Speakes spoke for the president about the airliner
incident. Speakes, saying there, are no circumstances which could justify the attack
on the plane. 'The Soviet Union owes an explanation to the world about how and why
this tragedy occurred,' he said. Here in Washington, Secretary of State George Shultz
spoke for himself at a morning news conference. GEORGE SHULTZ (Secretary of State):
At approximately 16:00 hours Greenw,ich Mean Time, the aircraft came to the attention
of Soviet radar. It was tracked constantly by the Soviets from that time. The
aircraft strayed into Soviet air space over the Kamchatka peninsula and over the Sea
of'Okhotsk and over the Sakhalin Island. The Soviets tracked the commercial airliner
for some two and one-half hours. A Soviet pilot reported visual contact with the
aircraft at 18:12 hours. At 18:21 hours, the Korean aircraft was reported by the
Soviet pilot at 10,000 meters. At 18:26 hours, the Soviet pilot reported that he
fired a missile and the target was destroyed. At 18:30 hours, the Korean aircraft was
reported by radar at 5,000 meters. At 18:38 hours, the Korean plane disappeared from
the radar screens. We know that at least eight Soviet fighters reacted at one time or
another to the airliner. The pilot who shot the aircraft down reported after the
attack that he had in fact fired a missile, that he had destroyed the target, and that
he was breaking away. About an hour later, Soviet controllers ordered a number of
their search aircraft to conduct search and rescue activity in the vicinity of the
last position of the Korean airline reflected by Soviet tracking. One of these
aircraft reported finding kerosene on the surface of the seas in that area. During
Wednesday night, the United States State Department officials, particularly assistant
secretary Burt, were in contact with Soviet officials seeking information concerning
the airliner's fate. The Soviets offered no information. The United States reacts
with revulsion to this attack. Loss of life appears to be heavy. We can see no
excuse whatsoever for this appalling act. We have no explanation to offer. We can
see no explanation whatever for shooting down an unarmed commercial airliner, no
matter whether it's in your air space or not.
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LEHRER: As the secretary said, the State Department official specifically assigned to
get an explanation from the Soviets is Assistant\Secretary\of\State\Richard\Burt. He
did speak twice today with Soviet officials here in Washington. 1r. Secretary, what
have the Soviets said to you? BURT: Well, Jim, the Soviets have said to us privately
essentially what they have said publicly in a Tass release. And that is that the
airliner did enter their air space, that they dispatched fighter planes to follow that
aircraft. They say that it went through over their air space and was headed towards
the Sea of Japan and left their air space. They do not acknowledge or admit the fact
that they engaged the aircraft and shot it down.
LEHRER: Have you specifically, has the United States specifically said, 'Soviet
Union, we know you shot down that plane.' BURT: Yes, we have.
LEHRER: And what do they say? BURT: They obviously deny it. They have given us a
statement that they followed that aircraft. But they say that they stopped tracking
the aircraft when it left their air space.
LEHRER: Both you.... BURT: They have said that they have mounted a search and air
rescue mission to search for that aircraft in the Sea of Japan.
LEHRER: Secretary Shultz, and now you, speak with great certainty about what
happened. How are you able to do that? BURT: We're able to do it on the basis of
information that we have obtained and other countries have obtained about the events
that occurred last night.
LEHRER: If this things continues to escalate and the Soviet Union continues to deny
having shot this plane down, is the United States prepared to publicly prove what you
all say?- BURT: We told the Soviet Union today that their statement and what they
have told us privately was totally inadequate. And we have reiterated our request for
i satisfactory explanation of the episode. And we will continue to press the Soviet
Union for a satisfactory explanation. Secretary of State Shultz said today that when
he goes to Madrid next week and meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko that he
will ask for an explanation.
LEHRER: But if that explanation doesn't come, is the United States, can the United
States publicly prove that the Soviet Union shot that plane down? BURT: I am
satisfied that we can prove it.
LEHRER: And.... BURT: And it is not, I should, I should say that it is not only the
United States that is....
LEHRER: Sure. BURT: ...stating that that aircraft
said so. The Korean government has said so. And as
simply based on our own sources.
was shot down. The Japanese have
I say, our information is not
LEHRER: And there's not a shadow of a doubt in your mind about it? BURT: We are
completely satisfied that that aircraft was engaged by Soviet fighter planes, that,
ah, as Secretary Shultz said in the- filmclip that he was, that that pilot was clearly
under the control and in continuous contact of ground authorities and that he fired
his missile and destroyed that aircraft.'.
LEHRER: The Soviet, Soviet embassy person told one of our reporters this afternoon
that this Korean plane did not have navigational lights on and also hinted, if that's
the word, indicated, use all the phony journalistic terms, and anyhow was suggesting
cavrnvr"
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that on a radar screen an AWACS reconnissance plane or AWACS communications plane
looks similar to a 747 and that may have been what happened. BURT: Jim, the Soviet
Union was in contact with that Korean airliner for two and a half hours as it dipped
in and out of Soviet air space. They dispatched fighters. And as we have said
before, at least one of those fighters was in visual contact with that aircraft. In
fact, we know that, that that fighter went very close to the aircraft, flew up one
side of the aircraft, flew down the other side of the aircraft and then engaged the
aircraft and attacked it. And it is very clear to us that when that attack order was
given that the pilot of that aircraft knew that he was striking a commerical airliner.
LEHRER: No question about that? BURT: It's simply you can't, you, how can you, how
could a pilot misjudge an AWACS, with its very special configuration and with a
radardome, from a jumbojet, a 747?
LEHRER: Thank you. Robin? BURT: Jim....
LEHRER: Yes. BURT: ...I might add one point.
LEHRER: Right. BURT: The fact that it was a military aircraft and if the Soviets
had attacked a miliary aircraft, that is also a terribly alarming, would be a terribly
alarming factor. For there are, there are standard international rules and norms for
engaging both civilian and military aircraft over one's own territory.
LEHRER: Uh huh. BURT: The Soviet Union has flown its own civilian aircraft over the
United States on several occasions, breaking rules, established rules. And we've
never even come close to attacking that aircraft with our military aircraft.
LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?
MACNEIL: One explanation of what may lie behind the Soviet action came from former
ambassador to Moscow, Malcolm Toon. We spoke to him this afternoon in Washington.
?IALCOL?i TOON: It is true that there are a lot of sensitive installations in, in that
part of the Soviet Union, and they have for years been very sensitive about any
penetration of that area, whether it's by an aircraft or by foreigners traveling. For
example, that whole area was banned completely to me when I was ambassador in Moscow.
So, there is something there, ah, that the Soviets are very sensitive about. But
again, I, I repeat that even if you have highly sensitive installations in that part
of the country and even if there was an unintended penetration of that area, that does
not justify this sort of action by the Soviet Union.
LEHRER: We look now at what the Soviet decision-making process may have been in this
incident with General\George\Reegan, former head of the U.S. Air Force Intelligence.
Since retirement, he's served as editor of the magazine, Strategic Review, and founded
the organization Peace Through Strength Coalition. General, could this have been the
result of an over-zealous pilot or low-level officer on the ground? KEEGAN: No, I
think that's hardly likely. The Soviet air defense system, in addition to being the
world's largest, is certainly highly disciplined. The lines of command are thoroughly
established, as are the lines of authority. And as the secretary has said, back in
19L4 a large group of nations, including the Soviet Union, agreed upon the rules that
would involve penetration of foreign air space by other aircraft and agreed upon how
civil aircraft would be treated, identified, ordered to land, and, and rules also
apply to military aircraft. Now, those are clearly established in international law
agreements.
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LEHRER: All right. Briefly, what are the rules, I mean, when would, what would have
had to have happened for the Soviet Union to have been justified, under the rules, for
the Soviet Union to have been justified in shooting down that airplane? KEEGAN: I
see no justification whatever. But under Soviet law, which is established very
clearly, quite precisely, any foreign aircraft that intrudes over Soviet air space is
susceptible to being intercepted and shot down. The rules are that Soviet
interceptors are to identify. They are to fly in front of, and if they cannot
communicate electronically are to move their wings laterally in such a way to signify
to the pilot that he is to land by following that fighter. If he fails to do so, the
fighter is then to circle to the left and fire a warning shot or series of shots off
the bow but is not to fire at the aircraft. And if at that point the aircraft refuses
to land or does not acknowledge, be it a military or a civil aircraft, then under
Soviet law, the Soviets are authorized, have authorized themselves to fire upon such
aircraft. Those rules are clear. They're well understood, certainly by the United
States and by the Soviets.
LEHRER: What about by the Koreans? KEEGAN: And understood by the Koreans. However,
the Koreans have been very careless traditionally. And I suspect if we're ever
allowed to investigate this case there may be some analogy between the case of 1978,
in which they flew one of their airlines a thousand miles off course.
LEHRER: But let me, let me, let me ask you this. Just to put the question to you
bluntly, do you believe that this could have happened under any circumstances other
than a decision being made in the, highest levels at the Kremlin to shoot that airplane
down? KEEGAN: I think that's the only way that that decision could have been made,
because in the command system, in all of the cases that I've had experience with,
which number in many, many dozens in the last 30 years....
LEHRER: Of planes going into somebody else's air space? KEEGAN: That's correct. To
my knowledge, the regional air defense, local air defense. have almost invariably
received their final destruct order, the command from Moscow. Now, there are
provisions that we're at the, say, wing level, acting under the rules clearly
established, that a wing of fighters goes up, intercepts, identifies, challenges,
orders to land and the foreign intruder fails to obey or comply. Then, the rules
authcrize that wing commander to destroy that aircraft. Nevertheless, the Soviet
system invariably checks up the chain of command 'all the way to Moscow and can do so
within two or three elapsed minutes of time.
i.EHRER: So in two and a half hours they'd have plenty of time. KEEGAN: Yes.
LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?
MACNEIL: For more on what the Soviet motivation and action may have been we turn to
Donald\Zagoria, an expert on Soviet foreign policy. He's a professor of government at
Hunter College, the City University of New York, and author of the recent book 'Soviet
Policy in East Asia.' Mr. Zagoria, what kind of explanation do you find plausible in
this case? You've heard what the others have said. DONALD ZIAGORIA. (Hunter College):
Well, Robert, I don't find any plausible explanation so far. I don't think anyone has
advanced one. Uh, it's difficult to believe it was an accident, because as Secretary
Burg indicated, uh, it's hard to see how the Soviet plane making visual contact with
this Korean airliner could have mistaken it for some kind of spy plane. Uh, it's also
hard to see, for me at least, how it might've been a deliberate decision at the
highest level of the Soviet leadership, because at a time when the Soviets are clearly
interested in making progress in improving relations with the United States, uh, in a
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situation where, uh, this new leadership, uh, uh, is bound to be aware of the enormous
world outrage that this would produce, uh, it's hard to see, uh, that being a
deliberate, uh, act.
MACNEIL: What about the sensitivity of whatever is in the Kamchatka peninsula or this
island where the plane was apparently shot down? I mean, what would be there that
would make them so paranoid? ZAGORIA: Well, I agree with Ambassador Toon that it's a
very. uh, that whole, uh, Kamchatka, Sea of Okhotsk, Sakhalin area is a very, uh,
sensitive region, uh, and the Soviets do have a degree of paranoia about penetration
of their borders. But, uh, none of that still makes any, any sense in describing, uh,
uh, motivation.
MACNEIL: You, you heard what General Keegan said about the understanding which the
Soviets had on their own and what had been adopted years ago, uh, internationally. Is
there anything in the kind of cold, cold war behavior between the superpowers which
might have justified this action in the Soviet Union? Given the extreme sensitivity
of that part of their country militarily? ZAGORIA: No, I, uh, I don't,. uh, see
anything that could've justified this action even in their own minds because as I say,
they've invested a fair amount of effort, particularly in the past year or to, in
trying to, uh, rekindle the small thaw in Soviet-American relations. Uh, and, uh, to,
uh, if they wanted to get tough with the United States or with the West, they could
pick, uh, 50 other ways to do it other than shooting down an unarmed Korean plane. So
it's something that just doesn't.make any sense to me.
MACNEIL: Thank you. Jim?
LEHRER: Our final guest is here in two capacities, as a member of Congress and as a
friend of Congressman Larry McDonald, who was aboard that Korean airliner. He's
Congressman Newt\Gingrich, Republican of Georgia, whose district is next to
Congressman McDonald's, in the Atlanta suburbs. He's with us tonight from the studios
of -Georgia Public Television in Atlanta. This afternoon, Congressman, you wrote a
letter to President Reagan demanding that the United-States make some specific demands
of the Soviet Union. Briefly, what are they? NEWT GINGRICH (R-Ga.): Jim, they're
designed to give us a chance to look at Mr. Zagoria's question of 'why?,' and they say
first, the Soviets should publicly identify and publish, punish, the officials
responsible for these murders. Second, they should apologize to every nation which
had citizens aboard the airplane which was shot down. Third, they should pay
compensation for both the loss and personal tragedy to each family whose loved one was
murdered by officials of the Soviet Union. And finally, they should issue public
orders to the Soviet armed forces that in future incidents, airliners which might get
into Soviet air space would be brought down without any kind of military action and
investigated, but would not be shot down.
LEHRER: Congressman, up to this point, as we heard Secretary Burt say, the Soviets
aren't even admitting that they shot the plane down. What if they do not respond,
they do not admit it, and they do not do what you want them to do? What then? What
should the United States do? GINGRICH: Jim, I think the most important action for
all Americans is within ourselves, not with the Soviets. We seem to be surprised
again by the brutality, by the savagery of the nation which, uh, shot, uh,'down this
aircraft, killed 2610 people, which earlier had forced down a Korean aircraft in '78,
which invaded Afghanistan, has used chemical warfare. 1 guess, you know, Larry
McDonald, of all the congressmen, probably had the strongest perception that the
Soviet Union was a clear threat to freedom everywhere, that it was a brutal nation
that would kill people as it killed them yesterday. And I think the first step for us
CON7VVMW
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is to begin to be honest about the nature of the dictatorship that we're dealing with,
and to quit, uh, kidding ourselves about the conditions out there, and to quit trying
to appease a nation uh, which is clearly a threat to civilization. Now, that doesn't
mean we have to go to war. It doesn't mean we have to cut off relations. But it dots
mean that we as a nation ought to quit being surprised at a dictatorship which is
callously willing to murder 269 people and then lie to the world, even when it knows
that the United States and Japan and Korea have tapes of its pilots having killed
those 269 people.
LEHRER: There were suggestions from some of your colleagues today in the Congress
that we ought to kill the wheat deal that was just signed last week by Secretary Block
in hoscow, that we should stop or do something in arms control, the arms control talks
that are start, that are due to begin in another few days in Geneva. Do you have
something specific in mind like that? GINGRICH: I think as a minimum first step, uh,
frankly, that the, uh, secretary of state should cancel the meeting with Gromyko.
LEHRER: That's on September 8. GINGRICH: That's on September 8. tJh, candidly, I'm,
Gromyko, when he was foreign minister, lied to John F. Kennedy about the missiles in
Cuba. His government is now lying to the world about this incident. And I think that
we should say that until there is a clear and a firm and an open statement by the
Soviet Union, that we ought to reserve the right to, uh, re-examine all of our
relations with the Soviet Union, including their embassy and the number of diplomats
they have in this country, their right to land aircraft in the United States, and a
variety of things. But I think that we should not do anything precipitously. We
don't need grand symbols, we don't need big gestures. We need a firm, quiet, steady,
systematic resolution that if the Soviet Union is determined to be a brutal
dictatorship that free people can learn how to, uh, preserve that freedom
systematically by increasing the pressure on the Russians without punishing ourselves.
LEHRER: Thank you.
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PBS MACNEIL-LEHRER REPORT
1 September 1983
MACNEIL: A Soviet fighter shoots down a Korean airline, apparently killing 269
people, including Americans. 1
MACKEIL: Good'evening. The United States today accused the Soviet Union of shooting
down a Korean Airlines jumbo jet carrying 269 people. Those on board included
Democratic Congressman Lawrence McDonald, of Georgia and, according to Korean Airlines,
as many as.30 other Americans. There were no reports of survivors. Korean Airline
Flight 007 was on its way from New York to Seoul, Korea, with a stop at Anchorage,
Alaska. According to the U.S. government, it was tracked by Soviet jet fighters and
shot down by a missile fired from an SU-15 over the Soviet island of Sakhalin. The
Soviet news agency Tass said only that Soviet fighters intercepted an unidentified
plane that intruded over Sakhalin but it did not respond to signals and continued
towards the Sea of Japan. Moscow did not acknowledge shooting down the airliner.
Tonight, the reaction and the implications. Jim?
LEHRER: Robin, because of the airliner tragedy, President Reagan will cut short his
California vacation, returning to Washington on Saturday to meet with top national
security advisers on the airliner tragedy, as well as the situation in Lebanon, where
he today also ordered an additional amphibious force to go. Earlier today, White
House press spokesman Larry Speakes spoke for the president about the airliner
incident. Speakes, saying there are no circumstances which could justify the attack
on the plane. 'The Soviet Union owes an explanation to the world about how and why
this tragedy occurred,' he said. Here in Washington, Secretary of State George Shultz
spoke for himself at a morning news conference. GEORGE SHULTZ (Secretary of State):
At approximately 16:00 hours Greenwich Mean Time, the aircraft came to the attention
of Soviet radar. It was tracked constantly by the Soviets from that time. The
aircraft strayed into Soviet air space over the Kamchatka peninsula and over the Sea
of'Okhotsk and over the Sakhalin Island. The Soviets tracked the commercial airliner
for some two and one-half hours. A Soviet pilot reported visual contact with the
aircraft at 18:12 hours. At 18:21 hours, the Korean aircraft was reported by the
Soviet pilot at 10,000 meters. At 18:26 hours, the Soviet pilot reported that he
fired a missile and the target was destroyed. At 18:30 hours, the Korean aircraft was
reported by radar at 5,000 meters. At 18:38 hours, the Korean plane disappeared from
the radar screens. We know that at least eight Soviet fighters reacted at one time or
another to the airliner. The pilot who shot the aircraft down reported after the
attack that he had in fact fired a missile, that he had destroyed the target, and that
he was breaking away. About an hour later, Soviet controllers ordered a number of
their search aircraft to conduct search and rescue activity in the vicinity of the
last position of the Korean airline reflected by Soviet tracking. One of these
aircraft reported finding kerosene on the surface of the seas in that area. During
Wednesday night, the United States State Department officials, particularly assistant
secretary Burt, were in contact with Soviet officials seeking information concerning
the airliner's fate. The Soviets offered no information. The United States reacts
with revulsion to this attack. Loss of life appears to be heavy. We can see no
excuse whatsoever for this appalling act. We have no explanation to offer. We can
see no explanation whatever for shooting down an unarmed commercial airliner, no
matter whether it's in your air space or not.
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LEHRER: As the secretary said, the State Department official specifically assigned to
get an explanation from the Soviets is Assistant\Secretary\of\State\Richard\Burt. He
did speak twice today with Soviet officials here in Washington. Mr. Secretary, what
have the Soviets said to you? BURT: Well, Jim, the Soviets have said to us privately
essentially what they have said publicly in a Tass release. And that is that the
airliner did enter their air space, that they dispatched fighter planes to follow that
aircraft. They say that it went through over their air space and was headed towards
the Sea of Japan and left their air space. They do not acknowledge or admit the fact
that they engaged the aircraft and shot it down.
LEHRER: Have you specifically, has the United States specifically said, 'Soviet
Union, we know you shot down that plane.' BURT: Yes, we have.
LEHRER: And what do they say? BURT: They obviously deny it. They have given us a
statement that they followed that aircraft. But they say that they stopped tracking
the aircraft when it left their air space.
LEHRER: Both you.... BURT: They have said that they have mounted a search and air
rescue mission to search for that aircraft in the Sea of Japan.
LEHRER: Secretary Shultz, and now you, speak with great certainty about what
happened. How are you able to do that? BURT: We're able to do it on the basis of
information that we have obtained and other countries have obtained about the events
that occurred last night.
LEHRER: If this things continues to escalate and the Soviet Union continues to deny
having shot this plane down, is the United States prepared to publicly prove what you
all say?- BURT: We told the Soviet Union today that their statement and what they
have told us privately was totally inadequate. And we have reiterated our request for
a satisfactory explanation of the episode. And we will continue to press the Soviet
Union for a satisfactory explanation. Secretary of State Shultz said today that when
he goes to Madrid next week and meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko that he
will ask for an explanation.
LEHRER: But if that explanation doesn't come, is the United States, can the United
States publicly prove that the Soviet Union shot that plane down? BURT: I an
satisfied that we can prove it.
LEHRER: And.... BURT: And it is not, I should, I should say that it is not only the
United States that is....
LEHRER: Sure. BURT: ...stating that that aircraft was shot down. The Japanese have
said so. The Korean government has said so. And as I say, our information is not
simply based or. our own sources.
LEHRER: And there's not a shadow of a doubt in your mind about it? BURT: We are
completely satisfied that that aircraft was engaged by Soviet fighter planes, that,
ah, as Secretary Shultz said in the filmclip that he was, that that pilot was clearly
under the control and in continuous contact of ground authorities and that he fired
his missile and destroyed that aircraft.'.
LEHRER: The Soviet, Soviet embassy person told one of our reporters this afternoon
that this Korean plane did not have navigational lights on and also hinted, if that's
the word, indicated, use all the phony journalistic terms, and anyhow was suggesting
conrnNUo
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that on a radar screen an AWACS reconnissance plane or AWACS communications plane
looks similar to a 747 and that may have been what happened. BURT: Jim, the Soviet
Union was in contact with that Korean airliner for two and a half hours as it dipped
in and out of Soviet air space. They dispatched fighters. And as we have said
before, at least one of those fighters was in visual contact with that aircraft. In
fact, we know that, that that fighter went very close to the aircraft, flew up one
side of the aircraft, flew down the other side of the aircraft and then engaged the
aircraft and attacked it. And it is very clear to us that when that attack order was
given that the pilot of that aircraft knew that he was striking a commerical airliner.
LEHRER: No question about that? BURT: It's simply you can't, you, how can you, how
could a pilot misjudge an AWACS, with its very special configuration and with a
radardome, from a jumbojet, a 747?
LEHRER: Thank you. Robin? BURT: Jim....
LEHRER: Yes. BURT: ...I might add one point.
LEHRER: Right. BURT: The fact that it was a military aircraft and if the Soviets
had attacked a miliary aircraft, that is also a terribly alarming, would be a terribly
alarming factor. For there are, there are standard international rules and norms for
engaging both civilian and military aircraft over one's own territory.
LEHRER: Uh huh. BURT: The Soviet Union has flown its own civilian aircraft over the
United States on several occasions, breaking rules, established rules. And we've
never even come close to attacking that aircraft with our military aircraft.
LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?
MACNEIL: One explanation of what may lie behind the Soviet action came from former
ambassador to Moscow, Malcolm Toon. We spoke to him this afternoon in Washington.
M,ALCOLM TOON: It is true that there are a lot of sensitive installations in, in that
part of the Soviet Union, and they have for years been very sensitive about any
penetration of that area, whether it's by an aircraft or by foreigners traveling. For
example, that whole area was banned completely to me when I was ambassador in Moscow.
So, there is something there, ah, that the Soviets are very sensitive about. But
again, I, I repeat that even if you have highly sensitive installations in that part
of the country and even if there was an unintended penetration of that area, that does
not justify this sort of action by the Soviet Union.
LEHRER: We look now at what the Soviet decision-making process may have been in this
incident with General\George\Keegan, former head of the U.S. Air Force Intelligence.
Since retirement, he's served as editor of the magazine, Strategic Review, and founded
the organization Peace Through Strength Coalition. General, could this have been the
result of an over-zealous pilot or low-level officer on the ground? KEEGAN: No, I
think that's hardly likely. The Soviet air defense system, in addition to being the
world's largest, is certainly highly disciplined. The lines of command are thoroughly
established, as are the lines of authority. And as the secretary has said, back in
19L4 a large group of nations, including the Soviet Union, agreed upon the rules that
would involve penetration of foreign air space by other aircraft and agreed upon how
civil aircraft would be treated, identified, ordered to land, and, and rules also
apply to military aircraft. Now, those are clearly established in international law
agreements.
awimc"
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LEHRER: All right. Briefly, what are the rules, I mean, when would, what would have
had to have happened for the Soviet Union to have been justified, under the rules, for
the Soviet Union to have been justified in shooting down that airplane? KEEGAN: I
see no justification whatever. But under Soviet law, which is established very
clearly, quite precisely, any foreign aircraft that intrudes over Soviet air space is
susceptible to being intercepted and shot down. The rules are that Soviet
interceptors are to identify. They are to fly in front of, and if they cannot
communicate electronically are to move their wings laterally in such a way to signify
to the pilot that he is to land by following that fighter. If he fails to do so, the
fighter is then to circle to the left and fire a warning shot or series of shots off
the bow but is not to fire at the aircraft. And if at that point the aircraft refuses
to land or does not acknowledge, be it a military or a civil aircraft, then under
Soviet law, the Soviets are authorized, have authorized themselves to fire upon such
aircraft. Those rules are clear. They're well understood, certainly by the United
States and by the Soviets.
LEHRER: What about by the Koreans? KEEGAN: And understood by the Koreans. However,
the Koreans have been very careless traditionally. And I suspect if we're ever
allowed to investigate this case there may be some analogy between the case of 1978,
in which they flew one of their airlines a thousand miles off course.
LEHRER: But let me, let me, let me ask you this. Just to put the question to you
bluntly, do you believe that this could have happened under any circumstances other
than a decision being made in the highest levels at the Kremlin to shoot that airplane
down? KEEGAN: I think that's the only way that that decision could have been made,
because in the command system, in all of the cases that I've had experience with,
which number in many, many dozens in the last 30 years....
LEHRER: Of planes going into somebody else's air space? KEEGAN: That's correct. To
my knowledge, the regional air defense, local air defense. have almost invariably
received their final destruct order, the command from Moscow. Now, there are
provisions that we're at the, say, wing level, acting under the rules clearly
established, that a wing of fighters goes up, intercepts, identifies, challenges,
orders to land and the foreign intruder fails to obey or comply. Them, the rules
authorize that wing commander to destroy that aircraft. Nevertheless, the Soviet
system invariably checks up the chair, of command 'all the way to Moscow and can do so
within two or three elapsed minutes of time.
.EHRER: So in two and a half hours they'd have plenty of time. KEEGAN: Yes.
LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?
?SACNEIL: For more on what the Soviet motivation and action may have been we turn to
Donald\Zagoria, an expert on Soviet foreign policy. He's a professor of government at
Hunter College, the City University of New York, and author of the recent book 'Soviet
Policy in East Asia.' Mir. Zagoria, what kind of explanation do you find plausible in
this case? You've heard what the others have said. DONALD ZIAGORIA. (Hunter College):
Well, Robert, I don't find any plausible explanation so far. I don't think anyone has
advanced one. Ub, it's difficult to believe it was an accident, because as Secretary
Burg indicated, uh, it's hard to see'how the Soviet plane making visual contact with
this Korean airliner could have mistaken it for some kind of spy plane. Uh, it's also
hard to see, for me at least, how it might've been a deliberate decision at the
highest level of the Soviet leadership, because at a time when the Soviets are clearly
interested in making progress in improving relations with the United States, uh, in a
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S
situation where, uh, this new leadership, uh, uh, is bound to be aware of the enormous
world outrage that this would produce, uh, it's hard to see, uh, that being a
deliberate, uh, act.
MACNEIL: What about the sensitivity of whatever is in the Kamchatka peninsula or this
island where the plane was apparently shot down? I mean, what would be there that
would make them so paranoid? ZAGORIA: Well, I agree with Ambassador Toon that it's a
very. uh, that whole, uh, Kamchatka, Sea of Okhotsk, Sakhalin area is a very, uh,
sensitive region, uh, and the Soviets do have a degree of paranoia about penetration
of their borders. But, uh, none of that still makes any, any sense in describing, uh,
uh, motivation.
MACNEIL: You, you heard what General Keegan said about the understanding which the
Soviets had on their own and what had been adopted years ago, uh, internationally. Is
there anything in the kind of cold, cold war behavior between the superpowers which
might have justified this action in the Soviet Union? Given the extreme sensitivity
of that part of their country militarily? ZAGORIA: No, I, uh, I don't, uh, see
anything that could've justified this action even in their own minds because as I say,
they've invested a fair amount of effort, particularly in the past year or so, in
trying to, uh, re-kindle the small thaw in Soviet-American relations. Uh, and, uh, to,
uh, if they wanted to get tough with the United States or with the West, they could
pick, uh, 50 other ways to do it other than shooting down an unarmed Korean plane. So
it's something that just doesn't.make any sense to me.
MACNEIL: Thank you. Jim?
LEHRER: Our final guest is here in two capacities, as a member of Congress and as a
friend of Congressman Larry McDonald, who was aboard that Korean airliner. He's
Congressman Newt\Gingrich, Republican of Georgia, whose district is next to
Congressman McDonald's, in the Atlanta suburbs. He's with us tonight from the studios
of -Georgia Public Television in Atlanta. This afternoon, Congressman, you wrote a
letter to President Reagan demanding that the United-States make some specific demands
of the Soviet Union. Briefly, what are they? NEWT GINGRICE (R-Ga.): Jim, they're
designed to give us a chance to look at Mr. Zagoria's question of 'why?,' and they say
first, the Soviets should publicly identify and publish, punish, the officials
responsible for these murders. Second, they should apologize to every nation which
had citizens aboard the airplane which was shot down. Third, they should pay
compensation for both the loss and personal tragedy to each family whose loved one was
murdered by officials of the Soviet Union. And finally, they should issue public
orders to the Soviet armed forces that in future incidents, airliners which might get
into Soviet air space would be brought down without any kind of military action and
investigated, but would not be shot down.
LEHRER: Congressman, up to this point, as we heard Secretary Burt say, the Soviets
aren't even admitting that they shot the plane down. What if they do not respond,
they do not admit it, and they do not do what you want them to do? What then? What
should the United States do? GINGRICH: Jim, I think the most important action for
all Americans is within ourselves, not with the Soviets. We seem to be surprised
again by the brutality, by the savagery of the nation which, uh, shot, uh,'down this
aircraft, killed 269 people, which earlier had forced down a Korean aircraft in '78,
which invaded Afghanistan, has used chemical warfare. 1 guess, you know, Larry
McDonald, of all the congressmen, probably had the strongest perception that the
Soviet Union was a clear threat to freedom everywhere, that it was a brutal nation
that would kill people as it killed them yesterday. And I think the first step for us
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6.
is to begin to be honest about the nature of the dictatorship that we're dealing with,
and to quit, uh, kidding ourselves about the conditions out there, and to quit trying
to appease a nation uh, which is clearly a threat to civilization. Now, that doesn't
mean we have to go to war. It doesn't mean we have to cut off relations. But it dots
mean that we as a nation ought to quit being surprised at a dictatorship which is
callously willing to murder 269 people and then lie to the world, even when it knows
.that the United States and Japan and Korea have tapes of its pilots having killed
those 269 people.
LEHRER: There were suggestions from some of your colleagues today in the Congress
that we ought to kill the wheat deal that was just signed last week by Secretary Block
in Moscow, that we should stop or do something in arms control, the arms control talks
that are start, that are due to begin in another few days in Geneva. Do you have
something specific in mind like that? GINGRICH: I think as a minimum first step, uh,
frankly, that the, uh, secretary of state should cancel the meeting with Gromyko..
LEHRER: That's on September S. GINGRICH: That's on September 8. Uh, candidly, I'm,
Gromyko, when he was foreign minister, lied to John F. Kennedy about the missiles in
Cuba. His government is now lying to the world about this incident. And I think that
we should say that until there is a clear and a firm and an open statement by the
Soviet Union, that we ought to reserve the right to, uh, re-examine all of our
relations with the Soviet Union, including their embassy and the number of diplomats
they have in this country, their right to land aircraft in the United States, and a
variety of things. But I think that we should not do anything precipitously. We
don't need grand symbols, we don't need big gestures. We need a firm, quiet, steady,
systematic resolution that if the Soviet Union is determined to be a brutal
dictatorship that free people can learn how to, uh, preserve that freedom
systematically by increasing the pressure on the Russians without punishing ourselves.
LEHRER: Thank you.
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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEW CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM Today Show STATION W R C T V
NBC Network
DATE September 2, 1983 7:00 AM CITY Washington, DC
SUBJECT Adm. Stansfield Turner/Korean Plane
BRYANT GUMBEL: And as we speak of the incident in the
air yesterday, the one question the world most wants to -- the
Soviets to answer is, why? In lieu of that answer we're dealing
this morning only in educated guesses.
One man whose guess is more educated than most is
Admiral Stansfield Turner, he is a military analyst, he's a
former CIA director, and he's in our Washington studios this
morning.
Good morning, Admiral.
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: Good morning, Bryant.
GUMBEL: Admiral, what's a decent answer to the question
of why they did this, was this simply a matter of sensitivity to
intrusion of air space?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, the Soviets are paranoid about
intrusions into their country. They've been invaded a lot.
They've shown this kind of sensitivity previously in air and sea
incidents.
In addition, though, you've got to recognize that the
Soviets place the interest of the state above those of the
individual. That's part of communism. And they don't put the
same high regard on the individual and his life as we do. They
have a different set of values. They're a quite different
country with a different outlook
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GUMBEL: Admiral, this incident can't be divorced from
the location where it took place. What can you tell us of Soviet
enplacements on the Kamchatka Peninsula, or on Sakhalin Island?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, the Kamchatka Peninsula is a
major military place. They have a naval base there, which is the
only one in the Far East that gives them direct access to the
ocean. And they have a missile impact area there where they fire
their test missiles. So they're very sensitive about Kamchatka.
GUMBEL: And that plane, as we can see, from that
graphic, went over the southern tip -- it's believed to have gone
over the southern tip of Kamchatka Peninsula and then across
Sakhalin Island.
ADMIRAL TURNER: That's correct. And right in here's
where the naval base is.
GUMBEL: As we continue to keep that shot -- I've got to
ask you -- even if you had a mind to, could anything be gained by
observing that area from.the air?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I think that it's just a very poor
way to collect intelligence from a commercial airliner in the
middle of the night. So -- and it's a very risky way, as facts
have proved, and as we saw in 1978, when they shot down a
previous Korean airliner. From the Soviet point of view, though,
and I'm not trying to apologize for them, this being the second
time a Korean civilian airliner has intruded into their airspace,
it has reinforced their normal paranoia.
GUMBEL: If you were they would you discount totally the
possibility this Korean plane was something other than just lost?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, as a Soviet, I would not, as I say,
because they are so suspicious and because this is a second
incident of a similar type.
GUMBEL: When Secretary Shultz confirmed the shooting
yesterday, he in part revealed the sophistication of our eaves-
dropping equipment. Did he tell the Soviets anything they didn't
know before?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, I think he did. He told them the
specific capabilities we had in this specific area at this time.
I'm sure they understood we had general capabilities of that sort
but he gave them some very specific data.
GUMBEL: In the long run, how detrimental is that to our
sense of security.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think it is a damaging report; the
most sensitive disclosure of this sort that I've ever seen by a
public official.
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GUMBEL: Admiral, can you give us any insight into the
orders intercept pilots have when they are sent aloft to
intercept a craft that has intruded into airspace?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, we certainly don't know what the
Soviet orders are but precedent -- again, going back to the 1978
incident -- is that they are to go through the motions that
you've described on the program this morning: waving their wings,
flashing their lights, trying to tell the plane to follow it and
then putting their landing gear down, which says to the plane,
land.
This was at night, yet it seems difficult to think that
they couldn't have got that through.
GUMBEL: I guess I asked you that because, what is the
likelihood that either the pilot or that someone on the ground
exceeded authority? I guess what I'm asking you is, how certain
are you that these orders came from the Kremlin, or that they
were made at a mid-level stage?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Because the incident took place over
two and a half hours, there's little question that it could have
and should have been known in the Kremlin.
It's my personal opinion that the Soviets -- again,
particularly because they were so embarrassed in 1978 -- probably
delegated authority in this area to shoot to the local commander.
Whether he's the one who finally made the actual decision or not
we'll probably never know.
GUMBEL: Final quick note. Given the technology
available, any way the Soviets could not have known that that was
a commercial airliner?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I would think just not possible at all;
both from the track that it was on, the fact that it's on a
scheduled time, they know that same flight comes every so often,
and the size and shape of the plane and all.
GUMBEL: Admiral Stansfield Turner, thank you for
joining us this morning.
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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
Good Morning America STATION WJLA-TV
ABC Network
DATE September 2, 1983 7:00 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
DAVID HARTMAN: 'Yesterday George Shultz, our Secretary
of State announced that -- and I'm quoting -- at 18:26 Greenwich
Mean Time, a Soviet pilot told ground control his target was
destroyed.
Now, that is just one of the details that illustrates
the precision with which, apparently, the United States can
monitor secret Soviet military conversations. The jet was shot
down in a region where the Soviets have strategic military
installations not far from major commercial airline routes.
HARTMAN: Michael Vlahos, former CIA employee, is now
Director of Security Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He
joins us from Washington. And Viktor Suvorov is a pseudonym, as
a matter of fact. You won't see his face. His voice will be
somewhat electronically disguised. He is a Russian defector,
former Soviet military officer. He's written a book called
"Inside the Soviet Army," and he joins us by satellite, live,
from London.
Mr. Vlahos, first of all, why did it take so long for us
to know that this plane was shot down?
MICHAEL VLAHOS: Well, there's a procedure whereby
intelligence that's collected, whether by satellite imagery or
signals itelligence, or what we call comment, interception of
communication transmissions, message traffic, has to be sorted
out. And there's so much, there's such a huge volume of this
kind of intercepted messages coming in to the United States that
the process of filtration and running it through a computer that
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might be able to make some rough determination of what's
important takes some time. And then it has to be analyzed.
Furthermore, the problem can be abetted if the messages
are encrypted and have to be decoded.
So that there is going to be an elapsed period of time,
especially in routine intercepts that we have no prior awareness
of their importance in some specific operational fashion.
HARTMAN: Right.
Is there any reason -- we hear talk today and late last
night about could this have been prevented. I mean, realisti-
cally, the way our intelligence operation works, whether it's
Japan, Korea, United States, any of it, realistically, might this
have been prevented? Could it have been stopped?
VLAHOS: Sure, if you want our military to be on full
alert around the periphery of the Soviet Union, anticipating a
hostile action, a warlike action on their part at all times. In
other words, every time that something like this happens, the
United States is blamed for some kind of intelligence failure or
intelligence lapse. Whereas, in reality, our military can't be
in a position of guaranteeing our security unless we're in a
position close to combat status, where our units are on full
alert.
So, unless you want to start escorting these passenger
liners and having the kind of internal preparations of our
intelligence apparatus to respond immediately to Soviet provoca-
tion, a la the good old days of the Cold War, then you can't
expect that this kind of thing can be prevented in normal
peacetime situations.
HARTMAN: Mr. Vlahos, thank you.
And now let's turn to London, Mr. Suvorov, a Soviet
defector to the West.
Mr. Suvorov, why would the Soviet Union risk an incident
of this nature? What's so important that they would take this
chance, internationally?
VIKTOR SUVOROV: First of all, that area, Okhotsk Sea,
it's extremely important area for Soviet Union. I repeat,
extremely. In that area there is lots of -- it's a place of
deployment of Soviet strategic submarine. There is Komsomolskiy,
city Komsomolskiy, in which way built strategic nuclear sub-
marine.
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Also, in that area there is quite a lots of missiles,
like Soviet missiles type 8K84, which have a double capability.
See, its illegal missile. It's a missile can be ballistic
missile and it can be anti-missile missile. You see, very
concentrated. There is such a missile in that area.
It's also been suggested there may be camps of some
kind, concentration camps, worker camps? Is that true?
SUVOROV: Of course. Oh, yes. In that area, there is,
I know, three very terrible camps. You see, it's at Taria (?),
Akushka (?), Olga (?), Chamor (?), Kalavaria (?). It is a very
important camps in which the prisoners directly involved in a
nuclear production. And aircraft been exactly nearly their
concentration Taria. You see, it is a base of nuclear submarine
and prisoners in that very big nuclear submarine base. They're
involved in a very dangerous job. Yes. They change active zone
of [unintelligible], you'see.
So, it is a military secret and it is a political
secret. So Soviet Union cannot have such a risk somebody will
know that, you seek, somebody will make such a photograph, you
see.
So, it's astonishing why they don't shot down that
aircraft two hours, you see. If aircraft appear in that area of
Taria, so it must be immediate action, you see.
Mr. Suvorov, thank you very much for joining us from
London this morning. It's good to have you with us.
SUVOROV: Thank you very much.
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ABC NIGHTLINE
1 September 1983
KOPPEL: Good',evening. I'm Ted Koppel, and this is Nightline. LARRY SPEAKES (Deputy
Press Secretary): (at press conference) Words can scarcely express our revulsion at
this horrifying act of violence.
KOPPEL: Tonight, the United States is still waiting for the Soviet Union to explain
why it shot down a Korean jetliner with 269 people on board. On this broadcast
tonight, we'll talk to a broad range of specialists on international relations, on the
Soviet Union, its air defenses, and on international intelligence as we focus on what
happened, how it happened, and what's likely next.
KOPPEL: If you were watching this broadcast last night, you probably went to sleep
with the same impression we did: there had been some kind of a hassle between Soviet
fighter jets and a Korean Air Line 747, but senior U.S. officials led us to believe,
and we led you to believe, that the plane had landed safely on Soviet territory.
Sadly, that was not true. The U.S. flag over the White House today, and over all
federal installations and all official U.S. buildings around the world, flies at half
staff. Two hundred sixty-nine passengers and crewmen aboard Korean Air Line's Flight
007 are missing and believed dead. The aircraft was shot down by a Soviet
air-to-missile, air-to-air missile. The United States and South Korean have called
for a special meeting of the U.N. Security Council tomorrow. Tomorrow, also, President
Reagan cuts short his vacation and returns from California to Washington. He'll meet
with his top security advisers and with congressional leaders tomorrow and over the
weekend. From the president to the Congress to the families of those who were on
board the downed jetliner, the reaction today was one of almost sickening shock. Some
found it hard to believe that the Soviets had actually shot down an unarmed plane with
so many passengers on board. hany who spoke of the incident were deeply moved with
pain and with anger.
KOPPEL: So far, at least, the Soviet government has acknowledged only that an
airliner, an unidentified one, penetrated Soviet air space. They have not admitted
shooting down the plane. Nor have the come close to expressing anything approaching
regret. Joining us now live is the U.S. undersecretary of state for political
affairs, Lawrence\Eagleburger. Secretary Eagleburger, what do we know? Are we
confident that the Soviet Union shot that plane down? E.AGLEBURGER: well, I think,
Ted, the facts are absolutely clear. There is no doubt whatsoever, on the basis of
evidence from a number of sources, that the Soviet air force shot down that Korean
Airlines airplane. There's no doubt about that whatsoever.
KOPPEL: Give us, if you can, a thumbnail sketch of, of what happened to the best of
the U.S. government's understanding and in what kind of a timeframe. EAGLEBURGER:
Well, the time frame is, without the facts right in front of me is gonna be a little
bit difficult, Ted.
KOPPEL: Roughly. EAGLEBURGER: But in effect, as the secretary said in his statement
today, there is no question that the Korean Airlines plane was outside of its normal
flight pattern and in fact over-flew Soviet territory. There is also no question
about the fact that that plane was captured by Soviet radar for about two and a half
hours. There were, at one time or another, eight Soviet aircraft up in the air,
either looking for it or in fact later, unfortunately, finding it. There's no
question at all about the fact that one Soviet aircraft, the one that in fact finally
shot the plane, down came to within two kilometers of the Korean aircraft.
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KOPPEL: Let me, let me stop you for a second. EAGLEBURGER: Yeah.
KO??EL: Because we are going to hear, a little later in the broadcast, exactly what
Secretary Shultz says. So, maybe I shouldn't have asked you that. You are confident
when it is said that a Soviet fighter visually made contact with that plane, saw the
Korean Airlines plane? EAGLEBURGER: No doubt whatsoever.
KOPPEL: Would they be able to identify from two kilometers away that this was a
civilian airliner? EAGLEBURGER: Ted, I can't, you know, I can't answer it as an
expert. I can simply say that a 747 is a rather obvious aircraft with obvious
configuration. And clearly I think they had to know it was a 747, and I myself
believe that at that distance they must also have known it was a civilian airliner.
KOPPEL: All right. EAGLEBURGER: I don't see any way to avoid that.
KOPPEL: A quick devil's-advocate question: Turn it around, a North Korean airliner
headed for Havana, Cuba, intrudes American air space, might we not do the same thing?
EAGLEBURGER: Absolutely not, and there's history to demonstrate this. For example,
in 1983 there was a Cubana Airlines airplane overflying the United States on its way
to Canada, which went out of its flight path and over-flew a sensitive U.S.
installation. What we did was warn them at the time and then pull their authority to
over-fly the United States for a while. We have had at least three incidents--two
with Aerofloat, one with the Cubana Airlines in the last several years. And in each
case, we took no military action whatsoever. The record is clear on this.
KOPPEL: All right. If the record is also as clear as you say, that there's no
question *but that the Soviets shot it down, why do you think they're being so
reluctant to admit what they did? I mean, they might not have to be apologetic about
it, if they don't feel they should be. But why don't they at least admit what they
did? EAGLEBURGER: Well, I can't put myself in the minds of the Soviet authorities.
KOPPEL: No, but help us to understand it a little bit. EAGL.EBURGER: Well, you know,
if anyone who knows the Soviets, I think, knows that this sort of an act, which ought
to tell us something about the Soviet Union, by the way, but that this sort of an act,
once it takes place, is not something that the Soviets are easily going to admit. I
don't know that they will ever admit it. We may well find ourselves in a debate with
the Soviets for some time on this issue. But this, it's just simply out of character
for the Soviets to admit when they have done a dastardly dead of this sort.
KOPPEL: What does the U.S. government do about a thing like this? What, what kinds
of options are avilable? EAGLEBURGER: Well, those are, you know, the decisions on
what will be done are for the president to make. And my advice and that of those of
us who are in the U.S. government is to give the president that advice in private.
There are a range of options that he could, and indeed tomorrow I think will, be
considering. We've done a great deal of work today to try to lay out those options
for him. The secretary will be talking to him tomorrow, and the president will have
to make those decisions. I can't make them, obviously, for him. But there are a
range of things that can be done. The first step we have obviously taken is that we
are going to the UN Security Council in association with the, the Koreans tomorrow, to
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present v?
a resolution and to try to get out on the table for public debate the facts of
this case. That's one step we have clearly taken now. There are other steps that we
can take, but those are for the president to decide.
KOPPEL: This question clearly has nothing to do with humanity. It has nothing to do
with morality, but strictly from a internationally legal point of view, were they
within their rights shooting that plane down? EAGLEBURGER: Well, as long as you
understand that I'm not an international lawyer. Nevertheless, in having looked at
this in some detail today, I think it is absolutely clear that they were far outside
the bounds of international law. If, if nothing else, no one could argue that that
aircraft presented any sort of a threat to the Soviet Union. And under those
circumstances, the response of the Soviets was totally outside of any human interest.
It was outside of international law. Clearly they had a right, and there are rules
about this in international law of how they can challenge the aircraft, how they can
indicate that it should land and so forth. But they have no right to shoot'it down
under these circumstances.
KOPPEL: On some of the maps that are in the cockpits of these commerical
airliners--and I guess we'll be looking at one of those maps a little later on--in a
box, ironically, just under Sakhalin Island, there is a little warning that says, You
should know that if you move into this area you may be shot down.' I mean, clearly }
this is not something that, that should take an experienced pilot by surprise.
EAGLESURGER: Well
T
d
th
fi
'
,
e
,
e
rst point is, I
m absolutely certain that the pilot of
this aircraft did not over-fly Soviet territory on purpose. I can't explain how he
was where he was, but obviously, there were some errors in navigation or something of
the sort. But again, that's not the issue. Sure, he can read the map and see that
the Soviets may shoot him down. That does not have anything to do with whether it is
legal under international law. Nor, would the pilot deliberately and knowingly have
gone there.
KOPPEL: All right, Hr. Secretary, still a great deal to talk about. Please indulge
us and stand by for a couple of minutes. Since the Soviet Union has still failed to
provide any detailed account of what happened to the Korean jetliner, just about all
the information we have to date has come from U.S. officials. That information was
provided in its most succinct form today by Secretary of State George Shultz. Here
now is his description of how the plane was shot down. GEORGE SHULTZ (Secretary of
State): At 14:00 hours Greenwich Mean Time yesterday, a Korean Airlines Boeing 747 en
route from New York to Seoul, Korea, departed Anchorage, Alaska. Two hundred and
sixty-nine passengers and crew were on board, including Congressman Lawrence P.
hcDonald. At approximately 16:00 hours Greenwich Mean Time, the aircraft came to the
attention of Soviet radar. It was tracked constantly by the Soviets from that time.
The aircraft strayed into Soviet air space over the Kamchatka peninsula and over the
Sea of Okhotsk and over the Sakhalin Island. The Soviets tracked the commercial
airliner for some two and one-half hours. A Soviet pilot reported visual contact with
the aircraft at 18:12 hours. The Soviet plane was, we know, in constant contact with
its ground control. At 18:21 hours, the Korean aircraft was reported by the Soviet
pilot at 10,000 meters. At 18:26 hours, the Soviet pilot reported that he fired a
missile and the target was destroyed. At 18:30 hours, the Korean aircraft was
reported by radar at 5,000 meters. At 18:38 hours, the Korean plane disappeared from
the radar screens. We know that at least eight Soviet fighters reacted at one time or
another to the airliner. The pilot who shot the aircraft down reported after the
attack that he had in fact fired a,missile, that he had destroyed the target and that
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he was breaking away. About an hour later, Soviet controllers ordered a number of
their search aircraft to conduct search and rescue activity in the vicinity of the
last position of the Korean airliner reflected by Soviet tracking. One of these
aircraft reported finding kerosene on the surface of the seas in that area.
K0??=L: The kind of detail that you've just head from the secretary of state has to
be based on some pretty firm information. When we return, we'll look at how
intelligence agencies got that kind of information on the Korean Airlines incident.
Well also talk live with former CIA director Admiral Stansfield Turner, as well as
two former deputy directors of the CIA. And later, we'll talk with the wife of
Congressman Larry McDonald of Georgia. Congressman McDonald was, of course, aboard
the downed Korean jetliner and is now presumed dead.
KOPPEL: Before we continue, I have some late wire copy on a related story.
Apparently this just happened. A Soviet Aeroflot jet landed without incident at
Mirabelle International Airport near Montreal after a security alert was ordered.
Canadian officials ordered the alert after an anonymous telephone threat was reported,
saying that the Aeroflot jet would be destroyed in retaliation for the South Korean
incident. In addition, the Canadian Airlines Pilot Association said it would consider
asking Ottawa to refuse landing rights to Soviet flights to Canada. The Korean
jetliner was shot down at approximately 2:30 Eastern Time yesterday afternoon.
Secretary of State Shultz gave his detailed briefing, which you heard a couple of
minutes ago, on the incident at about 10:45 this morning. How did U.S. intelligence
gather and confirm its information in the intervening hours? Here's a report from
Jack Smith.
SMITH: Korean Airlines has been flying 747s across the Pacific for 10 years. U.S.
intelligence officials don't know just why yesterday's flight went astray, but they do
know what happened when it did and right down to the last detail. The route over the
?acific to Seoul, South Korea, normally skirts Soviet territory, but yesterday, though
on, the right arc was inexplicably at least 100 miles off course. It flew into Soviet
airspace over the Kamchatka peninsula and entered it again over Sakhalin Island, where
it was shot down two and a half hours after appearing on Soviet radar and fell into
the Sea of Japan. But if U.S. intelligence had this information, why did U.S.
officials not react sooner? RICHARD BURT (Asst.. Secretary of State): That
inforration was picked up through various sources. It had to be filtered. It had to
be translated. And we were not able to form a firm judgment on the fate of the
aircraft, as I said, until early this morning.
SMITH: In fact, U.S. officials, like Burt, say they didn't even know the plane might
have been shot down till yesterday evening, and the president wasn't told till 10:30
p.m., eight hours after it went down. What happened? U.S. intelligence nowadays uses
sophisticated spy satellites to gather information. But they're also listening posts
on the ground, at sea and in the air, 2,000 worldwide. A high proportion are in the
Western Pacific, with listening posts in the Aleutian Islands, Japan, South Korean and
it is generally believe northern China as well. The area is important. The Soviet
fleet is in *Vladyvostok. Kamchatka peninsula is an impact area for Soviet missile
tests. And the entire Soviet Eastern defense system is there as well. It was Soviet
pilots from this command who shot down the Korean airliner. And it was their
conversations with their Soviet ground controllers that gave U.S. intelligence such a
clear picture of what happened. The U.S.'s latest listening system, called Cobra, can
be mounted on ships or put in aircraft. Its only limitations are the horizon. So,
even mounted on the ground it can hear radio traffic for hundreds of miles. There is
no doubt U.S. monitoring stations picked up yesterday's Soviet radio traffic right
away. In fact, one source today claimed the national security agency was even
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listening in from its headquarters outside Washington, D.C., via satellite as the
tragedy occurred. This couldn't be confirmed but even if true does not mean
intelligence officials there or in the Pacific actually knew what was happening. Some
analysts today speculated that the information was delayed by being recorded
automatically by computers. U.S. intelligence routinely uses computers to digest the
mounds of raw Soviet radio, Telex and phone traffic it picks up each day. But most
intelligence experts believe that in a critical area like the Western Pacific, Soviet
air activity, radar and radio, would have been monitored by humans. And there are two
explanations of why it took them so long to react. White House spokesman Larry
Speakes provided one of them today when he told reporters privately that some
information came through Japanese intelligence. 'You have to keep in mind,' said
Speakes, 'that we were translating from Russian to Japanese to English. And it seemed
such an incredible incident that we were very careful in our reporting and were
rechecking and rechecking again to be sure that we had not misinterpreted anything.'
The problem of translating and the human element. But analysts point to another
reason. VOICE OF UNIDENTIFIED AIR FORCE PILOT: (Inaudible).
SMITH: That's how a U.S. Air Force pilot sounds. Even in English, it's sometimes
hard to make out what's being said, because pilots speak in jargon and code words.
Soviet jargon is even harder. Even with the best listening device, reception is also
often poor. Analysts believe that many words in the to and fro between the Soviet
pilots and their controllers would have been lost, leaving listeners to guess at
precise meanings after events had already taken place. BURT: We only learned that
the aircraft had been shot down hours after the fact. And as soon as, as, we learned,
though, that the aircraft might be in trouble, we did get in touch immediately with
the Soviets.
SMITH: But that was still hours too late to save the 269 passengers and crew who were
aboard that Korean airliner. This is Jack Smith for Nightline in Washington.
KOPP.EL: With us now live in our Washington bureau is Admiral\Stansfield\Turner
director of the Central Intelligence Agency under President Jimmy Carter. Joining us
from Seoul, South Korea, Ray\Cline, a 30-year intelligence veteran and former CIA
deputy director and from our affiliate KVUE in Austin, Texas, Admiral\Bobbv\Inman,
former deputy director of the CIA and former director of the National Security Agency
which monitors international communications. Admiral Inman, in a sense it must make
every intelligence officer's skin crawl a little bit when a secretary of state gives
the kind of detailed analysis that Secretary Shultz gave today. How much does that
reveal to our adversaries? INMAN: Mr. Koppel, you always cringe when sources and
methods are being exposed. But there are situations that are of sufficient gravity
that those who have the authority to declassify, the principal officers of government,
make the decision to do so. I must say this morning, as from a distance uninvolved I
watched the process unfold, I was pleased that the decision was made to announce that
it occurred rather than letting leaks be the way that facts dribble out. My
experience has been that when the leaks are the source, the damage to sources and
methods usually is even worse.
KOPPEL: Admiral Turner, how do you feel on the same subject? TURNER: Well, I think
I was shocked by the amount of detail that the secretary of state gave this morning,
coincidentally, on the same morning that the news reported that the president had sent
a memorandum to every member of the government in person, encouraging greater
security. The secretary discussed these techniques in greater detail than I've ever
heard before'in public and certainly gave the Soviets a clear readout on just what
those capabilities are in this particular area of the world.
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KOPPEL: Let's move on to precisely what happened. And Ray Cline, I'd like to begin
with you. Are you satisfied that the orders for shooting that plane down did not
originate at the scene? CLINE: It's clear that the, ah, pilot had to ask permission
to fire, that they came from some higher headquarters. You probaby know a special
sort of war theater operational headquarters has been set up by the Russians in the
Soviet East Asia, and it may, may have gone back that far. It could have gone to
Moscow. But there was a request for permission.
KOPPEL: Let's bounce that round. First of all, Admiral Inman, you believe it went
all the way back to Moscow? because obviously, the implications, if Moscow gave the
order, are considerably greater. I realize I'm asking you to speculate, but it's
informed speculation, I would assume. INMAN: The Soviets have been spent enormous
sums of money in their air defense system over the years. It's a system that puts a
great deal of effort around all of the Soviet borders. There's a steady flow of
information that goes to filter centers and back to Moscow itself. Given the
description this morning that the events went on for longer than two hours and a half,
I think there's no doubt that Moscow, as well as regional centers, were fully informed
about what was occurring. Whether it was necessary to go that far back for authority
to fire would be speculation. My own guess would be following the very poor
performance of the Soviet air defense system during the '78 Korean aircraft intrusion
that likely authority to fire may have been delegated much further out into the field.
KOPPEL: Let me ask you to expand on that just a little bit, because not all of our
viewers may know what you're talking about. This was then the other Korean airliner
penetrated as far as *Marmansk, didn't it? INMAN: It, the aircraft came in over the
Arctic. It was headed to Paris. Again, on a sad navigation error penetrated Soviet
territory and went very deep into the northern peninsula, finally was intercepted,
then took evasive action. My recollection of the debriefing from the pilots, they
took, ah, evasive action, were fired on and finally landed on a frozen lake. It was
very clear in the aftermath that the Soviets were very unhappy with the performance of
their defense system. And unfortunately, some leaks in the U.S. -that were printed in
the media took some substantial pleasure in the poor Soviet air defense performance.
All of that is likely to have led to tougher Soviet approaches for any intrusions in
the future.
K0PPEL, : Admiral Turner, that happened on your watch. So, ah, let me have your
analysis of what that incident, what role that incident may have played in yesterday'.s
shooting down of the, of the Korean airliner. You, you agree with what Admiral Inman
just analyzed for us? TURNER: Yes, I agree generally with what Bobby Inman said. I
think we should also take into account while it doesn't condone what the Soviets did,
that it must have made them more suspicious today when a Korean airliner, for the
second time, penetrated deeply into their airspace. They must have a paranoia about
this kind of thing, because we watched them react so violently over many years to any
kind of intrusions. But here they are doubly suspicious when it's the same country,
the same kind of airline, doing the same kind of thing in a different part of the
world.
KOPPEL: Well, I suppose that, ah, I mean part of the reason that it's happening
clearly is in order to get to Seoul from Anchorage, Alaska, you have to pass fairly
close to Soviet territory. Why would they be particularly suspicious of the Koreans?
TURNER: Well, as I say, when the Koreans, five years ago, went a thousand miles into
Soviet territory, then had done it again this time, I think that makes them
suspicious. But beyond that, Ted, for decades now we've seen intense reaction by the
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Soviets. Usually, of course, it's been military aircraft that have come close
their borders, and they've reacted against-them. They've had some shoot-downs and so
on. They just have a very strong feeling about this kind of thing. It's not, ah,
again, condoning what they're doing, but it is part of the Soviet makeup, the Soviet
psychology.
KOPPEL: Ray Cline, pick up on the same subject. CLINE: Yeah.
KOPPEL: And then I'd like to ask you something about the Korean (inaudible). CLINE:
Well, I, I, I, I certainly don't agree with Stan Turner on that. I think they, ah,
there is no excuse for shooting at this civilian airline. They knew what it was.
They called it a Korean airline, and those flights go regularly. If they have a right
to shoot down any civilian aircraft that gets a little off course and goes into their-
territory, it's international piracy. It's international chaos. So. I don't think we
should, ah, make excuses for them. I think it shows that the, the Russians are tough
and determined to keep their military perimeter protected, and they don't give a damn
who gets hurt in the process. And that's a signal for us. And I think we oughta
recognize it as such and, ah, deal with it in a diplomatic and political way. But,,
ah, we cannot make excuses for the Soviet behavior, in my opinion.
KOPPEL: All right, gentlemen, let me, ah, let me just ask one more question and go
around once quickly, and then we'll take a break. Part of what was overheard is that
the Soviets did indeed, I forget now whether it was the ground controller--I believe
it was--did indeed try to communicate with the pilot of the Korean airliner. For some
reason or another he did not respond. Does anyone of you have an explanation for
that? Ray Cline, why don't you begin? CLINE: There's no, there's no knowledge here }
of, ah, of what actually happened. But the attempt must have been fairly perfunctory.
There are different types of identification systems. There may have been some
incompatibility, but there is the voice. There were many ways to interrogate that
plane if they'd really wanted to communicate with it.
KOPPEL: Well, what, what I'm saying, Admiral Inman, is that, ah, if we here in the
United States, no matter for the moment how, manage to intercept the attempt by the
Soviets to contact that Korean, why shouldn't he have heard it, and why didn't he
respond? INMAN: First, the likelihood that the Russian pilot would be speaking in
Korean is remote. So, you've got a barrier....
KOPPEL: No, I'm not talking about the Russian pilot. I'm talking about ground
control, and one would assume that they're, I don't know, what language is used in
international air traffic? IN?iAN: That's not doubt Russian. English is the
international language for air traffic control. But when you talk about an attempt to
communicate with a Korean aircraft, you're talking about from the fighters that are
there, not from the ground.. So, you've already got a language problem. Secondly,
most of those communications are done by visual signals. In the daytime it's fairly
easy to do. At nighttime it's very difficult at all to do it. So, the odds are very
high that those poor Korean pilots, one, did not know they were off course and two,
did not understand, therefore, the nature of the approaches that were being made on
the aircraft.
KOPPEL: Admiral Turner, I've done a little reading on the subject. And apparently
that's one of the basic things that every commercial pilot and non-commercial pilot,
for that matter, is taught. If a fighter plane comes in front of you, even at night
and starts flashing its lights on irregularly, dips its wings, that means follow me.
Why-wouldn't the man know, why wouldn't the Korean pilot know what was involved?
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TURNER: That's certainly difficult to divine, because it would have been clear. But
in the incident in 1978 we discussed previously, Ted, the same thing happened. The
pilot did not respond, apparently, to the movements of the Soviet aircraft in trying
to get him to land. Let me just add that, ah, I do agree with Ray Cline that there is
no excuse for this kind of shoot-down, and I didn't mean to in any way apologize for
the Soviets in that regard. But I do think you have to take into account that the
Soviets are doubly suspicious when this same airline does the same thing to them
twice.
KOPPEL: All right, gentlemen, let's take a break. We'll continue our discussion in -a
moment, as we consider why the Soviets might provoke an incident so certain to be
condemned around the world. Later tonight, we'll look at the problems and dangers
faced by airline crews when they fly to close in sensitive and restricted airspace.
And we'll talk with Kathy McDonald, whose husband, Georgia Congressman Larry McDonald,.
was aboard the Korean jet when it was shot down.
KOPPEL: The question, given the absolute certainty of international condemnation, why
would the Soviet shoot down an unarmed passenger jet, even if it had entered Soviet
airspace illegally? Joining our other guests now live in our Washington bureau,
halcolm\Toon former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, also here in Washington, ABC
News Moscow bureau chief Bob\Zelnick. lie is currently in'the United States on home
leave. And still with us, undersecretary of state Lawrence Eagleburger. Ambassador
Toon, you know the Soviets as well as anyone. Why in heaven's name would they do
something like this? TOON: Thank you for the compliment, Ted. I'm gonna have to say
that I really don't know. I, ah, I agree with others who have said earlier this
evening that there's no possible excuse for this sort of behavior on the part of the
Soviets. I understand their, their, ah, ah, sensitivity about that, that part of
their terrain out in the Far Last. But to shoot down an unarmed civilian airliner, I
think, there is no justification for that at all, in my view.
KOPPEL: Well, there can't be any justification for it, and I'm really not asking for
justification. I'm trying to understand motivation. Can you think of any? TOON:
No-,-I can't. I, I think it's absolutely without any justification and no excuse for
it at all.
KOPPEL: Bob Zelnick, you and I have talked many times in, in my discussions with you
about the Soviet Union, about Soviet paranoia. Is that possibly at the route of this?
ZELNICK: Well, it's certainly a strong contributing factor. When you ask why would
they do it in the face of universal condemnation, I don't think that their ultimate
priority is avoiding condemnation, particularly by nations they regard as adversaries.
Their ultimate priority is protecting their own borders. And particularly at this
time of very high tensions they have been painting the world as a grim and threatening
place. They've been painting their own; borders as rimmed by adversaries and enemies.
They've been painting an American administration which is anxious, as they say, to
reverse historical processes and bring down the motherland of socialism and gear up
for what they charge is first strike potential and an ability to, ah, rule the world
by dictat. Now, when they quibble with this interpretation, when they even challenge
the integrity of those making the intepretation, but it takes on the ethic of the
society when it is repeated day in and day out as it has been been in the Soviet press
and in statements by Soviet leaders.
KOPPEL: You're telling me that even the leaders who may realize that some of this
rhetoric is a little inflated, that sometimes they begin to believe their own
rhetoric? ZELNICK: Whether they believe it in their heart of hearts is a judgment
that no journalist is equipped to make and very few individuals are equipped to make.
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9.
I don't know what they believe in their heart of hearts. I don't know what we believe
in our heart of hearts when some of our leaders make simliar charges about the Soviet
Union. I do know that it has a way of reinforcing itself, of influencing the conduct
of officials and particularly in a highly bureaucratized society, like the Soviet
Union, of becoming engrained in the procedures in dealing with incidents such as this
penetration by the South Korean aircraft.
K0?PEL: Secretary Eagleburger, let me come back to you and raise something else that
Bob Zelnick was saying to me earlier in the evening. The Soviets are always the ones
that depict this government, this administration in particular, as the cowboys, the
wreckless folks with the hand always on the six-shooter. Why, then, are they so
wreckless? LAGLEBURGER: Well, in the first place, they're wrong in their description
of us. But in the second place, again, you've asked the same question in a different
way--why are they to wreckless? How do you explain the inexplicable, Ted. I think, I
said earlier on this program I think this incident shows us something about the Soviet
Union. They're consumed by this desire for secrecy, and I think that's probably a
part of, of trying to explain to the degree anybody, any sane person can, this
reaction. It's a closed society. It is everything Mr. Zelnick says it is. I think !
it's always dangerous, by the way, to believe that Soviet leaders don't believe what
they say. It's, it's a closed society. It's consumed by its desire for secrecy. It
is paranoid in many ways, and I think these all add up to, ah, as I have to admit, an
unsatisfactory explanation of an insane and hideous act,for which nobody in the West,
I think, can ever give an adequate explanation.
KOPPEL: Ambassador Too7i, I believe you were ambassador to Moscow in 1978, when the
last incident happened, that is when the last Korean airliner penetrated Soviet
airspace and was also shot, not with the same horrible consequences. What was going
on at that time from which you can instruct us in what's going on now? TOON: Well, I
think the, ah, the thing that really surprised us about that incident was the fact
that the Soviet defense forces reacted so sluggishly to the penetration of the
a'i:space by, ah, by the Korean airliner. They were almost a thousand miles inside the
Soviet Union before there was any reaction at all. And I suspect that after that
happened, there was a, a very careful look at their command and control system. And I
think probably one of the reasons why this sort of thing happened was that those,
those control systems had 'been tightened to the -point where, ah, ah, this sort of
thing might possibly be explained.
KOPPEL: I've asked this question of others on this broadcast tonight, but I haven't
asked you, Ambassador Toon. Do you think the order came from Moscow directly? TOON:
I, ah, I really don't know, Ted. I, obviously, it came from higher authority.
Whether it had to go all the way back to Moscow, I just don't know. We have assumed
in the past that any act that was calculated to impact negatively on relations with
Washington had to have fairly high approval, probably a the Politburo level. But
whether that's in this category, I just don't know.
KOPPEL: All right, gentlemen, when we come back, and we will in just a moment, I
wanna talk about what long-term effect there may be on U.S.-Soviet relations. We'11
continue this discussion in a moment.
KOPPEL: We have an extraordinary reservoir of expertise at our disposal here, so what
I'd like to do is go once all the way, quite literally, around the world and ask the
question, 'what do you think is going to happen in terms of U.S.-Soviet relations in
the mid-range, in the next three, six months, the next year?' Senator Helms? HELMS:
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Well, Ted, I would think that would depend on what President Reagan does in terms of
leadership. And I think that he's sufficiently exercised about this tragic episode
to, uh, to have some influence with Congress. I wanna see what the Foreign Relations
Committee will do, some of the apologists for the Soviet Union in the past. But all
in all, I think you'll see a review, a reassessment of our total relationship with the
Soviet Union. And I think that's long overdue because up to now we really haven't
been realistic.
KOPPEL: Secretary Eagleburger, let me jump back here to Washington. It's going to be
your problem as much as anyone's. I'm not talking now about the options. I know you
won't talk about the options. But I would like to get your assessment of what the
long-term effect will be. Is there a long-term effect with an incident like this?
EAGLEBURGER: Oh, I don't think there's any question about it, Ted, that an act like
this cannot help but have an influence on our relationship and on our attitude toward
the Soviet Union. I don't deny, in fact, I wouldn't try to deny, that it's going to
have an impact. I think the only thing I would say is that as we think through that
impact and how we ought to deal with it, we need to understand as well that we still
have to deal with the Soviet Union. It is the other superpower, it is on this planet
with us. And while we can regret this act, we can think it is hideous, and we can
take whatever actions the president decides are necessary, that is not the point. But
we must remember in this, at the same time, we are going to have to deal with and live
on the same planet with the Soviet Union.
KOPPEL: Senator Helms, you buy that? HELMS: Well, uh, I just consider it to be a
crime against humanity if we do not respond to this in a way to bring together the
civilized nations of this world in reaction to this, this tragedy.
KOPPEL: All right. Let me go to our three intelligence experts for a moment now. It
is sometimes forgotten in the flush of excitement over how you get information that
once you got it, you've gotta analyze it. I'd like you to analyze it in terms,
now, of what the mid-term, long-term U.S. relationship is going to be. Admiral
Turner? TURNER: I think this will give us an opportunity to tell the world what the
Soviet Union is really like. I don't think it will change our relationship
drastically because we've known what the Soviet Union is really like all along. Five
years ago they came very close to doing exactly this same thing. And I certainly
agree with Ambassador Eagleburger that we have to get along with the Soviets on this
planet and we've got to negotiate with them. I think a major factor in the Soviet
calculation was that it will blow over, that they can deter other people from
penetrating their territory by this extreme action that they have just taken. And,
therefore, they think they can weather the adverse publicity that they'll get in the
short term.
KOPPEL: Admiral Inman, they've certainly been right about that in the past. Uh, when
100,000 Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan--outrage, Poland--outrage, and what do we
do? Under the Carter administration the president recommended lighting candles in the
window. President Reagan, at least, uh, to date, has recommended lowering the flag to
half mast. Will anything ultimately be done? IN?1A1: Well, over the past two years
the Soviets have been conducting a very skillful propaganda campaign, particularly.in
western Europe, to display themselves as the peacemakers, to show the U.S. as the
great threat to the outside world. What we've seen today is the real Soviet Union.
Now, that's going to have an impact, uh, on public opinion in Western Europe as well
as in this country. Some very well-meaning people who hoped that, uh, that if we led
the way by unilateral moves, the Soviets would follow, I hope will now reassess their
stands. Well, once we get rid of the wishful optimism, the fact remains that we have
to deal with Soviets. But we deal with them for our own self-interest, not because we
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like them, anything about them, or the way they do anything. Uh, that, I presume, the
decision recently ont he grain deal was because it was in our own self-interest. Uh,
we'll continue arms control discussions because trying to make progress there is in
our own interest. But hopefully it will bring some more realism and maybe it'll make
it a little eas-ier to get a consensus in this country and in Western Europe about
tough measures we have to take in the national security front day by day in dealing
with the Soviets.
KOPPEL: All right. Admiral (sic) Toon, Bob Zelnick, Larry Eagleburger, Admiral Toon
first, I'd like for you to consider for a moment this question. TOON: It's
ambassador, not admiral.
KOPPEL: I beg your pardon. We've got to many admirals here that sometimes I get
carried away. Ambassador Toon, what do you think is going on inside the Kremlin right
now. What do you think is going within the top leadership of the Soviet Union? What
are they talking about? TOON: Well, I would hope there'd be some soul-searching
going on inside the Politburo, and I would hope, frankly, that they would come up with
a satisfactory explanation for this terrible act in Korea. Let me just reinforce what
Larry Eagleburger has said, and-others have said, Ted. I think in, over the long
term, we've got to have a relationship with Moscow, no matter how badly they
misbehave, which will permit us to carry on a dialogue with them and prevent
misperceptions by one of (sic) the other. But in the short term, I think we've gotta
make clear to them that we cannot carry on as usual, business as usual, so long as
they're misbehaving in this way. And in this respect, frankly, I disagreed with, uh,
Secretary of State Shultz today when he said that, uh, he would go forward with the
meeting-with Gromyko. I think that oughts be put on the shelf until the Soviets come
back with a satisfactory explanation.
KOPPEL: You're talking about the scheduled meeting in Madrid next week? TOON:
That's right, yes.
KOPPEL: Bob Zelnick, what's going on in Moscow right now? I realize that's, that's
an impossible question to answer, but let's hear some informed speculation. ZELNICK:
Ted, 1 think as with any sane national leadership, the people in the Kremlin are
tonight, or tomorrow morning, as the case may be, are wondering how to limit the
damage from this, uh, very, very damaging episode, uh, for them. And I can't help but
recall, uh, a similar incident, not involving the Soviet Union, but involving the
State of Israel, uh, 10 years ago when they shot down a Syrian, excuse me, a Libyan
passenger jet over the Sinai, and, uh, a day or so later, the prime minister, Golda
heir, number one, acknowledged that the Israeli jets had been the parties that shot
down the plane. Number two, offered an explanation, self-serving though it may be,
that involved, uh, ignoring warnings and signals, uh, on the part of the Libyan
pilots. And number three, expressed deep regret over the incident and compassion for
the victims and their surviving family members. And I think in a sense this incident
can be a test of, uh, Yuri Andropov's sophistication, or his want of sophistication as
a Soviet leader, in that he has to make not, not an abject mea culpa apology. But he
has to recognize that facts are facts-and that there is something relevant about world
opinion and he has to address it, and'address it truthfully.
KOPPEL: All right. Final question to Larry Eagleburger, because tonight, all three
networks wanted to broadcast out of Moscow and they were given- this lame excuse that
the lioscow television studios were being, uh, worked on, there was some maintenance
word. being done there. They simply weren't available. It somehow suggests that
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behind that, that rather blunt, rather brutal we-don't-give-a-damn is some concern
after all. Do you think that they are at all worried about what world reaction is
going to be? EAGLEBURGER: Oh, yes, Ted, I don't think there's any question that
they're worried about world reaction. And I think they've probably realized now that
they are, in terms of world reaction, in deep trouble. I think they are, it may well
be a test for Hr. Andropov. It's one that they thus far have flunked, I must say, in
terms o: the reaction so far today and the answer they gave us to our demand for an
ex.p:anation. Uh, I think they're thinking right now. about how they can limit the
danage. I have real doubts in my own mind that they will be able to step up to this
one and admit their culpability and apologize and act in the way that Hr. Zelnick
described the government of Israel acted. But'we can hope.
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ABC NIGHTLIN#
1 September 1983
KOPPEL: Good evening. I'm Ted Koppel, and this is Nightline. LARRY SPEAKES (Deputy
Press Secretary): (at press conference) Words can scarcely express our revulsion at
this horrifying act of violence.
KOPPEL: Tonight, the United States is still waiting for the Soviet Union to explain
why it shot down a Korean jetliner with 269 people on board. On this broadcast
tonight, we'll talk to a broad range of specialists on international relations, on the
Soviet Union, its air defenses, and on international intelligence as we focus on what
happened, how it happened, and what's likely next.
KOPPEL: If you were watching this broadcast last night, you probably went to sleep
with the same impression we did: there had been some kind of a hassle between Soviet
fighter jets and a Korean Air Line 747, but senior U.S. officials led us to believe,
and we led you to believe, that the plane had landed safely on Soviet territory.
Sadly, that was not true. The U.S. flag over the White House today, and over all
federal installations and all official U.S. buildings around the world, flies at half
staff. Two hundred sixty-nine passengers and crewmen aboard Korean Air Line's Flight
007 are missing and believed dead. The aircraft was shot down by a Soviet
air-to-missile, air-to-air missile. The United States and South Korean have called
for a special meeting of the U.N. Security Council tomorrow. Tomorrow, also, President
Reagan cuts short his vacation and returns from California to Washington. He'll meet
with his top security advisers and with congressional leaders tomorrow and over the
weekend. From the president to the Congress to the families of those who were on
board the downed jetliner, the reaction today was one of almost sickening shock. Some
found it hard to believe that the'Soviets had actually shot down an unarmed plane with
so many passengers on board. ?iany who spoke of the incident were deeply moved with
pain and with anger.
KOPPEL: So far, at least, the Soviet government has acknowledged only that an
airliner, an unidentified one, penetrated Soviet air space. They have not admitted
shooting down the plane. Nor have the come close to expressing anything approaching
regret. Joining us now live is the U.S. undersecretary of state for political
affairs, Lawrence\Eagleburger. Secretary Eagleburger, what do we know? Are we
confident that the Soviet Union shot that plane down? EAGLEBURGER: Well, I think,
Ted, the facts are absolutely clear. There is no doubt whatsoever, on the basis of
evidence from a number of sources, that the Soviet air force shot down that Korean
Airlines airplane. There's no doubt about that whatsoever.
KOPPEL: Give us, if you can, a thumbnail sketch of, of what happened to the best of
the U.S. government's understanding and in what kind of a timeframe. EAGLEBURGER:
Well, the time frame is, without the facts right in front of me is gonna be a little
bit difficult, Ted.
KOPPEL: Roughly. EAGLEBURGER: But in effect, as the secretary said in his statement
today, there is no question that the Korean Airlines plane was outside of its normal
flight pattern and in fact over-flew Soviet territory. There is also no question
about the fact that that plane was captured by Soviet radar for about two and a half
hours. There were, at one time or another, eight Soviet aircraft up in the air,
either looking for it or in fact later, unfortunately, finding it. There's no
question at all about the fact that one Soviet aircraft, the one that in fact finally
shot the plane, down came to within two kilometers of the Korean aircraft.
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KOPPEL: Let me, let me stop you for a second. EAGLEBURGER: Yeah.
KOPPEL: Because we are going to hear, a little later in the broadcast, exactly what
Secretary Shultz says. So, maybe I shouldn't have asked you that. You are confident
when it is said that a Soviet fighter visually made contact with that plane, saw the
Korean Airlines plane? EAGLEBURGER: No doubt whatsoever.
KOPPEL: Would they be able to identify from two kilometers away that this was a
civilian airliner? EAGLEBURGER: Ted, I can't, you know, I can't answer it as an
expert. I can simply say that a 747 is a rather obvious aircraft with obvious
configuration. And clearly I think they had to know it was a 747, and I myself
believe that at that distance they must also have known it was a civilian airliner.
KOPPEL: All right. EAGLEBURGER: I don't see any way to avoid that.
KOPPEL: A quick devil's-advocate question: Turn it around, a North Korean airliner
headed for Havana, Cuba, intrudes American air space, might we not do the same thing?
_EAGLEBURGER: Absolutely not, and there's history to demonstrate this. For example,
in 1983 there was a Cubana Airlines airplane over-flying the United States on its way
to Canada, which went out of its flight path and over-flew a sensitive U.S.
installation. What we did was warn them at the time and then pull their authority to
over-fly the United States for a while. We have had at least three incidents--two
with Aerofloat, one with the Cubana Airlines in the last several years. And in each
case, we took no military action whatsoever. The record is clear on this.
KOPPEL: All right. If the record is also as clear as you say, that there's no
question 'but that the Soviets shot it down, why do you think they're being so
reluctant to admit what they did? I mean, they might not have to be apologetic about
it, if they don't feel they should be. But why don't they at least admit what they
did? EAGLEBURGER: Well, I can't put myself in the minds of the Soviet authorities.
KOPPEL: No, but help us to understand it a little bit. EAGL.EBURGER: Well, you know,
if anyone who knows the Soviets, I think, knows that this sort of an act, which ought
to tell us something about the Soviet Union, by the way, but that this sort of an act,
once it takes place, is not something that the Soviets are easily going to admit. I
don't know that they will ever admit it. We may well find ourselves in a debate with
the Soviets for some time on this issue. But this, it's just simply out of character
for the Soviets to admit when they have done a dastardly dead of this sort.
KOPPEL: What does the U.S. government do about a thing like this? What, what kinds
of options are avilable? EAGLEBURGER: Well, those are, you know, the decisions on
what will be done are for the president to make. And my advice and that of those of
us who are in the U.S. government is to give the president that advice in private.
There are a range of options that he could, and indeed tomorrow I think will, be
considering. We've done a great deal of work today to try to lay out those options
for him. The secretary will be talking to him tomorrow, and the president will have
to make those decisions. I can't make them, obviously, for him. But there are a
range of things that can be done. The first step we have obviously taken is that we
are going to the UN Security Council in association with the, the Koreans tomorrow, to
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present a resolution and to try to get out on the table for public debate the facts of
this case. That's one step we have clearly taken now. There are other steps that we
can take, but those are for the president to decide.
KOPPEL: This question clearly has nothing to do with humanity. It has nothing to do
with morality, but strictly from a internationally legal point of view, were they
within their rights shooting that plane down? EAGLEBURGER: Well, as long as you
understand that I'm not an international lawyer. Nevertheless, in having looked at
this in some detail today, I think it is absolutely clear that they were far outside
the bounds of international law. If, if nothing else, no one could argue that that
aircraft presented any sort of a threat to the Soviet Union. And under those
circumstances, the response of the Soviets was totally outside of any human interest.
It was outside of international law. Clearly they had a right, and there are rules
about this in international law of how they can challenge the aircraft, how they can
indicate that it should land and so forth. But they have no right to shoot'it down
under these circumstances.
KOPPEL: On some of the maps that are in the cockpits of these commerical
airliners--and I guess we'll be looking at one of those maps a little later on--in a
box, ironically, just under Sakhalin Island, there is a little warning that says, 'You
should know that if you move into this area you may be shot down.' I mean, clearly
this is not something that, that should take an experienced pilot by surprise.
EAGLEBURGER: Well, Ted, the first point is, I'm absolutely certain that the pilot of
this aircraft did not over-fly Soviet territory on purpose. I can't explain how he
was where he was, but obviously, there were some errors in navigation or something of
the sort. But again, that's not the issue. Sure, he can read the map and see that
the Soviets may shoot him down. That does not have anything to do with whether it is
legal under international law. Nor, would the pilot deliberately and knowingly have
gone there.
KOPPEL: All right, Mr. Secretary, still a great deal to talk about. Please indulge
US' and stand by for a couple of minutes. Since the Soviet Union has still failed to
provide any detailed account of what happened to the Korean jetliner, just about all
the information we have to date has come from U.S. officials. That information was
provided in its most succinct form today by Secretary of State George Shultz. Here
now is his description of how the plane was shot down. GEORGE SHULTZ (Secretary of
State): At 14:00 hours Greenwich Mean Time yesterday, a Korean Airlines Boeing 747 en
route from New York to Seoul, Korea, departed Anchorage, Alaska. Two hundred and
sixty-nine passengers and crew were on board, 'including Congressman Lawrence P.
McDonald. At approximately 16:00 hours Greenwich Mean Time, the aircraft came to the
attention of Soviet radar. It was tracked constantly by the Soviets from that time.
The aircraft strayed into Soviet air space over the Kamchatka peninsula and over the
Sea of Okhotsk and over the Sakhalin Island. The Soviets tracked the commercial
airliner for some two and one-half hours. A Soviet pilot reported visual contact with
the aircraft at 18:12 hours. The Soviet plane was, we know, in constant contact with
its ground control. At 18:21 hours, the Korean aircraft was reported by the Soviet
pilot at 10,000 meters. At 18:26 hours, the Soviet pilot reported that he fired a
missile and the target was destroyed. At 18:30 hours, the Korean aircraft was
reported by radar at 5,000 meters. At 18:38 hours, the Korean plane disappeared from
the radar screens. We know that at least eight Soviet fighters reacted at one time or
another to the airliner. The pilot who shot the aircraft down reported after the +
attack that he had in fact fired a,missile, that he had destroyed the target and that
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he was breaking away. About an hour later, Soviet controllers ordered a number of
their search aircraft to conduct search and rescue activity in the vicinity of the
last position of the Korean airliner reflected by Soviet tracking. One of these
aircraft reported finding kerosene on the surface of the seas in that area.
KOP?EL; The kind of detail that you've just head from the secretary of state has to
be based on some pretty firm information. When we return, we'll look at how
intelligence agencies got that kind of information on the Korean Airlines incident.
We'll also talk live with former CIA director Admiral Stansfield Turner, as well as
two former deputy directors of the CIA. And later, we'll talk with the wife of
Congressman Larry McDonald of Georgia. Congressman McDonald was, of course,* aboard
the downed Korean jetliner and is now presumed dead.
KOPPEL: Before we continue, I have some late wire copy on a related story.
Apparently this just happened. A Soviet Aeroflot jet landed without incident at
Mirabelle International Airport near Montreal after a security alert was ordered.
Canadian officials ordered the alert after an anonymous telephone threat was reported,
saying that the Aeroflot jet would be destroyed in retaliation for the South Korean
incident. In addition, the Canadian Airlines Pilot Association said it would consider
asking Ottawa to refuse landing rights to Soviet flights to Canada. The Korean
jetliner was shot down at approximately 2:30 Eastern Time yesterday afternoon.
Secretary of State Shultz gave his detailed briefing, which you heard a couple of
minutes ago, on the incident at about 10:45 this morning. How did U.S. intelligence
gather and confirm its information in the intervening hours? Here's a report from
Jack Smith.
SMITH: Korean Airlines has been flying 747s across the Pacific for 10 years. U.S.
intelligence officials don't know just why yesterday's flight went astray, but they do
know what happened when it did and right down to the last detail. The route over the
Pacific to Seoul, South Korea, normally skirts Soviet territory, but yesterday, though
on. the right are was inexplicably at least 100 miles off course. It flew into Soviet
airspace over the Kamchatka peninsula and entered it again over Sakhalin Island, where
it was shot down two and a half hours after appearing on Soviet radar and fell into
the Sea of Japan. But if U.S. intelligence had this information, why did U.S.
officials not react sooner? RICHARD BURT (Asst. Secretary of State): That
information was picked up through various sources. It had to be filtered. It had to
be translated. And we were not able to form a firm judgment on the fate of the
aircraft, as I said, until early this morning.
SMITH: In fact, U.S. officials, like Burt, say they didn't even know the plane might
have been shot down till yesterday evening, and the president wasn't told till 10:30
p.m., eight hours after it went down. What happened? U.S. intelligence nowadays uses
sophisticated spy satellites to gather information. But they're also listening posts
on the ground, at sea and in the air, 2,000 worldwide. A high proportion are in the
Western Pacific, with listening posts in the Aleutian Islands, Japan, South Korean and
it is generally believe northern China as well. The area is important. The Soviet
fleet is in *Vladyvostok. Kamchatka peninsula is an impact area for Soviet missile
tests. And the entire Soviet Eastern defense system is there as well. It was Soviet
pilots from this command who shot down the Korean airliner. And it was their
conversations with their Soviet ground controllers that gave U.S. intelligence such a
clear picture of what happened. The U.S.'s latest listening system, called Cobra, can
be mounted on ships or put in aircraft. Its only limitations are the horizon. So,
even mounted on the ground it can hear radio traffic for hundreds of miles. There is
no doubt U.S. monitoring stations picked up yesterday's Soviet radio traffic right
away. In fact, one source today claimed the national security agency was even
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listening in from its headquarters outside Washington, D.C., via satellite as the
tragedy occurred. This couldn't be confirmed but even if true does not mean
intelligence officials there or in the Pacific actually knew what was happening. Some
analysts today speculated that the information was delayed by being recorded
automatically by computers. U.S. intelligence routinely uses computers to digest the
mounds of raw Soviet radio, Telex and phone traffic it picks up each day. But most
intelligence experts believe that in a critical area like the Western Pacific, Soviet
air activity, radar and radio, would have been monitored by humans. And there are two
explanations of why it took them so long to react. White House spokesman Larry
Speakes provided one of them today when he told reporters privately that some
information came through Japanese intelligence. 'You have to keep in mind,' said
Speakes, 'that we were translating from Russian to Japanese to English. And it seemed
such an incredible incident that we were very careful in our reporting and were
rechecking and rechecking again to be sure that we had not misinterpreted anything.'
The problem of translating and the human element. But analysts point to another
reason. VOICE OF UNIDENTIFIED AIR FORCE PILOT: (Inaudible).
SMITH: That's how a U.S. Air Force pilot sounds. Even in English, it's sometimes
hard to make out what's being said, because pilots speak in jargon and code words.
Soviet jargon is even harder. Even with the best listening device, reception is also
often poor. Analysts believe that many words in the to and fro between the Soviet
pilots and their controllers would have been lost, leaving listeners to guess at
precise meanings after events had already taken place. BURT: We only learned that
the aircraft had been shot down hours after the fact. And as soon as, as we learned,
though, that the aircraft might be in trouble, we did get in touch immediately with
the Soviets.
SMITH: But that was still hours too late to save the 269 passengers and crew who were
aboard that Korean airliner. This is Jack Smith for Nightline in Washington.
KOPP.EL: With us now live in our Washington bureau is Admiral\Stansfield\Turner,
director of the Central Intelligence Agency under President Jimmy Carter. Joining us
from Seoul, South Korea, Ray\Cline, a 30-year intelligence veteran and former CIA
deputy director and from our affiliate KVUE in Austin, Texas, Admiral\Bobbv\Inman,
former deputy director of the CIA and former director of the National Security Agency
which monitors international communications. Admiral Inman, in a sense it must make
every intelligence officer's skin crawl a little bit when a secretary of state gives
the kind of detailed analysis that Secretary Shultz gave today. How much does that
reveal to our adversaries? INMAN: Mr. Koppel, you always cringe when sources and
methods are being exposed. But there are situations that are of sufficient gravity
that those who have the authority to declassify, the principal officers of government,
make the decision to do so. I must say this morning, as from a distance uninvolved I
watched the process unfold, I was pleased that the decision was made to announce that
it occurred rather than letting leaks be the way that facts dribble out. My
experience has been that when the leaks are the source, the damage to sources and
methods usually is even worse.
KOPPEL: Admiral Turner, how do you feel on the same subject? TURNER: Well, I think
I was shocked by the amount of detail that the secretary of state gave this morning,
coincidentally, on the same morning that the news reported that the president had sent
a memorandum to every member of the government in person, encouraging greater
security. The secretary discussed these techniques in greater detail than I've ever
heard before,in public and certainly gave the Soviets a clear readout on just what
those capabilities are in this particular area of the world.
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KOPPEL: Let's move on to precisely what happened. And Ray Cline, I'd like to begin
with you. Are you satisfied that the orders for shooting that plane down did not
originate at the scene? CLINE: It's clear that the, ah, pilot had to ask permission
to fire, that they came from some higher headquarters. You probaby know a special
sort of war theater operational headquarters has been set up by the Russians in the
Soviet East Asia, and it may, may have gone back that far. It could have gone to
Moscow. But there was a request for permission.
KOPPEL: Let's bounce that round. First of all, Admiral Inman, you believe it went
all the way back to Moscow? Because obviously, the implications, if Moscow gave the
order, are considerably greater. I realize I'm asking you to speculate, but it's
informed speculation, I would assume. INMAN: The Soviets have been spent enormous
sums of money in their air defense system over the years. It's a system that puts a
great deal of effort around all of the Soviet borders. There's a steady flow of
information that goes to filter centers and back to Moscow itself. Given the
description this morning that the events went on for longer than two hours and a half,
I think there's no doubt that Moscow, as well as regional centers, were fully informed
about what was occurring. Whether it was necessary to go that far back for authority
to fire would be speculation. My own guess would be following the very poor
performance of the Soviet air defense system during the '78 Korean aircraft intrusion
that likely authority to fire may have been delegated much further out into the field.
KOPPEL: Let me ask you to expand on that just a little bit, because not all of our
viewers may know what you're talking about. This was then the other Korean airliner
penetrated as far as *Marmansk, didn't it? INMAN: It, the aircraft came in over the
Arctic. It was headed to Paris. Again, on a sad navigation error penetrated Soviet
territory and went very deep into the northern peninsula, finally was intercepted,
then took evasive action. My recollection of the debriefing from the pilots, they
took, ah, evasive action, were fired on and finally landed on a frozen lake. It was
very clear in the aftermath that the Soviets were very unhappy with the performance of
their defense system. And unfortunately, some leaks in the U.S. that were printed in
the media took some substantial pleasure in the poor Soviet air defense performance.
All of that is likely to have led to tougher Soviet approaches for any intrusions in
the future.
KOPPEL: Admiral Turner, that happened on your watch. So, ah, let me have your
analysis of what that incident, what role that incident may have played in yesterday'.s
shooting down of the, of the Korean airliner. You, you agree with what Admiral Inman
just analyzed for us? TURNER: Yes, I agree generally with what Bobby Inman said. I
think we should also take into account while it doesn't condone what the Soviets did,
that it must have made them more suspicious today when a Korean airliner, for the
second time, penetrated deeply into their airspace. They must have a paranoia about
this kind of thing, because we watched them react so violently over many years to any
kind of intrusions. But here they are doubly suspicious when it's the same country,
the same kind of airline, doing the same kind of thing in a different part of the
world.
KOPPEL: Well, I suppose that, ah, I mean part of the reason that it's happening
clearly is in order to get to Seoul from Anchorage, Alaska, you have to pass fairly
close to Soviet territory. Why would they be particularly suspicious of the Koreans?
TURNER: Well, as I say, when the Koreans, five years ago, went a thousand miles into
Soviet territory, then had done it again this time, I think that makes them
suspicious. But beyond that, Ted, for decades now we've seen intense reaction by the
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Soviets. Usually, of course, it's been military aircraft that have come close to
their borders, and they've reacted against them. They've had some shoot-downs and 50
on. They just have a very strong feeling about this kind of thing. It's not, ah,
again, condoning what they're doing, but it is part of the Soviet makeup, the Soviet
psychology.
KOPPEL: Ray Cline, pick up on the same subject. CLINE: Yeah.
KOPPEL: And then I'd like to ask you something about the Korean (inaudible). CLINE:
Well, I, I, I, I certainly don't agree with Stan Turner on that. I think they, ah,
there is no excuse for. shooting at this civilian airline. They knew what it was.
They called it a Korean airline, and those flights go regularly. If they have a right
to shoot down any civilian aircraft that gets a little off course and goes into their-
territory, it's international piracy. It's international chaos. So. I don't think we
should, ah, make excuses for them. I think it shows that the, the Russians are tough
and determined to keep their military perimeter
protected, and they don't give a damn
who gets hurt in the process. And that's a signal for us. And I think we oughta
recognize it as such and, ah, deal with it in a diplomatic and political way. But,
ah, we cannot make excuses for the Soviet behavior, in my opinion.
KOPPEL: All right, gentlemen, let me, ah, let me just ask one more question and go
around once quickly, and then we'll take a break. Part of what was overheard is that
the Soviets did indeed, I forget now whether it was the ground controller--I believe
it was--did indeed try to communicate with the pilot of the Korean airliner. For some
reason or another he did not respond. Does anyone of you have an explanation for
that? Ray Cline, why don't you begin? CLINE: There's no, there's no knowledge here
of, ah, of what actually happened. But the attempt must have been fairly perfunctory.
There are different types of identification systems. There may have been some
incompatibility, but there is the voice. There were many ways to interrogate that
plane if they'd really wanted to communicate with it.
KOPPEL: Well, what, what I'm saying, Admiral Inman, is that, ah, if we here in the
United States, no matter for the moment how, manage to intercept the attempt by the
Soviets to contact that Korean, why shouldn't he have heard it, and why didn't he
respond? INIAN: First, the likelihood that the Russian pilot would be speaking in
Korean is remote. So, you've got a barrier....
KOPPEL: No, I'm not talking about the Russian pilot. I'm talking about ground
control, and one would assume that they're, I don't know, what language is used in
international air traffic? INISAN: That's not doubt Russian. English is the
international language for air traffic control. But when you talk about an attempt to
communicate with a Korean aircraft, you're talking about from the fighters that are
there, not from the ground... So, you've already got a language problem. Secondly,
most of those communications are done by visual signals. In the daytime it's fairly
easy to do. At nighttime it's very difficult at all to do it. So, the odds are very
high that those poor Korean pilots, one, did not know they were off course and two,
did not understand, therefore, the nature of the approaches that were being made on
the aircraft.
KOPPEL: Admiral Turner, I've done a little reading on the subject. And apparently
that's one of the basic things that every commercial pilot and non-commercial pilot,
for that matter, is taught. If a fighter plane comes in front of you, even at night
and starts flashing its lights on irregularly, dips its wings, that means follow me.
Why wouldn't the man know, why wouldn't the Korean pilot know what was involved?
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TURNER: That's certainly difficult to divine, because it would have been clear. But
in the incident in 1978 we discussed previously, Ted, the same thing happened. The
pilot did not respond, apparently, to the movements of the Soviet aircraft in trying
to get him to land. Let me just add that, ah, I do agree with Ray Cline that there is
no excuse for this kind of shoot-down, and I didn't mean to in any way apologize for
the Soviets in that regard. But I do think you have to take into account that the
Soviets are doubly suspicious when this same airline does the same thing to them
twice.
KOPPEL: All right, gentlemen, let's take a break. We'll continue our discussion in :a
moment, as we consider why the Soviets might provoke an incident so certain to be
condemned around the world. Later tonight, we'll look at the problems and dangers
faced by airline crews when they fly so close in sensitive and restricted airspace.
And we'll talk with Kathy HeDonald, whose husband, Georgia Congressman Larry ?icDonald,.
was aboard the Korean jet when it was shot down.
KOPPEL: The question, given the absolute certainty of international condemnation, why
would the Soviet shoot down an unarmed passenger jet, even if it had entered Soviet
airspace illegally? Joining our other guests now live in our Washington bureau,
halcolm\Toon, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, also here in Washington, ABC
News hoscow bureau chief Bob\Zelnick. He is currently in*the United States on home
leave. And still with us, undersecretary of state Lawrence Eagleburger. Ambassador
Toon, you know the Soviets as well as anyone. Why in heaven's name would they do
something like this? TOON: Thank you for the compliment, Ted. I'm gonna have to say
that I really don't know. I, ah, I agree with others who have said earlier this
evening that there's no possible excuse for this sort of behavior on the part of the
Soviets. I understand their, their, ah, ah, sensitivity about that, that part of
their terrain out in the Far East. But to shoot down an unarmed civilian airliner, I
think, there is no justification for that at all, in my view.
KOPPEL: Well, there can't be any justification for it, and I'm really not asking for
justification. I'm trying to understand motivation. Can you think of any? TOON:
No,?I can't. I, I think it's absolutely without any justification and no excuse for
it at all.
KOPPEL: Bob Zelnick, you and I have talked many times in, in my discussions with you
about the Soviet Union, about Soviet paranoia. Is that possibly at the route of this?
ZE..N1CK: Well, it's certainly a strong contributing factor. When you ask why would
they do it in the face of universal condemnation, I don't think that their ultimate
priority is avoiding condemnation, particularly by nations they regard as adversaries.
Their ultimate priority is protecting their own borders. And particularly at this
time of very high tensions they have been painting the world as a grim and threatening
place. They've been painting their own borders as rimmed by adversaries and enemies.
They've been painting an American administration which is anxious, as they say, to
reverse historical processes and bring down the motherland of socialism and gear up
for what they charge is first strike potential and an ability to, ah, rule the world
by dictat. Now, when they quibble with this interpretation, when they even challenge
the integrity of those making the intepretation, but it takes on the ethic of the
society when it is repeated day in and day out as it has been been in the Soviet press
and in statements by Soviet leaders.
KOPPEL: You're telling me that even the leaders who may realize that some of this
rhetoric is a little inflated, that sometimes they begin to believe their own
rhetoric? ZELNICK: Whether they believe it in their heart of hearts is a judgment
that no journalist is equipped to make and very few individuals are equipped to make.
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I don't know what they believe in their heart of hearts. I don't know what we believe
in our heart of hearts when some of our leaders make simliar charges about the Soviet
Union. I do know that it has a way of reinforcing itself, of influencing the conduct
of officials and particularly in a highly bureaucratized society, like the Soviet
Union, of becoming engrained in the procedures in dealing with incidents such as this
penetration by the South Korean aircraft.
KOPPEL: Secretary Eagleburger, let me come back to you and raise something else that
Bob Zelnick was saying to we earlier in the evening. The Soviets are always the ones
that depict this government, this administration in particular, as the cowboys, the
wreckless folks with the hand always on the six-shooter. Why, then, are they so
wreckless? LAGLEBURGER: Well, in the first place, they're wrong in their description
of us. But in the second place, again, you've asked the same question in a different
way--why are they so wreckless? How do you explain the inexplicable, Ted. I think, I
said earlier on this program I think this incident shows us something about the Soviet
Union. They're consumed by this desire for secrecy, and I think that's probably a
part of, of trying to explain to the degree anybody, any sane person can, this
reaction. It's a closed society. It is everything Mr. Zelnick says it is. I think
it's always dangerous, by the way, to believe that Soviet leaders don't believe what
they say. It's, it's a closed society. It's consumed by its desire for secrecy. It
is paranoid in many ways, and I think these all add up to, ah, as I have to admit, an
unsatisfactory explanation of an insane and hideous act,for which nobody in the West,
I think, can ever give an adequate explanation.
KOPPEL: Ambassador Too7i, I believe you were ambassador to Moscow in 1978, when the
last incident happened, that is when the last Korean airliner penetrated Soviet
airspace and was also shot, not with the same horrible consequences. What was going
on at that time from which you can instruct us in what's going on now? TOOT: Well, I
think the, ah, the thing that really surprised us about that incident was the fact
that the Soviet defense forces reacted to sluggishly to the penetration of the
airspace by, ah, by the Korean airliner. They were almost a thousand miles inside the
Soviet Union before there was any reaction at all. And I suspect that after that
happened, there was a, a very careful look at their command and control system. And I
think probably one of the reasons why this sort of thing happened was that those,
those control systems had been tightened to the-point where, ah, ah, this sort of
thing might possibly be explained.
KOPPEL: I've asked this question of others on this broadcast tonight, but I haven't
asked you, Ambassador Toon. Do you think the order came from Moscow directly? TOON:
I, ah, I really don't know, Ted. I, obviously, it came from higher authority.
Whether it had to go all the way back to Moscow, I just don't know. We have assumed
in the past that any act that was calculated to impact negatively on relations with
Washington had to have fairly high approval, probably a the Politburo level. But
whether that's in this category, I just don't know.
KOPPEL: All right, gentlemen, when we come back, and we will in just a moment, I
wanna talk about what long-term effect there may be on U.S.-Soviet relations. We'll
continue this discussion in a moment.
KOPPEL: We have an extraordinary reservoir of expertise at our disposal here, so what
I'd like to do is go once all the way, quite literally, around the world and ask the
question, 'what do you think is going to happen in terms of U.S.-Soviet relations in
the midrange, in the next three, six months, the next year?' Senator Helms? HELMS:
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Well, Ted, I would think that would depend on what President Reagan does in'terms of
leadership. And I think that he's sufficiently exercised about this tragic episode
to, uh, to have some influence with Congress. I wanna see what the Foreign Relations
Committee will do, some of the apologists for the Soviet Union in the past. But all
in all. I think you'll see a review, a reassessment of our total relationship with the
Soviet Union. And I think that's long overdue because up to now we really haven't
been realistic.
KOPPEL: Secretary Eagleburger, let me jump back here to Washington. It's going to be
your problem as much as anyone's. I?'m not talking now about the options. I know you
won't talk about the options. But I would like to get your assessment of what the
long-term effect will be. Is there a long-term effect with an incident like this?
EAGLEBURGER: Oh, I don't think there's any question about it, Ted, that an act like
this cannot help but have an influence on our relationship and on our attitude toward
the Soviet Union. I don't deny, in fact, I wouldn't try to deny, that it's going to
have an impact. I think the only thing I would say is that as we think through that
impact and how we ought to deal with it, we need to understand as well that we still
have to deal with the Soviet Union. It is the other superpower, it is on this planet
with us. And while we can regret this act, we can think it is hideous, and we can
take whatever actions the president decides are necessary, that is not the point. But
we must remember in this, at the same time, we are going to have to deal with and live
on the same planet with the Soviet Union.
KOPPEL: Senator Helms, you buy that? HELMS: Well, uh, I just consider it to be a
crime against humanity if we do not respond to this in a way to bring together the
civilized nations of this world in reaction to this, this tragedy.
KOPPEL: All right. Let me go to our three intelligence experts for a moment now. It
is sometimes forgotten in the flush of excitement over bow you get information that
once you got it, you've gotta analyze it. I'd like you to analyze it in terms,
now, of what the mid-term, long-term U.S. relationship is going to be. Admiral
Turner? TURNER: I think this will give us an opportunity to tell the world what the
Soviet Union is really like. I don't think it will change our relationship
drastically because we've known what the Soviet Union is really like all along. Five
years ago they came very close to doing exactly this same thing. And I certainly
agree with Ambassador Eagleburger that we have to get along with the Soviets on this
planet and we've got to negotiate with them. I think a major factor in the Soviet
calculation was that it will blow over, that they can deter other people from
penetrating their territory by this extreme action that they have just taken. And,
therefore, they think they can weather the adverse publicity that they'll get in the
short term.
KOPPEL: Admiral Inman, they've certainly been right about that in the past. Uh, when
100,000 Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan--outrage, Poland--outrage, and what do we
do? Under the Carter administration the president recommended lighting candles in the
window. President Reagan, at least, uh, to date, has recommended lowering the flag to
half mast. Will anything ultimately be done? INMAN: Well, over the past two years
the Soviets have been conducting a very skillful propaganda campaign, particularly.in
western Europe, to display themselves as the peacemakers, to show the U.S. as the
great threat to the outside world. What we've seen today is the real Soviet Union.
Now, that's going to have an impact, uh, on public opinion in Western Europe as well
as in this country. Some very well-meaning people who hoped that, uh, that if we led
the way by unilateral moves, the Soviets would follow, I hope will now reassess their
stands. Well, once we get rid of the wishful optimism, the fact remains that we have
to deal with Soviets. But we deal with them for our own self-interest, not because we
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like them, anything about them, or the way they do anything. Uh, that, I presume, the
decision recently ont he grain deal was because it was in our own self-interest. Uh,
we'll continue arms control discussions because trying to make progress there is in
our own interest. But hopefully it will bring some more realism and maybe it'll make
it a little easier to get a consensus in this country and in Western Europe about
tough measures we have to take in the national security front day by day in dealing
with the Soviets.
KOPPEL: All right. Admiral (sic) Toon, Bob Zelnick, Larry Eagleburger, Admiral Toon
first, I'd like for you to consider for a moment this question. TOON: It's
ambassador, not admiral.
KOPPEL: I beg your pardon. We've got so many admirals here that sometimes I get
carried away. Ambassador Toon, what do you think is going on inside the Kremlin right
now. What do you think is going within the top leadership of the Soviet Union? What
are they talking about? TOON: Well, I would hope there'd be some soul-searching
going on inside the Politburo, and I would hope, frankly, that they would come up with
a satisfactory explanation for this terrible act in Korea. Let me just reinforce what
Larry Eagleburger has said, and others have said, Ted. I think in, over the long
term, we've got to have a relationship with Moscow, no matter how badly they
misbehave, which will permit us to carry on a dialogue with them and prevent
misperceptions by one of (sic) the other. But in the short term, I think we've gotta
make clear to them that we cannot carry on as usual, business as usual, so long as
they're mist,ehaving in this way. And in this respect, frankly, I disagreed with, uh,
Secretary of State Shultz today when he said that, uh, he would go forward with the
meeting with Gromyko. I think that oughta be put on the shelf until the Soviets come
back with a satisfactory explanation.
KOPPEL: You're talking about the scheduled meeting in Madrid next week? TOON:
That's right, yes.
KOPPEL: Bob Zelnick, what's going on in Moscow right now? I realize that's, that's
an impossible question to answer, but let's hear some informed speculation. ZELNICK:
Ted, 1 think as with any sane national leadership, the people in the Kremlin are,
tonight, or tomorrow morning, as the case may be, are wondering how to limit the
dama?e from this, uh, very, very damaging episode, uh, for them. And I can't help but
recall, uh, a similar incident, not involving the Soviet Union, but involving the
State of Israel, uh, 10 years ago when they shot down a Syrian, excuse me, a Libyan
passenger jet over the Sinai, and, uh, a day or so later, the prime minister, Golda
'heir, number one, acknowledged that the Israeli jets had been the parties that shot
dog.:. the plane. Number two, offered an explanation, self-serving though it may be,
that involved, uh, ignoring warnings and signals, uh, on the part of the Libyan
pilots. And number three, expressed deep regret over the incident and compassion for
the victims and their surviving family members. And I think in a sense this incident
can be a test of, uh, Yuri Andropov's sophistication, or his want of sophistication as
a Soviet leader, in that he has to make not, not an abject mea culpa apology. But he
has to recognize that facts are facts and that there is something relevant about world
opinion and he has to address it, and address it truthfully.
KOPPEL: All right. Final question to Larry Eagleburger, because tonight, all three
networks wanted to broadcast out of Moscow and they were given. this lame excuse that
the Moscow television studios were being, uh, worked on, there was some maintenance
wor'. being done there. They simply weren't available. It somehow suggests that
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behind that, that rather blunt, rather brutal we-don't-give-a-damn is some concern
after all. Do you think that they are at all worried about what world reaction is
going to be? EAGLEBURGER: Oh, yes, Ted, I don't think there's any question that
they're worried about world reaction. And I think they've probably realized now that
they are, in terms of world reaction, in deep trouble. I think they are, it may well
be a test for Mr. Andropov. It's one that they thus far have flunked, I must say, in
terms of the reaction so far today and the answer they gave us to our demand for an
explanation. Uh, I think they're thinking right now about how they can limit the
damage. I have real doubts in my own mind that they will be able to step up to this
one and admit their culpability and apologize and act in the way that Mr. Zelnick
described the government of Israel acted. But'we can hope.
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