AMBASSADOR JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000200930007-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 30, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO N REPORTS, ~N~.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
FoR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
DATE October 30, 1983 12:00 Noon
sua~ECr Ambassador Jeane J.Kirkpatrick
STATION W R C T V
NBC Network
Washington, DC
MARVIN KALB: Our guest today on Meet the Press is
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, head of the U.S. Delegation to the
United Nations. A political scientist and specialist in Latin
American politics, Ambassador Kirkpatrick has played a key role
in shaping administration policies of that region. She holds
Cabinet rank and is a member of the National Security Council
Our reporters today are Henry Trewhitt, of the Baltimore
Sun; Robert Novak, of the Chicago Sun,Times; Hendrick Smith, '
of The New York Times; and to open he questioning, our regular
panelist ?B ill Monroe, of NBC News. "
BILL MONROE: Madam Ambassador, The New York Times says
this morning that the U.S. will pay a heavy cost for the invasion
of Grenada. Quoting the Times editorial, "The cost is loss of
the high moral ground, a demonstration to the world that America
has no more respe?c.t for laws and borders, for the codes of
civilization, that the Soviet Union." What is your feeling about
the cost?
AMBASSADOR JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK: Well, I think theNew
York Times -- with all due respect, I_ think the New-York Times is
simply wrong. I think, in fact, that the -- those nations who
may seriously feel that it was an immoral act already thought we
were an immoral power. I expect that most of the nations in the
region will breathe a sigh of relief, as a matter of fact, at the
success of the operation and at the removal of what a good number
of them recognize was a clear and present danger of their own
security.
I think that, furthermore, the -- the feeling of
inherent security and the certain knowledge that the legal
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grounds of our operation were -- were sound will prove to be much
stronger than any kind of reflexive Latin disapproval of U.S.
intervention anyplace in the region.
It's interesting to note that the countries of Central
America, with the single exception of Nicaragua, and several of
the most key countries in Latin America have been very mild and
ambiguous and ambivalent in their comments on the action, because
they understand the extent to which their security depends on a
confident, strong American presence.
MONROE: Well, Mrs. Kirkpatrick, not a single nation
except those allied with us in the action against Grenada have
spoken up in our defense. The French and the Dutch voted against
us in the Security Council, the Mexicans and other members of the
OAS have criticized us. Can you cite a single provision of
international law, the United Nations, the Organization of
American States, under which we have the right to invade a
nation like Grenada if we feel there chaos there, or we worry
that some of our people may be in danger?
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: Oh, certainly. And let me just say
that I did that in the -- in my speech before the U.N., in which
I presented the U.S. case. I said that the U.N. Charter does not
simply forbid the use of force under all circumstances as an
absolute. The U.N. Charter leaves very ample ground for the use
of force against force in protection of the other rights and
values in the Charter. And those other values include security
and peace and democracy, in fact, even in the U.N. Charter. We
acted, of course, at the request of the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States. We acted -- you say "not a single nation." if
I may say so, that's also mistaken. We acted with the full
approval of other key nations in the Caribbean. Jamica and
Barbados, for example, also participated in the action.
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: Well, those six, yes. But those are
the states in the region.
KALB: Thank you, Ambassador Kirkpartick. We'll be back
with more questions for Ambassador Deane Kirkpatrick.
KALE: Our guest on Meet the Press, U.N. Ambassador
Deane Kirkpatrick. Mr. Smith?
HEDRICK SMITH: Madam Ambassador, you say the legal
argument for our going into Grenada is sound. If that's the case,
why hasn't it been more persuasive with old allies, like th
British, the French, the West Germans, the Italians, all of whom
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have either criticized us or voted against us in the U.N.?
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: Let me say that the -- Our European
allies are principally, I believe, allied with us on matters that
concern the defense of Europe. NATO was one of the collective
security agreements which President Harry Truman negotiated and
the Congress ratified after World War II, but it was only one of
those. They do not necessarily show very much sensitivity to
U.S. security in other regions and we don't necessarily approve
of their policies all the time.
The fact is that we Americans have a somewhat senti-
mental picture about our relations with our European allies in
international affairs. That alliance has always been focussed on
the defense of Europe and they have repeatedly undertaken actions
witout consulting with us, for example, in other parts of the
world. Sometimes we don't approve of those actions either. And
we undertake actions independently of them, and sometimes they
don't approve of those.
This is an action which above all concerned our -- our
region, our region geographicaly. It's only -- it was not at all
involved in NATO. It's importantly related, I think, to our
ability to fulfill our NATO obligations in the long run, but in
an indirect kind of way.
I think what's important is that the states of the
region who were concerned approved the action and, indeed,
requested it, and wouldn't necessarily approve what we did in
--to help in the defense of Europe.
SMITH: Well, you say that they're mainly focused on
Europe, but we backed the British when they were involved in the
battle of the Falkland Islands, very much involving Latin
America. The British didn't back us on this one. How do you
explain that and how do you react to that?
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: Well, frankly, I find that rather
difficult to explain.
SMITH: What message are the Nicaraguans and others in
Central America supposed to get from this action? Does Nicaragua
now have to worry about American intervention down there? Should
they? Is that the intended message?
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: If I may say so, Nicaragua worries
all the time about U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. They, as
--from the perspective in the U.N. I'm very sensitive to that,
because every few months they come to the U.N. and say that we
are about to launch a massive U.S. military invasion of Nicara-
gua. They did that first about a year-and-a-half ago. I think
that Nicaragua feels continuously threatened and what they feel
threatened by is the growing competence and confidence of their
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own neighbors -- of Honduras, Costa Rica, E1 Salvador, Guatemala
-- and by the cotadora process which has now worked out some
points, many of which are not very acceptable to Nicaragua.
ROBERT NOVAK: Ambassador Kirkpatrick, if there had not
been one American student on the island of Grenada, or no
substantial number of them, do you think this administration
would have launched the operation at the request of the Eastern
Caribbean states?
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: I don't know. I argued in the United
Nations, Bob, that I believed there was a combination f factors,
each of which played a significant role in our decision, legal
factors, and -- each of which figure in the legal case for our
action.
First was indeed, as the President's emphasized,
Secretary Shultz has emphasized, the protection of innocent
American nationals, some -- nearly a thousand of them on that
island and in a highly vulnerable condition. Second was the
request of the Organization of East Caribbean States. Third was
the virtual vaccum of power on the island and -- which was
accompanied by very great violence.
NOVAK: Well, let me -- let me re-phase it, Madam
Ambassador. If there were no American nationals in substanital
numbers, was there ample justification on these other reasons for
launching the operation?
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: That's one of what my husband calls
"what would you do if your grandmother died next Thursday"
questions. You know, I don't know. I haven't addressed that
question very specifically. I know that the importance -- that
the defense of American nationals on th island figured very
importantly in the President's decision.
NOVAK: I wonder if I could quickly switch to Lebanon.
As Ambassador to the United Nations, would you favor the replace-
ment of the American Marines by a United Nations peacekeeping
force?
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: Oh, under the right circumstances,
with the right mandate, of course. And I -- I'm sure you know
that the United States and the other members of the multinational
force have explored at the U.N. ways of introducing UNIFIL
troops, United Nations troops, into the region of the Chouf, and
the Bekka, and other highly controverted areas of Beirut -- of
Lebanon, in and around Beirut.
The Soviet Union is a member of the United Nations
Security Council with a veto power. They have not been enthusi-
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astic about permitting U.N. troops into any area in which it
looks like one of their client states, or close associates as
least, which Syria is, might move. And so they've been very,
very negative about any such move. I personally think that U.N.
peacekeeping forces could do a very valuable job there.
HENRY TREWHITT: Mrs. Kirkpatrick, you mentioned earlier
that the allies in Europe were concerned first of all about
issues that were related to NATO European defense. How does the
Grenada invasion play in that regard, do you think? Is it going
to change the attitude of Allied governments regarding the
deployment of INF weapons in Europe, that sort of thing?
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: No, I don't think so. I think that
those questions are going to be settled on the basis of Euroean
considerations.
TREWHITT: What about European publics, which have been
very vocal against INF deployment? How much ammunition does an
event such as this give them?
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: I think that the question of deploy-
ments, missile deployments, in Europe will be settled on the
basis of European considerations, European security finally. I
really, truly do. I think that th Soviet and related --domestic
communist party propaganda apparatuses in those governments, in
those countries -- excuse me -- in those countries is suffici-
ently effective that they find grounds for atacking us and
casting doubts and aspersions on our motives and on our behavior
virtually regardless of what we do, frankly.
TREWHITT: Mrs. Kirkpatrick, I'm going to do a quick 180
degree turn here, because I may not have another chance to ask
you about your personal plans. I've heard you nominated for
everything from immediate retirement to Secretary of State. are
you preparing to leave the United Nations?
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: I'm not preparing anything.
TREWHITT: Do you plan to stay in office till the end of
this term?
AMB. KIRKPARTICK: I'm not pre -- I'm not given to
long-range planning.
KALB: Madam Ambassador, I'd like to go back to Grenada
nod try to re-phase a question asked earlier. Most people I
think have praised the President in terms of trying to protect
American lives on Grenada. The issue that comes up is whether
the United States can arrogate to itself the right, because of
its military power in Latin America, to change government there,
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to overthrow a government there. How do you respond to that?
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: Well, I think that like all questions
of politics an international affairs and law, one has to look at
the concrete circumstancesand not at the abstract question. I
think that given the concrete circumstances in Grenada, that the
legs, as well as the moral and political case for our action, was
very strong. Now I think that we'd have to look at other
concrete cases to make decisons about what would be justified in
other concrete cases.
KALE: But you're a specialist in that -- this area.
You know the long shadow likely to be ct by another use of
massive American military power to accomplish a political aim.
Does this bother you? Are you concerned about this?
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: Quite frankly, as a specialist in the
area, I am not, and I will tell you why. I was in Venezuela two
years ago and a very high level official in that government, who
shall go nameless, looked at a map of the region. It showed
Grenada and Venezuela. They were 90 miles apart. And he drew a
circle from Grenada,in which circle was reflected the range of a
MIG leaving Grenada, to show what kind of control of air, how far
that MIG could attain, how far over Venezuela that MIG could get
from Grenada.
I have had other Latin officials show me, in very
concrete terms, where the sea lanes -- what it meant to the sea
lanes through which all shipping that passes through the Panama
Canal into the Atlantic pass with regard to Grenada.
I have been just recently in Central America and I have
listened to very high level officials and influential private
sector journalists, publishers, writers, teachers, businessmen,
all kinds of people, labor leaders in those countries worry
desperately about the vulnerability of their governments and
their countries to the growing superior an aggressive force of
Nicaragua in the region. I do not, quite frankly, believe that
this use -- limited, specific, purposeful -- of force by the
United States, in conjunction with the other states in the
region, is going to produce the sort of backlash that you're
desribing in the area. And I do say that most earnestly, as
someone with a longstanding interests in this area.
MONROE: Many Americans support the administration's
action in Grenada, but I wonder if you're saying that that
action, that military success had no moral cost, no public
opinion cost, in view of the unanimity shown by nations at the
United Nations, at the Organization of American States against
the action we took, with the exception of the U.S. and the six
Caribbean islands.
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AMB. KIRKPATRICK: Well, now wait a minute. Let's
--let's not say that there was unanimity, because there won't
unanimity. That's -- there wasn't unanimity at all. And what
there was was a Security Council vote, which was heavily against
us.
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: But let me remind you -- with three
abstentions. Let me remind you that there are -- the United
States regularly loses in the United Nations, in the General
Assembly and in the Security Council. No nation is more regu-
larly both a loser and a victim at the United Nations than the
United States except Israel, who is even more totally a loser and
a a victim.
The United Nations is a political system and it's a
political system which is largely controlled by our adversaries.
I've been talking about this even since I've been there. It is
not news when the United States is outvoted at the United
Nations. It only becomes news when, for some reason or another,
we're about to eke out a victory in some U.N.
MONROE: In view -- in view of the international
reaction to this situation in Grenada, with nations such as the
French, the Dutch, the Pakistanis, the Mexicans, and other
obviously condemnatory of what we have done, are you telling us
that there was no moral cost and no public opinion cost to that
action?
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: Mr. Monroe, I'm telling you that I
don't think there's any moral cost to that action. I'll go
beyond that and say that I don't think there' any moral cost in
France with the French Government. I would say that there are at
least as many Frenchmen, attentive Frenchmen who are shocked by
the decision of their government to vote for that resolution as
who support it. If you follow the French press, which I do all
the time, let me say, I think that's quite clear. Many Frenchmen
see our action in Grenadaas least as defensible, an perhaps even
more understandable, morally, politically, legally as France's
action, for example, in Chad to help protect that country against
terror.
SMITH: Madam Ambassador, you've made a major point, and
so has the President, about protecting American citizens on
Grenada, and certainly Americans here want to see that done. But
there are some who contend that not all was done before the
invasion to get them out peacefully, that the airport in Grenada
was open on the Monday before the invasion. Wasn't there more
that the United Sates could have done peacefully to evacuate
Americans without an invasion?
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AMB. KIRKPATRICK: All I can say is that -- one, I do't
think it was an invasion; I think it was a rescue. And I think
that we ought to stop calling it an invasion, if I may say so.
It was a rescue operation and it was felt and recognized to be
such by most of the Americans involved. I don't doubt that you
can find one, or two or three who think the contrary. It was, I
believe, well-handled. We had to behave very prudently, because
it was also very clear that those -- that there was proximate,
real danger already posed to those -- particularly to those
students, as well as to the Governor-General, I think, in
Grenada.
SMITH: What do you say to the 30 or 40 people who came
out by air on Monday from Grenada peacefully, some of them
Americans, one of them Director of the President's Commission on
Social Security?
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: They were fortunate.
NOVAK: Ambassador Kirkpatrick, a week ago today The
Washington Post had a front page story which described you as
e~ttere~ andreferred to what they said you believed to be the,
quote, "week and rudderless leadership of Secretary of State
George Shultz," unquote. Is that a correct characterization of
your attitude toward the Secretary of State?
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: I'm glad you raised that question. I
would like to say that about 90 percent of what's been published
about me and the Secretary of State, or any other figure in our
government, or any other post in our government in the last two
weeks has been really hopelesly distorted.f
KALB: Two minutes to go.
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: That on is one of those. This is --
I mean it is just simply, you know, not an accurate characteriza-
tion of my views at all.
NOVAK: Do you consider yourself embittered because...
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: No, not at all. Not at all. I mean
-- you know, this was , Bob, a media event, which I still don't
understand quite either -- I don't understand who scripted it and
I don't understand who pushed it. And I just know that it was
largely not so. I consider it behind me.
KALB: Mr. Trewhitt?
TREWHITT: Mrs. Kirkpatrick, you just a few minutes ago,
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made a fairly strong case for the position that the United States
is consistently belabored and in the minority in the United
Nations. Is ther eany plan to grade-down U.S. participation in
the United Nations? And if not, why not, in those cirucum-
stances, if that is a correct characterization of our role?
AMB. KIRKPATRICK: I think -- I've said it many times
since I've been there, Mr. Trewhitt. I think what we have to do
is be more effective in the United Nations. We let really -- we
let our influence in that body and our effectiveness in that body
decline through a period of probably twenty years. We failed to
understand what kind of a political system it is and we have
failed above all to adequately link our relations with nations
inside the U.N. to our relations with nations outside the U.N.
The fact is a good many of the nations with whom we have
very good relations outside the U.N. behave very badly toward us
regularly, on a wide range of issues, inside the U.N. I think we
need to let nations ,k now that if they want to be friends of ours
outside the U.N. , they need to behave like friends inside U.N.
bodies as well. That, I think, is the answer.
KALB: Thank you, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, for being with
us today on Meet the Press.
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