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December 21, 2016
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June 27, 2008
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November 11, 1983
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Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200950002-2 PBS MACNEIL-LEHRER NEWSHOUR,,I& 11 November 1983 MACNEIL: To analyze Andropov's first year and the meaning of his present seclusion, we have first Lawrence\Caldwell, who was scholar in residence at the CIA's office of Soviet analysis for the past two years. He now teaches at Occidental College in California, and is a staff member of the Arroyo Center of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in.Pasadena. Dr. Caldwell, is Andropov, in your view, still running the USSR? LAWRENCE CALDWELL (Occidental College): It'a~?hard to know, given the signals we've had about health. Think I would disagree with Jiri Valenta in his most recent statement there. He holds all the formal levers of power.. Uh, there's no sign of a challenge to him. We did have signs during the six or eight months prior to the death of Brezhnev that there was some maneuvering and jacking... jockeying. We haven!:t had: those signs this time. So Andropov doesn't have an alternative at the moment. If he's in ill health, which, uh, seems increasingly apparent,.uh, of course he?probably:?. isn't running the show. But there is no-alternative. MACNEIL: How much of a, uh, of a leadership void would you say that there is? '. I.. mean, they pointed, for instance, to tht:, uh, the uncertainties and the different voices in Moscow at the time of the Korean airliner. Did that reveal to you a serious lack of leadership? CALDWELL: No, I think the only substantial signal of a lacl. of leadership is, the fact that Andropov has been out of sight. The only statements we've had from Andropov have come in the press, and those probably come from the central committee. Uh, as far as the handling of the KAL incident, I wouldn't intt-rpret -that as a signal that he hasn't been in charge. On the contrary, u`-, it cc.:t1 ? x??":?11 mean that he was, or the leadership as a whole was trying to disa.ss-Iciat.e h!r frc?r art it :.. d:.ate-respons!hill ty front-what was, no doubt, an embarrassing ir.r;c1 . MACNEIL: Now obviously we can't predict'how ill. he is, say how ill h;? ir,, a:-;.3 w can't predict hok long he m y l i vo . Sup;,_se he does die sor t_ i r:: rt._ fc:.. rer.ths or year. Are we. in For a long:r period of uncertatny? h_'li. h= r~t?'? t:; somebody, presumably. Is he likely to be replaced by s-jet-' wv.- will. a, who will take hold of the leadership and hold it for a long period of tir::>, or art, WCC in for a series of quick succ_:ssions? CA.LDWELL.: If he were to die now or if h: w?: re. to be::one incapacitated and, arid be replaced in the s ort run, then alno_t 1. Y we would be in for another intermediate stage of the leadership. The features t dt governed his succession, uh,? the sort of institutional balance among the KGB and the military and the party and the ministry on foreign affairs, that remains in place. The people who are there who are the, his principal colleagues on the politburo are still quite aged. Consequently, uh, my guess is that if he were to have to step down or were to die, we would see another interim leader. We're in a process of succession, one that will continue for some time. MACNEIL: Until the younger generation... CALDWELL: Until the younger generation. And there aren't many of the younger generation on the current politburo. The Soviets that I've talked to, uh, had hoped that Andropov would be able to weather this transition on his own, that he would be able to grab ahold of the policy levers, u!-, to bring new people into the politburo, and that he would be the instrument of the succession. Obviously if he's incapacitated he won't be the instrument, and we'll see another one with a short term, I would gather.* LVAYEVUEP . Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200950002-2 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200950002-2 MACNEIL: Is this long period of uncertainty, is this good for the West, for the United States and the West? CALDWELL: In my opinion it's neither good nor bad. On balance, probably, it's bad, and it's bad in a couple of ways. First, uncertainty in Moscow, uh, given the severely, uh, degenerated nature of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, uncertainty in Moscow over the leadership question probably increases the possibilities of miscalculation. Uh, if indeed the, the hypothesis is'correct that Andropov was incapacitated in September, perhaps the KAL incident was the first example of the Soviet incapacity to deal with crises. So in that sense, I think it's not good from the American point of view.. In terms of the United States being able to exercise any leverage on the process, uh, I don't think anyone would argue that there's much we could do in that respect at all. On the other hand, I think the atmosphere of the relationship's important. No one gets points in Moscow by arguing in favor of improvement of the relationship with Washington, and I... think. that has a consequence. It says something about the environment within which the.. succession will take place. MACNEIL: Thank you. Jim? ,LEHRER: Another view of it now from Richard\Pipes, former director of Eastern European and Soviet affairs at the National Security Council. He's served at the NSC for the first two years of the Reagan administration and has now returned to his teaching position at Harvard University. Dr. Pipes, first, with Andropov apparently,. uh, incapacitated, who do you think is likely running the shots there now, calling the shots there? DR. RICHARD PIPES (Former Member National Security Council): You must realize tht Soviet Union is run by bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy is concentrated in the central committee, and basically they can run the country from day to day, from week to week without any Leader sy--.1p. Where t'r.._ lea:z ership is essential is to give a thrust forward, to ma?:c charges. LEP..RgR: So n.thing, then, of ir: lortanc_ w.uld b-:! p::t. on hold, s:~ to speak, while Andropov either recovers or dies. PIPiE5: There is, uh, things ;:ill not be put on, uh., the day-to--day affairs will not be pot on hold. Put I ttir:' 0-:dt yo.:'r: g:tr: , to find is that wh.. ti-; top let:-'- is ill. or whoa th,i:r _ is a 'th bureaucrats don.' t know who w .11 be in ch r e and th:; tend not to stick their n~!cks out. So there is a fear of doing nothing innovative, either in foreign or donstic policy. LEHRER: Do you agree with the position that, that, uh, we're in, that assuming Andropov does not recover and dies or becomes incapacitated even further, that we're in for another interim leadership, or another inter... interim leadership figure? PIPES: Not necessarily. I was struck by the fact that a few months ago the party brought from Leningrad--the leader of the Leningrad party was Romanov, who has a very good na:ne*to be a Russian leader. LEHRER:..?Mo. PIPES: Brought him to... LEHRER:. He.has a direct lineage from the czar. PIPES: 'Well, it would seem so. LEHRER: Yes. PIPES: ...Uh, brought him to Moscow and, uh, gave him a post on. the secretariat. He's a young man; he's a man in his early 50s, and it almost looked as if they were saying, 'Well, Andropov is ill, he may not last, and we want somebody young to be on the spot.' Now, he's one of three people-who are both on the politburo and the secretariat; and the next leader is likely to come out of that group. CO NUED Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200950002-2 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200950002-2 J. LEHRER: And if it's him, that means that it could be for a long term and not for some interim period. PIPES: It could be. LEHRER: What. is your view of whether or not this period of certainty, uncertainty, that we're in is a plus or a minus for the United States? PIPES: I. think it's a plus, uh, the reason being that as I've said, when the bureaucracy lacks a clear leader, uh, it tends not to be innovative and take initiatives. Uh, that applies to foreign policy as well. Uh, the, we have experienced in the, in the past during the, uh, succession struggles in the '20s after Lenin's death, the Soviet Union was less aggressive than either before or after. And the same thing happened after Stalin's death in the immediate few years. Uh, when the succession struggle is, uh, on its way, then these people have to so much concentrate on establishing a domestic base., they tend not to get too: adventuresome abroad. LEHRER: 'I see. And what, how, in specifics, do,,you think., uh', would this play itself out? ' If the United States, uh, were to use this opportunity, what kinds of things. do you think could be accomplished now in this environment? -PIPES: .I think we should not try either to negotiate anything, because it is almost. impossible to negotiate without a leader firmly in place. I think this has been our problem 'the, last two, :., three years, that all our attempts at negotiating not just arms control, but any= regional problems, have run into stone wall, because no one dares to make proposals, and they repeat the sane old proposals. Uh, I would not try to do that until they have the new leader in place. Uh, basically I'd keep hands off; uh, go about our own business, whatever we have to do, and not try to intervere (sic), interfere in the internal processes there. LEHRER: But not even any kind of external thing, we shouldn't do anything either, right? PIPES: Well, we should go about our business. We should re-arm. Ah, we. should try to contain Soviet and Soviet-in_rired expansion, as well as the rest of the w: rld . We sh. uld see to it'. that we don't s:11 military tec:hr;~.'.ogy and all these. things and let them resolve their own p:roblems. Ah, ny feeling is and always has been that the deg.:; ? . th*! pr:obl Earc: at h.-In