ALFONSO CALLEJAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000301410015-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: October 24, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO IV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM CBS Nightwatch
STATION WDVM-TV
CBS Network
DATE October 24, 1984 2:00 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT Alfonso Gallejas
CHARLIE ROSE: During Sunday night's debate, one issue
was that of the CIA manuals which appeared to encourage. such
subversive tactics as assassination. Those manuals were distrib-
uted to Nicaragua's largest rebel group, known as the Nicaraguan
Democratic Force. President Reagan contended that the controver-
sial terrorist advice was deleted from most of the manuals, but
the CIA disputes that claim, and so does our guest, Alfonso
Gallejas. He is a member of the ruling directorate of the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force.
Mr. Callejas, how did you first learn about these
ALFONSO CALLEJAS: Well, in fact, in last December I run
into this manual in one of our offices in Tegucigalpa.,
ROSE: Which is in Honduras, which is the base for
CALLEJAS: Well, we have a communication office there.
And so I run into this manual. I read it, and I was shocked when
I read in the New York Times last week about the hiring of
professional killers to assassinate political targets. Because
in the manual that I read, it had nothing of the sort. So,
apparently, the manuals that I got had been edited and those
pages were taken out.
ROSE: How many pages were taken out, two?
CALLEJAS: There were two pages taken out. Yes.
ROSE: And you're talking about the use of criminals to
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assassinate members of your own force to create martyrs? Is that
what you're talking about?
CALLEJAS: No, I never saw such a thing. Evidently -- I
learned from reading the New York Times that also that contained,
to me, was a surprise.
And you know, in this business of war, we do get a lot
of advices from different sources as to what we should do. And
many people want us to imitate the Salvadoran guerrillas, for
instance, and blowing up dams and power lines and kidnapping
people.
ROSE: Do you do that?
CALLEJAS: Of course not. We are not terrorists.
ROSE: How did they end up with the CIA-related manual
that encourages this kind of terrorism? Which many people would
say is state-sponsored terrorism, much like the kind of terrorism
that the Secretary of State of the United States has denounced
and said that the United States should have no part.
CALLEJAS: Well, I fully agree with Mr. Shultz and with
Mr. Reagan. Terrorism isn't part of our struggle. We want to
establish in Nicaragua respect for human rights.
ROSE: But why the manual, then? I mean how did the
GALLEJAS: Well, the manual came about, for what I read
from Mr. Chamorro's statements to the...
ROSE: He's another member of the directorate.
CALLEJAS: That's correct.
The statement that he made to the Miami Herald. And he
states that this gentleman came and offered his notes on how a
guerrilla should be conducted. And he thought that there was
some good ideas into that. Well, when the manual was printed,
he, himself, discovered these two horrible pages with all the
objections. So he says that he...
ROSE: That was page 70 and 71?
CALLEJAS: 69, 70...
ROSE: Right in there.
CALLEJAS: That's correct.
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CALLEJAS: And they were replaced by pages that did not
contain anything that would offend our feelings and our policies.
ROSE: What happened to the man who gave you that
manual, the notes?
CALLEJAS: I don't know. I never met this gentleman.
And what I saw was that manual, and the story I read was that he
came down as a free-lancer and offer this advice.
ROSE: Did he say he was from the CIA?
CALLEJAS: No, on the contrary. Mr Chamorro said that
he was not presented by any CIA agent and that he came on his
own, and also that he paid for the printing, and also gave our
forces some communications equipment. He seems to [be] disposed
of a lot of money.
ROSE: He also -- what was still in the manual was the
phrase "neutralize government officials."
GALLEJAS: Yeah. I'm glad you brought that up. See, I
read it in Spanish, the translation. In Spanish, the connotation
that the slang in English gives it, to neutralize, doesn't mean
what you understand here.
ROSE: What most of us understand here, it means to
assassinate a...
GALLEJAS: That's correct.
ROSE: ...government official, to assassinate the
Sandinista leadership.
CALLEJAS: In Spanish it just mean neutralize, like...
ROSE: It means kidnap?
GALLEJAS: ...when the quarterback is neutralized by the
defense team, see? So, in Spanish it doesn't mean that to us.
ROSE: Was there any remaining material in that manual
with respect to creating a martyr within your own forces by
having your own forces hire criminals? That was not there. It
GALLEJAS: You know, that would have been tremendous
objections, if our own.forces would be trained to kill their own
fellow.
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4
ROSE: To create a martyr. That would be objectionable
to you.
GALLEJAS: How would I feel if I'm one of the com-
batants? The martyr could be me.
ROSE: Yes. And that would not make you feel very good
CALLEJAS: So that would create a tremendous shock
amongst our ranks, because I might be that martyr that they need.
So it's absurd.
See, like I said before, we do get many advices from
many free-lancers that volunteer advices. We don't necessarily
take them.
ROSE: I've got less than a minute. Tell me how the war
is going to end up. Is it going to end up because you have no
more funds and you're not able to prosecute the war? Are you now
dependent on what happens in the elections that the Sandinistas
are engaged in in Nicaragua? What's going to be the end result?
CALLEJAS: Well, I hope I had a crystal ball. First of
all, it's not going to end up because of lack of funds, be-
cause...
ROSE: But the Congress has said no more funds, and
those funds have run out.
CALLEJAS: Well, we have been operating without any
assistance from the United States Government.'
ROSE: Are you getting assistance from other people?
GALLEJAS: We are getting assistance from other places
that we have to keep confidential. So, our dependency from the
help approved by Congress is no longer. So, we cannot be called
the puppets of the CIA, like some liberals like to call us,
especially in Europe.
ROSE: Thank you very much, Mr. Alfonso Gallejas. We
thank you for joining us to talk about the manual and about the
nature of the war and how it goes for the Contras.
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