NICARAGUA/CIA)JENNINGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000301430005-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 30, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT
30 October 1984
NICARAGUA/CIA>JENNINGS: And now, to that CIA manual for antigovernment <
>MANUAL>forces in Nicaragua. It is still a hot topic. Today Sen.
Barry Goldwater postponed, until after the election next
Tuesday, hearings on the manual, how it came about and
what it.contained. The State Department was asked about
the manual again today, and a spokesman insisted U.S.
policy is not to overthrow the Sandinista regime. Well,
what about the people on the ground, those in Nicaragua
itself? What did they believe about the CIA's plans?
ABC's Peter Collins has been on special assignment.
COLLINS: The CIA's decision to train Nicaraguan rebels in
the techniques of sabotage and assassination goes back to
the early days of the Reagan administration. This former
rebel officer, who is disguised to protect his identity,
says the CIA arranged for him and others to be trained in
Argentina. EMILIO (former rebel): There was in three
different groups there went about 60 guys. (sic)
COLLINS: When was that? EMILIO: In '81.
COLLINS: He says the training was to help them overthrow
the Sandinistas. EMILIO: How to make it involve all the
Nicaraguan leaders, how to get him, how to make a
kidnapping, how to put a bomb in Nicaragua.
COLLINS: Later, there was more training in Honduras from
one of the CIA's own experts. EDGAR CHAMORRO (former
director, Nicaraguan democratic force): He was a
counterinsurgency agent in Vietnam and he knew a. lot about
it. So he came to advise us.
COLLINS: The American lived with the rebels in this safe
house in Tegucigalpa. He was known as Juanito and had an
odd habit he had picked up from the Vietcong. CHAMORRO:
He used to dress in black, you know, black pants and black
shirt.
COLLINS: Edgar Chamorro was in charge of psychological
warfare for the rebels and worked closely with Juanito.
He says he and the CIA man decided some 5,000 guerrillas
in Honduran camps needed guidelines. Another CIA source
says Juanito had in mind a manual for a handful of
trainers that would draw on U.S..special forces tactics
that go back to Vietnam. CHAMORRO: Juanito gave us the
know-how and gave us money to produce this book.
GonUnued
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COLLINS: From the beginning, there were disputes over
words, about how to get over the idea about things like
assassination without actually saying it, because U.S.
policy forbid such killings. CHAMORRO.: The book never
uses the word 'assassination.' The book, in the text
what's left...
COLLINS: Does the book recommend... CHAMORRO: Used the
word 'neutralize.'
COLLINS: You mean, the strong words like 'neutralization'
or 'killings' or 'martyrs' weren't supposed to be in
there? EMILIO: Weren't supposed to be in there.
COLLINS: It's understood you're supposed to do those
things. EMILIO: It's understood that you're supposed to
do that, but not to say it in a manual. Never.
COLLINS: But according to Chamorro, the manual went to
this print shop in Honduras because of a slip-up.
Juanito, the American agent,.was later forced out of
Honduras in a dispute with a CIA station chief over the
manual. He was replaced by another American agent who
told the rebels Juanito had make a mistake. CHAMORRO: He
could decide the one, Juanito, because he said you should
never write that down. You do it, but don't write about
it.
COLLINS: Does this book reflect the philosophy of the
CIA? CHAMORRO: Yes, in the case of Nicaragua, yes.
COLLINS: The CIA refuses comment about the manual, and
the rebel group created by the CIA officially disavows its
tactics. ALFONSO CALLEJAS (Nicaraguan democratic force):
We don't condone any assassination of anyone. We don't
condone terrorism.
COLLINS: When the -CIA operation began, the administration
said it was because of Nicaraguan support for Salvadoran
guerrillas. As one official put it, 'One dirty little war
for another.' Now it emerges from the rebels themselves,
who say that 'dirty little war' included such forbidden
tactics as assassination, and the CIA officials not only
knew about it, they encouraged it. Peter Collins, ABC
News, Miami. <
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