NICARAGUA/USSR
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP88-01070R000301440010-7
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 8, 2010
Sequence Number:
10
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 8, 1984
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
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PBS MACNEIL/LEHRER NEWSHOUR
8 November 1984
NICARAGUA/USSR -
LEHRER: Well, let's go to the central issue. Ah, if
there are MiGs there now or some other time, how
serious--the president says this would be a serious matter
for the United States--how serious a matter should it be?
HYDE: Well, it would be a serious escalation of tension
that's already there. Honduras has an army of about
16,000. Ah, the army in Nicaragua is upwards of 75,000.
And, ah, if they bring in these sophisticated fighter
planes that are also bombers and can go or, ah, fully
loaded 400-miles, ah, with, ah, tanks, a range of 400
miles, this would, ah, be very destabilizing, to use a
favorite word. And, ah, I would think some action would
have to be taken, not necessarily military at first. But
there are economic sanctions, ah, diplomatic sanctions.
Certainly, the Contadora process, which contemplates
de-escalating the tensions and getting weaponry out of the
area, would be, ah, certainly violated. And that's why I
kind of have my doubts that the MiGs are there.
LEHRER: All right. What's your view-of it, ah,
Congressman Shannon, as to how big a deal this would be if
they are there? SHANNON: Well, first of all, let me just
say that I share Henry Hyde's doubts that they are there.
And I think that we are all having this discussion on
very, very skimpy information. I mean, even
administration officials have said'that they seriously
doubt that there are MiGs there.
LEHRER: Well, then what's goin' on, Congressman?
SHANNON: I don't know what's going on. And I am a little
bit chagrined that the intelligence community
wou
this story so intently to the press on election night or
Election Day or, you know, I don't know when it was, was
leaked, and create all of this, ah, a h, fever o concern
both in this country and Nicaragua.
LEHRER: Well, what... SHANNON: Ah, and I don't know
what the political purpose behind that would be or what
any other purpose, ah, might be. But I think it's
terribly unfair to jump to the conclusion that the, ah,
the MiGs are there. And I've been listening to the radio,
and I've been getting telephone calls from people, ah, and-.
they're having all sorts of great discussions about
whether we should go in and take them out militarily if
they are there. I doubt very seriously that there are
MiGs in Nicaragua. If they were.MiGs, I think that would
be cause for concern of the United-States.
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LEHRER: To do what?. What should we do., Congressman
Shannon? SHANNON: I, I think that we should go to the
Security Council at the United Nations under those, ah,
circumstances. Actually, more appropriately, Honduras,
ah, should go to the Security Council. And we have legal
means and procedures that we could follow, as Congressman
Hyde, ah, pointed out. And this notion that you have to
jump to some kind of military solution to everything,I
think, is just absolutely dead wrong.
LEHRER: You agree we shouldn't, Congressman Hyde, you you
agree we shouldn't jump to a military conclusion. But you
also say that somewhere down the line that would be .
necessary, if it was necessary, do it, don't hesitate.
HYDE: Well, I think if, ah, Honduras has a reasonable
fear of invasion from Nicaragua, ah, I think we should
have an obligation to, ah, assure their security. I would
disagree a little bit with Jim, my good friend. I would
go to the Soviet Union, not necessarily to the U.N. Ah,
they would have difficulty, ah, ah, taking time off from
beating up on South Africa and Israel to teal with this.
But the Soviet Union, which, it's their ship, it was
loaded in Odessa,. it came direct to Corinto, I would
think, ah, asking them what they're doing and, ah, ah,
would be more effective.
LEHRER: Let me ask you this, Congressman Hyde, and then
we have to move on. Ah, you also said you doubted those
MiGs are there. What do you think is goin' on here then?
HYDE: Well, I think, ah, it's interesting if some
disinformation is planted. Jim said - the intelligence
community leaked the story. He knows something I on
know. It could have come from anywhere Ah, it has
created some theater for the media. Ah, but, ah, Ortega
has been... SHANNON: I deny that, sir. HYDE: You deny
that affirmatively. SHANNON: Yes. Yes. HYDE: Ortega-
has-been predicting an invasion. Ah, they may be trying
to create a flurry of activity to say, 'See what I mean.
America has designs on invading us,' which I don't, which
I'm sure we don't.
MACNEIL: How plausible, do you think, are Professor
Rubinstein's theses on what the Soviets might be up to, or
hypothesis? HYDE: Well, yes., I think it makes sense that
the Soviets, worst-case scenario, they do have MIGs in
there to see what our reaction would be. They may have
anticipated a Mondale victory, who knows, when they
started the ship out. But, it is plausible. But, again,
it doesn't make sense. It would make liars out of the
Sandinistas.. The Soviets have also said there are MIGs in
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there and it would certainly ruin any propaganda value
that the Nicaraguans think they have, the Sandinistas,
rather,'with the Contadora countries.
MACNEIL: What's'your view of the possible Soviet
motivation,'Congressman Shannon? SHANNON: I don't know
what the Soviet motivation would be. I think that the
tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States
can lead to an awful lot of unfathomable kinds of actions
on both sides, unless we strengthen them, strengthen the
relationship and relieve some of those tensions. But, I
just have great difficulty seeing any rationale at all at
this. particular point, either one of political
embarrassment or one to try to provoke us for any kind of
nefarious reason, why the Soviets would do this. It would
be foolhardy and I don't think anybody would gain from it,
so I just don't believe it's the case. And I think that,
if our intelligence continues to track these ships an
these crates, as I'm sure they will, we'll i'n_d_tTa_t_it'
wasn't the case. --
MACNEIL: Professor Rubinstein, given the past history of
..relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union at moments
of crisis, when there's a desire to have no
misunderstandings, the U.S. is reported already to have
talked to the Soviet Union about this. Is it likely, how
will the Soviet leadership tend'to behave? Would they
say, privately, 'Look, there aren't any MiGs in there,' or
would they say, 'It's none of your-business,' or would
they see the thing blowing up so much that they might want
to-come clean privately? RUBINSTEIN: I think everything
you've said would be a possible reaction on.the part of
the Soviets. I don't know what we said to them. But, you
know, this is not the Cuban missile crisis. And it would
be, I think, foolhardy of us to act as if there is a major
crisis brewing between the Soviet Union and the United
States over those crates. It may very well be that the
U.S. intelligence community pre-empted a crisis by
announcing that there was this Soviet ship that behaved
erratically, that zigzagged its wa around the coast of
South America, came up the Pacific coast and tried o
off-load rather secretly and, in so doing, it may very
well have alerted the.Kremlin to the fact that, if there
was an attempt to send in aids, that they better back
down or, at least, they have time to ak own o,
think in retrospect, if there is no crisis, part of the
credit probably has to go to the intelligence sources that
notified us in the first place.
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