INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000301510002-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 15, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO N REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM Larry King: Let's Talk
DATE December 15, 1984 7:00 P.M.
STATION WJLA-TV
SUBJECT Interview with Admiral Stansfield Turner
Washington, D.C.
LARRY KING: Terrorism, hijacking, spies. That's the
topics tonight on the Larry King: Let's Talk edition here on
Channel 7. Our special guest is Admiral Stansfield Turner, the
former Director of the CIA.
KING: And our special tonight, Admiral Stansfield
Turner, the former Director of the CIA, who next June a most
revealing book will be published by Mr. Turner, Admiral Turner on
lots of things. But we'll cover some things current, right on
top of things.
What is your analysis, off the top, of that whole event
with that hijacking?
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: Larry, it's tough to know
whether the Iranian government was really behind this. It's too
early to accuse them of that, though there are some suspicious
signs. There are terrorists in the Middle East who seem intent
on doing in the United States, one way or the other. And this
had a very anti-American flavor when they picked up that air-
craft. They obviously were trying to get their own buddies out
of Kuwait, where they have participated in an anti-, or at least
partially anti-American terrorist act some months ago.
So I think it's an anti-American terrorist group. They
took advantage of getting into Teheran, where they'd have a more
sympathetic background, if it wasn't a collaborative effort with
the Iranian goverment.
So we were caught in the middle. It's a tough
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KING: If it was, that would have been pretty elaborate
planning, though, wouldn't it, Iran? Wait a number of days, fake
it like you're someone coming to clean up the plane. I mean that
would have been -- that's pretty good planning.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, but the suspicion is, first, that
Iran has harbored and trained terrorists. We're quite sure of
that. Second, that, you know, the Iranians demanded the release
of those same people from Kuwait. And thirdly, when they did go
to get into that airplane, somehow, nobody got hurt. They
subdued the four terrorists and the terrorists weren't shot.
Now, I'm basing it on the best information that seems to
be available this evening. In a week or two, when we get more
facts, maybe some of this will be laid aside.
KING: Is there anything we could have done during this?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I don't think so. Had it been
almost any other country in the world, we might well have offered
to send in one of our own rescue teams. You have to have a
friendly reception in this kind of a circumstance because you've
got to sneak up surreptitiously to the aircraft. We couldn't
have gone in and captured the Iranian airport and then rescued
the hostages. That would have been too much.
KING: Is there any, Admiral, defense against terrorism
beyond Israel's, which says, "A terrorist act against even
civilians makes them military. We'll never talk to you, and
we're just going to go in and get them out. Or whoever dies,
dies"?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Sure there is, Larry. Look, in the
United States we don't have any serious hijacking problem
anymore. Why? Because you and I stand in line and they check us
pretty carefully at our airports. Somebody didn't check this
airplane before it took off from Dubai in the United Arab
Emirates, just across the Persian Gulf from Iran.
Sure there's a defense. Look at what's happened in West
Germany. They had a terrible problem a few years ago with the
Baader-Meinhof Gang. Look what's happened in Italy. They
captured and killed a former Prime Minister, Aldo Moro, the
terrorists did, the Red Brigades, so-called. Those are both
under control. Why? Because those countries took it seriously.
They put out a dragnet operation and they got all the little
clues of information they could about the Baader-Meinhof or the
Red Brigades. They've paid a price, just as you and I pay a
price every time we go to an airport.
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KING: How is the CIA involved?
ADMIRAL TURNER: The CIA is very active, I assume -- it
certainly was in my day, but I have not reason to think it isn't
just as active today -- in trying to find out what's going on
with international terrorism. It's not an easy proposition.
First of all, there are lots of terrorist groups, and
some of them just pop up today and disappear tomorrow. But,
Larry, most of them are real fanatics. And if you want to try to
find out what's going on in a fanatic organization, you've got to
find somebody who looks like a fanatic to meld in with them.
It's tough to find somebody. It's tough to have him be persua-
sive enough to get on the inside. And then when he's there, he's
at considerable risk himself, too, if they find out any hint that
he's working with the CIA.
It's done. I've seen it done. And it can be very
successful. It can thwart a terrorist operation. But it's not
easy. And we are naive if we think we're going to be able to
stop all terrorism against the United States with just the CIA.
KING: You've seen it done. In other words, the CIA
successfully infiltrated terrorist groups and prevented terrorism
from occurring by the nature of the infiltration.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I can't give you any details.
KING: I realize that.
ADMIRAL TURNER: But I can guaranty you that I saw
terrorist plans frustrated as a result of CIA efforts.
KING: All right., Now, how do you deal with a Qaddafi,
a man who promotes terrorism, state terrorism? We had that sting
operation a couple weeks ago, the Egyptian thing. From a CIA
standpoint -- I guess that's the easiest one to deal with him, if
there's any. You can' t deal with him openly -- how do you deal
with that?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, you can try to get inside his
organization and understand where he's moving next, and then
thwart it. That's a tough proposition.
I think the way we've got to deal with Qaddafi is for
the United States to assume more open leadership. We've got to
try to galvanize responsible nations around the world to make
Qaddafi a pariah, when it's proven that he's done things like
attempt assassinations in Egypt.
KING: And hire people.
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ADMIRAL TURNER: Hire people all over the world. It's
happened in our country, where he attempted it. The incident in
Great Britain, where his people killed a policewoman. Just
unforgivable.
We've got to say we're going to cordon this man off. I
would, for instance, not let any American airliner, or try to get
the whole international airline association to stop flying to
Libya, deny him that privilege, that opportunity; and don't give
his planes landing rights anywhere else until we've got evidence
that this kind of thing stops.
KING: But we do business with him, do we not?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I don't think so.
KING: No oil? The Americans are out of there.
ADMIRAL TURNER: The Americans are out. A lot of our
European allies are in. The French are big in buying oil there.
KING: So you're saying use our clout with our friends
and others to pressure him.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Sure. Nobody needs to buy oil from
Libya today. There's plenty of oil to be had. It's a little
inconvenience. It might even be a little expense for people to
get rid of Libyan oil and try Nigerian or something else. But
the Nigerians would love to sell it, and we'd rather have them
buy it -- we'd rather put the money in Nigeria than Libya.
KING: How about the move of faking him out with a sting
operation?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I think that was a clever one,
and I think that kind of thing is important to let the world
really have evidence of what a scoundrel he is.
KING: The other side. Do you fear if you cordon off a
fanatic, a true fanatic, you leave him nothing left but more
fanaticism?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't think there's any way you can
make Qaddafi more fanatic. He's almost a nut right now. So, no,
I'm not too worried about that.
KING: Not worried that if you cordoned him off it
wouldn't make him worse. You know, the man with the back to the
building does anything.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think he's about as worse as he can
get, Larry.
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KING: How good are we in infiltration, in the whole
spying game? How would you rate the CIA?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I'd rate us very good, very good. It's
a subjective evaluation.
Most people try to compare us with the Soviets, the KGB.
The Soviets do a lot more in terms of human intelligence effort,
penetration, putting spies out. I'm never sure why because they
can either hear it on the Larry King Show or read it in Aviation
Week, if we have any secrets in this country. They all seem to
come out in the public, unfortunately.
But seriously, they do a great effort. They put a
tremendous amount of time and money. For instance, a few weeks
ago we arrested a pair of Soviets and an American FBI officer on
the West Coast as an alleged spy effort. Did you read that those
two Soviets had been in this country 11 years? One of them, the
man, was a butcher. And the lady, I think, was a nurse. And I
believe they'd been living here for 11 years to build up a
position from which they could work as spies. You see what I
mean? Patience.
KING: Don't we do the reverse? Haven't we got people
11, 12, 13 years in Eastern Europe?
ADMIRAL TURNER: It's pretty hard to get any American to
live for 11 or 12, 13 years as a butcher in Bulgarian. Now, we
don't have to operate that way because I think we're more clever
than the Soviets. We don't have as big a human intelligence
effort as they. I was trying to compare the two. And I'd say
theirs is much bigger, but ours is more clever. I mean they've
been arrested just recently several'times here. And we get
arrested once in a while too. But I believe that our human
intelligence effort is satisfying our needs as well as theirs is
satisfying theirs.
KING: One of the great problems in this whole game is
we don't know our good things. In other words, the CIA, under
you, yesterday, may have thwarted a major terrorist bombing. No
credit. The guy who did it doesn't even get his name up on the
board at the CIA building. Right?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I gave away, or gave out a lot of
medals, Larry, for people who did very commendable things,
sometimes heroic things. A good many of those medals I gave out
in a small room, like, say, my own office, with six or seven
people there to know about it, because that's all who could know
that this person was even doing something that warranted praise.
Sometimes a lot of people in the agency could be there for a
public medal -- almost a public medal ceremony. But sometimes
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no. You have to keep the whole operation secret, almost forever.
KING: In a country that abhors secrecy -- the United
States doesn't like secrecy.
KING: We have Freedom of Information Acts. We want our
people to be open. Right?
KING: A Soviet agent -- it's probable that a Soviet
agent is watching us now.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I would think so.
KING: The odds are in favor of it. Right?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes.
KING: The reverse couldn't be true in Moscow, could it?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No.
KING: The head of their KGB is not on television
talking and answering questions that he doesn't know, prepared in
advance, with an American watching. So you start two steps
behind. Right?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. But that's the strength of our
country, freedom of expression. That's one of the things we
stand for most is that we have the right to say what we want to
say.
KING: Is it a delicate balance, then, when you're
Director of the CIA and you're committed to the Bill of Rights,
and by nature you have to lie, don't you?
KING: Agents lie.
ADMIRAL TURNER: That's another thing. But when you're
talking about the Director, who lives here in the United States
and deals in the United States, I would not tolerate lying inside
our organization or to our Congress or to our public.
Now, sometimes you decline to answer. I've fenced one
or two of your questions on this show because they can't be
answered within the safety of our country.
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KING: But lie, never.
ADMIRAL TURNER: But lie, never. That's my view. We
cannot lie. And I don't want to go to jail for lying to the
Congress, or something like that.
KING: We'll be right back.
KING: Let's stay with this secrecy thing here for a
moment. It is a tender line, isn't it, a thin line?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. Secrecy is an anathema in a
government that operates on the consent of the governed. Because
if the governed don't know what's going on, they can't give their
consent.
Now, what we found out in the mid-1970s was that secrecy
had been abused by the CIA. Not too much, but enough that it was
soundly criticized. And the point was that because of all that
criticism, human intelligence activities were really at a very
low pace when I happened to join the CIA in 1977. Why? Because
the professionals didn't want to get caught out again and bring
on more criticism, and maybe undo their whole agency.
So what I'm saying, Larry, is in 30 years with no
supervision, no accountability, human intelligence had sort of
round to a halt. So what did we do? We brought in some account-
ability. We brought in some supervision. It started under
Gerald Ford and George Bush, when he was Director of the CIA.
And it started when in 1976 the Senate established a committee on
intelligence, and the House, followed in 1977. So we've got a
compromise now.
Yes, the public cannot know these secrets, even though
they are the ones who have to consent to the government. But
what we do is we let the House and the Senate Intelligence
Committees know the secrets of intelligence, and they act as
surrogates for you and me and the public.
KING: It would be wonderful if a free society didn't
need this, wouldn't it?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Because when people aren't. held
accountable, they make mistakes. If you're not going to be held
accountable for what you say on this show, you may be a little
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less judicious in how you handle yourself. I mean we're all like
that. It's just human nature. And therefore I believe even
people doing secret work have to be held accountable. Because in
a democracy like ours, if they do make mistakes, there are enough
investigative reporters around that it's going to come out.
KING: The danger. When an organization is secret, it
can do a lot of things, even with all the oversights. So the CIA
could be doing something tomorrow' against its charter, couldn't
it? It's hard to find out.
ADMIRAL TURNER: No.
KING: Not hard?
ADMIRAL TURNER: If the two Intelligence Committees are
persevering, there's no reason they can't find out.
Take all the trouble we're in today in Nicaragua.
That's because, over time, it's all spilled out through those
committees, because it's something they've looked into. They
didn't look into it as aggressively, I believe, as they should
have. And some of the errors, like this manual, weren't un-
covered until -- the manual that advocated assassination --until
too late, or later than they should have. But that's a learning
process. We're still feeling our way into this whole surrogate
oversight process.
So, I think we can have both the necessary secrecy,
because we limit those secrets to a few people in the White House
and on Capitol Hill, and yet we can have enough check to avoid a
repetition of the abuses of the past.
KING: How far should we go? Would you -- if you were
the head of the CIA today and I tell you I can get a guy into
Libya who will assassinate Qaddafi, would you sign off on it?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I couldn't sign off on it. Presi-
dent Gerald Ford wrote the first presidential executive order on
intelligence in February 1976 and he said no one in the govern-
ment will participate in or conspire to assassinate anybody.
President Carter reaffirmed that. President Reagan has reaf-
firmed that, also.
I believe it's a good rule. I don't think we should
decide who should live and who should not live, other than in
war. And therefore to make that judgment that it's a good idea
to kill a Qaddafi, when you don't know who will come next, you
don't know what kind of a moral judgment you're making, I don't
think is a good move.
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KING: How about teaching other people to kill?
KING : When the CIA has manuals that tell other people
how to tell and how to revolutionize.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think that was a bad manual, but it
was not a manual on assassination. It was a manual. on guerrilla
warfare. And to that extent, it's a perfectly legitimate thing
to help other people when you're engaging in guerrilla warfare.
And one of the covert techniques for using the CIA in a situation
like Nicaragua is to use paramilitary, we call it, support,
training, military equipment -- to guerrillas who are fighting on
the side of freedom.
KING: We're talking real world here, right?
KING: Which is one of the difficult aspects of this.
How do you get spies? How do you recruit spies? Who wants to be
a spy? Can you give me a prototype of him or her?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, there's no single prototype. But
you get some spies because they're fed up with their own country.
They've been so oppressed. They've seen how corrupt their
countries are, or how bad the ideology of Communism, in parti-
cular, is.
You get some spies purely for money. You get some spies
because they establish a friendship with a CIA officer. He
doesn't acknowledge, maybe, to be in the CIA, but they establish
a friendship with this American and they become attached to him
bcause he's a nice and a warm person.
Sometimes you get spies just because they want kicks,
they want to have a thrill in life. Life is dull for them.
There are lots of different reasons, and some of them
are psychotic.
KING: You weed them out? Or not necessarily?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Not necessarily. But you -- we have
psychologists in the CIA who study all the spies that we engage.
KING: Really?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, yes. We psychoanalyze all of them.
Now, can't usually lay them out on the couch, Larry, and have a
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regular session. But we would give the psychologist all the data
we could gather on this individual. It maybe his handwriting.
It may be furtive conversations we've had with him in a back
alley. Whatever we know about him, whatever we can collect about
him. We turn it over to the psychologist, the shrink, and we
say, "See what you can tell us about this person." And then as
we learn more and more about him, we keep building up his
dossier, and the psychologists keep looking at him, and they say,
"Be a little wary. It sounds like he may be a double agent.
He's not really as persuasive as he's trying to be." That is,
that he wants to work for us. His reasons don't sound valid.
It's fascinating.
KING: Do you feel we've had Kim Philbys here, or Kim
Philbys, the English double agent, here, a type here? Wilson was
one?
KING: No, Wilson was after, and that was mercenary.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. And Wilson, as far as we know,
didn't just go out giving secrets to the Soviet Union. He was
trying to make money for himself."
KING: Could we have a Philby?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, we've had some Philbys, but on a
much lower level. The British have had Mcleans and Philbys and
Burgesses and other people who have been at a pretty high level
and stayed there for a long period of time. And that was very,
very costly.
During my time in the CIA, a man named Barnett, who had
been a CIA person, left the CIA, and later on we found he had
turned coat and was giving information to the Soviets. But he
was not a big wheel.
KING: Admiral Stansfield Turner. I'm Larry King.
We'll be right back.
KING: You miss the power?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, you miss the excitement of being in
on what's going on around the world and what the country's
involved in. But, Larry, I don't miss the pressure. I like to
go home tonight and know that I don't really have to read until
one or two o'clock in the morning in order to be ready for
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tomorrow, not to be embarrassed tomorrow, like if I went up on
Capitol Hill and had to testify, or something.
KING: You don't want that phone call at 2:00 A.M. in
the morning.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I've had enough of that.
KING: But that's a high too, isn't it?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, yes. You get a great kick out of
that when it's happening. But I'm glad it's over.
KING: A lot of years of it is enough.
Thank you, Stan.
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