ESPIONAGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000301960007-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
This Week with David Brinkley STAnON WJLA-TV
ABC Network
December 1, 19t r 11:30 A.M.
Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT Espionage
DAVID BRINKLEY: A spy a day, almost. Four of them
arrested in this country in five days and accused of spying for
the Soviet Union, China, and Israel. It appears there are so
many around, they will steal the socks off your feet, or anything
they can sell to a foreign country for cash. Accused spies have
been found in all four of the top secret agencies of government:
the National Security Agency, the CIA, the FBI, and military
intelligence. Eleven have been arrested this year. Well, how
many are still out there at work and have not been discovered?
We'll ask today's guests about all of this: William
Webster, Director of the FBI; from Israel, Simcha Dinitz, a
member of the Israeli Parliament and former Ambassador to the
United States; Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York,
formerly Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee;
Richard Helms, former Director of the CIA. Some background from
our man John Martin....
On the arrest of an American charged with spying for
Israel, the Israeli Government apologized this morning and
promised to, quote, deal with those responsible, unquote.
BOB ZELNICK: In a statement delivered by Cabinet
Secretary Yossi Belin, Israeli apologizes for any spying that may
have been committed against the United States, and pledges to
take concrete steps to get all the facts and prevent a recurrence
of the incident. While saying the internal investigation headed
by Prime Minister Shimon Peres is not yet complete, the Israelis
pledged to follow the evidence, no matter where the trail might
lead.
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The statement does not mention accused spy Jonathan
Pollard by name, nor does it refer to this man, Rafi Eitan, who
reportedly ran the intelligence unit that recruited Pollard. But
the statement does pledge, first, that those responsible for the
incident will be brought to account; second, that the unit
responsible for the activity will be completely and permanently
dismantled; and third, that all necessary procedures will be
implemented to see that the incident is not repeated.
The statement describes Israel's relationship with the
United States as one of friendship, close affinity and mutual
trust, and describes espionage as totally contradictory to
Israeli policy in dealing with the United States.
The Israelis have still not said they'll let U.S.
investigators at their own officials. And while the Israelis
have given no date for the completion of their investigation,
today's apology is so sweeping and total as to go a long way
toward relieving U.S. fears of a cover-up.
BRINKLEY: The Soviet Union, of course, has been spying
in this country for years, all the way back to World War II.
Klaus Keats (?) was working in the supersecret Manhattan Project
working on the first atomic bomb and sending its secrets to
Moscow about as fast as they got to Washington. And they have
never stopped buying or stealing secret information.
But Israel, why would they do it? Most of our security
information is shared with them anyway, and why would they even
need spies?
Here's some background on all this from John Martin.
JOHN MARTIN: The United States is in the middle of the
greatest number of espionage prosecutions in history, David. But
perhaps not until this week did the nature of spying become so
clear. To anybody who had any doubts, there was a lesson, and
that is that nation's spy on their enemies, but also their
friends. And they pay a price.
If reports are correct, an Israeli diplomat working at
this consulate in New York and another working in Washington
were the contacts for a spying mission so sensitive that its
disclosure is threatening to unravel some of the diplomatic bonds
between two of the world's best friends.
CHARLES REDMAN: We are dismayed that the government of
Israel was not as forthcoming as we would have hoped and
expected. But the important point now, the crucial point is that
we have prompt access to those involved.
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MARTIN: The immediate issues are return of hundreds of
American documents and the right to question the two Israeli
diplomats.
The man accused of providing the documents is
31-year-old Jonathan Pollard, reportedly on his way to becoming
the Middle East desk officer for naval intelligence.
By some accounts, American intelligence on Arab military
strengths, as well as appraisals of the Israeli military, went to
an Israeli intelligence unit.
PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN: As events of recent days have
made clear, many nations spy on the United States.
MARTIN: Yesterday, in a radio speech, the President of
the United States largely ignored the embarrassing questions of
why Israel would resort to espionage and at what level it was
authorized. But he warned of the consequences of secret
penetration.
PRESIDENT REAGAN: We will not hesitate to root out and
prosecute the spies of any nation. We'll let the chips fall
where they may.
MARTIN: Despite the high number of recent prosecutions
mentioned by Mr. Reagan yesterday, all four major branches of
American intelligence have suffered one form of penetration or
loss in the last two years.
The National Security Agency: Ronald Pelton, a
communications expert, accused of taking Soviet money for
revealing secret NSA activities after he left the agency.
The Central Intelligence Agency: Larry Chin, accused of
30 years of spying for Communist China from inside the CIA.
Sharon Scharange, convicted of betraying CIA informants in Ghana.
And Edward Howard, accused of passing secrets that may have
betrayed a CIA informant inside the Soviet Union.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation: Richard Miller,
the first agent accused of espionage, now facing retrial.
And Naval Intelligence, where Mr. Pollard was reportedly
rising in the ranks, but exposed by colleagues suspicious of his
requests for classified documents outside his area of
responsibility.
The Pentagon said this past week it is tightening
security for the most highly secret materials handled by some
50,000 military and civilian defense workers.
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Congress is looking at a series of reforms, including
greater use of lie detectors, increased financial auditing, and
personality screening.
According to the FBI, counterintelligence funding is up
25 percent, and agents are deliberately pursuing more cases for
public prosecution.
JAMES GEER: Going public definitely says something to
the Soviets. Yes. To anyone who might in the back of their mind
have the thought of maybe this is an easy way to earn some money.
MARTIN: Still, there are troubling questions of whether
the United States is doing enough to protect its secrets. Four
out of five recent espionage cases were exposed not by
counterintelligence agents, but by spouses and a defector. And
in recent years the United States has lost a lot of secrets to
spies: a radar for tanks, fighters and the Stealth bomber;
details of the Minuteman missile; and plans for the keyhole
statellite, which looks from space at objects as small as a foot
across.
WILLIAM COLBY: Those were telling the Soviets something
that, presumably, they didn't know as to our degree of access
through various of these techniques. And I'd say they were quite
damaging.
MARTIN: But perhaps the most unsettling was the
appearance and disappearance of this man, KGB officer Vitaly
Yurchenko. Experts are still asking: If the KGB sent him here
on a mission, how did he fool the CIA? And what did he
accomplish?
Despite losses and confusion, counterintelligence
officials insist they are getting better at what they do, getting
more money to do it, and getting more cooperation from each
other. But this latest series of cases suggests that proposed
reforms of the security system are long overdue.
BRINKLEY: We'll be back with the Director of the FBI, a
member of the Israeli Parliament, the former Director of the CIA,
and a former Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
BRINKLEY: Senator Moynihan, in New York, former Vice
Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, thanks very much
for coming in to talk with us today.
And Richard Helms, here in Washington, former Director
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of the CIA.
A pleasure to have both of you with us.
RICHARD HELMS: Good morning, David.
BRINKLEY: How are you?
First tell us, the Israelis, as you have heard a few
minutes ago, issued a statement of apology. My question is, why
would they have ever done that in the first place? We give them,
so far as I know, everything we have in the way of intelligence
information.
Senator Moynihan, what do you think?
SENATOR DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN: Well, I don't think
they know, at this point.
We don't give them everything. We have warm and close
relationships and we share a great deal, not everything.
And the most important point is that they have acted as
an ally and as a democracy. They've faced this situation.
They've offered us a very handsome apology. We can straighten
this out in no time. The KGB is another question altogether.
RICHARD HELMS: I would think that if one examines these
cases, one discovers that most of espionage in the United States
is done on the margins, even by the KGB. They have a vast amount
of information about the U.S. from our congressional testimony,
from publications, from technical magazines. And all they want
are a few little things that are out in the high-tech area that
we dont put in the public domain. And I suppose the same thing
applies as far as the Israelis are concerned.
I was just surprised that it took them a whole week to
make the statement they did this morning, because normally
countries, when they get caught at this kind of thing, very
quickly try to cauterize the wound and get it over with before
the papers and the media in general have an opportunity to sort
of have a Watergate run at the thing for a whole week.
BRINKLEY: Here with us are George Will of ABC News and
Sam Donaldson, ABC News White House correspondent.
GEORGE WILL: Mr. Helms, how exercised should Americans
be over the fact that Israel, which unquestionably is a friend,
is doing something that doesn't look very friendly? That is,
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does everyone do it? Are we doing it to France and Britain and
Germany and Italy? And is it perhaps the case that we do it
electronically, and therefore don't get caught, because we have
satellites and all kinds of other gadgets, and other people get
caught?
HELMS: I don't think that's the case. We use all kinds
of human agents in countries all over the world.
After all, espionage is not played by the Marquis of
Queensbury rules. And the only sin in espionage is getting
caught. And that friends spy on the United States surprises me
not at all.
WILL: In other words, we are indeed spying on,say, our
NATO allies.
HELMS: I hope so.
WILL: Pat, let me ask you a question. You're sort of
qualified to commit sociology in public. And I want you to
address this question: Why is it that this sort of thing used to
be done for ideological reasons, out of moral passion, sympathy
with the politics of the other side; now espionage seems to be a
kind of squalid commercial transaction? Should we be alarmed, in
some way, about -- I know this is hard to do -- with the moral
tone that makes this kind of transaction multiply?
SENATOR MOYNIHAN: I think we should be alarmed and I
think we should start pulling out fingernails to make clear it's
not funny, it's not worth it, and it won't be tolerated.
But George, you've heard me on this other subject about
-- and Mr. Helms and I might not fully agree. It's ten years
ago that Nelson Rockefeller, as Vice President of the United
States and head of a presidential commission, said that the
Soviet Union, the KGB had begun a massive invasion of American
telephone communications. When they knew that we knew, and then
saw us not do anything, that was a kind of statement that it's
going to be a lot easier, a lot more tolerated than anyone had a
right to expect.
And Judge Webster and I got together this summer on the
subject. I think we're going to. But three Administrations went
by, and nothing yet has happened.
HELMS: Of course I agree with you, Pat. It isn't only
that. It's there are too many Eastern Bloc diplomats permitted
in this country.
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BRINKLEY: There are thousands of them, aren't there?
HELMS: Well, I don't know whether there are thousands.
But there are certainly -- between the United Nations and their
embassies in Washington and consulates around the country, there
are hundreds of them. And they're all working for the same boss
in the KGB. And I think it's high time that we really got around
to seeing to it that we had as many people in their countries as
they have in our country.
SENATOR MOYNIHAN: Would you not agree that, at minimum,
they've got to stop intercepting American telephone calls?
They've practically compromised our entire communications system.
And we can stop it. We can tell them to stop it. And we haven't
done yet.
SAM DONALDSON: Let me see if I can sort a couple of
things out here. I may have misheard you, Mr. Helms. Did you
say that the only sin in espionage is getting caught?
HELMS: That's basically what I said.
DONALDSON: Well, then, let's do away with the laws
against espionage. Would you not agree?
HELMS: No, I wouldn't agree with that at all. That's
just paying with words, Sam. The issue is that since this is an
illegal activity to begin with, and espionage has always been
illegal since the beginning of time, countries do it, they try
not to get caught. If they do get caught, then that's bad. But
if they don't get caught, it's a fine thing. And the people that
run these agents enjoy it.
DONALDSON: Well now, that's the same thing as saying
that if you cheat on your income taxes and don't get caught,
that's a fine thing and you're entitled to. It's only if you get
caught that you have to pay the price.
HELMS: That isn't the same thing at all.
DONALDSON: Well, explain the difference to me.
HELMS: The difference is that everybody understands
that espionage is outside the law. Income taxes are inside the
law.
DONALDSON: Oh, if it's outside the law and you don't
get caught, that's all right.
HELMS: Well, I don't say it's all right, and I don't
say it's the...
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DONALDSON: Well, you just said it was all right, Mr.
Helms. I don't understand what you're saying.
HELMS: What I am saying is that friendly countries spy
on friendly countries; and that when the ruckus starts is when
the agent, individually, gets caught.
DONALDSON: Senator Moynihan...
HELMS: Countries know that they spy on each other and
they know that this has been going on. And I assume that if you
want to get the history of it, you can get the Justice Department
to tell you what every country has been doing to spy on the
United States.
DONALDSON: Well, Senator Moynihan, did I hear you
originally suggest that perhaps Israeli spying against the United
States was something to be excused; that it's Soviet spying that
really threatens us? Should there be a different administration
of the law?
SENATOR MOYNIHAN: No, sir. No, sir. I said that the
Israeli government had behaved as an ally and as a democracy, has
moved to clear this up, and will do, and it had to do. And I'm
glad it did.
DONALDSON: Well, do you think we should still insist,
as we had been, that the U.S. Government be able to interview the
Israeli diplomats who went home, even though we wanted them to
stay here? And should we continue to insist that all documents
that might have been given to Israel in this case be returned?
SENATOR MOYNIHAN: Yes. Let me say this is the time for
the people who are friends of Israel to say nothing is going to
change that relationship of ours. But that relationship involves
an agreement to do what they've just done, to give those
documents back and to give us access to those two people.
WILL: Senator Moynihan, I think we'd like to hear more
about -- although I know you've spoken about this at length over
the years. What kind of telephonic communication are the
Russians intercepting?
BRINKLEY: And how do they do it?
WILL: And how important is it that during the period of
detente a Republican Administration gave them as a location for
their new embassy the highest position in the City of Washington
as yet undeveloped?
SENATOR MOYNIHAN: Mt. Alto, where they will have --
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they will be intercept the microwave transmissions of just about
every major activity in Washington. And then, from a highrise
apartment, Riverdale here in the Bronx -- they'll have even more
equipment out in Glen Cove. They have a huge dish down in Cuba.
With computers, they can now just about take in anything
they're looking for, any telephone call they're looking for.
They use the same system that Bell Telephone uses. And we have
never told them to stop it.
BRINKLEY: This is phone calls between private persons,
not government offices.
SENATOR MOYNIHAN: Yes, sir. The government has begun,
David, to bury its lines and use cables. And they're beginning
to make a distinction between the protection they provide the
government themselves and the people.
WILL: But that must be terribly expensive.
SENATOR MOYNIHAN: It is.
WILL: Why don't we tell -- you say if we told them to
stop, would they stop?
SENATOR MOYNIHAN: We can tell them to stop.
Can I tell you what a counsel of the Central
Intelligence Agency once said to me when I asked them in a
hearing, "Aren't the Soviets violating the Fourth Amendment
rights of Americans"?
He said, "No."
I said, "No?"
He said, "No. The Fourth Amendment only protects you
against invasion of privacy by your own government."
Now, what does that invite, except contempt from the
KGB? And we're beginning to see it.
HELMS: Pat, I don't see how you would believe that if
we asked the Soviets to stop this, they in fact would stop it. I
mean this listening posts are in their own diplomatic
installations, which is after all their own territory in this
country. And I think they would sort of laugh at us, wouldn't
they, if we said, "You mustn't do this anymore"?
SENATOR MOYNIHAN: I'd be prepared to find out, Dick.
Just start expelling them one-by-one.
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HELMS: But I don't see the United States Government, in
any Administration, following that sort of a policy.
SENATOR MOYNIHAN: I think the President's speech
yesterday was a good speech, and it encourages me to think he may
do this. We have the legislation coming to him, and it is a
possibility. Why not try it?
HELMS: Well, I agree with you. I think the President's
speech was excellent.
BRINKLEY: Thank you. I'm sorry, I have to interrupt.
Our time is up....
Coming next, from Israel by satellite, Simcha Dinitz, a
member of the Israeli Knesset, or Parliament, and former
Ambassador to the United States.
BRINKLEY: Mr. Dinitz, in Israel, thank you very much
for coming in to talk with us today. Happy to have you with us.
Now, the statement your government issued a short time
ago we have broadcast and sent to all fifty states. And I
suspect this will diminish, and perhaps disappear totally very
shortly. But in the meantime, we have a few questions, such as:
Why did Israel ever want or need to spy on the United States?
SIMCHA DINITZ: Well, obviously, this is the exception
and that is contrary to the policy of Israel. Israel has very
close and intimate relations with the United States, not only in
the political field, but also in the intelligence field, as well
as in the military field. And that is why spying in the United
States is unauthorized and contrary to Israel's policy, and has
been so for years.
And therefore your question, why should Israel spy, is a
good question. It should not.
DINITZ: It did. And that was a terrible mistake for
jjhich we apologized, first privately, and today publicly. And we
are taking every possible measure -- and I can assure you,
relentlessly, we are pursuing it -- not only to punish the
responsible ones, but also to dismantle the unit which has been
dealing with these matters.
WILL: Mr. Dinitz, you, I believe, were Ambassador in
the United States when the question that echoed around this
capital was, "What did he know and when did he know it?" And the
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question is now going to be asked, have not Shamir, Rabin and
Peres, the people most likely to be involved in this in a very
serious way, haven't they looked upon themselves and found
themselves innocent? Is there going to be some other kind of
inquiry into this?
DINITZ: Well, I can assure you -- and I know this from
first source -- that neither the Prime Minister nor the Foreign
Minister nor the Minister of Defense were aware or, much less,
authorized such operation. And that is one of the reasons the
investigation is very deep and penetrating. Because in addition
to the embarrassment that it caused us in the relations with the
United States, it caused us tremendous embarrassment to
ourselves, to our own system, that something like this can happen
without the political level knowning about it.
WILL: But someone in Israel, and probably someone with
experience in intelligence, thought that Israel had something
that it needed and could only get this way.
Do you think that was a reasonable judgment? Leave
aside the fact that it may not have been worth the risk of
getting caught. Is there something Israel needed and could only
get this way?
DINITZ: I think, if I may, one has to put it in a
proper perspective. One has to remember that we are dealing here
with a country, Israel, which is surrounded by 115 million
enemies bent on its destruction and preparing war, and a surprise
war. And Israel buries daily victims of terrorism. We did this
yesterday. We did it today, a few hours before this show.
Therefore, the margin of Israel's security is so narrow
that any attempt to gather information from third parties that
will lead us to either frustrate acts of terrorism or prevent a
surprise attack on us is so acute, it's so needed that, as a
result of this desire, sometimes happen cases like this of
trespassing, of bypassing, of overriding authorities and
regulations.
DONALDSON: Mr. Dinitz, there are stories about that the
United States is spying on Israel. Now, do you know that to be a
fact? If it is, does it make any difference in this particular
case, that two wrongs make a right?
DINITZ: First of all, I don't think that two wrongs
make a right.
Secondly, I know very little about these things. And I
have listned very carefully to what Mr. Helms said. He is a much
greater expert on these matters than I am. And I would believe
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him if he says that they do.
But I would say this: If cases like this would have
happened in the past, it would always be dealt in a very
discreet manner, away from the public eye, as two friendly
countries should deal with it, and not blow it in a manner that
might endanger -- I hope it doesn't -- the existing intimacy and
trust of the relations between our two countries.
DONALDSON: Well, why was this case treated in a
different manner, then? Why was it made so public by the United
States Government?
DINITZ: Well, that, with all due respect, is not a
question that should be addressed to me.
DONALDSON: Why do you think?
DINITZ: I would say that probably the correct -- or the
interest that the United States has in catching spies -- and you
had a very spy year, I would say, this year, and maybe last few
months. And I think it sort of fell into the general pattern of
trying to capture or to dismantle spy rings which were really
dangerous, which really undermined the national security of the
United States. And we fell, somehow, into this array. And as a
result, we're treated as if we were a hostile country or if we
were a country that was trying to injure the national interest of
the United States.
DONALDSON: Well now, as you know, the United States is
demanding that it have the right to interview the two Israeli
diplomats who were recalled and who are said to have been
the contacts for Pollard. And also, to United States is
demanding the return of any documents that Pollard may have
turned over to you.
Will your government do those things?
DINITZ: I know these American requests. And, of
course, I cannot speak for the government and say whether this
particular request or that particular request will be responded.
I would say this: that the general mood is of total
cooperation with the United States within the framework of what
is done and what is not done between two friendly countries. I'm
sure that on the proper level these things will be discussed.
And our intention will be to give the total and absolute
satisfaction to the United States, provided it doesn't outframe
what is customary between friends.
DONALDSON Well now, would you advise your government,
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since you're not a part of it, would you advise it to accede to
U.S. requests in these areas?
DINITZ: I will advise my government to accede to U.S.
requests to the ultimate possibility and to the maximum
possibility. I would not advise my government to do things which
might undermine the very existence of Israel's security
organization. Because I think a strong Israeli secret
organization is also important for the United States and for the
Free World.
DONALDSON: Returning documents that were stolen from
the United States wouldn't undermine your security organization,
would it?
DINITZ: I really do not know whether we have such
documents, so I cannot tell you whether such documents should be
returned. But I would say whatever does not undermine the
accepted custom and the security of Israel's services I think
would be done, and I'm sure that this is the spirit that will
guide my government.
BRINKLEY: Mr. Dinitz, Jonathan Pollard, we are told,
was dealing with an Israeli diplomat in your embassy in
Washington and with another one at the U.N. mission in New York.
Your government has disowned what they did and apologized for it.
What happened? Did they go into business for
themselves?
DINITZ: No, I do not believe so. I believe that -- you
mean when they were operating, if they did it on their own?
DINITZ: They definitely -- they did it without the
authority or the knowledge of the political level in Israel. I
do not know all the details how they got involved in it in the
first place. There are many stories reported about it, how the
man first introduced himself as a volunteer. They didn't search
him, they didn't recruit him, even as an official representative
of the United States. And I think the thing has been due to
negligence and very -- and I'm not belittling it -- very serious
negligence, which we are now trying to undo. In fact, we are
already undoing. But it was not done with the authority of the
political level.
BRINKLEY: Mr. Dinitz, thank you....
Coming next, William Webster, Director of the FBI.
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BRINKLEY: Mr. Webster, thanks very much for coming
Now, one thing we're told is we're catching, so many
spies are coming to be known because of better police work and
detection, and so on. Is that so?
WILLIAM WEBSTER: That's part of it. It's certainly
part of it.
BRINKLEY: All right. Then I want to ask you this. The
Walker family was stealing secrets from the Navy, selling them
for ten years, until a disgruntled ex-wife phoned in and blew the
whistle on it. That doesn't sound like very good police work,
does it?
WEBSTER: Don't confuse counterintelligence work with
security precautions that definitely need improvement in all our
agencies. The Walker tip was a very important one. It was a tip
about one individual. A good investigation resulted in four
indictments.
I've gone back to 1980 and there've been 33 arrests, 25
convictions, and I can only find two or three that were just
off-the-wall tips. There were people whose business it was to
tell us. There were recruitments in place that we developed.
There were defectors that we utilized. There were electronic
surveillance and physical surveillance. All of the things that
are the tradecraft of counterintelligence.
I think we're doing a good job.
WILL: I'd like to ask you about the point that Pat
Moynihan raises -- and I know he's talked to you about it -- this
enormous invasion of American privacy by Soviets listening to
what? I guess telephone communication that goes through the air.
How does it work? They can't single out -- they can't
say, "I'm going to listen to Donaldson's conversation." Do they
key on key words and use their computer to sort it out?
BRINKLEY: Let me interrupt and clarify one point. Are
you talking about telephone conversations that are sent by
satellite?
WILL: Or microwave.
WEBSTER: Microwave.
WILL: Most long-distance calls don't go underground
through cables. They're in the air.
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WEBSTER: Modern technology permits you to really single
out and zero in on a specific telephone conversation,
particularly if you know the location and the person who is
sending it. They're very good at this. This technology is
available for everyone.
WILL: Did they buy it from us?
WEBSTER: I don't know if they buy it or they developed
it themselves or they stole it.
It's the kind of thing that our laws are behind the
times on. We just really haven't caught up with this. Microwave
interception probably violates -- does not violate our long-line
Title III interceptions because there are no wires involved.
WILL: Do they zero in on particular callers or
receivers of calls, or do they look for subject matter in a
conversation?
WEBSTER: Both. The computers are working wildly for
particular words, identifiers.
WILL: What if every American in every conversation
said, "MX missile"? Would it overload their computers? I mean
is that how it works?
WEBSTER: Let's try it sometime. I'd like to burn out a
few fuses.
[Laughter]
DONALDSON: The Vitaly Yurchenko case, the Soviet KGB
agent who defected to the United States and then went back to the
Soviet Union in early November. It's said that two or three of
the people who've been arrested and charged with espionage have
been arrested because of tips that he gave. Is that correct?
DONALDSON: Well, how much more is there? Are there
others you have to arrest?
WEBSTER: I can't put it in terms of arrests. But we
have opened a substantial number of cases based on very useful
information that he has supplied. Not only new cases, but we're
reviewing all the information that might reflect on other hopes
that were opened in prior years.
DONALDSON: All right. Does that suggest that Yurchenko
was in fact a valid defector who simply changed his mind? Or are
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these people so low-level that the Soviets may just have given it
to us as part of the dissemination of propaganda and
disinformation that he might have represented?
WEBSTER: Well, that analysis is ongoing, and I don't
think we should close our eyes to that possibility. But
certainly everything that I know about it is that it would be an
act of folly to have given up that kind of information simply to
have some embarrassment going on at the time of the summit. It's
been very useful.
DONALDSON: Judge Webster, we've had a number of
arguments made on this broadcast that perhaps spying by Israel
should not be in the same league as spying by the Soviet Union.
How does the Bureau attack these cases when you have a tip or you
have some information suggesting that there is spying? Is one
level on a higher level and another nation on a lower level?
WEBSTER: Well, necessarily, that's so. Those countries
that we know are hostile to us and present national security
interests get our full attention, with the resources, the limited
resources that we have. Those countries that are friendly to us
that occasionally get overzealous, when we become aware of those
activities, well, we take appropriate steps. We do not have the
resources to keep track of our friends in the same way.
DONALDSON: Well, then, what happened in the Pollard
case? Why did it become such a public issue?
WEBSTER: Well, one reason it became a public issue,
because the person who was actually charged is an American
citizen who was selling, charged with selling classified
information. It doesn't make any difference who he sells it to,
he has betrayed his country, if those allegations are proven in
court.
DONALDSON: Even if he sells it to Israel, one of our
closest friends and allies.
WEBSTER: Absolutely. We have regular channels for
dissemination of shared information, and that is not one of them.
DONALDSON: Well, upon conviction, should he receive the
same type of sentence, severe sentence, that someone who spied
for the Soviet Union might receive?
WEBSTER: Well, of course, he isn't convicted yet.
DONALDSON: That's right.
WEBSTER: And I shouldn't talk too much about him. But
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if we talk about any person who sells to one of our --
information to one of our friends, classified information, the
judge has to take into account the extent of the national
security violation and the damage to the national security.
WILL: When we talk about espionage, most Americans
think of it as one government taking the secrets of another
government. But, obviously, the Soviet Union, out in the
Silicon Valley and elsewhere, is interested in private-sector
secrets, industrial espionage. Is that 20 percent, 30 percent,
60 percent? What's the most important espionage being done? Is
it stealing government secrets or technology?
WEBSTER: Government secrets that relate to military
plans and preparations certainly would always be at the top of
the effort. But in the last few years, the Soviets, through the
KGB, through the GRU, through other political departments which
have access thorugh trade commissions and so on to our public
source material, have focused very heavily on our high
technology.
WILL: At the summit, the two sides agreed to open
consulates, one in Kiev and one in New York. Now, I gather we'll
send them diplomats and they'll send us at least a third spies,
if the ratio holds. Isn't that about what you maintain?
WEBSTER: I think that's a fair prediction.
WILL: And the President's agreed with Mr. Gorbachev to
have student exchanges. Are there going to be any spies among
the students, gray-faced, 60-year-old students coming over?
WEBSTER: I think that there will probably be that
effort. But I think the numbers that are involved there are
manageable, in the students. And I'm hoping that any...
WILL: But you're outgunned already.
WEBSTER: We are outgunned already. And I'm hoping that
any new initiatives will take into account that factor and be
charged against existing complements, if that's at all possible.
DONALDSON: Judge Webster, Friday night in Washington,
on Connecticut Avenue, there was a suspicious fire against the
offices of the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee. Are
you going to investigate that?
WEBSTER: The Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms is currently
investigating it because it falls clearly within their arson
responsibilities. If there's any indication of a terrorist
activity, we will get into it.
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DONALDSON: Well now, you have said, the Bureau has said
that the possible responsible group for two or three of these
attacks on the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee's
offices around the country, particularly the one in Santa Ana, in
which the director died, was the work, the possible work of the
Jewish Defense League. Do you still hold that view?
WEBSTER: Well, we don't want to make -- we want to say
that, to be absolutely clear, that there are similarities in the
modus operandi of certain incidents which were claimed on the
telephone by persons claiming it on behalf of the Jewish Defense
League.
I think we have to confine ourselves to where we are.
But certainly we are following this very closely and we have open
investigations on all of them.
BRINKLEY: Thank you very much....
BRINKLEY: Finally, one of these American spies sold the
Russians American military technology that cost us several
hundred million dollars, and they paid him 15,000 for it. For
them, one of the great bargains in history, about equal to buying
a Rolls-Royce at a yard sale for 75 cents.
Well, there are several reasons for these absurdly low
prices. First, that a spy peddling secrets can only deal with
one buyer, he can't auction them to the highest bidder, and he
can't advertise what he is selling.
Second, some of our spies are simply flat broke. One of
the accused, Ronald Pelton, said he was bankrupt, he had $6.80 in
cash, $8.00 in the bank, a $10.00 watch, five pairs of shoes, a
bowling ball and a razor, period. The Russians bailed him out,
apparently.
And third, the Russians are afraid of the Internal
Revenue Service, afraid if American spies began living too
lavishly and driving around in fancy cars, the IRS would ask
where they got the money. They think the IRS is more eagle-eyed
and more efficient than our counterintelligence agencies, and
they may be right.
The result? Hugely expensive American technology sold
to them for next to nothing.
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