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Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 12, 2004
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Publication Date: 
February 19, 1979
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PDF icon CIA-RDP88-01314R000100330001-8.pdf133.42 KB
Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP88-013 ~_ i. cLE A.EPEA:CED INQUIRY MAGAZINE ON YAGE f ? Z0 19 February 1979 A small group of Chilean ppropagand ran a sophisticated press cammaigy Now they are running the _ LL i portions of. a Senate report, several members of the current Chilean government worked directly for the CIA in the campaign to over- throw Salvador Allende. One of them, Chile's current foreign minister, Her- nAn Cubillos, was for several years a - "principal" agent of them. That rev' elation came in a closed hearing on October 23, 1978, in the trial of former rrr official Robert Berrellez. Berrellez was charged with having committed. perjury during hearings in 1973 of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee into attempts by rrr and the CIA to block the election of Salvador Allende as president of Chile. The leak was part of a defense effort to convince the Department of Justice to drop the case rather than risk further disclosures of "national security" information in court. - Berrellez was threatening to make public the fact-suppressed at the CIA's request from the Senate Intelli- gence Committee's report Covert Action in Chile 1965E-'1974--that 20 leading Chileans, many now in the govern- ment, had been members of a ciA-.. financed think tank, the Institute of General Studies. CIA funding for Ics- began in 1971 and continued after the coup-at least until 1974. Members of the ICs were not simply CIA contacts: They were CIA agents, a counterelite that the cm backed to replace the Al- lende government. After the coup, with the military primarily concerned with internal security, ICs members largely took over the administration of the country. The ICs has been de ibed b e of its U.S. contacts, :err official Harold Henrix, as "some propagandists work- ing again on radio and television"; and by its British contact, Robert Moss, .as "the nerve center of political oppo- sition to Marxism." The classified ver- sion of the Senate Intelligence Com- mittee's report on the CIA in Chile echoes Moss's assessment: "The Insti- tute of General Studies became the brain center of all groups opposed to Allende Government [sic]." The ICs organization grew out of 'a coordinated 1970 media campaign. against Allende's election. At the cen- ter of this effort were the top executives of Chile's leading newspaper, El Mer- curio, and of the magazines Portada and Que Pasa. This media campaign soon meshed with a CIA coup attempt code- named Track n, whose objective, ac- cording to a CIA cable, was to "[c]reate a coup climate by propaganda, dis- information, and terrorist activities in- tended to provoke: the left to give a .pretext for a coup." Luis Maira, a Christian Democratic party deputy, wrote of the ICs propaganda campaign to unseat Allende: "Their effort was based on a cynical belief that huge sums of money spent in a giant pub- licity apparatus could accomplish any- thing." Three years later Maira. was on the junta's "10 most wanted" list, and the ICs was running Chile. . .. But the coup did not succeed in 1970, because the opposition groups did not have the wi:il, the organization;'. or the technical know-how to pull one off. Allende won the election and many IGS members left Chile, apparently taken in by their own scare campaign against the leader of the Popular Unity faction. The director of `ICs, Pablo Baraona Urzua, fled to Paraguay; Cristian Zegers, who headed the CIA- funded Andalien ad agency, left for Venezuela; Enrique Campos Menen- dez settled in Madrid; Marcos Cha- mudes, editor of s'xc, ran across the border to.Mendoza, Argentina; and Carlos Urenda Zcgers, an attorney for El fercurio, went all the way toAustra- lia As the Senate Intelligence Cotn- mittee report observes, "When Al lende took office, little was left of the CIA-funded propaganda apparatus." UT THERE WERE A FEW intransigents, including CIA agent David Phillips, who re- fused to give up. Phillips took the mat- ter of Allende's victory personally. He had been recruited into the agency back in 1952 while working as ajour- nalist in Chile. Phillips's children were :.Chilean citizens. He had helped de- feat Allende three times already and was not about to throw in the towel, especially now that he was the CIA's director of covert operations for the Western hemisphere. Phillips had' long been close to El Mercurio publisher Agustin Edwards, a reliable friend of the CIA. Phillips's South Pacific Mail had been printed on the presses of El ll~.fercurio in Valpara- iso, before Phillips was able to buy his } own press and move the operation to Santiago. Phillips later sold the paper, to David Hellyer, a career CIA officer working under journalistic cover in j Chile for the Copley News Service. In Approvd For Release 2004/10/28 CIA-RDP88-01314R000100330001-8 r