HADDA BE PLAYING ON THE JUKEBOX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 1, 1979
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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7/9'11/76
,
The Magazine For People Who Need To Know
COUNTERSPY
,
Volume 3, Number 4 $2 April/May 1979
,
Hadda Be Playing on the Jukebox
Hadda be flashing like the Daily Double
Hadda be playing on TeeVee
Hadda be loudmouthed on the Comedy Hour
Hadda be announced over Loud Speakers
CIA & Mafia are in Cahoots
Hadda be said in old ladies' language
Hadda be said in American Headlines
Kennedy stretched & smiled & got doublecrossed
by low life goons & Agents
Rich bankers with Criminal Connections
Dope pushers in CIA working with dope pushers
from Cuba
working with Big Time syndicate Tampa Florida
Hadda be said with big mouth
Hadda be moaned over Factory foghorns
Hadda be chattered on Car Radio News Broadcast
Hadda be screamed in the kitchen
Hadda be yelled in the basement where uncles
were fighting
Hadda be Howled on the streets by Newsboys to
bus conductors
Hadda be foghorned in N.Y. Harbor
Hadda echo under hard hats
Hadda turn up the Volume in University ballrooms
Hadda be written in library books, footnoted
Hadda be in headlines'of the Times & Le Monde
Hadda be barked over TV
Hadda be heard in side alleys thru bar room doors
Hadda be played on Wire Services
Hadda be bells ringing, Comedians stopt dead in the
middle of a joke in Las Vegas
Hadda be FBI chief J. E. Hoover & Frank Costello
syndicate mouthpiece meeting in Central Park together
weekends in N.Y. reported posthumously Time
magazine
Hadda be the Mafia & CIA together
started War on Cuba Bay of Pigs & Poison assassination
headlines
Hadda be the Dope Cops & the Mafia
sold all that Heroin in America
Hadda be FBI & Organized Crime working together in
Cahoots "against the Commies"
let Lucky Luciano out of Jail take over Sicily
Mediterranean drug trade
Hadda be Corsican goons in Office Strategic Services'
Pay busted 1645 dock strikers in Marseilles, 'sixties port
trans-shipment,Indochina heroin
Hadda be ringing on Multinational Cashregisters
world-wide laundry for organized Criminal money
?
Hadda be CIA & Mafia & FBI together
bigger than Nixon, bigger than War.
Hjidda be a gorged throat full of murder
Hadda be mOuth and ass a solid mass of rage
a Red hot head, a scream in the back of the throat
Hadda be in Kissinger's brain
Hadda be in Rockefeller's mouth
Hadda be Central Intelligence The family "Our Thing" the.
Agency mafia organized Crime FBI Dope Cops
& Multinational Corporations
one, big set of Criminal gangs working together in Cahoots
Hit Men murderers eveotwhere outraged, on the make
Sedret drunk Brutai'Dirty Rich
on top of a Slag heap of prisonsl ndustrial? Cancer,
plutonium smog, garbaged cities, grandmas! bedsores,
Fathers' resentments
Hadda be the Rulers wanted Law & Order they got rich on
,k-"anted Protection status quo, wanted Junkies wanted y
Attica Wanted Kent State Wanted War in Indochina- -
Hadda be CIA & the Mafia & the FBI
Multinational Capitalist's Strong arms squads, "Private
ifetective Agencies for the very rich''
'd their Armies, Navies and Air Force bombing Planes,
Iladda be Capitalism the Vortex of this rage, this
cprnpetition man to man, horses heads in the Capo's bed,
turf & rumbles, hit men, gang wars across oceans,
bombing Cambodia settled the score when Soviet Pilots
manned Egyptian fighter planes
Chile's red democracy bumped off with White House pots
:..pans a warning to Mediterranean governments
Secret Police embraced for dedades, NKVD & CIA keep
*hother's secrets, OGPU & DIA never hit their own,
& FBI one mird?brute force
world-wide, and full of money
Hadda be rich, hadda be powerful, hadda hire technology
from Harvard
Hadda murder in Indonesia 500,000
Hadda murder in Indochina 2,000,060
Hadda murder in Czechoslovakia
Hadda murder in Chile
Hadda murder in Russia
Hadda murder in America
Copyright ?1978 by Alio), Ginsberg
Reprinted by Permission of CIT" LIGHTS BOOKS.
?Allen Ginsberg
INSIDE: CIA in Iran, Brazil, F.R.Germany, and Lebanese Right
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,
AN ALERT AND A PLEA
In April, 1976, the Board of Direc-
tor's of the American Friends Service
Committee stated unequivocally: "The
CIA and the Internal Security Division
of the' FBI must be abolished."
CounterSpy could not agree more.
Based on our combined research of
ten years and the stated mission of
the CIA, CounterSpy has come to the
unavoidable conclusion that the CIA is
as bad as, if not.worse, than the Na-
zis SS - which the CIA once embraced
- and has thus gone beyond the pale
of reform. and must be abolished.
Given the abysmal failure of all
U.S. governmental agencies, inclu-
ding the judiciary, to prevent CIA's
crimes, CounterSpy uses the main
instrument for deterring CIA crimes:
eiep-o-stife. 'Exposure not only of CIA
officers but also of anyone who fad i -
litates CIA missions. This is, be-
cause the latter constitute a functio-
ning-part of the total CIA; just as the
German academics of the SD - who
at Nuremberg defended their activi-
ties as separate from those of the
Gestapo - were found to be contri-
buting members of the total Gestapo.
Secondly, the CIA's collaborating
minions, particularly in foreign
countries, more often than not, do
the actual dirty work of assassina-
tion, torture, etc. Thus, based on
. these facts and the expressed con-
cerns of many people from other
countries, it is as (if not more) im-
portant to print the names of colla-
bcrators as it is the names of CIA
case officers.
2
In this respect, CounterSpy and its
spokespersons have never consciously
disseminated false or inaccurate in-
formation. Due to the criminal clan-
destinity of the CIA, CIA collaborators
have been mistaken for CIA officers.
Why this is a matter of great concern
is beyond us since logic, reinforced
by the Nuremberg decisions, indicates
that in terms of liability they cannot
be separated. Whether one is assassi-
nated by an officer, an agent, a con-
sultant, or contract employee: he or
she is still dead. Moreover, to name
only officers is to limit the protection
of the CIA's potential victims and to
contribute to the misbelief of non-
officers that they are somehow sepa-
rate from CIA crimes. Be that as it
may. CounterSpy in the interest of
non-divisiveness is happy to differen-
tiate between officers and non-officers
to be semantically exact.
As if the present CIA situation were
not bad enough, the straight press
has now stated, regarding the CIA's
new pending charter that: "What
started life as an administration code
to curb the misdeeds of the intelli-
gence agencies is evolving into a
license for wide ranging secret acti-
vity at home and abroad.... Among
other things, the agencies would be
allowed to infiltrate domestic politi-
cal and business organizations and
spy on law abiding Americans abroad."
(Washington Post, 3/31/79, p. A-2)
This is an emergency situation for
all Americans.
If ever there was a need for a
CounterSpy, it is right now. Counter-
Spy is not perfect. CounterSpy has
erred since it is human. CounterSpy
does, however, have an undeniable
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fulfilling a vital need. The latter is
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validated by the extent and intensity
on unconscionable attacks against
CounterSpy by the CIA and its apolo-
gists. For example, during the past
year the most scurrilous venom has
been directed at CounterSpy by:
Time magazine, The Washington
Star , which provides free space to
CIA mouthpiece, Cord Meyer; Con-
gressperson Larry McDonald whose
"data" in the Congressional Record
is from admitted informer and
agent provocateur, John Reeves; -
Ray Cline and William E. Colby
from the "whited sepulchre" of
Georgetown University - Colby even
from a church pulpit; and self-pro-
claimed practicing Christian, James
Jest's Angleton (to name a few). In
short, from their self-constructed
shroud of flag and cross, they have, .
and continue to wage full scale
psychological warfare against
CounterSpy which suggests we" are
doing s\Triething right.
? CounterSpy also believes it is
fulfilling a vital need based on the
national and international response
it has received. During 1978-79,
staff persons have spoken at the
annual conventions of the AAUG and
the U.S. Farmers Association; the
Society of Iranian Physicians in North
America; and the Universities of
Princeton (twice), Georgetown, Ame-
rican, Howard, Pace, and D.C.
Without exception, there was over-
Waelrning endorsement of our work
and pleas that we persevere.
CounterSpy is more than grateful
for these expressions of support and
the many persons who have written
to endorse us. We, however, are
only three delicate, sensitive human
beings and the psychological warfare
is wearing us down to the bone, parti-
cularly since we refuse to use CIA
such tactics dehumanize their users.
It is, thus, apparent to us that to
continue under the present condi-
tions will waste us, so.to speak, and
we shall be useless to the struggle.
CounterSpy will, therefore, cease
with this issue.
We shall resume only if individuals
and organizations come forth and
privately and publicly support Coun-
terSpy in its work against the CIA.
We shall take the initiative of con-
tacting individuals and organizations,
including political and religious
groups, churches, synagogues,
unions, as undry associations, etc.,
to solicit support. But three persons
can only do so much. Thus, we ask
our readers to write us ASAP and do
what they can to rally individuals
and organizations in their local
communities. As of this writing,
a national organization of proven
campaigners of the "good fight" has
come forth in support. But, we need
more and plea with urgency for it,
We should note here that Counter-
Spy is genuinely open to criticism
and reconsideration of all its policies
, and tactics including naming names.
'Together we can move mountains,
alone we can't move at all.
Konrad. Ege
Peter Gribbin
John Kelly
CONTENTS:
Brazil and CIA by Peter Gribbin Page 4
CIA In Iran by John Kelly ... . .... Page 24
U.S. Lebanese Right by Robin Rubin Page 37
FRG: Made In the U.S.A. by Konrad Ege Page 44
tactics, evAPIKQMedf@hgtopge DnnAki n/19: ?.? rih
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Brazil and
CIA
Peter Gribbin
In the rush to consolidate its role
as the new leader of the so-called
Free World, the U.S. government
saw as a major task the containment
of countries which, during the Second
World War, had begun to pursue an
independent course of development.
If and when change was to occur, it
was to be of a made-to-order vari-
ety, directed from Washington. To
this end, the establishment of power-
ful, .centralized police forces in Asia,
Africa, and especially Latin America
became a top priority.
The person the Eisenhower admin
istration charged with organizing a
task force ?n police training was By-
ron Engle. He was chosen because
of his experiences training Japanese
police after. WW II and setting up a
police advisory board in Turkey.
Funding for the new police program
supposedly came from the State De-
partment, even though Engle had been
with the CIA since 1947. This promp-
ted FBI head J. Edgar Hoover to com-
plain that the police program was
just one more CIA cover. 2
When the Kennedy administration
moved into Washington, Engle's pro-
gram took on new life. The cabinet-
level Counter-Intelligence (C-1) Group
was headed by Maxwell Taylor, a for-
mer general who was later named U. S.
Ambassador to South Viet Nam. The
C-I Group along with the CIA was res-
ponsible for creating the Special For-
ces (Green Berets); new training in
counter-insurgency at military schools
from the National War College on
down; and new dkppratiedalEctiiReltGaiseigft04/10/1
4
Service Institute, all designed to make
members of the State Department, the
CIA and the military branches know-
ledgeable in counter-inairgency tech-
niques. In addition, a special Com-
mittee on Police and Police Training
was set up under the direction of U.
Alexis Johnson, who has worked hand-
in-glove with the CIA throughout his
career. Johnson later became deputy
ambassador to South Viet Nam, but in
his present capacity he appointed Engle
as head of the new, expanded police
program. After all, hadn't Engle once
trained 100,000 Japanese police in only
two months ?3
In the Fall of 1961, just as Joao Gou-
lart was taking over the presidency, the
United States began an expanded influx
of CIA agents and AID officials into Bra-
zil. AID Public Safety advisers like
Dan Mitrione were responsible for "im-
proving" the Brazilian police forces.
Engle sent CIA officer Lauren J. (Jack)
Goin to Brazil under the cover of "ad-
viser in scientific investigations". Be-
fore coming to Brazil, Goin had set up
the first police advisory team in Indone-
sia which was instrumental in the CIA-
backed coup which culminated in the
documented killing of over three-hun-
dred thousand Indonesians. He had also
served with Engle when the first police
advisory team was created in Turke0
ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
The Goulart regime of 1961-1964
represented the "fundamental contradic-
tion between a government's responsi-
bility to the citizens who elected it, and
the obedience to the demands of foreign
creditors expressed in the IMF stabili-
zation programme. 115 A government
which refuses to make any gesture to--
ward meeting their conditions frequent-
ly finds its international credit for im-
ports cut off which, in turn, increases
the likelihood of a CIA-induced, right-
2 kAVIIIM,8-01314R000100350003-4
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A country in the throes of a balance
of payments crisis is usually unable to
obtain needed credit unless "significant
policy chenges are made" 6 For exam-
ple, new loans may be obtained only
through a change away from nationalist
economic policies toward measures fa-
voring foreign investment. As is being
increasingly borne out by other Third
World countries, Brazil's democra-
tic system at the start of the 1960's
proved unequal to the difficult chal-
lenge posed by the foreign exchange
constraint. Since Goulart was elec-
ted by a 'populist' coalition of voters
spanning class lines, the party sys-
tem itself discouraged strategies that
might put any significant group at a
disadvantage. In this atmosphere,
. the coup of '64 became a sine qua non
for new U.S. credit.
Previously, in 1958, President
Juscelino Ktibitschek had been forced
to come to an agreement with the In-.
tern.ational Monetary Fund on certain
stabilization measures in order to se-
cure a $300 million loan.7 (His prede-
cessor, Getulio Vargas, had commit-
ted suicide in 1954. Behind him he
left a document in which he blamed
outside forces for helping to create
the circumstances that drove him to
take his life: "'The foreign companies
made profits of up to five hundred per
cent. They demonstrably deprived
the state of more than a hundred mil-
lion dollars by false evaluations of
import goods. "8) But the president'
of the Bank of Brazil refused to go
along with. the. government's proposed
credit squeeze which would have caus-
ed a depression in the private sector.
After floundering around for the grea-
ter part of 1958, instituting half-way
measures unacceptable to the IMF,
Kubitschek broke off negotiations and
gave up hope for the American loan.
He managed to obtain the needed for-
eign credit by means of a short-term,
high-cost loan from private sources
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abroad. But his successor, Janio
Quadros, inherited a full-scale 'debt
repayment crisis that could no longer
be postpOned.
Quadros immediately came to terms
with the IMF and his foreign creditors.
He abolished the "exchange auctions"
which the Brazilian government, by
auctioning off its foreign exchange re-
serves to the highest bidder/importer,
had previously used as a source of rev-
enue. 9 Certain exchange controls (aub,
oldies) were established for "necessary"
imports, effecting a devaluation of the
Brazilian cruzeiro by fifty percent. The
IMF was still not satisfied, however,
and by July of 1961 it succeeded in for-
cing Quadros to abolish all exchange
controls and to peg all exchange trans-
actions at the (free) world market rate. 10
By meeting the imris demands, Quia-
dros was able to negotiate new credits
and reschedule payments due with his
U.S. and European creditors. Inflation
still raged, however, and when Quadros
limited credit (like Kubitschek before
him) he came up against strong political
cotmterpressures. Hoping to win pop-
ular support and a new mandate to lead
the country, Quadros resigned after on-
ly eight months in office.
Although some sources saw his res-
ignation as being forced upon him by the
CIA, Quadros had, in fact, been the U.S.
government's last hope for bringing their
brand of stability to Brazil within a dem-
ocratic framework. In th,e New York
Times of August 26, 1961, the mood of
the State Department was described as
"one of fear that the departure of Pres-
ident Quadros from Brazil's political
scene, if it is not reversed, would plunge
the country into serious political diffi-
culties threatening its stability and in-
terfering with the financial and econom-
ic stabilization programme."
Quadros' successor, Joao Goulart,
whose political strength rested on the
close ties he had fostered with the un-
ions while Minister of Labor under Var-
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gas, was to the left of the Brazilian pol-
itical spectrum. The real threat-- to
industrialists, the army and foreign in-
vestors-- was the likelihood that under
Goulart organized labor would become
the dominant political force in Brazil.11
If Quadros could not carry through his
stabilization program, there seemed
even less to hope for, in that respect,
from Goulart.
During Goulart's presidency, the
contradictions inherent in Brazil's
post-war development reached the
breaking point. Goulart had inherited
the accumulated problems of fifteen
years of inflation and foreign borrow-
ing which none of his predecessors
had successfully tackled. Brazil's
last effort at economic stabilization
within a democratic framework was
made in 1963. The Three-Year plan,
drawn up by Minister of Finance, San-
tiago Dantas, and Minister for Econo-
mic Planning, Celso Furtado, was
Made with one eye on the Brazilian
electorate and the other on the IMF.12
On the one hand, this plan prom-
ised to carry out tax and agrarian re-
forms while resuming a high rate of
growth. Simultaneously, however, it
sought to curb inflation which was a
precondition for receiving new credits
and/or deferral of payments due.. In
1963, this crushing debt repayment
burden threatened to eat up 45 percent
of Brazil's export earnings.13 When
the plan was presented to the IMF, the
latter wanted more stringent condit-
ions. These were: devaluation of the
cruzeiro; exchange reform which
meant abolishing subsidies on the im-
port of wheat and petroleum; and, re-
strictions on the budget deficit (which
translated into a cutback in govern-
ment services) and on wage increases.
These restrictions were designed to
contract the money supply and depress
the costs of goods and labor. Cheaper
goods and labor (at the expense of the
6
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workers) would make Brazilian prod-
ucts more competitive on the world
market. But the contradictory ele-
ments of the Three-Year Plan soon
exploded.
Brazil was able to head off immin-
ent disaster when the Agency for In-
ternational Development (AID) agreed
to release $400 million on the condi-
tion that the government stick to its
austerity program." The government's
program was doomed to failure, how-
ever, because of a proposed 70 per -
cent wage increase to government
employees - the military among them
- whose support was necessary if
Goulart was to stay in power. Caught
between a rock and a hard place,
Goulart gave in to the wage in-
crease and held off on the proposed
stabilization. The U.S. immediately
suspended its aid disbursements.
Goulart further exacerbated Ameri-
can hostility towards him when he
signed the Profit Remittance Law.15
This law, which infuriated foreign
investors, provided that profit
remittances could be calculated only
on the amount of capital originally
brought into the country, and not on
the (much larger) unremitted past
profits which had been reinvested iii
Brazil. U.S. distaste for Goulart
was expressed in the cutting-off of
aid to his government while at the
same time giving aid to certain
conservative state governors (Carlos
Lacerda in Guanabara and Adhernar
de Barros in Sao Paulo) with whom it
thought it could do business.
The final act of Goulart's futile
attempt to placate both foreign and
domestic interests was played out in
the first quarter of 1964. Early in
the year, Goulart held discussions
on yet another exchange reform and
rescheduling of Brazil's foreign
debt with a three-men team from the
IMF. But this attempt to come to
terms with his creditors fell through
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when, in a gesture towards the Left,
he announced the expropriation and
redistribution of' privately owned land
and the nationalization of private oil
refineries. Unfortunately, these
moves did more to mobilize the Right
than they did to gain support from the
Left. On April 1, 1964, the military
quickly deposed Goulart and installed
its own caretaker government.
The subsequent fifteen years have
shown that with the overthrow of Joao
Goulart, democracy in Brazil came to
a screeching halt. After a shaky
twenty years, basic political rights
were abandoned. Provisions of the
First .Institutional Act drawn up after
the coup created a cassacao, or poli-
tical death for ten years. These emer-
gency powers soon gave way to a
Second Institutional Act. The Fifth
Institutional Act shut down Congress,
suspended habeas corpus for political
activity, and gave full autocratic power
to the president. 16 Labor laws en-
acted after the coup rescinded virtually
all job-related rights: the right to
strike, to negotiate directly with the
employers instead of the state, and to
establish trade union representation
within factories. 17 The destruction of
democracy in Brazil was evidence of
the impossibility of serving two
masters. Goulart was never able to
reconcile the legitimate demands of
domestic pressure groups with the
external economic constraints of
Brazil's creditors. As a final ironic
twist, Goulart's refusal to succumb to
foreign pressures only served to
irritate undemocratic forces inside
Brazil to the point where they saw it
in their interest to get rid of demo-
cracy and Goulart in one fell swoop.
Imperialism's Internal Allies: Brazil's
National Enemies
In the fall of 1961, just as Joao
Goulart was assuming the presidency,
the United States began to make con-
tact with his right-wing opposition. At
the same time, the CIA began a multi-
faceted penetration of Brazilian so
ciety designed to influence that
country's internal politics. Lincobi
Gordon, U.S, Ambassador to Brazil,
was appointed the same day that
Goulart's predecessor, Janio Quadros
resigned. Soon after his arrival in
October, Gordon met with a right-wing
adx-nirat named Silvio Heck. Heck in.
formed Gordon of a poll of the armed
services which revealed that over two-
thirds of the enlisted men opposed Gou-
lart. Heck also hoped that when it came
time to oust Goulart "the U. Sr8 would
T
take an understanding view.' Although
Gordon later determine d that Heck's
figures were exaggerated, he never once
warned Goulart or his advisers of this
conspiracy.
The CIA, for its part, took more than
a passive interest in helping right-wing
military forces come to power in -Bra-
zil. The overthrow of Goulart and the de-
struction of democracy in Brazil was
effected through the manipulation of di-
verse social groups. Police, the mili -
tary, political parties, labor unions,
student federations and housewives's
associations were all exploited in the
interest of stirring up opposition to
Goulart. Yet, while Washington's
original intent may have been to replace
Goulart with the- strongman General
Castello Branco, the guaranty of the
coup's longterm success demanded an
increase in U.S. material and training
for the Brazilian security forces which
continues to this day.
The military coup took as its first
president Humberto Castello Branco, a
man who had a long and close relation-
ship with the United States military.
During the Allied invasion of Italy in
1945, a number of prominent Brazilian
ofAcers participating in the campaign
became exposed to American military
ideas and tactics.19 Castello Branco's
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roomate in Italy was a CIA-coup
engineer, then-Lieutenant Colonel
Vernon (Dick) Walters. In 1964,
Walters was the U.S. embassy's mili-
tary attache, and the man most closely
connected with -Brazil's military
leadership.
Since the end of World War II,
Washington had used its role as police-
man of the so-called Free World to
justify expanding its influence in the
Brazilian forces. Military planning
between the two countries was co-
ordinated by a Joint Brazil United
States Military Commission (.1BUSMC)6
In 1949, the Pentagon helped Brazil
set up and staff the Escola Superior
de Guerra (Advanced War College),
a carbon copy of the U.S. National
War College.
The Advanced War College is re-
sponsible for national security
studies, development of military
strategy, and ideas on nation building
- the last being taken from the Pen-.
tagon and the U.S. Army's ex-
perience in reconstructing postwar
Japan. 21 To this day, the college has
graduated over three thousand
civilians and military managers in-
doctrinated in a right-wing military
ideology and the belief that only the
armed forces can lead Brazil to its
proper destiny as the great power of
Latin America. 22
Another Brazilian army general
who was instrumental in the coup was
Golbery do Couto e Silva. Like
Castello Branco, Couto e Silva was
a member of Brazil's military elite
who became enamoured of U.S.
military thinking while a member of
the Allied expeditionary force in
Italy in 1945.2" The Brazilian army's
"Intellectual -gray emminence",
Couto e Silva was particularly in-
fluential in the formation of the Ad-
vanced War College, popularly known
as the "Brazilian Sorbonne". At one
point the head of Dow Chemical's
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8
Brazilian section, Couto e Silva
became head of Brazil's first
national intelligence service, the SNI
24
after the coup in 1964.
In the early 60's, the now-retired
General Couto e Silva became the
chief of staff at the Institute for Social
Research Studies (IPES, in Portuguese).
The leading inspiration at IPES was
Glycon de Paiva25, a mining engineer
from the state of Minas Gerais. To
avoid detection, IPES posed as an
educational organization that donated
money to reduce illiteracy among poor
children. IPES' real work, however,
was organizing opposition to Goulart
and maintaining dossiers on anyone de
Paiva considered an enemy.
Making the rounds of Brazil's major
industrialists, de Paiva was able to
appeal to their interests by translating
his visceral hatred of communism into a
simple message they could understand:
Goulart wants to take away from you that
which is yours. In this way, de Paiva
was able to drum up cigse to $20,000
a month in donations.
One immediate target of IPES'
anti-Goulart campaign were house-
wives who de Paiva recognized as being
receptive to warnings about the threat
that communism posed to the Bra-
zilian family and the values of society in
general. He set up women's societies
in all the major cities. In Rio de
Janeiro it was called the Women's Cam-
paign for Democracy (CAMDE)27.
During the week of the coup in March,
1964, IPES organized a huge march
against Goulart. In Sao Paulo 10,000
people joined a March of the Family
with God for Freedom. Sao Paulo women
presented a manifesto on behalf of
Christian democracy, while at the same
time the Archbishop of Sao Paulo for-
bade his bishops fro m participating in
the march because he said it had been
funded by the U.S. advertising agency,
McCann Erickson. 28
De Paiva's major concern, however,
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was the threat posed by Goulart's open-
ness towards the Left. In this respect,
Couto e Silva's role in keeping files at
IPES was twofold. On the one hand, he
put paid agents in the Brazilian mili-
tary to make sure that key men
throughout the services remained
loyal to the Brazilian "nation" and not
to Goulart. At the same time, IPES
placed Paid'informers in factories,
schools, and government offices to
report on supporters of Goulart. Petro-
bras, the state-owned oil company,
received special attention as de Paiva
was convinced that Goulart had many
supporters there. Before Couto e
Silva was finished, IPES had files on
400, 000 "enemies" of Brazil. 29
Another part of the CIA's effort to
create anti-Goulart sentiment in Bra-
zil was the rigging of elections.
Working through a front group
called the Instituto Brasileiro de
Acao Democratica (IBAD), the CIA
channeled money into local political
campaigns. IBAD, in turn, passed the
money through its two branches,
Democratic Popular Action3XADEP)
and Sales Promotion, Inc. u In the
1962 elections, IBAD not only funded
more than one thousand candidates
but recruited them so that their first
allegiance would be with IBAD and the
CIA. At every level, from state
deputies up to governorships, the
CIA stacked the ballots in favor of its
candidates.
In February, 1964, the CIA was
nearly "burned" b}.r a parliamentary
investigation into its violation of
election laws in 19'62. 31 The CIA had
spent close to '$20 million, but a
scandal was averted by three develop-
ments: five of the nine members of
investigating committee had them-
selves received CIA funds; three of
banks involved - First National City
Bank, the Bank of Chicago, and the
Royal Bank of Canada - refused to ?
money deposited in the IBAD and the
ADEP accounts; and lastly', Goulart,
still hoping to appease Washington,
saw to it that the final report was
laundered.
The CIA also manipulated certain
members of the student movement. The
benefits of having assets in the univer-
sities, however, were not realized until
after the overthrow of Goulart. Though
largely ineffectual before the coup, the
Grupo de Acao Patriotica (GAP) was
later used to spy on members of the
national student union (UNE). GAP was
founded by Aristoteles Luis Drummond
whose hero w as the right-wing Admiral
Silvio Heck. .2 During a radio talk show
he did in Rio deJaneiro, Drummond
expounded on GAP' s determined de-
fense of liberty and property, which he
claimed Only the military, could safe-
guard. Not surprisingly, the inter-
view was rebroadcast by the CIA's
Voice of America. Later on, the CIA
supplied Drummond with 50,000 books
specializing in Cold War pamphlets on
the communist menace and, more to
the point, diatribes against the UNE.
Still, GAP' s following was small and
whenever DrummOnd put up posters
saying "GAP with Heck", he made sure
it was in the dead of the night.
In the four years following the coup,
however, Drummond and GAP came
to play a key role in the new junta. For
example, during a student demonstra-
tion in May of 168, protesting the dis-
criminating cost of education, a mili-
tary jeep was overturned and set on fire.
The next morning, Drummond was
asked to speak about the incident with
President Costa e Silva. Boarding a
military aircraft, Drummond was flown
to Brasilia where he spent an hour with
the president identifying leaders of the
demonstration and assuring Costa e
Silva that they were communists who
did not r9resent the majority of
students.
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POLICE OPERATIONS
As oppositioh to the military junta
increased, control of the state
apparatus became synonymous with
increased surveillance, arrests, and
torture of those engaging in political
activity. In response, Couto e Silva,
the chief of staff at IPE, took his
hundreds of thousands of files to Bra-
silia to set up the first national in-
telligence service, the SNI. 34 As
with the 'creation of DINA in Chile,
Brazil's SNI was set up immediately
after a CIA-backed military coup.
Inevitable, the SNI turned to its more
powerful counterpart in the North.
In police barracks all over Brazil it
was common knowledge that many
officers took money from, and re-
ported directly to, the CIA stations.
In return, the CIA and the SNI began
to push the police for results. Hard-
pressed for incriminating evidence
on subversives, the police con-
cluded that nothing made a detainee
more ,willing to talk than a little tor-
ture. Besides, working closely with
the CIA opened one up to special
stores of equipment. Everything
from tear gas to field telephones
(used to administer electric shocks)
could be delivered immediately from
the Panama branch of the CIA's
Technical Services Division (TSD).
Requesting such material through nor
mal channels might take months.
Yet, the information on dissidents
in Couto e Silva's files was inconclu-
sive, and the processing of prisoners
was cumbersome. An alternative re-
source had to be found. The sense of
limitations on the part of the Bra-
zilian police soon gave rise to vigi-
lante groups which sought to appease
the fears of Brazil's new leaders
and their U.S. backers. One of the
men who acted on these concerns was
Henning Albert Boilesen, president
of a liquid
10
picion that Boilesen was in the pay of
the CIA grew when he began solici-
ting money from wealthy industria-
lists for a new organization called
Operacao Bandeirantes (OBAN)35.
OBAN united the various military and
police intelligence services into one
paramilitary organization which knew
no limits.
Esquadraos da Morte (Death Squads)
were not a new phenomenon in Brazil.
Before the coup they had been a source
of extra income for off-duty policemen.
If a thug needed a rival eliminated, he
could arrange for a member of a Death
Squad to get the job done. Despite
salary increases from the AID, six
years after the coup Death Squad exe-
cutions by off-duty police personnel
were still taking place. And now, a
new wrinkle had been added. The "Ten
for One" dictum meant that for every
killing of a Death Squad member, ten
people would die. When a Sao Paulo
police investigator was killed in 1970,
nearly twenty people were executed by
the police. 36
U.S. AID officials knew of and
supported police participation in Death
Squads. In Uruguay, a CIA operations
officer, William Cantrell, used the
cover of an AID Public Safety Advisor
to help set up the Department of Infor-
mation and Intelligence (DLI)37. Cant
relies chauffeur, Nelson Bardesio was
himself a member of the Death Squad in
Montevideo. Under interrogation by
Tupamaro guerillas in 1972, Bardesio
testified that the DII served as a cover
for the Death Squad. Bardesio's testi-
mony further revealed that a Bra-
zilian diplomat offered to set up radio
communications between Brazilia and
Montevideo. Uruguayan intelligence
officials, claimed Bardesio, received
Death Squad-type training in Brazil.
The living link between the two
countries' Death Squads is Sergio
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police in Brazil. A leader in the elimi-
nation of the Brazilian Left, Fleury has
been identified by hundreds of political
prisoners as the man who supervised
their torture. 38 Through his work in
the Death Squads, Fleury's infamy
has spread from Sao Paulo to all of
Brazil and on to Uruguay. On at
least two occasions, he met with groups
of Uruguayan police through CIA con-
tacts.-9
The systematic use of torture was
also condoned if not encouraged by
U.S. AID officials. Poliee in Brazil
once speculated on what the Public
Safety Advisor Dan Mitrione would do
if he were witness to the torturing of a
prisoner. One said he would leave.
Another asked, "Where, the country ?"
"No", said the first; "leave the
room. ,,40 To this day-, the U.S. Public
Safety Program in Brazil has assisted
in the training of over 100,000 federal
and state police personnel. Moreover,
600 high-ranking officers have .re-
ceived training at the now-defunct
International Police Academy (IPA) on
the campus of Geugetown University in
Washington,D.1C. The United States is
also responsible for the construction,
equipping, and development of the curri-
culum and faculty of Brazil's National
Police Academy, its National Tele-
communications Center, and the Natio-
nal Institute of Criminalistics and Iden-
tification. 42
In the actual torturing of prisoners,
the military and civilian police worked
hand in hand. It was a common prac-
tice for prisoners to be taken from a
prison run by the civilian police tq one
run by a branch of the military and
then back again to a facility run by the
police. CENIMAR, the navy's intelli-
gence section, had its main prison and
and torture center in the'basement of
the Ministry of the Navy, near the
docks of the harbor in Rio de Janeiro.
U.S. Navy officers based at the naval
mission often heard screams from
across the courtyard. But none of them
- not even mission commander, Rear
Admiral C. Thor Hanson - ever raised
the matter with their hosts.43
From the CENIMAR facility, priso-
ners were shipped across Guanabara
Bay by motor launch to a prison on the
Isle of Flowers. Inside the low white
buildings were interrogators who specia-
lized in torture. The staff there was
made up of members of the Department
of Political and Social Order (DOPS).
The island's commander was Clemente
Jose Monteiro Filho, a graduate of the
School of the Americas (commonly re-
ferred to as the escuela de golpes , the
school of coups) at Fort Gulick in the
44
Panama Canal Zone. The leader of
interrogation and torture was Alfredo
Poeck, a navy commander who had taken
a three month course at the Special
Warfare School at Fort Bragg in. 1961.45
A common torture routine consisted
of a preliminary beating by a flat wooden
paddle with holes drilled through it
called a palmatoria. This would be
followed by a more concentrated appli-
cation of electric wires to the genitals
designed to elicit information from the
victim. If this method failed, the priso-
ner was subjected to another, round with
the palrnatoria ? often for six hours at
a time. 46 Today, Brazil's terror tech-
nology has advanc ed beyond the electric
prod and the wooden paddle. Testimony
from political prisoners verified by the
Brazilian College of Lawyers lists
among the newest inventions a refrige-
rated cubicle called a geladeira . Nude
prisoners are boxed in the geladeira for
several days at a time, receiving fre-
quent dousing of ice-cold water. All
the time, loudspeakers emit deafening
sounds. One prisoner described this
as a "machine to drive people crazyl.'47
The graduates of CIA-connected
police programs in the U.S. are an un-
deniable concern to the Brazilian
people. CounterSpy, speaking to this
concern, is presenting the names of
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these graduates during the 1961-64
periods. The entire list of Brazilian
graduates of CIA- connected police
programs is available on request.
ABREU, Antonio Candido (in U. S. from
4/15/63-7/15/63); AFFONSO, Leonel
Archanjo (4/15/63-7/15/63); AL1VIEI-
DA, Eudes Batista (7/15/63-10/15/63);
ALMEIDA, Jose Tabosa (4/15/63-7/
15/63); ANDRADE, Neylor Vasconcel-
los (4/15/63-7/15/63); ARAUJO, Tani-
bio Delivalle y (4/15/63-7/15/63);
ARAUJO, Jose Eduardo (7/15/63-10/15/
63); ARNAUT, Vilmar Leal (7/15/63-
10/15/63); BARBOSA, Joaquim (4/15/63
-7/15/63); BOFFA, Carlos Alberto (7/
15/63-10/15/63); BRANDAO, Raul (4/151
63-7/15/63); COSTA, Jose Luiz (7/15/63
-10/15/63); DA COSTA, Ismar Concal-
ves (1/15/63-4/15/63); DANTAS, Walter
(1/15/63-4/15/63); DE ABREU, Eudes
Coutinho (1/15 /63-4/15/63); DE ALMA-
DA, Antonio Soares (4/15/63-7/15/63;
DE ARRUDA, Firmiand Pacheco (015/
63-4/15/63); FERNANDES, Antonio (7/
15/63-10/15/63);FERNANDES, Oezer
Carvalho (1/15/63-2/15/63); FERREIRA,
Rubens Jose (7/15/63-10/15/63); FIR-
MO SERENO, Joao (4/15/63-7/15/63);
HOSTIN, Jose Mario (4/15/63-7/15/63);
LAGE, Raimundo Valerio Dias (7/15/63
-10/15/63); MAFRA, Heitor Martins
(7/15/63-10/15/63); NASCIMENTO, Ri-
cardo Frazao do (4/15/63-7/15/63);
NOGUEIRA, Hever da Silva (1/15/63- 2/
15/63); OLIVEIRA, Alceu Drummond
(7/15/63-10/15/63); PEREIRA, Paulo
Fernandes (1/15/63-4/15/63); RIBEI-
RO, Arlindo Bento (7/15/63-10/15/63);'
ROSA, Helio Pestana (1/15/63-4/15/63k
SARAIVA, Iaci Cruz (1/15/63-2/15/63);
SILVA, Paulo Souza da (4/15/63-7/15/
63); SILVA, Wilson Games da (7/15/63
-10/15/63); SILVEIRA FILHO, Paulo
Agemiro da (7/15/63-10/15/63); SOUSA
Saulo Nunes (4/15/63-7/15/63);SOUZA
Dilson de Almeida (1/15/63-4/15/63);
TEIXEIRA, Dioran (7/1-5/63-10/15/63);
12
LABOR OPERATIONS
In this final section we will examine
how CIA's subversion of Brazilian labor
leaders and other trade union officials
helped to topple Goulart. As such, we
are making available to the people of
Brazil the names of those persons who
participated in special training sessions
in the U.S. from 1961-1964. These
courses were run by the American Insti-
tute for Free Labor Development (A1FLD)
which, according to Philip Agee is a
"CIA controlled labor center financed
through AID"48. Before going into the
names, however, it is important to
trace the history-of U.S. labor's
cahoots with American foreign policy in
Latin America,
Since the middle of the 1950's, the
American Federation of Labor and the
Congress of Industrial Organizations -
once they had merged to become the
AFL-CIO - have taken on an increasingly
active role in the implementation of
American foreign policy. When the
International Confederations of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU) was established
as an anti-communist rival to the
World Federation of Free Trade Unions
(WFTU), the "Free World" acknow-
ledged that Latin America would become
the exclusive domain of the AFL-CIO in
its Cold War counter-offensive against
its perceived nemesis, Soviet Expan-
sionism. 49
ICFTU's affiliate in the Western
hemisphere was the Inter-American
Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT).
In both ideology and practice, ORIT
mirrored the AFL-CIO which both funds
and profits from its little sister to the
South. ?RIVE "prime goal is to fight
Communism and to promote 'democratic
trade-unionism'. It preaches reform
within the existing capitalist system,
denying the existence of class antago-
nism.... ORIT points to the U.S. as an
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can heap upon the working class and
orgfi.nized labor. "50 The principle
sources of ORIT's funding has been the
AFL-CIO, ICFTU's International
Solidarity Fund, and other U.S. agen-
cies. In 1961, its annual budget
amounted to $125,000, exclusive the
grants. 51 The CIA has exercised con-
siderable control over ORIT. In the
early 60's, Morris Paladin? was ORITs
Director of Education, Director of
Organization and Assistant Secretary
General. At the same time, Paladin?
was also the CIA's principal agent
in ORIT, working out of the CIA's
International Organizations (I0) Divi-
sion in Mexico City. 52
Another creature of the AFL-CIO's
work in the international arena is the
American Institute for Free Labor?
Development (AIFLD). Inaugurated
in 1962, AIFLD's board of directors
testifies to the commonality of inter-
ests shared by the CIA and America's
industrial and labor elite. AIFLD' s
executive director until 1 966 was
Serafino Romualdi, former Inter-
American representative for the AFL-
CIO. Other board members include
AFL-CIO chief George Meany; Joseph
Beirne, head l of the Communication
Workers of America and a collaborator
in CIA labor operations through the
Post, Telegraph and Telephone Wor-
kers International (PTTI);" J. Peter
Grace, an ex-President and present
Chairman of the Board of AIFLD,
and head of the W. R. Grace Company?
which has extensive interests in Latin
America. Other business leaders
who hold or have held executive posi-
tions include Charles Brincker-
hoof, chairman of the board of the
Anaconda Company; William M.
Hickey, president of the United Cor-
poration; Robert C. Hill, director,
Merck and Company; Juan C. Trippe,
chairman of the board, Pan American
World Airways; I-fenry S. Wood-
bridge, chairman of the board, Tru-
Temper Copper Corporation.53 A
new member of AIFLD's board of
directors was Nelson Rockefeller
who joined shortly before his death.
Aside from this illustrious crew,
executives rounding out AIFLD's
leadership come from Gulf Oil Inter-
national, Johnson and Johnson Inter-
national, Owens -Illinois, and mem.-
hers of the Institute of International
Education and the Fund for Interna-
tional Social and Economic Education,
both recipients of funding from CIA
fronts. 54
The extent to which AIFLD is under
the aegis of the CIA is indicated by
?the fact that Serafino Romualdi, while
at AIFLD, was still an agent of the
CIA's Interna,tional Organizations (IC))
Division. Through the 10 Division,
Romualdi and William Doherty - for-
mer Inter-American Representative
of the Post, Telegraph amid Tele-
phone Workers International (PTTI)
and now AIFLD's Social Projects
Director- exercised day-to-day cont-
rol of AIFLD for the CIA. 55
Unlike ()Ruts out-front role in pro-
/noting pro-Western trade unionism,
AIFLD is dedicated to nstren.gthening
the democratic labor sector in terms
of technical assistance and social
projects ... primarily in the areas of
education and training, manpower
studies, cooperatives and housing."56
William Doherty is less equivocal
when he points out that AIFLD is an
example of the desirability of coopera-
tion between employers and workers.
He thus emphasizes AIFLD's main
goal: to dispel the hostility of Latin
American workers toward U.S. cor-
porations. 57
A less optimistic but more realistic
appraisal of AIFLD's role is given by
Philip Agee in his book, Inside the
Company. Speaking of its creation in
1962, he states that AIFLD is "Washing-
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ton's answer to the limitations of
current labour programmes undertaken
through AID as well as through ORIT
and CIA stations." The problem' says
Agee, was "how to accelerate expan-
sion of labour organizing activities in
Latin Ameri ca in order to deny workers
to labour unions dominated by the ex-
treme left and to reverse communist
58
and Castroite penetration.
"AID programmes',' says Agee, "are
limited because of their direct depen-
dence on the U.S. government... ORIT
programmes are limited because its
affiliates are weak or non-existent in
some countries... The CIA station pro-
grammes are limited by personnel
problems, but more so by the limits
on the amount of money that can be
channeled covertly through the stations
and through international organizations
like ORIT and ICFTU. "59
Under the official cover of 'adult
education', AIFLD sets up social pro-
jects such as workers' housing, credit
unions and cooperatives. AIFLD's
major task, however, is similar to
ORIT's in that it seeks to organize anti-
communist labor unions in Latin Ameri-
ca. To this end, AIFLD set up training
institutes which would carry on the
teaching of courses presently being
given by AIFLD members. And although
administrate control of the training
institutes in Washington would be by
AIFLD, it was hoped that the institutes
themselves would be headed by a sala
ried CIA agents under operational
60
control of the local CIA station.
A logical outcome of AIFLD's ob-
session with anti-communism was the
direct participation of its trainees in
the overthrow of Joao Goulart . Even be-
fore Goulart came to power, AFL-CIO
leaders were critical of growing
communist strength in both the labor
movement and in Juscelino Kubit-
schek's government. In 1956,
Romualdi, along with labor attache
Irving Salert and U.S. Ambassador
14
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James C. Dunn, arranged to have
Brazilian labor leaders visit the U.S.
AIFLD's goal was the "development
of a core of labor leaders who, by
commanding the enthusiastic support
of the rank and file, could turn back '
Communist attempts to capture the
Brazilian labor movement. "61
The 1960 elections saw Janio
Quadros elected president and Gou-
lart vice-president. During this
time, Romualdi began to court Carlos
Lacerda, the right-wing governor of
Guanabara, the capital of which is
Rio de Janeiro. When Quadros
attempted to halt Brazil's raging in-
flation by limiting the supply of
credit, pressure against him moun-
ted. In August of '61, after only
eight months in office, Quadros un-
expectedly resigned. By doing this, he
hoped to rally the nation behind him
and thus give himself new popular
support. But Lacerda, acting on the
advice of Romualdi, saw to it that
the expected communist call for a
general strike would be defeated.
Speaking to the opening session of the
ORIT Convention being held in Rio,
Lacerda said he would resign in
order to lead "from the streets" the
fight against Quadros.62'During
the convention, Romualdi and AFL-
CIO Secretary-Treasurer William F.
Schnitzler pressured the labor
leaders into boycotting the proposed
strike. 63
When the call for a general strike
was issued on August 26, the Mari-
time Workers, the Centr.1 Committee
of the Railway Unions and the Trade
Union Committee for the Defense of
Democracy representing over four
million workers prevented their mem-
bers from honoring the strike, thus
causing its failure. 64
When news of ORIT's complicity
with Lacerda's anti-government plans
became known, Quadros' Minister of
Labor threatened to outlaw ORIT in
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Brazil. Only Quadros' resignation65
kept him from issuing the decree.
ORIT's relations with Qu.adros'
successor were even worse. Early
in 1962, an ORIT delegation headed by
General Secretary Arturo Jauregui,
Mexican Senator Manuel Pavon and
Romu'aldi went to Brasilia to confer
with Goulart. After waiting the whole
day to speak with the president, the
delegation left without even having had
a chance to see Goulart. When Gou-
lart came to New 'nrk later in the
year, he innocently asked the AIFLD
director," My dear Rornualdi, when
are you coming to visit me in Brasi -
Ha ?1,66
Goulart's popularity steadily de-
clined as inflation ate away the wages
of Brazilian workers. Between 1958
and 1963, the cost of living in-
creased by over 600 percent. 67 To
counter the combined criticism of in-
dustry, commerce, the military and
the Church, Goulart began to take his
case to the workers and oppressed
people of Brazil's countryside. But
Rornualdi and his allies had other
plans.
To undermine Goulart's support
in organized labor, ORIT, AIFLD,
and the American embassy worked to
break up the left-dominated CGT
(General Workers Command), the
nation's largest progressive labor
organization. Their efforts culminated
at the Third National Labor Congress
Of 1962. U.S. labor specialist flown
in especially for the occasion plotted
strategy for the ''democratic" trade
union leaders. They convinced this
minority bloc to pull out of the
gathering, thus undermining the CGT's
efforts to unify labor.
Meanwhile, the Movimento Demo-
cratic? Sindical (MDS), under its
motto "God, private property and
free enterprise", received AIFLD
aid and advice in sponsaring meetings
and setting woo trade-unioxcourse_a.
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In addition, the Instituto Cultural do
Trabalho (ICT)-- AIFLD's local
affiliate partially financed by U.S.
butsiness concerns -- trained labor
personnel and disseminated anti-
communist propaganda. In response
to growing radical peasant movements
in the rural Northeast, AIFLD
initiated a:series of training and aid
programs for reformist groups and
leaders. 68
The close ties between AIFLD and
the CIA went beyond the use of AIFLD
trainees in CIA-sponsored coups. It is
the CIA's desire to continue its pene-
tration of labor unions as a means of
silencing one of the main foci of
opposition to the U.S. presence in
Latin America. In Brazil, the CIA
channeled $30,000 to the International
Federation of Petroleum and Chemical
Workers (IFPCW) through its conduit
the Andrew Hamilton Foundation. 69It
was AIFLD's plan to get the IFPCW to
affiliate with its anti-communist IFI-CW
counterpart in North America.'
As a measure of the success of its
payoff, sixteen major petroleum
uniOns in Brazil failed to unite in a
National Federation of Petroleum Wor-
kers which the CIA opposed. AIFLD
was able to get these unions to align
with the conservative IFPCW by
awarding financial aid to unions taking
such a course. At one point, the
IFPCW representative in Brazil, Al-
berto Ramos, wrote to one A. Noguria,
"I have with me 45 million cruzeiros
(almost $17,000) for you to distribute
to the unions for campaigns in accor-
dance with our plans." An itemized
payoff sheet attached to the note listed
the following recipients; $875.00 to Dr.
Jorge Filho of the Ministry of Labor; a
bonus of $312,50 to a reporter for
favorable newspaper coverage; and
$140.63 to two labor leaders for helping
the IFPCW defeat an opposition candi-
date for union office. However, because
Clk-h&fie-Or1SI2168M3g480Y-TCW
was
?15
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
forced to end its Brazilian organizing
70
efforts.
In the fall of '63, Romualdi and
AIFLD vice-president Berent Friele --
"an old Brazilian hand belonging to the
Rockefeller entourage"-- met with one
of Goulart's chief opponents, Aclhemar
de Barros, governor of Sao Paulo. 71 De
Barros told the two men of plans al-
ready under way to mobilize police and
military contingents against Goulart.
When he complained that the U.S. Em-
bassy was not listening, Romualdi
wrote to the embassy's labor attache,
John Fishburn, "The Embassy's re-
action, says Ro ualdi, was, of course,
noncommittal."
Even before hiss pleas to the embassy
fell on deaf ears, Romualdi had decided
that "a substantial sector of labor's
rank and file were fed up with the Goulart
regime. "73 Starting in 1963, AIFLD
"trained in Washington a special all-
Brazilian class of thirty-three partici-
pants. "74 After travelling to Western
Europe and Israel with Romualdi, they
returned to Brazil. Upon arrival, some
went to the countryside to organize and
conduct seminars. Others went to Rio,
Sao Paulo and various industrial centers.
Here then are the names of those per-
sons who participated in CIA -directed
labor training courses in the U.S. from
1961-1964.
ABATE, Hugo (in U.S. from 9/15/61-
12/15/61); ABBUD, Jose (7/15/6'-
9/15/61); ABRITA, Antonio (8/15/63-
10/15/63); ABRITTA, Ernane Souza
(8/15/61-11/15/61); ALMEIDA, Gilson
Dias de (6/15/63-9/15/63); A LiviEIDA,
Jose Gomes de* (1/15/63-3/15/63);
AMANTE, Francisco Hegidio (7(15/
61-9/1.5/61); ARAUJO, Paulo Hen-
rique (1/15/63-3/15/63); BARBOSA,
Jose Sebastiao (7/15/63-9/15/63);
BARBOSA, Onofre Martins (8/15/62-
10/15/62); BARETA, Nelson (7/15/63
-10/15/63); BARRET?, Benjamin
Bittencourt (9/15/61-12/15/61);
BARRET?, Vincente de Paulo (5/15/
63-7/15/63); BARROS, Luiz Capito-
lino (7/15/63-10/15/63); BASTOS,
Carlindo Martins (1/15/63-3/15/63);
BASTOS, Thodiano Conceigao da
Silva * (1/15/63-3/15/63); BAYER,
Wilfredo Marcos (9/15/61-12/15/61);
BOTTEGA, Abilio (6/15/62-9/15/62
BRAGA, Nelson (5/15/63-7/15/63);
BRANCO, Aparicio de Cerqueira
(7/15/62-10/15/62); BRANCO, Eliseu
Castelo *(1/15/63-3/15/63); BRA-
SIEL, Wanderly Pimenta * (1/15/63-
3/15/63); BUSSE, Ralf (8/15/62-10/
15/62); CARVALHO, Antonio Nelson
(10/15/62-1Z/15/62); CARVALHO,
Aureo * (1/15/63-3/15/63); CASTAN-
HEIR A, Bento * (1/15/63-3/15/63);
CERQUEIRA, Jose de Arimateira
(7/15/61-9/15/61); CESAR, Jose
Oliveira (8/15/61-11/15/61); CON-
TESINO, Erico Antonio (7/15/61-
9/15/61); COR,REA, Jose Benedict?
(7/15/63-10/1'5/63); COSTA, Fortu-
nato Batista de (6/15/63-9/15/63);
COSTA, Jose Alives da (7/15/63-
10/15/63);
CROCETTI, Mario Domingos *
(1/15/63-3/15/63); CRUZ, Serafim
Ferreira da (11/15/60-12/15/60);
CUNHA, Euclides Veriato da (7/15/
63-10/15/63); CUNHA, Joao Manoel
(7/15/63-10/15/63); DA SILVA, Ped-
ro Guedes (7/15/60-10/15/60);
DANTAS, Antonio Cavalcanti (6/15/63-
9/15/63); DE SILVA, Manoel Francisco
(11/15/60-12/15/60); DIAS, Irineu Fran-
cisco (4/15/61-7/15/61); DIMBARRE,
Alfredo (7/15/63-10/15/63); DIOGO, Nel-
son (6/15/63-9/15/63); FARACO DE
MORIAS, Hermenegildo (8/15/61-10/15/
61); FARIA, Gerald? Pio de * (1/15/63-
3/15/63); FERREIRA, Alcides *(l/
15/63-3/15/63); FERREIRA, Jose Felix
(10/15/63-12/15/63); FERREIRA, Sonia
Apparecida (5/15/63-11/15/63); FLO-
RENTINO, Primo Bert? (10/15/63-12/
15/63); FONSECA FILHO, Tristao Perei-
ra da (6/15/62-9/15/62); FONSECA, Val-
denor Flores da (7/15/63-10/15/63);
16 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
FRANCISCO, Alvise (1/15/63-3/15/
63); FREITAS, Jose Reis (10/15/63-12/
15/63); GEVAERD, Cezlos Jose * (1/15/
63-3/15/63); GIL, Waldomiro (8/15/62-
10/15/62); GIRO, Guilherme (6/15/62-
9/15/62); GOMES, Silvio (10/15/62-12/
15/62); GOMES, Vicente de Paula (10/
15/63-12/15/63); GONCALVES, Darci
Manoel (6/15/63-9/15/63); GONCALVES,
Osmar, H. (7/15/61-9/15/61); GUIMA-
RAES, Benedicto Luiz (8/15/61-11/15/
61); HAUK, Helmuth (8/15/63-10/15/63);
HELFENSTREIN, Werno (8/15/61-10/15/
61); LEITE, Antonio Pereira (7/15/63-
10/15/63); LEITE, Florian? Gomes (8/
.15/61-10/15/61); LENZI, Carlos Alberto
Silveira (5/15/63-7/15/63); LIMA, Jose
Bezerra de *(1/15/63-3/15/63); LIMA,
Manoel Barbosa (6/15/62-9/15/62);
LIRANI, Julio (8/15/61-10/15/61);
LUIZ, Jose Martinho (9/15/61-12/15/
61); MACHADO, FILHO, Antonio Rodri-
guez (8/15/63_40/15/63); MAGNANI,
Fabio (8/15/63-10/15/63); MALUF, Ed-
mund? Amin* (1/15/63-3/15/63); MAN-
ZONI , Antenor (7/15/63-10/15/63);
MARCASSA, Joao * (1/15/63-3/15/63);
MARINHO,.Dorniniciano de Sousa (6/15/
62-9/15/62); MARQUES, Ivo I3ento
(1/15/63-3/15/63); MELLO Jr., Theo-
dore Narciso (5/15/63-7/15/63); MELLO,
Jose Gabriel de (8/15/61-10/15/61);
MOREIRA, Joao Balbino Goncalves
(6/15/62-9/15/62); MOREIRA, Pedro
Martins (8/15/61-10/15/61); MUELLER,
Cezar Francisco (9/15/61-12/15/61);
NASCIlvIENTO, Luiz (8/15/6L-3/15/61)
NASCIMENTO, Zozirno Gomes * (1/
15/63-3/15/63); NASCIMERTO, Djal-
ma Paiva do 4(1/15/63-3/15/63); NE-
VES, Jose Ferreira (8/15/61-11/15/
61) ;
NINA, Celso Afonso (8/15/63-10/
15/63); NOGUEIRA, Paulo * (1/15/63
-3 /15/63); OLIVEIRA, Deodato (7/
15/61-9/15/61); OLIVEIRA, Edward
Xirnenes de (8/15/61-11/15/61); OLI-
VEIRA, ' Elieser da Si1va:(1/15/63-
3/15/63); OLIVEIRA, Jose Luiz de
de * (1/15/63-3/15/63); OLIVEIRA,
Vbirajara Ferreira de (7/15/63-
10/15/63); PAIVA, Carlos de * (1/15/
63-3/15/63); PAIYAO, Miguel Santos
de (1/15/61-4/15/61); PAULA, Eli-
son Galdino de * (1/15/63-3/15/63);
PEREIR,A, Antenor (7/15/63-10/15/
63); PEREIRA? Vitalino Alexandre
(10/15/63-12/15/63); PINTO, Ger-
ald() Servulo (10/15/62-12/15/62);
PRIESS, Carlos Fernando (9/15/61-
12/15/61); PROVENSI, Mario Jose
(8/15/61-10/15/61); QUEIROZ, Mar-
tinho Martins (7/15/61-11/15/61);
REGO, ?radio Moraes (8/15/63-10/
15/63);
REIMER, Getulio (8/15/62-10/15/
62); REINALDO, Bernardino da Silva
(7/15/63-10/15/63); REIS, Leopoldo
Miguel Dos (7/15/61-9/15/61); RE-
ZENDE, Osvaldo Gomes (8/15/62-
10/15/62); RIBEIRO, Adair (7/15/61
-9/15/61); RIBEIRO, Nelio de Car-
valho (8/15/63-10/15/63); RIBEIRO,
Vbaldino Fontoura * (1/15/63-3/15/
63); ROCHA, Hildebrand? Pinheiro
(6/15/63-9/15/63); ROQUE NETTO,
Sebastiao Jose (8/15/61-10/15/61);
SANTOS, Etavaldo Dantas dos (6/15/
63-9/15/63); SANTOS, Reinaldo dos
(9/15/61-12/15/61); SCOZ, Elzide
(10/15/63-12/15/63); SILVA SOB-
RINHO, Jose Domingues (8/15/62-
10/15/62); SILVA, Alvimar Macedo
(9/15/61-12/15/61); SILVA, Avelino
da (8/15/61-10/15/61); SILVA, Edir
Inacio da (10/15/62-12/15/62); SIL-
VA, Francisco Narciso da (9/15/61
-12/15/61); SILVA, Helio Jose Nunes da
(6/15/63-9/15/63);
SILVA, Horacio Arantes (6/15/62-9/
15/62); SILVA, Humberto Ferreira
(9/15/61-12/15/61); SILVA, Ivan (6/
15/63-9/15/63); SILVA, Joao Baptista
Raimundo da (7/15/61-9/15/61); SILVA,
Julio Trajano da*(1/15/63-3/15/63);
SILVA, Paulo da Cruz (7/15/63-10/15/
63); SILVA, Waldomiro Luiz da (9/15/
. 61-12/15/61); SILVEIRA, Jose Ber-
nardino da (8/15/61-11/15/61); SILVEI-
(7/15/63-10/kWroilved4Wifeiikease f?Gd4110/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
17
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
RA Jr., Norberto Candido (9/15/61-12/
15/61); SOUSA BARBOSA, Onessimo de
(10/15/63-12/15/63); SOUTO, Carlos
Ferreira (7/15/61-9/15/61); SOUZA,
Adelino Rodrigues de (6115/62-9/15/62);
TORREKO DA COSTA, Carlos Coqueijo
(3/15/62-5/15/62); VIANNA, Gilberto
Luiz (7/15/63-10/15/63); WAIDT, Nilo
(8/15/61-10/15/61);
( * designates participation in AIFLD
training session in Washington, DC in
the first three months of 1963.)
The role of AIFLD's trainees in the
coup was made clear by the CIA's
William C. Doherty, AIFLD Director
of Social Projects at the time. At an
AFL-CIO Labor News Conference in
July, 1964, Doherty noted that the
trainees "were very active in orga -
nizin.g workers... As a matter of
fact, some of them were so active
that they became intimately involved
in some of the clandestine operations
of the revolution [Washington's
code-word for the coupl befcr e it
took place on April 1. What happened
in Brazil.. did not just happen -- it
was planned -- and planned months
in advance. Many of the trade union
leaders -- some of whom were actually
trained in our institute -- were in-
volved in the revolution see above),
and in the overthrow of the Goulart
regime. "75
AIFLD had succeeded in delivering
the Brazilian labor movement from
Communist leadership. Its supposed
goal of creating an independent, demo-
cratic labor movement, however, was
quickly abandoned. Two and one-half
t. years after the coup, AFL-CIO union
leaders who went to Brazil under AID's
exchange program returned with a
devastating indictment of conditions
for workers and unions in Brazil. In a
New York Times dispatch from Rio
de Janeiro (November 23, 1966),
James Jones offior
18
clelieitc4isktfiaK0270.04/10/12
kers of America stated that "The
leaders of unions here have the grea-
test fear I have ever seen in my life.
They are afraid to raise their voices
on behalf of their workers for fear of
police reprisals." 76
In fact, AIFLD leaders supported
the authoritarian measures taken by
the military junta and provided ratio-
nales for its policies. After one of
Serafino Romualdi's principal contacts,
Adhemar de Barros, was deprived of
his political rights for ten years, Romu-
aldi stated equivocally that "it is still
too early for a final judgement On the
success or failure of the Brazilian
1964 revolution (sic !)"77 To cement its
solidarity with the new regime,
William Doherty appeared on the same
platform with Brazil's president,
General Castello Branco, in April, 1966
to help lay the foundation for an
AIFLD housing project in Sao Paulo.
During his speech, Doherty declared
that it was "appropriate that the cere-
monies were taking place on the second
anniversary of Brazil's democratic
Revolution (sic)". 78
CONCLUSION
The denial of all political rights and
the suppression of working class efforts
to gain a more equitable share of Brazil's
enormous natural wealth give the lie to
to the country's "economic miracle"
that foreign investors proclaim. 79 What-
ever gains Brazil can speak of are rea-
lized by only a small elite. Furthermore,
the markets which she can boast of are
those for raw materials, agricultural
products and manufactured goods. These
markets are all export-oriented and thus
depend on the fluctuating prices of the
world market. When we add to this the
cheap cost of Brazilian labor, which is
a prerequisite for keeping these goods
competitive, is it any wonder that Bra-
zil's per capitaGNP is one of the low-
:tchirgisptlijsistamin3f8E5daviclY, the
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
cost of fueling Brazil's "economic mir-
acle" is more than its people can tolerate
Since,the military coup of 1964, there
has been a decline in the real wages of
Brazilians amounting to almost 40 per-
cent. 81 Brazil's gross foreign debt for
1978 is expected to reach a spectacular
$40 billion, with interest and amortiza-
tion payments totalling $8 billion. 82
The reason for the seeming paradox be-
tween a country so rich in natural re-
sources yet one whose people suffer life-
long misery is quite simple, however:
"for capitalists, both Brazilian and
foreign, the masses are looked upon
as costs, not customers: the lower
their real wages, the higher the prof-
its from selling to the local upper
class and the international market. "83
If cheap labor and an absence of
political opposition have been consid-
ered Brazil's major investment advan-
tages since 1964, events of recent
years suggest that the attractiveness
of Brazil to foreign investors may be
on the decline. In 1978, Brazilian
autoworkers paralyzed the industry
with a major strike. 84In 1969, bank
robberies by revolutionary groups in
Sao Paulo alone amounted to over $1.5
million. 85
Brazil's rulers themselves have had
to assume a "get-tough" attitude toward
the 'U.S. in the wake of State Depart-
ment reports on human rights viola-
tions. In order to gain credibility
arriongsf their local backers, the Bra-
zilians 'showed how badly they were
miffed by cancelling in March, 1977
a 25-year old military assistance trea-
ty between Washington and Brasilia.
At the same time, Brazil turned down
a $50 million loan credit for the pur-
chase of military supplies because of
human rights demands attached to it
by the U.S. Congress. 86 In. S eptern-
ber, 1977, the Brazilian Foreign Min-
istry announced the termination of a
Brazilian-American military commis -
sion 'and- a naApj3novettfurs?ftatS441104/10/12
lished in 1942 to coordinate World War
II efforts. Also canceled were .a1967
pact governing the use of armaments
imported from the U.S. and a 1952
agreement for U.S. participation in
aerial mapping of Brazil. 87 Of the
March rejection, chief of staff, Gen-
eral Moacir Barcelos Potyguara sta-
ted that the decision would cause no
problems in Brazil's military prepar-
edness.88
Unfortunately, this cavalier attitude
will not effect the long-term military
relations between the two countries.
The March, 1977 announcement was to
take place one year later. No mention
was made of rejecting that which is
already in the pipeline to Brazil. At the
least, Brazil should benefit for years to
come from its friendship with the U.S.
Furthermore, U.S. opposition to Bra-
zil's planned purchase of West German
nuclear reprocessing technology seems
to have subsided. In a recent visit to
Brazil, Vice :President Mondale backed
away from criticizing the country's
plans to build a uranium reprocessing
plant capable of producing weapons-grade
plutonium.89
As for Brazil's new president, Joao
Baptista Figueiredo, and what lies in
store for the :Brazilian people, a few
words must be said. For the unsuspect--
ing, last month's appointment of Figueir-
edo as president appeared to usher in a
new era of liberalization for that coun-
try's political situation. Pledging to
continue the reforms (which included
the closing of Congress for four months
in 1977) initiated by his predecessor,
Ernesto Geisel, Figueiredo declared that
it would be his "unswerving purpose" to
make Brazil a. democrapy. He guaranteed
freedom of expression for the "many seg-
ments of .Brazilian public opinion. ""
But for those who have even the slightest
familiarity with the man who is Brazil's
fifth military head of state since the
armed forces carried out a CIA-backed
vc-map _6 (0?114090.4pamteeta4Figueir!do
19
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
is to be watched closely.
His backgrOund speaks to the intimate
role the CIA has played in Making Brazil
one of the most represqive and, not sur-
prisingly, one of the 'safest' investment
climates in Latin America. After the
'64 coup, the CIA helped Brazil set up
its first national intelligence service, the
SNI. Figueiredo became the director of
its Rio office. Later he was named head
of the military police in Sao Paolo, after
which he became then-President Emilio
Medici's chief of staff. Before com-
ing to Brasilia in 1974 t6 direct the
SNI, Figueiredo commanded the Third
Army in Porto Alegre. Given the doc-
umented penetration and usurpation of
the SNI and the police forces by the
CIA, can there remain any doubt that
with' Figueiredo's ascendancy to the
executive office, Langley truly has
their "man in Brazil"?
In an effort to dress up the seamy
history of their new president, the
National Renewal Alliance, the Gov-
ernment party, hired the largest ad-
vertising agency in Brazil to change
Figueiredo's public image. The agen-
cy, Al Cantro Machado, which works
closely with the huge New York ad
agency, Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, re-
placed Figueiredo's dark glasses with
clear, metal-framed ones, got him to
tone down on insults such as "For me
the smell of horses is better than the
smell of people, "and, finally, suc-
ceeded in projecting him as almost a
populist, anti-establishment figure.
But for the people of Brazil, the
media blitz around "election" time con-
trasts sharply with the harsh conditions
under which they have lived since the
'64 coup. With the creation of the SNI
and the imposition of successive Insti-
tutional Acts, the derpocratic freedoms
Brazilians once enjoyed have been de-
stroyed. The danger of living in South
America's oldest police state, however,
has not deterred them from struggling
Figueiredo took office on March 15,
over 200,000 industrial workers were
on strike in Sao Paulo demanding a
wage hike of 78 percent to keep pace
with Brazil's astronomical /ate of in-
flation, up 44 percent over last year. 91
Contradicting his liberalization
pledges and new image, Figueiredo,
after only a week in office sent troops
into Rio de Janeiro on Friday March
23rd. The troops seized the union
headquarters and arrested 1,600 wor-
kers. Although the workers were re-
leased over the weekend, the Ministry
of Labor unilaterally called for new union
elections and issued a decree which
stripped a group of union officials of their
posts. The duly-elected head of the me-
tal, mechanical and electrical workers'
union, Luiz Inaco da Silva has been pro-
hibited from running for reelection or
participating in union activity. Although
Inaco has denied that the strike was cal-
led to test the promised liberalization
of the Figueiredo regime, the manner in
which it was dealt with makes clear the
government's intolerance of even legal
opposition.
It is in the wake of this strike-break-
ing that Figueiredo's statement about
'fair-play' between Brazil's legislative
and executive branches must be evalua-
ted. During his inaugural address, he
stated that "The game is just beginning
and as soon as I am in office the ball will
belong to me. If the politicians play well,
fine. But if they play badly, I will put
the ball under my arm and leave the field. "92
If this warning was ambiguous at the time,
Figueiredo's actions of last week have
clarified any uncertainty that people may
have had. Under the new president, the
future of Brazil's 116 million people bodes
Ill. For, without the slightest hesitation,
Figueiredo has removed democracy from
the realm of political possibilities in Bra-
zil and has tucked it away in his desk drawer
where it will continue to gather dust as it
has for the past fifteen years, to be brought
5:1?litiltAaaiittipt8h-&,11iIVI08016?1?53
to achieve basic la ma night
mliproPeo ForileleAe 2004/10/ 63?06i-4azili an
20 on
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 :,CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
CIA OFFICERS IN BRAZIL
AS OF AUGUST, 1978
BURTON, Stewart D.
(born: 5 April 1928)
Burton has served in Brazil on three
previous occasions: from 1952-1955
at the Consulate General in Sao Paulo
as a Vice-Consul with the rank of S-11;
from 1962-1964 at the Consulate in
Curitiba as a "political officer" with
the rank of R-5; and, frc;rn 1967-1970
at the Consulate General in Rio de Ja-
neiro as a "political officer" progres:
sing from R-4 to R-3. As of August,
1978, Burton was at the Embassy in
Brasilia under the cover of "First Sec-
retary."
GRAVES, R. Martin
(born: 1 July 1937)
Graves, also, has had previous ex-
perience in Brazil. In 1967 he was
stationed in Recife as an Economic Of-
ficer with the rank of R-6. From 1968
to 1969 he served at the then-Embassy
in Rio de Janeiro as a Political Officer
with the rank of R-5. At the end of
1969 he was transferred to Sao Paulo
where he served for three years as a
Political Officer. After a stint/in Sai-
gon and back home at the State Depart-
ment, Graves was reassigned to the
.Embassy in Brasilia as a Political Of-
ficer in January, 1976. In August,
1978 he was transferred to th Consu-
late General in Rio de Janeiro.
NEVES, Antonio L.
(born: 15 June 1931)
Neves 'first came to Brazil in 1962
after seven years in the Department
of Army as an "analyst." His first
assignment was at the then-Embassy
in Rio de Janeiro as an Attache with
the rank of R-6. He served for four
years in Brazil, after which he was
assigned to Rome, and then the State
Department in Washingiton. He reap-
Approved-For Release 2004/10/12
peared at the Consulate General in Rio
de Janeiro in August, 1978.
EDGER, David N.
(born: 20 June 1945)
Edger taught public school in 3.967-1968
before serving as an "educator" in the
Department of Army for five years. Upon,
joining the State Department in January,
1973, he was assigned to the Embassy ;
in Santiago, Chile as a "political officer','
with the rank of R-7. As of August, 1978,0
he was working in the U.S. Embassy in
Brasilia. His position is that of Second
Secretary.
MALLET, John W.
(born: 10 April 1945)
Mallet's Government Experience con-
sists of two years as a "programs- ana-
lyst" with the Department of Army from
1972-1974. When he joined the State De-
tartment in 1975, he was assigned to the
Embassy in Santiago as a "political offi-
cer" with the rank of R-7. As of August,
1978, he has been at the Embassy in Ba-.r'
silia working under the cover of Second ,
Secretary.
CIA COLLABORATORS IN BRAZIL
AS OF AUGUST, 1978
The following U.S. governmental
employees have collaborated or
worked with the CTA' in a functional
capacity.
ARENALES, Alfonso
(born: 3/1/26)
Arenales joined the State Department
in 1957 where he served as an "intelli-
gence research analyst" for, two years.
He has served in Iran, Rio de Janeiro
and the Dominican Republic. It .should
be noted that during Arenales' three
years in the Dominican Republic (1964
-67), Lyndon Johnson and the CIA
overthrew the democratically. elected
Ieslggt:13t4Pech;063d the
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island with over 40,000 U.S. Marines;
and sent in Brazilian troops to crush
the popular resistance movement.
Arenales is presently serving in the
political section of the U.S. Embassy
in Brasilia as a Consul.
HIGH, George Borman
(b. 7/25/31)
High joined the State Department in
1956 and served for two and one-
half years as an "intelligence re-
search analyst". He has served in
Angola and Lebanon (where he was
an "Arab language-area trainee" at
the Foreign Service Institute field-
school). Back at the State Department,
served as the desk officer for South
Africa, Angola-Mozambique, and Ma-
dagascar, respectively. He has
served in Equador, Argentina, and
has been detailed to the Army War
College. As of August, 1978, High
was at the U.S. Embassy in Brasilia,
serving as a Consul for Ministerial
Affairs.
POVENMIRE, Dale Miller
(b. 6/6/30)
Povenmire joined the State Department
in 1957 with the rank of R-8. In 1958 he
was stationed in Santiago as a "political
and economic officer". He spent the
next three years at the State Department
as an "intelligence research specialist".
His next assignments were in Zanzibar
and Paraguay. In 1966, Povenmire was
back at the State Department as an
"international relations officer". Two
years later, he became a representative
at the National Military Command Center
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Penta-
gon. He was then assigned to Venezuela
and Portugal. As of August, 1978, he was
the "labor officer" at the Consulate
General in Sao Paulo.
22
REFERENCES
1) A. J.Langguth, Hidden Terrors,
New York: Pantheon Books, 1978,
p. 47.
2) Ibid., p. 49.
3) Ibid., p. 51.
4) Ibid., pp. 71-72.
5) Cheryl Payer, The Debt Trap: The
IMF and the Third World , New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1974, p. 44.
6) Ibid. p. 15.
7) Ibid., p. 149.
8) Langguth,Hidden Terrors, p. 64.
9) Payer, Debt Trap, p. 145.
10) Ibid., p. 150.
11) Langguth, p. 71.
12) Payer, p. 152.
13) Ibid.
14) Ibid., p. 153.
15) Ibid., p. 153.
16) Langguth, p. p. 145.
17) Helen Shapiro and Steven Volk,
"Global Shift: Brazil Steals the Show",
N orth American Congress on Latin
America, Report on the Americas ,
Jan. -Feb., 1979, p. 25.
18) Langguth, p. 85.
19) Penny Lernoux, "Fascism in
Brazil", Inquiry , November 27,
1978, p. 13.
20)
21)
p.
22)
23)
24)
Langguth, p. 95
Lernoux, "Fascism in Brazil",
13.
Ibid. p. 16.
Ibid.., p. 13.
Ibid., p. 13.
25)
Langguth,
p. 85.
26)
Ibid., p.
86.
27)
Ibid.,
p.
90.
28)
Ibid.,
p.
108.
2)
Ibid.,
p.
87.
30)
Ibid.,
p.
90.
31)
Ibid.,
p.
102.
32)
Ibid.,
p.
89.
33)
Ibid.,
p.
154.
34)
Ibid.,
p.
120.
35)
Ibid.,
p.
123.
36)
Michael Klare and Nancy Stein,
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?
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
"Police Terrorism in Latin America",
North American Congress on Latin
America, Latin America and Empire
Report, Jan., ,1974, p. 21.
37) Ibid,
38) Ibid.
39) ,Langguth, p. 244.
40) Ibid., p. 140.
41) Klare and Stein, "Police Terrorism';
p. 21.
42) Ibid.
43) Langguth, p. 162.'
44) Ibid. p. 163.
45) Ibid., p.96.
46) Ibid., pp. 164-165.
47) Lernoux, p. 14.
48) Philip Agee, Inside the Company:
CIA Diary, New York: Stonehill, 1975,
p.601.
49) Hobart A. Spalding, Jr. "U.S. and
Latin Amercan Labor: The Dynamics
of Imperialist Control," in Ideology &
Social:Change in Latin America, June
Nash, Juan Corradi and Hobart Spal-
ding, Jr. editors, New York: Gordon
and Breach, 1977, p. 66.
50) Ibid., p. 62.
51) Ibid., p. 63.
52) Agee, Inside the Company, p. 237.
53) Ronald Radosh, American Labor
and United States Foreign Policy , New
York, Random House, 1969, p.420.
54) Spalding, "U.S. and Latin American
Labor", p. 67.
55) Agee, p. 244.
56) U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Subcommittee on American
Republic Affairs, Survey of the Alliance
for Progress, Labor Policies and Prog-
rams, 90th Congress, 2nd Session,
July 15, 1968, pp. 5-9.
57) RaFlosh, American Labor, p. 418.
58) Agee, p. 243.
5,9) Ibid., p. 244.
60) Ibid., p. 245.
61) Serafino Romualdi, Presidents
and Peons: Recollections of a Labor
Ambassador in Latin America, New
York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1967, p.
278.
62)
Ibid.,
p.
285.
63)
Ibid.,
p.
286.
64)
Ibid.
65)
Ibid.
66)
Ibid.,
p.
287.
67)
Ibid.,
p.
288.
68)
Spalding, pp. 70-71.
69)
Radosh, p. 432.
70)
Ernest Garvey, "Meddling in Bra-
zil: The CIA Bungles On," common-
weal, February 9, 1968, pp. 553-54.
71) Romualdi, Presidents and Peons,
p. 289.
72) Ibid.
73) Ibid.
74) Ibid.
75) See Radosh, p. 427.
76) See George Morris, CIA and Am-
erican Labor: The Subversion of the
AFL-CIO's Foreign Policy, New York:
International Publishers, 1967, p.95.
77) Rornualdi, p. 290.
78) Radosh, P. 427.
79) Payer, pp. 143-44.
80) Ibid., p. 144.
81) Paul M. Sweezy, "Corporations,
the State and Imperialism," Monthly
Review, November, 1978, p. 9. ,
82) See Shapiro and Volk, "Global
Shift," p. 25;
83) Sweezy, "Corporations, "p.
84) Shapiro and Volk, p. 26.
85) Joao Quartim, Dictatorship and
Armed Struggle in Brazil, New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1971, p. 169.
86) New York Times, 11 March 1977,
p. -A -1.
87) Washington Star, 20 September
1977, p. A-1.
88) New York Times, 11 March 1977,
p. A-1.
89) Washington Post 23 March 1979,
p. A-20.
90) New York Times, 16 March 1979,
p. A-3.
9i) Washington Post, 27 March 1979,
p. A-10.
92) New York Times, 16 March 1979,
p. A-3.
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CIA in Iran
John Kelly
As recently as January 26, 1979,
President Carter stated: "We do not
have any intention of interfering in the
affairs of Iran, the internal affairs of
their government." 1
Carter's obviously comic relief,re-
mark about no U.S. interference pro-
bably drew few laughs in Iran. It is on
a par with Eisenhower's lie before the
world that then-captured U-2 pilot,
Gary Powers, was not a CIA agent.
This lie, in conjunction with the CIA
operations, had devastating effects
for the world. It destroyed a pending
U.S. - U. S. S. R. conference and un-
necessarily prolonged the Cold War.
Carter's statement is of equal im-
portance vis-a-vis the peaceful rela-
tions between the American and Ira-
nian peoples. Let us, therefore, put
it to the litmus test of the following
collage of facts.
Since July2 and continuing up to
December, 1978,3 there have been a
reported 50-75 full-time CIA officers
in Iran. There have also been "at
least 100 retired intelligence specie-
lists"4 working for U.S. firms in Iran
-- many of whom were thought to be
still working for the CIA. 5
Accbrding to Jesse J. Leaf, Chief
CIA Analyst on Iran, 1968-73, the CIA
in Iran serviced the shah and his
SAVAK. 6Two major tasks of the CIA
in Iran included the surreptitious
monitoring and "combating" of anti-
shah groups which also entailed joint
operations with Israeli Mossad agents
against Palestitians. A second major
task was the policing of the oil fields.7
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24
Within the oil workers and other
industrial workers, the union struc-
ture was "run directly by SAVAK.
SAVAK, in turn, was directed by the
CIA. This CIA apparatus is still some-
what in place in Iran. An unknown
number of CIA officers, agents, and
Iranian collaborators are also still in
Iran under direction of the same for-
ces and political objectives.
Since 1950, according to the Pentagon,
more than 15,000 Iranian officers and
soldiers have been trained at U.S. mili-
tary institutions. 9 As the Washington
Star observed:" Part of what is believed
to be a pro-U.S. bias among the mili-
tary comes from this training; ...u10
Most of these "pro-U.S." military per-
sonnel are in place in Iran.
On September 11, 1978, President Car-
ter personally telephoned the Shah of
Iran--which by that time had been
described as the worst violator of human
rights by Amnesty International--to
voice his total support.
in November, 1978, Carter called in
former CIA Director, Richard M. Helms
for secretive "lengthy discussions'11
on Iran. Helms, a boyhood friend of the
shah's, was in Teheran in 1953 to par-
ticipate in the coup. 12 He is also guilty
of many crimes against the Iranian
people, including the running of SAVAK.
During Helm's tenure as CIA director,
according to Jesse J. Leaf (cf supra),
the CIA provided torture seminars to
SAVAK officials, 13 Leaf was also in-
structed that the CIA had a specific '
"line" on Iran, viz., total support of the
shah; and CIA bureaucrats and analysts
--not to mention operatives--had to con-
form to this line." Although the shah is
now out of Iran, there is no indication
that the CIA's political line on Iran has
changed.
A man who has spent his career
towing CIA lines, Robert Bowie, is now
head of the CIA's Analysis Division. In
November, 1978, Bowie along with Lt.
Gen. E. F. Tighe, Director of the De-
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fense Intelligence Agency, visited Iran
for the White House. 15 Except to report
that Tighe briefed the shah, the CIA and
DIA would not confilm that it was a joint
mission n 1 6
or the objectives for the
mission. Apparently, a classified
special report of the trip has been filed
with the White House. Its findings and
recommendations have yet to be dis-
closed.
\ In December at the direction of
National Security Advisor, Zbigniew
Brzezinski?who has reportedly been
in "freq17
u_ent contact" with Ardeshir
Zahedi (see below)- -Carter commi-
ssioned a report on Iran by.George
W. Ball.' The findings and recommen-
dations of the report have yet to be re-
leased.18
In early January, 19'79, the Deputy
U.S. Forces in Europe Commander,
Robert E. Huyser, was dispatched to
Iran "to maintain contact with Iran's
military" 1,9and "to urge the military
to remain united an`d loyal to the con-
stitution (and thus to Bakhtiar)" 20
The White House maintained that
Huyser was sent to inspect U.S. spy
equipment. These statements were un-
likely while being revealing. It was
unlikely that the second-ranking U.S.
military officer in Europe would per-
sonally inspect spy equipment. The
statements were revealing in that they
suggested Huyser'is an intelligence
operative. Intelligence operatives are
the ones who implement coups, desta-
bilizations, etc. One should remember
that in August, 1953, Brigadier Gene-
ral H. Norman Schwartzkopf was
dispatched to Iran foLthe purpose of
"renewing contacts" with, the Iranian
military. Schwartzkopf stayed in Iran
during the shah's absence and pro-
ceeded to hand out $10 million in CIA
money2z to create pro-shah demonstra-
tions. Two weeks after Huyser's
arrival in Iran there were unexpected,
pro-shah demonstrations by military
personnel and well-dressed Iranians
Approved For Release 2004/10/12
including women in fur coats (reminis-
cent of the CIA-induced anti-Allende
demonstrations in Chile). According
to the Washington Post: "The efforts
to organize pro-shah demonstrations
are now headed by some Iranian gene-
rals and Iranian ambassador to the
U.S., Ardeshir Zahedi... "23 Ardeshir
Zahedi is the former son-in-law of the
shah and the son of the late General
Fazollah Zahedi who worked with the
CIA and the shah to overthrow Prime
Minister Mos sadegh in 1953.24 Not sur-
prisingly, Zahedi is presently being in-
vestigated by the Justice Department
and a U.S. grand jury for involvement
*with SAVAK and the CIA in creating the
bogus pro-shah demonstrations in
November, 1977 in the U.S. for the
shah's visit.25 One final observation on
Huyser is the charge by Pravda that he
"has been assigned the role of vice-
regent" 26 to direct the Iranian military.
In 1953, the Soviet Union made a similar
charge against H. Norman Schwartz-
kopf when he was in Iran, and history
has demonstrated the validity of their
charge. 27
Yet another' concern is the newly -
created 40-50 member White House
Task Force on Iran headed by David
Dunlop Newsom. Its goings-on are also
never detailed, and its members con-
sists of DOD, CIA, arid Treasury De-
partment agents. 28 If the White House
eschews intervention or even inter-
ference in Iran, why does this task
force operate in secret and why are
some of its members practiced inter-
ventionists ? Newsom, by the way, is a
graduate of the National War College 29
which conducts courses on counter-
insurgencies and coups.
In December, 1978, the Pentagon
flew five\water cannon riot-control
trucks into Iran for the Iranian army. 30
As late as January, 1979, Carter
sent "... 150,000 barrels of diesel fuel
to keep Iranian military vehicles
moving during the confrontation
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25
Approved For Release 2004/10/12
over Khomeini's travel plans. "31
There have also been published re-
ports that the Carter administration
was "encouraged" by the recent
shooting and killing of demonstrators
32
by the Iranian army.
Also of serious concern is the pre-
sence of CIA coup engineer, Vernon A.
Walters (supposedly retired) in Marra-
kesh, Morocco where the shah is now
residing. 33 Walters, along with Averill
Harriman, General Robert Landry
(USAF), Walter Levy, then-CIA oil
expert, and William Roundtree (State
Dept.) went to Iran in 1951 34 to being
the process which culminated in the
overthrow of Mossadegh and the re-
installation of the shah. One should
note here that the "sudden" coup in
1953 was a good two years in the making.
Of equally grave concern is what
appears to be the re-activation of Ker-
mit Roosevelt, the CIA officer most re-
sponsible for the re-installation of the
shah in 1953. I have positively con-
firmed that Roosevelt has had recent
discussions about Iran with State and
CIA officials, including his personal
friend , CIA Director, Stansfield
Turner. In addition, Roosevelt has
been in contact with a high official of
British intelligence with whom he
worked in Iran in 1953. (The British
intelligence official has recently been
dispatched to Saudi Arabia where he is
formally employed as a consultant to
the Saudi government.- This same Saudi
government also recently hired Ray-
mond H. Close, recent CIA Chief of
Station/Saudi Arabia, to head Saudi
intelligence. 35) Without even knowing
what Roosevelt is discussing, just in-
voking his advice suggests the CIA is
studying the possibility of some form
of intervention.
Finally, of grave concern is the New
York Times report that in December,
1978 there were "dozens of specialists
flown in to help the shah... " And, "the
new arrivals, according to the embassy
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sources, include a number of CIA
specialist s on Iran, in addition to
diplomats and military personnel. Some
have served in Iran before and have
been sent back because of their ex-
perience. "36 This new infusion of CIA
personnel speaks for itself given the
mission of the CIA. It should be seen
in light of the 50-175 CIA agents and
officials already in Iran, and the fact
that there has been no indication that any
of these CIA personnel have left Iran.
Concomitant with the on-going
White House, CIA and Pentagon
machinations is what appears to be
a concerted campaign in the economic
world to clamor for the return of the
shah and/or installation of a pro-West
regime. The following analysis high-
lights this contention.
"Wall Street found itself over a barrel
last week. The barrel was an oil barrel,
and it was less than full be.cause of the
political troubles in Iran" 37.
At the end of the week referred to by
the Monitor the Dow Jones industrial
average otropped 25.12 points, closing to
834. 63. 38
"There's no question that Iran is
weighing on the rnarket" was Dreyfus
Corporation analyst, Monte Gordon's
assessment. 39
Fueling these economic panics were
Schlesinger's remarks before the Senate
Energy Committee that the stoppage of
Iranian o.0
was "prospectively more
4
serious " .vis the U.S. economy,
than the 1973-74 Middle East oil embargo
and that the prospect of an outright oil
shortage "has grown more serious in
recent weeks". More specifically, ?
Schlesinger contended that the U.S. had
about a 70-day supply of oil on hand in
commercial inventories, not counting the
government's strategic petroleum re-
serve, which he said was far
below its target level. 42
The panic effects of Schlesinger's
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? person), 50agitating the next day be-
fore the House Science and Technology
Committee by stating that, "the effect
of the Iranian situation is to advance
the date when demand koy oil overtakes
supply for two years." Schlesinger
also dragged out the National Security
canard by suggesting that the U.S.
might not have the oil to fill its one
billion-barrel strategic petroleum re-
serve when5A the storage facilities are
completed.
? One objective of Schlesinger's blitz-
krieg is to bring about Congress' de-
control of oil priCes leading to higher
oil and gasoline prices and, in turn, to
greater profits for the oil companies
which by the way have just experienced
a year of record high profits. James R.
Schlesinger, Jr. has serviced the
interests of corporate profits through-
out his career.
Indicative of this serving is Schle-
singer's DOE which has been described
as "... i8pre.pared for new oil
gouging" begun by the oil companies
even without the decontrol of oil prices.
The DOE is ill-prepared because of
Schlesinger and therplegation of only
of its employees5 (many of whom
are still occupied with the price gouging
rampant during the 1973-74 Middle East
oil embargo) to the task of monitoring
oil gouging. Representative John D.
Dingell and some DOE officials have
also suggested that the Carter admini-
stration has not requested enough funds
to support even.these inadequate en-
forcement efforts.55
The other possible objective of the
Schlesinger-led campaign is to equate
the absence of the shah with the econo-
mic hardships of the American people.
This creates an atmosphere conducive
to some form of U.S. governmental
intervention in order to restore the
shah or install a so-called pro-Western
regime or force the present government
to resume the shah's policies towards
the U.S. It is important .to remember
remarks were instantaneous particularly
since the 1973-74 Middle East oil em-
bargo was a part of a chain of events
producing the postwar period's deepest
recession. "Schlesinger was the
-
trigger"43 was the way one trader re-
acted. Accordingly, "As soonas his
' (Schlesinger's) remarks went out on the
world' s communication system, the
dollar fell sharply and gold bounded to
a new high of $252 an ounce in
London. "44 (N. Y. Tirnes, 2/9/79, p.1)
Also affected that day was the Dow Rine
Jones industrial average which closed
with a loss of 6. 84 points at .816.01.
The day following Schlesinger's
'remarks, Treasury Secretary W.
Michael Blumenthal challenged the va-
lidity of these remarks. Blumenthal,
in faci, indicated that no new economic
crisis-was in the offing and that both
the Iranian oil curtailment and can-
cellation of arms orders would have
only a limited impact on the American
trade and balance of payments
accounts.45
Blumenthal, while appearing to be
the "good guy", contributed to Schle-
singer's panic-rousing by describing
the Schlesinger statement as "clearly
the type of thing that causes people to
run to gold." Blumenthal also took
the occasion to make the disturbing
statement that "the U.S. stood ready
to act to prevent a re-emergence of
disorderly conditions" in foreign
markets. (At least one analyst took
this to mean unspecified, "large scale
intervention" by the U.S. government
vis-a-vis foreign exchange rnarketS.48)
Schlesinger himself, through his
new assistant, James Bishop, contra-
dicted his assertion about the U.S.
having about a 70-day supply of oil on
hand by indicating that there was a
comfortable supply of oil stocks which
would last for more than a year.
Despite this reversal, Schlesinger
continued his panic (so described by
an unidentified, Schlesinger spokes-
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here that Schlesinger is both a former
Secretary of Defense and a former
Director of the CIA and is, therefore,
well-versed in the devious operations
()Thoth. In 1973, for example, Schle-
singer in tandem with Kissinger and
Haig placed the U.S. on the brink of a
war by initiating a world-wide nuclear
alert (which activated the entire Strate-
gic Air Command, the U.S. ' s nuclear
strike force)56. Many people considered
this alert as a veiled attempt to divert
attention from Nixon's on-going Water-
gate crime exposes. Schlesinger, him-
self, suggested ulterior reasons for
the alert by his assertion: "I think the
probability of Soviet forces being en-
route (the supposed reason for the
alert) was considered by some to be
57
low." He came eiren closer to
suggesting the Watergate crisis as the
motivation for the alert in the following
statement:
"I think it was important in view of
the circumptances that have raised a
question or may have raised a question
about the ability of the United States to
react appropriately, fi rmly, and
quickly, that this (alert) certainly
scotched whatever myths have deve-
loped with regard to that possibility'.158
Interestingly, on the day after the
newspapers published Schlesinger's
Iranian remarks, the Washington Post
(2/9/79, p. A-19) featured Kissinger's
statement attributing the shah's loss of
power to the "emasculation" of the CIA.
Thus we have Kissinger, Schlesinger's
- i
partner in the alert operation, n syn-
copation, practically calling for a CIA
intervention in Iran. Kissinger, by the
way, (who has worked with the CIA
since his days as a graduate student at
Harvard) has been reportedly in "Ire-
59
quent contact" with Ardeshir Zahedi.
As mentioned, Zahedi has been charged
with organizing recent, bogus, pro-
shah demonstrations in Iran. Even
"...some diplomats from his own em-
bassy, have accused Zahedi of trying
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28
to mount a plot to resare the shah to
the throne by force."
As if Schlesinger and Kissinger were
not enough, General Alexander M.
Haig, Jr. is now in print stating that
"the events that have already taken
place (in Iran)--regardless of whether
you're optimistic or pessimistic about
the ultimate outcome--do pose a serious
threat to the interests of the Western
world and will require subsequent
modifications in Western politics..."61
Recalling Carter's statement, in part,
that "We do not have any intention of
interfering in the affairs of Iran...
we have to conclude, based on the above
mentioned data, that this is a lie.
Carter, himself, has been personally
interfering in the affairs of?Iran from
the very beginning. Secondly, a power-
ful faction within the U.S. governmental
-industrial complex has readied the
option of a CIA/Pentagon intervention in
Iran. This is not to say that a CIA/
Pentagon intervention in Iran is immi-
nent. Rather, it is to highlight the
existence of this apparatus-in-place, if
you will. Publicizing of this CIA/Pen-
tagon structure, aimed at Iran, will
alert the Iranian people to this very
real danger as well as provide their
representatives with the wherewithal
to initiate precautions and to approach
Carter with some hard questions. Pub-
licizing will also inform the American
people in turn placing the CIA and the
Pentagon on notice that they are being
watched. Hopefully this will limit their
interventionist capabilities. Finally, to
give flesh to my charges, I am pre-
senting the names and brief histo-
ries of nine U.S. governmental
employees now in Iran who have
worked or collaborated with the. CIA
in a functional capacity. Prior to
this listing, I am presenting the
names of CIA collaborators, arid
some CIA officers, known to have
served in Iran during the 1951-53
GUIRi#8830914114Retst feCrigt0134Fause
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as rnentiohed, the recent influx of
"CIA specialists" into Iran included
persons with prior experience in
Iran.
In addition to the the list of CIA asso-
ciates, lam presenting the names of 39
Iranians - obtained from the State Depart-
ment through a Freedom of Information
request--who graduated from either
police or labor training programs in the
United States. As noted, simply training
in the, United States tends to give one a
pro-U.S. bias. More to the point, the
police graduates attended CIA-controlled
programs such as the Office of Public
Safety, the International Police Aca-
demy, and (two of them) even the CIA's
bomb school at the Border Patrol
Offices in Los Fresnos, Texas. These
individuals were active members of the
CIA/SAVAK structure and, at a mini-
mum, were considered assetsby the
CIA to be called upon during crucial
periods such as the present time in
Iran. The labor graduates also attended
CIA-connected programs such as the
Office of International Visitors
Program. Graduates of these CIA-
connected labor programs have had
documented involvement in CIA coups,
destabilizations, and subversions in
Brazil, Guyana, Chile, Indonesia, and
South Vietnam. The Iranian graduates
were members of the union, structure
which., as rnentioned,was "run directly
by SAVAK" which in turn, was directed
by the CIA. Additionally, according to
the Washington Post (2/7/79, p. A-14),
in Iran "secret police masquerading as
trade union officials were always pre-
sent". As with the police graduates
these individuals, as a minimum, were
considered assets by the CIA to be
called upon during crucial periods. Both
they and the police graduates may still -
be operating. Thus, it is in the obvious
interest of the Iranian people to know
who they are.
Yet another final, important obser-
vation indic
*RakalrOFF46169aireaSdbi41/40/12
attitude towards Iran is that two para-
military operations, of which the CIA
was witting, have occurred in Iran since
the installation of the Khomeini govern-
ment.
On February 11, 1979, a raid, or-
chestrated by former CIA/Special For-
ces Colonel Arthur "Bull" Simons and
14 Americans with extensive intelligence
histories, was instigated against the
Gasre prison in Teheran to free two
Americans, William Gaylord and Paul
62
Chiapperroni. Another American freed
in this raid was Mary Ellen Sckneider,
43, of Bethesda, Maryland. Schnei-
der originally went to Iran in 1977 in the
employ of a U.S. helicOpter firm. While
in prison, Schneider, oddly enough, in-
structed U.S. embassy officials not to
inform her relatives or her friends
about her impriSonment. Her American
friends and relatives also indicated
that they seldom heard from Schneider
during her two years in Iran and were
uncertain as to exactly what she was
doing. (ibid. ) Following her release
from Gasre prison, Schneider did not
go to the US. embassy, but simply
phoned the embassy to say that she had
been released and that was all. Shortly
thereafter, Schneider was again
arrested for undisclosed reasons.
The person who financed the prison
raid and hired the Americans was
right-wing millionaire, H. Ross Perot
who has a history of involvement in
CIA operations. Perot, prior to the
raid, informed the White House, the
State Department, the Pentagon, and
, the CIA through his friend, retired
Admiral Thomas Moorer, a personal
friend of CIA Director, Stansfield Tur-
ner. Gaylord and Chiapperroni are
are employees of Perot's firm, Elec-
tronic Data Systems (EDS). EDS had a
$40 million computer contratt with the
shah and SAVAK for the compiling and
processing of dossiers on Iranian stu-
dents studying around the world, par-
: ClAjFkl9k1131-45141 AM do 66381J603i4
probably
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
why an illegal raid was undertaken to
free Gaylord and Chiapperroni. It does
not, however, explain the involvement
of Mary Ellen Schneider and other un-
identified Americans, including a Cana-
dian, who were also freed. Inter-
estingly, an unidentified EDS spokes-
person denied the monitoring of Ira-
nians by EDS, but admitted its sur-
veillance of Saudis in the U.S. 64 (Cer-
tainly, little consolation to the Saudis).
On February 14, 1979, the U.S.
Embassy in Teheran was sieged. There
are many unanswered questions and
mysterious aspects about this siege.
The first is Ambassador Willian
Sullivan's early order to the marines
65
not to engage the attackers. The
second was the presence of the myste
rious Mary Ellen Schneider who was
temporarily living at the embassy
although she is not supposedly a U.S.
government employee. b6 A third dis-
turbing aspect was the presence of
UPI photographer, Thomas Karges,
"who accompanied the attackers on the
compound". o7A fourth puzzling as
was the direct radio/telephone
contact --even though the attackers
supposedly cut the wires-- between the
Pentagon and presumably the CIA and
the besieged embassy. This contact
was accomplished in part by two un-
identified Iranians in Iran and Charles
Watters, a 54 year-old ham radio
operator and president of Sinco
Engineering Company in Orlando, Flo-
8
b
rida. Until recently. Walters'
si ster and her husband were "stationed
in Teheran"69 for undisclosed reasons.
His brother-in-law "is still stationed
in Teheran"70. Watters is a part of a
worldwide network of amateur radio
operators who have been in frequent
contact the past year of turmoil in Iran.
Included in this network are Naiel
Malhas of Amman, Jordan; Mr. Lee
Winde, 35, of Laurel, Maryland; and,
CIA communications specia1ist1
. Richard
7
Price of Potom*proteelif5thaRdleaseF20641-10/12
wing the embassy siege, the Soviet
Union, which was monitoring Watters'
broadlyst according to Watters him-
self, charged that the siege was a
CIA/SAVAK creation "to create a pre-
text for open military intervention by
the U.S. in Iran". 73 The following day,
Senate Minority Leader, Howard H.
Baker, Jr. called for "Entebbe -type
raids and economic sanctions"74 in
retaliation for the embassy siege.
Most people know of the criminal in-
volvement of CIA officer Kermit Roose-
velt and the previously mentioned, H.
Norman Schwartzkopf. The following
CIA officers and collaborators were also
present in Iran in 1953:
STONE, Howard E.
(born: March 3, 1925). According to
Agee and Wolf: "Stone was ordered to
leave Syria for alleged participation with
two others from the American Embassy
in a coup against the Syrian government...
In the ranks of the CIA Stone is known by
his nickname, "Rocky", with a reputation
as one of the Agency's best coup engi-
neers". (Dirty Work , Lyle Stuart, Inc.,
Secaucus, New Jersey, 1978, p. 672).
Stone, according to the U.S. State Depart-
rnent's Biographic Register (BR)1957, was
tent to Iran in February, 1952 as a For-
e ign Service Staff Officer (S-9, political
officer). Through 1952-53, Stone actually
operated clandestinely for the CIA.
30
PALMER, Roy Vance
( born: March 25, 1923)
According to the BR, 1969, Palrre r
was the Chief of the Research Section
of the U.S. Department of Defense.
During 1951-52, the Pentagon resear-
ched, planned, and programmed the
1953 coup in Iran. In July,. 1952, Pal-
mer was sent to Teheran, Iran and
was all of a sudden a Foreign Service
Staff Officer (5-7 Political Officer),
: CIA-RDP88-0131411000100350003-4
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDF'88-01314R000100350003-4,
according to the? BR 1969. Throughout
1952 and 1953, Palmer operated clan-
destinely in Iran.
BARBIS, George Milton
(born: July 8, 1926)
Barbis is a CIA collaborator who
served as a Foreign Service Reserve
,Officer (R-6) in Teheran, 1951-53. He
later became an "intelligence research
specialist". Barbis is a graduate of
the National War College.
WALLER, John H.
(born: May 8, 1923)
Waller is a CIA officer who operated
clandestinely in Teheran, 1947-49;
Meshed 1949-50; and back in Teheran
11/1/50-8/29/53.
GOODWIN, Joseph Carl
(born: October 3, 1910)
Goodwin wa.s a CIA officer who ope-
rated clandestinely in Iran from Sep-
tember 4, 1952 to January 2, 1955.
Goodwin's direct involvement in 1953
coup operations is a matter of record
(cf. New York Times, 12/27/77), p.40)
In on e operation, Goodwin, assisted
by then New York Times reporter,
Kenneth Love, distributed CIA-pre-
pared leaflets declaring Colonel Zahe-
di as the legitimate successor to
Premier Mohammed Mossadegh.
SULLIVAN, William Healey
William H. Sullivan as of March, 1978,
was still U.S. Ambassador to Iran.
Sullivan has worked closely with the
CIA throughout his diplomatic career.
In Laos, he was intimately involved
with the CIA's war and personally tar-
getted massive bombings which by
any definition constituted war crimes.
He has now been reportedly recalled
from Iran.
The following U.S. governmental
employees, Atift30@4 FlOrIReleatit 21504/10/1
December, 1978, have worked or
collaborated with the CIA in a func- ?
tional capacity.
NAAS, Charles W.
(Deputy Chief of Mission)
Naas was bornon January 24, 1925 in
Massachusetts . From 1951 to 1954,
Naas was an "intelligence research
analyst" at the State Department. In
1955, he served as a "political officer/
R-5" in Karachi, Pakistan. He subse-
quently served in India, Afghanistan,
Turkey (as "political officer"), USUN
(political security affairs), and as
Director of Iranian Affairs/State. From
1973 to 1974, he was detailed to the
Foreign Service Institute which con-
ducts courses on counterinsurgency.
techniques.
LAMBRAKIS, George B.
(Political Officer)
Lambrakis was born on June 4, 1931 in
Illinois. His first governmental position
was that of public affairs trainee/USIA
in Saigon, Vietnam, followed by a stint
as "provincial public affairs officer" (S-
9) in Pakse-Savannakhet. He next
served as an R-8 (Foreign Service Re-
serve Officer) at the State Department
in January, 1957 and 4 months later be-
came an "intelligence research specia-
list". He subsequently served in Guinea,
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
(as "political officer"), Israel, Italy (at
the NATO Defense College), England,
and Beirut.
GOELZ, Louis P.
(Chief Consul)
Goelz was born on February, 25,1927
in Pennsylvania. From 1952-55, he
served as a "civilian research analyst'
in the Department of the U.S. Air
Force - a common CIA cover position
at that time. From the USAF, he went
directly to the State Department as an
intelligence research analyst. He sub-
2 : ClitteRDP8040m4R064300560,03E-aong Kong,
Brazil, Mexico, and knows Spanish. 31
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
MILLS, Robert H.
(Administrative Officer)
Mills was born on November 3, 1937.
In 1967 he served as a public safety
program assistant /R-6 for AID in
Thailand, presumably involved in
creating its counterinsurgency police
programs. He subsequently served in
Indonesia (as "political officer/R-6)
and Kiev, U. S. S. R. He arrived in
Teheran in December, 1978 to re-
place Robert L. Gingles. Robert H.
Mills is a CIA officer.
MILLS, John Lamar
(Economic -Comae rcial Officer)
J. L. Mills was born on April 5, 1926
in Georgia. He previously served in
San Salvador, Banghazi, Venezuela,
and Bolivia. In 1959 he served as a
"research intelligence specialist", and
in 1969 attended the Naval War College.
He arrived in Teheran in December,
1978, to replace Roger E. C. Brewin,
another intelligence specialist.
HARARY, Joseph
(Commercial Officer)
Harary was born on December 28,1917
in New York. His first position in the
State Deja rtment was that of "intelli-
gence research analyst" in 1950. He
subsequently served in France, Dakar,
India, and Indonesia. He also did
stints in the AID and the Peace Corps.
From 1964 to at least 1974, his classi-
fication is that of Foreign Service Re-
serve Officer (R). Harary arrived in
Iran in December, 1978 to replace
David E. Westley.
BANNERMAN, Robert B.
(Regional Security Officer)
Bannerman was born on May 2, 1940.
He previously served in Peru; and in
Cambodia and Laos during the illegal
U.S. war in those countries. Follo-
wing Indochina, he served in South
Africa changing_f_rom a Foreign Ser-
vice Staff OffiMPMeet FaotiWpgy 2004/1
32
Service Reserve Officer (R) classifi-
cation.
METRINKO, Michael John
(Principal Officer, Tabriz)
Metrinko was born on November 11,
1946. He previously served as a
Peace Corps Volunteer teacher in
Turkey and Iran from 1968-73, then
suddenly became a Foreign Service
Reserve Officer/R-7.
TOMSETH, Victor L.
(Principal Officer, Tabriz)
Tomseth was born on April 14, 1941 in
Oregon. From 1964-65, he was a
Peace Corps volunteer in Nepal. In
1966 he was a Foreign Service Reserve
Officer (R-7) at the Foreign Service
Institute. From 1967-70, he .served
in Thailand during which time period
the U.S. was engaged in a massive
counterinsurgency in Indochina. He
knows Thai and Farsi.
Without taking a position on their
guilt or innocence, CounterSpy at
this time is not printing the names of
Iranian graduates of CIA connected
labor and police programs given the
on-going secret trials and summary
executions. The identities of these
Iranians are known to Iranians who
need to know for their own protection.
REFERENCES
1) Transcript of Press Conference of
January 26, 1979. As printed in the
New York Times (NYT), 1/27/79, p.6.
2) NYT, 7/9/78, p.10. Undercover
CIA officers who recently have been
directly involved with the shah and
SAVAK, both in and out of Iran, have
included: William Owens, Henry
Plastee, Donald Patterson, and Ro-
bert B. Phillips. (Cf.: Washington
0/12 : cm,RomsfqpiitapoolofagooDa-4A-17,
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
A-18). All four of these CIA officers
were involved in the CIA/Pentagon pro-
ject, IBEX which surveilled and re -
corded the activities of Iranian citizens
for SAVAK, the National Security
Agency (NSA), and the CIA. IBEX also
provided information to MOSSAD, the
Israeli intelligence agency. These
same four CIA, officers may have been
reactivated given the CIA's procedure
of reactivating officers with prior
experience in a given country, parti-
cularly during crisis periods such as
at the present time.
In the same WP article, Bob Woodward
reported that: "Fifteen CIA employees,
operating under cover as the United
States Advisory Team (USAT) draw up
and expand plans for the sophisticated
intelligence-gathering system." These
CIA-covering advisory teams are still
in Iran. As of February 27, 1979,
there were 20 U.S. Air Force per-
sonnel at a monitoring site near Kab-
kan; and, 150 Americans, including
30 USAF,personnel, at the monitoring
station/Behshahr (WP , 3/1/79, p. A-
13). While some of the U.S. per-
sonnel have been removed from the
monitoring stations, they have not
? all left Iran.
One final note on IBEX was that a
? wealthy Iranian, Abolfath Mahvi,
illegally obtained the IBEX contract
for Rockwell international through his
Aero Services Co. Ltd. (P.O. Box
1179, Reid House, Bermuda).
3) WP, 12/17/78, p.A-1.
4) NYT, 7/9/78, p.10
5) ibid. Some of the U.S. firrns that
hide CIA personnel in Iran have in-
cluded: Rockwell International, Honey-
well, Bell Helicopter International,
Hewlett-Packard, Watkins-Johnson,
and Electronic Data Systems (EDS).
Given this history of hiding CIA and
DIAlpersonnel, one must view with
concern the recent report that Iran's
new Armed Forces Chief of Staff,
Major General, Mohammed Vali Gharani
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 :
has "...left the door open for the re-
turn to Iran of American defense con-
tract personnel". (WP, 2/22/79, p.
A-19). An undisclosed number of these
employees are as close as Athens,
Greece, waiting to return to Iran.
6) NYT, 1/7/79.
7) WP, 12/17/78, p. A-1.
8) Halliday, Fred. "Iran: Trade Unions
and the Working Class Opposition",
Merip Reports , No. 71, v.8, Oct. ,1978,
p.11.
9) Washington Star (WS), 2/1/79, p. A-9.
The same WS article noted that:" ...
there are more than 1,500 Iranians
receiving military training here (U.S.A.)
including the Shah's son, a pilot, and an
entire submarine crew." This presence,
particularly the shah's son as a leader
is of concern given that:" The freight
handling facilities at McGuire Air Force
Base supporting Imperial Iranian Air
Force (IIAF) cargo operations is a
unique arrangement between the U. S.
Air Force and the IIAF." (Quote is from
USAF Colonel, E. Arcene McSmith, Jr.
in a letter to U.S. Representative
Millicent Fenwick, dated Jan. 25, 1979)
This "unique" military depot could
serve as a secret staging area for
attivating the 1,500 Iranian military
personnel, led by the shah's son.
10) ibid.
11) WP, 12/6/78, p. A-18
12) Demaris, Ovid, Dirty Business ,
Harper's Magazine Press, New York,
1974, p.178.
13) NYT, 1/7/79.
14) ibid.
15) WP 12/6/78, p. A-18.
16) ibid.
17) WP, 2/9/79, p.A-21. Of concern
here is that: "Brzezinski reportedly
favors a freer hand for the intelli-
gence agencies...." (WP, 2/14/79,
p. A-10).
18) WP, 12/15/78, p.A-1.
19) Christian Science Monitor, (CSM
1/31/79, p.2.
20) WP, 2/12/79, ?.A-l6. Huyser
CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
left iran on February 3, 1979 to the
chants of "Death to Huyser" (NYT,
2/5/79, p. A-2). Left in Huyser's
place, however, was a high-ranking
Pentagon official, Eric Von Marbod,
who has been in and out of Iran since
1975 (ibid.). Von Marbod has already
been involved in CIA projects in Iran
such as IBEX, and he has previously
been charged with corruption by
James Schlesinger, Jr. and even the
shah. (WP , 1/2/77) Obviously, his
presence in Iran is a matter of
serious concern.
Following Huyer's return, Joseph
Kraft, a CIA aficionado, reported
that Huyser was in Iran to hold "the
military men together in support
of Bakhtiar; (and) to strengthen his
hand the general carried a personal
message from Carter pledging
American support for the cohesion
and viability of the Iranian armed
forces... Thereafter Huyser bent
his energies to shoring up the
armed forces around Bakhtiar...
Privately, Carter told visitors he
expected Bakhtiar to prevail over
Khomeini and that, if necessary, the
armed forces would intervene to
maintain constitutional order." ?
(WP,2/25/79, p. B-7).
So much for Huyser's inspection of
spy equipment, and Carter's non-
interference in Iran!
21) Tully, Andrew, CIA: The In-
side Story , Crest Books New
York, 1962, p.8.
22) ibid.
23) WP, 12/17/78, p. A-1.
24) Tully, Andrew, p. 81.
25) WP, 2/9/79, pp. A-1, A-21.
26) CSM, 1/31/79, p.2.
27) Tully, Andrew, p. 80.
28) WP, 1/3/79, p. A-14. Two CIA
cortacts on this task force on Iran are
subcommittee chairpersons, Benjamin
Huger Read and Henry Precht who
formerly operated in Iran
On December 31, 1978, a disturbing
turn of events occurred in that this
CIA/Pentagon task force on Iran be-
came the executive arm of U.S.
policies for Iran. According to the
WP: "A turning point appeard to have
come December 31... where the focal
point for shaping many of the Ameri-
can pronouncements and operational
decisions on Iran was effectively
shifted from the White House to the
State Department, and particularly
to the interagency task force headed
by Undersecretary of State, David
D. Newsom." (WP, 1/10/79, p.
A-12)
29) The Biographic Register, 1974,
p. 276.
30) WP, 12/15/78, p. A-35.
31) WP, 1/18/79, p. A-16.
32) ibid.
33) NYT, 2/3/79, p.7
34) Walters, Vernon, Silent Missions,
Doubleday and Co., Inc. New York,
1978, p. 242.
35) WP , 12/20/77.
36) CSM, 2/5/79, p.13.
37) ibid.
38) ibid.
39) NYT, 2/8/79, p. l.
40) ibid.
41) ibid.
42) ibid.
43) ibid., p. 13-1.
44) NYT, 2/9/79, p. A-1.
45) ibid., p. D-3.
46) ibid., p. A-1.
47) ibid.
48) ibid., p. D-6.
49) ibid., p. A-1.
50) NYT, 2/8/79, p. D-3.
51) NYT, 2/9/79, p. D-3.
52) ibid.
53) WP, 2./17/79, p. A-1.
54) ibid.
55) ibid. , p. A-13
56) Kalb, M. and Kalb, B.
Kissinger, Little, Brown and
Company, Boston, 1974, p. 492.
as a politicalppffiveictFor Release 2004/10/12 : CF-RDilligi:C/1k411330.100350003-4
34
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
58)
59) WP, 2/9/79, p. A-21 .
60) WP, 2/7/70, p. A-14.
61) WP, 2/19/79, p. A-34.
62) Atlanta Journal (AJ), 2/20/79,
p. A-1.
63) WP, 2/16/79, p. 4-33.
64) WP Magazine, 2/11/79, p. 5.
65) NYT, 2/15/79, p. A-1.
66) WP, 2/16/79, p. A-33.
67) WP, 2/15/79,.p. A-15.
68) WS, ?
2/15/79 p A-16.
6 9 ) ibid.
70) ibid.
71) WP, 2/19/79, pp. C-1, C-11.
72) ibid.
73) WP, 2/16/79, p. A-1.
74) AS, 2/16/79, p. 18-A.
APPENDIX! UPDATE
Relative to reference # 5, it should
be noted that while Major General
Mohammed Vali Gharani has re -
signed, Iran's then-Defense Minister,
Admiral Ahmad Madani has disclose,d
he "would welcome back the return
of some (up to 200) Atricanrnili-
tary experts" and that "discussions"
are occurring between unidentified
Iranian military attaches and U.S.
officials in Washington, D.C. (WP,
3/28/79, p. A-1). The same Wash-
ington Postarticle revealed that
there are still 25 U.S. military ad-
visors, who served during the shah's
reign, "directly attached to the U.S.
Embassy"in Teheran, and that the
80, 000-men national gendarmerie was
to stay intact under the nominal hea-
ding of Ibrahim Jazdi who "is accused
by his adversaries of wanting to create
a national guard as a personal power
base."
Relative to Schlesinger's building
of an atmosphere conductive to U.S.
Approvea,ror Keiearse Luu4410/12 : eompaesr4iibmibtmontiton of
governmental .interverthonn L an.swaz
the selective release of a CIA report
which "painted a gloomy picture... of
the nation's ability to recover from
the loss of Iranian oil and warned of
major shortage, higher prices and an
economic slowdown". (WP, 3/22/79, p.
A-7). The CIA report stated baldly
that "the bottom line is that unless
Iranian production is soon restored to
a level of about three to four million
barrels per day, or 'oil consumption is
restrained, stocks will fall to abnor-
mally low levels by midyear. This will
inevitable lead to increased rationing
of supplies by oil companies, higher
prices, and curtailed economic
growth. " (ibid.) The same day the
Treasury Department warned that the
threat to national security, vis-a-vis
the world oil situation, is "greater now
than at any time in the past" (ibid. )
Even the title of the Post article -
"U.S. Imperiled by Loss of Iran Oil
Supplies, New CIA Report Claims",
rather played into the panic agitating
of Schlesinger.
Contradicting Schlesinger's propagan-
da is a recent article appropriately en-
titled: "Oil 'Facts' Don't Quite Match
the Rhetoric" (Richard Halloran, NYT ,
3/18/79, p. E-5). Halloran revealed
the following facts: 1) The Congressio-
nal Research Service has reported a
world-wide oil shortage of 80,000 bar-
rels per day, not the 500-800,000 clai-
med by Schlesinger. 2) "Respectable
challenges" to Schlesinger "suggest
that the crisis talk is overblown". 3)
During the Iranian oil cut-off, "demand
for crude oil arid its refined products,
such as gasoline, has risen only 1.9
percent" ; and supplies are up a solid
3..4 percent." 4) At this time, "an
average of 250,000 barrels a day less
than a year ago is being drained out"
of U.S. oil stocks. 5) "The basic
crude oil stocks appear to be quite
sufficient..., above the level of the
same period in 1977.. with stocks
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
domestic oil is up; imports of crude
oil are up - not down, despite the loss
of 900,000 Iranian barrels per day;
and imports of refined products are
up." 7) Gasoline "stocks appear
healthy, dropping from last year's
high to roughly the 1977 levels in De-
cember through February".
Despite the findings, Schlesinger is
continuing his propaganda campaign.
On March 30, 1979, he claimed be-
fore the House Energy and Power Sub-
committee that the U.S. faces a se-
vere lack of oil supplies which will
produce "spot shortages at a minimum
this summer." And these shortages
stem from the need to rebuild inven-
tories drawn down during the Iranian
crisis. (WP, 3/31/79 , p.D-8).
Two days after Schlesinger's tes-
timony the Washington Post published
the following statements which would
appear to put the lie to Schlesinger is
propaganda to create an atmosphere
conducive to U.S. governmental inter-
vention in Iran.
"Energy Secretary James R.
Schlesinger ha s said repeatedly that
the drop is production resulting from
the Iranian revolution caused a
world oil shortage of 2 million barrels
a day or more of that shortfall affec-
ting the United States."
According to a DOE memo, how-
ever, government analysts conclude
that during the first two months of
this year, world-wide production (in-
cluding OPEC) was 60.1 million bar-
rels a day compared with 57.3 million
36
barrels a day last year. (WP, 4/1/79,
p. A-1).
As John Berry concluded the "princi-
pal legacy" of the Iranian oil cut-off has
been "much higher oil prices". (WP, 3/29/
79, p. A-1).
An equally indefensible legacy, resul-
ting from Schlesinger's propaganda cam-
paign, would be justification for U.S. go-
vernmental intervention in Iran. As the
above analysis and exposition of facts have
indicated such a rational hs no bearing in
truth.
Finally, it should be mentioned that
William E. Colby, former CIA Director,
wrote vis-a-vis U.S. interference in
Iran that "At this juncture, it is time to
say a good word for 'interference!...
[and] some CIA-styled 'interference' has
been effective in support of America's
interests. In this context, then-, there
is a good word to be said for interference,
such .as discreet as sistanee given to the Shah
to activate the beneficiaries of the 'white
revolution'". (WS, 1/19/79).
Colby has directed criminal CIA inter-
ventions for more than 25 years. His
words can be legitimately considered as
reflecting an option being studied by the
CIA fora course of action in Iran. To say
the least, Colby's words are a caveat for
the Iranian people Colby, by the way, has
apparently taken a new interest in Iran and
was seen attending an educational series
on Islamism given by the Middle East In-
stitute and the Islamic Center in Washink- ?
ton, DC.
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Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
U.S.
Lebanese
Right
Robin Rubin
The Lebanese emigre community in
the United States has been organized in
venous political and cultural groupings
Its successful impact upon American
foreign policy has correlated with the
larger objectives of the United States
in th.e Middle East. The recent surge
of activity initiated by Lebanese
rightists and their American suppor-
ters, especially directed at Congress
and the White House, and, to a lesser
degree, the State Department and other
governmental agencies (paralleling
Zionist lobbying) has been a well-or-
chestrated campaign, organized by
the seven year-old American Lebanese
League (ALL). ALL was founded in
Columbus, Ohio by several right-
wing professional and business Leba--
nese-Arn.ericans and was transformed
into an aciive national lobbying effort
in May 1976, a critical period in the
Lebanese crisis. Because rightwing
and predominately Lebenese elements
discovered the National Association of
Arab-Americ App ebTved.A0 maltase 12,0 (14/10/12 AgrIkfipAcenctle3r
sympathetic to backing isolationist and
reactionary goals in Lebanon, the Mon-
seigneur Elias Hayek, now the Exe-
cutive-Director of ALL, generated
support to split from NAAA, and there-
by, forged ALL into a national organi-
zation. Robert Basil, a former Penta-
gon arms dealer during the Vietnam
60ria, and presently a consultant (along
with his brother-partner, Colonel Jack
Basil, a former lobbyist for the Natio-
nal Rifle Association and ardent ALL
supporter) in Robert Basil Internatio-
nal, Inc., assumed what was termed
"vigorously political and aggressive
leadership" last year of ALL. ALL
differs from other Lebanese organi-
zations in its focus on the American'
government and its mostly U.S. -Leba-
nese political concerns. For example,
the World Lebanese Cultural Union
(WLCU), whose American chapter is
based in Philadelphia and headed by a.
very successful car dealer, Anthony
Abraham, vaguely parallels the World
Zionist Organization in its structure.
The WLCU plays an important role (es-
pecially in Latin America) in registe-
ring Lebanese Christian emigrants
'for Lebanese citizenship to help main-
tain the Maronite position in the popu-
lation balance in Lebanon. (As ALL, the
WLCU has close connections with the
Lebanese "strident" right - the Pha
lange (Kata'ib) and the National Liberal
Party (Ahrar); unlike the more sophis-
ticated ALL, the WLCU which enjoys
Lebanese governmental support, dis-
tributes unsavory and racist tracts such
as The One White Race.)
ALL zealously subscribes to Anwar
Sadat's motto that the United States has
at least 99 per cent of the cards in its
hand vis-a-vis the Middle East imbroglio
and acts upon that assumption. Accor-
ding to a high ALL official, their
raison d'etre purports "to marshall the
thoughts and attitudes of the American-
Lebanese relations but alvig placing
le4Mgq9ainun 14. And
37
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ALL leadership and high-level staff is
characterized more by its espousal of
right-wing causes than a Christian ethos
of Lebanon. They have been able to
promote their politics because the
events in the Middle East have brought
the U.S. into increasing involvement
there; and various representatives of
the U.S. government have found incen-
tives to promote special interest groups
such as ALL.
ALL was able to transform itself
from an ineffective "cultural" organi-
zation to a well-financed political struc-
ture, precisely with the help of essen-
tially pro-Zionist, imperialist, and
Cold warrior Congresspeople and other
sympathetic members of the U.S.
Government. Despite its extensive
political activity, ALL is a tax-exempt
organization, which circumvents that
legality by operating political lobbying
arm, the American Lebanese Infor-
mation Center (ALIC). ALIC, whose
staff writes position papers and
supplies information to American
officials, conducts a slick PR oper-
tion, aimed at the government, media,
and other sympathetic elements of the
public. ALL and ALIC claim to repre-
sent 10,000 Lebanese-Americans of
approximately one-million of that
community living in the U, S. Informed
sources contest even this number, and
claim that it is grossly over-esti-
mated, as ALL is not a popularly-
based grass-roots organization, but
rather it concentrates on a small
nucleus of wealthy, conservative and
highly visible members of the Leba-
nese community. Its hierarchy and
obvious targets indicate that it ignores
mass political organization in regional
areas in favour of focusing on influen-
cing the U.S. Government to achieve
their goal of crushing their progressive
foes.
Another influential lobbying group
that works iApiirWelawaeilleitiels6 266/1/10/12 : CIA-R
ALIC, and in fact, is probably not in- an
tegrated with them only because of the
Foreign Agents Act, is the front for
the Chamounist Ahrar (National Libe-
ral Party), the Lebanese Information
and Research Center. LIRC, headed by
Ramsi Rahani, is almost totally fun-
ded by Ahrar and most of its staff are
Lebanese rightist officials in the Ahrar
in Lebanon. ALL, ALIC, and LIRC,
arranged a press conference that Re-
presentatives Abraham Ka zen, Lester
Wolff, Benjamin Gilman, Edward
Derwinski, Robert Drinan, and Hollen-
beck sponsored. Msgr. Elias Hayek,
Executive-Director of ALL and ALIC;
Alfred Madi, Secretary General of the
Lebanese Christian Forces (and on the
staff of LIRC); and May Rahani, Vice-
President of the Trans-Century Foun-
dation (and sister of Ramsi Rahani).
All conferees spoke about the posi-
tive role played by Israel in Lebanon
and how Lebanese democracy and its
laissez-faire capitalist system had
been ruined by the Syrian occupation
forces of the Arab Deterrent Forces.
Well-known pro-Zionist, anti-Soviet
and "liberal-imperialist" Senators and
Representatives such as Pat Moynihan,
Richard Stone, Clifford Case, Henry
Jackson, Edward Derwinski, Benjamin
Gilman, Jonathan Bingham, and Abra-
ham Kazen among others have ener-
getically supported rightist Lebanese
aims as they correspond with what
these people see as the best method
to further U.S. imperialist goals: the
"zionisation" of Lebanon; propping up
the pro-Western rightist cliques which
support foreign financial and economic
"cornprador" domination; and a trade-
linkage with the rest of the oil-rich
Arab world; and to serving as a mili-
tary bulwark to act on behalf,of Ameri-
can interests -- much the same role
Israel and (until recently) Iran have tra-
ditionally played in the Middle East
since the 1950s.
-ilimitRadnairnclutazaleli supporter
9YetiuMeeated his
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
interest in Lebanon often on the floor of
the Senate. A member of his staff said
Moynihan Was acting on commitment
that "one can't look at these as isolated
issues, but only as part of the involve-
ment of the rest of the radical states.
Syria's intentions are shown by Assad's
recent trip to the Soviet Union and
East Germany. Syria is trying to gain
control of Lebanon purely to push it
into becoming a confrontation state with
Israel" (despite the blatant evidence to
the contrary: when Syria intervened in
March, 1976, it was precisely to pre-
vent a Leftist take-over which could
have guaranteed Lebanon's becoming a
confrontation state. ) Moynihan's office
has worked closely with the ALL people
since the beginning of 1978, in a concer-
ted effort to remove the Syrians
from Lebanon. Their modus operandi
pivoted around basically three efforts:
mounting a public relations campaign di-
rected at the press, the Congress, other
governmental agencies and at the UN;
urging the State Department to pressure
? Saudi Arabia (though Moynihan's office
acknowledged their disgust with the
State Department's "insouciance and
lack of vision"); and more tangentially,
attempting to pressure the SALT talks
and trade negotiations. Moynihan has
spoken out most eloquently on behalf
of the "Lebanese democracy" on the
floor of the Senate and in New York City;
protested all legislation favouring _
Syria; sent wires and letters of de-
nunciation of Syria's actions in Lebanon
to President Carter, the State Depart-
ment and the U.N.; 'sponsored anti-
Syrian legislation in the Congress; hos-
ted luncheons in the Senate Office
Building featuring guest speaker Dory
Chamoun, the political head of Ahrar,
(the invitations were sent out on a letter-
head stationary of the Coalition for a
Democratic Majority, for which the
honorary co-chairmen are Messrs.
Moynihan and Jackson), and has been at
The degree of cooperation between
Moynihan's office and ALL is .,.,..,..strated
by the fact that ALLts president Basil
expected Moynihan to write President
Carter a letter that Basil had drafted.
The key points of the letter asked for
Carter's endorsement of the withdrawal
of Syrian military forces in Lebanon to
be replaced by the U. N., to remind the
proposed U.N. forces that they should
be particularly careful in areas where
Christians were minorities, and to
support the Lebanese central govern-
ment in efforts to disarm the Palesti-
nians, and only after that to ask other
groups to lay down their arms. For
some reason Moynihan was reluctant to
write precisely that letter, but did
comply by writing a tone-down version
of that missive. Moynihan was duly en-
couraged when Carter spoke later about
I5eace in Lebanon" at the Joint-Session
of Congress held to explain the Camp
David agreements; Moynihan stressed
that Lebanon would remain a problem
despite Camp David until Soviet in-
volvement had been addressed-- a point
often made by the Lebanese right.
The American-Lebanese rightist cam-
paign on the Hill. has paid off, both in
attention and in substantive action. Se-
veral months ago, ALL requested that
the sympathetic Chairman of the-Sub-
committee on Near Eastern and South
Asia/I:Affairs, Sen. Richard Stone, con-
duct hearings about the degenerating Le-
banese crisis. Witnesses included Basil
and former Lebanese Ambassador to the
U.S. Charles Malik, known for his
philosophical writings on the Christian
Mediterranean character of Lebanon and
for his links with the head of the Lebanese
Christian National Front, Camille Cha-
moun. Malik has been intimately asso-
ciated with the 1958 U.S. military inter-
vention in Lebanon that had saved Cha-
/noun's (then President of Lebanon) re-
gime from being overthrown. At these
hearings, Basil and Malik were pleaing
the general di siRAgroval -guf' Asitttaie)12be4/1 0/12 :feRt114014Bibel 150R000100360813036tb anon
39
Approved For Release 2004/10/12: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
from the Syrians and to reestablish de-
mocracy in Lebanon as it had existed be-
fore--code words for Christian, right-
wing, comprador -mercantile domination.
Despite the deviations from this subject,
it was ultimately agreed that the U.S. 'had
to do something to save the Christian
community.."
Representative Edward Derwinski, a
five-star Zionist supporter and frequent
liason with the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC), introduced
an amendment, striking the $90 million
aid for Syria in the 1978 House appro-
priations foreign aid bill. Though Le-
banese-American:Representatives Toby
Moffettand Mary Rose Oakas voted
against it, the amendment easily passed
in the House with partial thanks to the
Lebanese and Israeli lobbyists. The aid
was, however, retained by the Senate
aid bill and in the conference committee,
which directed the President to use it
at his discretion, but only if it aided
peace in Lebanon. It is also likely that
a heated campaign may develop to pro-
test or even to attempt to reverse the
approval to sell the Syrians L-100 air-
planes (the civilian version of the C-130
transport carriers), not unlike the
fierce battle over the Middle East arms
deal package.
In mid-October, Senators Dole and
Hillings introduced a resolution con-
demning the Syrian attacks on East
Beirut; on the House side, Rep. Bruce
Vento introduced a similar resolution,
which also called for immediate re-
moval of Syrian troops. This orches -
trated campaign resulted in proposed
legislation and public and written
attacks, coming from all levels of the
U.S. government. Pro-Zionist Clifford
Case spoke out against the "continued
deliberate and indiscriminate shelling
by Syrian forces in civilian areas" (the
areas where the Syrians were shelling
hardest and to which he was referring,
had accordiAorteb 4-68 f?oF ReglgetM514740/12 :
into military strongholds). Case also
Atl
spoke out against the L-100 decision
and the approval of the $90 million aid
to Syria (though Israel was awarded
$1.785 billion and Egypt got $750
million): "In the week and a half since
these two generous gestures of aid and
planes were made to Syria, the Syrians
have reciprocated by stepping up their
shelling and attacks on the Christian
community in Lebanon."
The Lebanese-rightist lobby has met
with a variety of governmental offi-
cials, beside the Congress: Vice Pre-
sident Mondale, representatives of the
White House, Department of Defense
and the State. The White House has
been barraged with pressure by them,
mainly through their Congressional
supporters. A letter in October was
sent by Senators Case, Moynihan, Bum-
pers, Packwood, Bentsen, Church,
Griffin, Sparkman, Stone, Clark, Pell,
Jackson, Cranston and Dole, applau-
ding the President for his intention to
request that the U.N. convene a
special session of the Security Coun-
cil because of the -deteriorating situa-
tion in Lebanon. They also urged the
President to seek an expansion of the
UNIFIL presence into Beirut in order
to replace the Syrian regular army for-
ces. Earlier, Derwinski and Bingham,
in a letter signed by over fifty House
members, asked Carter to demand
Syria's withdrawel from Lebanon. Re-
cently, Representatives Kazen, Abd-
nor, Wolff and Gilman sent a letter,
co-signed by 2.19 members of Congress,
condemning Syria and demanding it
leave Lebanon.
The State Department has shown the
least enthusiasm for this Hill-rightist
barrage of activity, paralleling their
position on other issues of the Middle
East. They hope to enlist support from
"moderate" Arab-Americin groups in
order to get as much credible Arab
support as possible for a final
Isr ael and
CIA-
gypt an per aps eVeVO'clan and
kg-o f/tOftto1WMe en
e R
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
Syria. Sen. Stone's office reported
that the Senator was distressed with
the State Department for not "laying
down the law" with the Syrians be-
cause of their misguided ideas that
Syria might still be brought into the
current Egyptian-Israeli peace nego-
tiations and that the Syrian peacekee-
ping force was better than what the
State Department believes is the alter-
native: chaos and anarchy in Lebanon.
Malik and Dory Chamoun have had fre-
quent consultations with State Depart-
ment officials. Chamoun candidly
characterized the State Department's
role in formulating U.S. policy in Le-
banon:
It is the end of the world when the
U.S. is too weak even to tell the Sy-
rians to get out. Some idiots in the
State Department -- I'm sorry to use
this term so loosely, but they are ab-
solute morons. Some of these people
still believe that they can get the
Syrians to accept the peace treaty."
Charnoun also blame s the current
troubles with Syria on State Depart-
ment design. In March, 1976, when
the Syrians saved the Christian necks,
Chamoun says:
"I was here in Washington when the
thing was told to me very blankly by
the State Department. They said:
Listen, you people, we cannot help
you. There is no Sixth Fleet. There
is no such thing as the gunboat any-
more. We can't do this sort of thing
any longer. But the only way we can
help you is by getting an Arab Force,
which will have to be composed main-
ly of Syrians to come into Lebanon
and to put an end to the fighting. And
we will be sort of co-sponsoring this
with the Saudis and the Egyptians and
others [the Israelis]. '. And this is the
only force that could be made avai-
lable. No U. N., no nothing. "
Dr. Elias Saady, an early sponsor
and founder of ALL offered his as-
tonishment at the lack of total U.S.
Approved For Release 2004/10/12
support, meaning the State Depart-
ment in particularly: "Why, is the
attitude of some parts of the U.S. Go-
vernment and other countries to-
wards the Lebanese Front and Re-
sistance, which is now being called
the Christian, so different than to-
wards other countries ? For, example,
the Hungarian,Resistance, the whole
world rose to these Freedorn Fighters;
why now are we ending up on the oppo-
site side ?" Chamoun answered that
by claiming that all the American
principles and morals have gone "right
down to the bottom of the oil well".
Saady further indicated his indignation:
"How can you accuse these people of
being criminals, thugs, fascists, when,
they are citizens of their own country
fighting an invader?" At this,' Cha-
moun lambasted another favorite bete
noire, Toby Moffett, who has main-
tained that there are thugs among the
Christians; "as if when you are fighting
an invader you have to wear gloves,"
retorted Charnoun.
The Lebanese rightist lobby's coa-
xing of the media has involved well-
organized press conferences, starring
Lebanese leader, Dory Chamoun and
Charles Malik (and dramatic phone
calls from Phalangist leader Gamayel
in the midst of the press conference
to bring the press up to date with his
version of the latest events in Beirut)
a.nd small press briefings, in which a
professional press kit is distributed.
An included clipping in this package
is an editorial "Maronites are part of
the Arab World", found in Events,
written by Salim el-Lozi, publisher of
Al-Ha-wadess and Events , and a well-
kn.own U. a- collaborator. It cannot be:'
ascertained how much influence this
lobby has exerted upon the media, ex-
cept that ALL admits contacts with .a.
wide range of influential columnists,
editors, and reporters. There has been
in the last few months an outpour of
ss acres
: C9AWORAM-44*Odibli3849001314
41
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
in Lebanon" (for which, French Foreign
Minister Louis de Guiringaud claims,
Camille, Chamoun "bears the principle
responsibility for the tragic events in
Lebanon" in his acceptance of "ill-
considered advice" from Israel, which
was encouraging the Christians to
attack the Syrians). This concern has
been expressed by such representatives
of the media as the Washington Post,
Washington Star, The New York Times,
the New Republic, Events , and nume -
rous columnists including the pro-Zio-
nist and liberal cold warrior, John
Roche. ALL has also been successful
in putting Basil and Malik on many news
-information programs.
Dory Chamoun, political head of
Ahrar, frequently speaks in Washington
and New York publicizing and lobbying
on behalf of U.S. political intervention
in Lebanon. At various stages of the
war, he has lambasted the Palestinians,
Communists and Syrians for their
destruction of Lebanon, while calling
for the reestablishment of the old Leba-
non. He spoke at a luncheon hosted by
Moynihan at the Dirksen Senate Office
Building, which press, several Sena-
tors and Congresspersons and a large
group of their aids attended. The -
major theme of his talk was that the
war in Lebanon was not a civil war,
but one of Lebanese fighting foreigners
- the Syrians and Palestinians (though
he did admit that the foreigners have
some native support in the Lebanese
National Movement and the "socialists").
He literally said that these foreigners
were hostile to U.S. interests in Leba-
non and the Middle East, and he could
not understand why the U.S. Govern-
ment did not do more. "The Syrian
takeover of Lebanon is a socialist
takeover, which is a change of
system from the old Lebanese econo-
mic laissez-faire". When asked what
the U.S. could do in this situation, he
replied "We can only ask the U. S. to
look seriousOlMoitEKUcia lisippeedatif)&10/1
42
Lebanon, and they should accuse who
is doing all the work. We would ask
them to get'Syria out of Lebanon and
replace it by whatever-- preferably
the U.N. or other Arab contingents"
(but Chamoun was also calculatingly
alluding to the landing of U.S. marines
in 1958 and did not rule out a repeat
performance). When he was further
asked about their military alliance
with Israel, he denied its existence,
but said cooperation was a "matter
of survival"."We'll grab anything to save
our necks and ask questions later."
He admitted that there had been ex-
changes of trips between the Israelis
and his group. "We do have Israeli
arms, as well as Egyptian arms"; but
he denied that Israel was supplying
them with U.S. arms; and if, indeed,
some weapons of American origin
should be found in Christian hands,
they were obtained from Egypt where
"they were found in the desert." In
another interviewwith Chamoun on .
the same subject, he said he could
not foresee Israeli troops intervening
again in Lebanon to help the Chris-
tian forces as "I don't think the Israe-
lis are going to offer such assistance."
Chamoun has claimed that his
group is not anti-Arab, only anti-
Syrian, as "the others mind their own
business". "All this talk about the
Muslims against the Christians, this
is the situation that the Palestinians,
Syrians, Soviets, and Commu-
nists have long been working for very
hard. But this has been going on for
hundreds of years; first between the
Turks and the Russians, then the
Turks and the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire. The power game has been
played by proxy in Lebanon via the
various minorities. " Chamoun con-
veniently forgot to mention that the
French and Americans have been
propping up Christian collaborators
for years. Chamoun's ire against Le-
2 : CIAIMPes-03814kbinA N346)01-iki 8 is ve-
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hement because f his cooperation
F7 /
with the Syrian ower:
"Sarkis does not dare tell the
Syrians to get out because, he's in
with them. ,They have been concoc-
ting this together. That is one reason
why Mr. Parker was ?a.ssassinated and
left in his trunk because Parker was in
the deal right from the beginning".
Chamoun, in a slip of his tongue, was
actually' referring to the assassinated
U.S. Ambassador Francis Meloy, who
was killed ,in Beirut in June 1976)
To underscore his distaste of what he
considers quizzling leadership: "I do
hope that Sarkis is about to go, not only
from the presidency, but physically as
well; that he will pxpire and leave this
world, not just the palace." Of Sarkis,
Chamoun says most derogatorily: "Not
all Christians are Christians, if yot
understand what I mean."
Myriad legislative activity, press
bombardment and the general lobbying
effort has successfully ended in poi-
tions of the Syrian forces in rightist
areas replaced by the Saudis, an
agreement that was worked out at the
seven-nation meeting of Arab ministers
in October, 1978, at Beit ed-Din, Leba-
non. At this meeting, however, Syrian
Foreign Minister Abd al-Halirn Khad-
dam stated that the central issue was
the Lebanese Christian ties with Israel.
He stated that Syria was determined to
end collaboration between Lebanon's
right-wing Christian militias and Israel
(a subject that has been hotly debated
by various factions of the right-wing).
The Arab ministers unanimously agreed
with Khaddarn.
ALL, ALIC and LIRC do not colla-
borate officially with AIPAC, but as
their goals most often coincide (as do
their patrons, the Lebanese Christian
right-wing and the Israeli Zionists),
they do work with the same sympathetic
Congresspeople, governrnental officials
and the media-- those., who advocate
Zionist and imperialist aims in the
Approved For Release 2004/10/1
Middle East. And the Palestinians and
Syrians are mutually detested. They do
coordinate efforts when their interests
merge, but carefully avoid the appea-
rance of general cooperation in tandem.
They are in regular contact with each
other, and one can regularly read in the
Near East Re-22EL, AIPAC's mouth.-
piece, about the legislation and activity
of pro-Lebanese rightists. At the
opening session of the Egyptian-Israeli
peace negotiations at the White House,
Basil was seen dragging over some of
the NAAA officials so that he could
introduce them to the Israeli Consular
General's delegation. Basil and Morey
Amitay, executive director of AIPAC,
work together on an informal basis, to
obviate criticism of blatant collabora-
tion between the two lobbies. Because
of the sensitive issue of Christian co-
operation with the Israeli anti-Arab
forces, ALL wants to avoid outright
appearances of being partners; and
they stress at any public meetings,
that ALL is not against the Palestinians.
The Palestinians are "fine and honour-
able people, but when they begin to act
like Lebanon was their state., then they
have gone too far," says a representatve
of ALL. Nevertheless, during an active
campaign on the Hill to push through the
Derwinski Amendment to cut off all aid
to Syria, ALL and AIPAC were frequent-
ly campaigning together. The mutuality
of their interests is clear.
Sen. Packwood stated in the Federa-
tion News of the United Jewish Agency
of Washington that the Israeli occupation
of Southern Lebanon had been favourable
accepted by the Lebanese Christians and
that they had not wanted them to leave.
Robert Basil and Judge Michael Saady of
Massachusetts, met with Prime Minister
Menahem Begin at the Waldorf Astoria
? in New York after the Camp David
agreements. They inquired about Israeli
support for the rightists, and Begin said
he sympathized with the Christian
community, and would not look kindly on
2 : CIA-RDP88-01314R0001003500034
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Approved For Release 2004/10/12: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
its elimination. But he expressed a wait
-and -see attitude Of whether the Israeli
government could militariiy, politically,
or economically further aid them, Judge
Saady and Basil, as representatives of
ALL have all() requested to speak to
the other two Camp David perticipants,
Sadat and Carter. In any case the U.S.
Israeli-Lebanese rightist alliance will
inevitable continue to cooperate in the
main theatre of activity in the Middle
East.
Recently, Sen. James Abourezk of
South Dakota, best summarized ALL
-ALIC-LIRC's constituency and where
' their true goals and concerns lie: "They
don't represent all the Maronites and
they certainly don't represent all the
Christians. What they represent is a
small right-wing minority wit,h a lot of
money, who are determined to use the
money and their alliance with Israel to
restore themselves to power."
FRG: Made
in the U.S.A.
Konrad Ege
In the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG = West Germany), there is one
U.S. soldier for every 260 citizens. U.S.
troops never left the FRG after World
War II; and at the same time, the U.S.
influence (Direr the FRG never ceased.
This influence, exercised openly for
many years, has been changing its ap -
pearence over the last years, especial-
ly since the founding of the Trilateral
Commission (TC)in 1973. The TC states
about itself that it was formed "by pri-
vate citizens of Western Europe, Japan,
and North America to foster closer co-
operation among these regions". In re-
ality, the TC is an institution con -
trolled by r SRPSHRVAPNrellet9fIV. *0409/12
44
multinational corporations and some
politicians, scientists, and journalists
who promote corporate interests and
strategies towards a common approach
to "world problems". (For the TC,
these problems are the continuing de-
cline of U.S. power and the rise of
progressive, democratic movements in
U.S. dominated countries.) The in-
fluence of the TC on world politics can
be seen by the fact that Jimmy Carter,
Walter Mondale, Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Cyrus Vance, Harld Brown, and Andrew
Young have all been members of the
TC.
The establishment of the TC makes
clear, once again, that the U.S. de-
sires a strong, capitalist Western
Eu-
rope, and they are putting their hope on
the FRG government, thus 'degrading it
to a client regime of U.S. interests in
Europe and limiting its autonomy se-,
verely.
The FRG governmental structure was
largely created by the U.S. Its politics
today are shaped by U.S. governmental
tools; the military, the CIA and other
intelligence agencies in tandem with
German capitalistic institutions, as well
as economic pressure. The FRG and
West Berlin are also used as bases for
U.S. espionage in Eastern Europe, and
for U.S. propaganda operations like
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
in Munich, and the Radio in the Ameri-
can Sector (RIAS) in West Berlin.
Since May, 1955, the FRG has been
a member of the NATO, an acknow-
ledgement of its independence. But
this "independence" is only "paper in-
dependence", because the FRG govern-
ment also entered into an agreement
allowing U. S. intelligence agencies
and the U.S. Military (for example, the
U,S, Army Operations and Researei
Detachment) to surveil citizens in the
FRG by opening mail and bugging
phones. The Confidential Communica-
tions Service monitors mail, and the
C147,1WPW1911314.13M90409(geivice in
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
Wiesbaden and the National Security
Agency-Section Europe, with more than
1,000 employees in Frankfurt, listens
to phones and monitors telegraph
communications all over the FRG and
West Berlin. These intelligence.orga-
nizations, in turn, work closely with
FRG security agencies.
The CIA is also supervising, and,
to some extent, controlling, FRG in-
telligence agencies such as the Bundes-
nachrichtendien.st (BND) which was
set up by the U.S. mainly out of Hit-
ler's Nazi spy organizations and fi-
nanced mainly by the CIA up to 1956.
Through the BND, the CIA also has
access to the FRG press, specifi-
cally to Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, Die
Welt, Welt am Sonntu, Deutsche Sol-
datenzeitung, and Bayernkurier (Ba-
yernkurier is owned by the conserva-
tive Christian Social Union). (Reinhard
Gehlen, The Service, World Publishing,
New York, 1972, p.187). Additionally,
as the then-editor in chief of the maga-
zine Quick reported in January, 1974,
some 120 FRG journalists are colla-
borating with the BND (Frankfurter
Rundschau, ,10/24/74).
According to former CIA officer
Philip Agee (frankfurter Informations-
dienst, 1/31/76), the CIA is also a
tradi tional supporter of the major pol-
itical.parties (Social Democrats and
Christian Democrats) and trade unions
in the FRG and West Berlin. At the
same time, the CIA certainly appre-
ciates the information it gets from
the FRG intelligence on FRG politi-
cians. Given the U.S. interest in the
FRG and West Berlin, it is no sur-
prise that the CIA station there is its
biggest in the world.
In realizing these interests, as the
above mentioned facts illustrate, the
CIA and other U.S. governmental agen-
cies have violated the soiiereignty of the
German people - and continue to do so.
Because key FRG governmental offi-
cials and inte114ence ame
proveu-r 61rclkWagir2004/10/12 :
been compromised by the CIA, Coun-
terSpy is publizising the names and
activities of the following U.S. go-
vernmental employees in the FRG.
The U.S. Embassy in the FRG (Deich-
manns Aue, e300 Bonn 2, phone 02221-
89 85) is not the main cover for the CIA.
Instead, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense for International Security
Affairs and the U.S. Army Europe/Re-
gional Survey Unit are utilized as covers.
Hence, the following list of U.S. citizens
working in the U.S. Embassy in Bonn,
who have worked as CIA officers, indi -
cates only a few of the dozens of CIA
officers operating in the FRG.
CARVER, George A., Jr.
(born: 1/14/30)
Attache
Fritz-Erler-Str. 21
5300 Bonn'l
Cerver was stationed in Saigon, Vietnam
as "industry advisor" from 1958-60.
Previous to that he was a program ana-
lyst in the Department of Army,
which, according to John Marks ("How
to Spot a Spook") is "almost a certain
tipoff" for someone being a CIA officer.
In addition to that, Carver is listed as a
Foreign Service Reserve Officer (R),
which is commonly used as a cover for
CIA officers. Finally, although suppo-
sedly a State Department officer, Carver
is not listed in many of the State Depart-
ments Biographic Register after 1961.
ROTH, Robeit H.
(b. 5/8/27)
Attache
Martin-Luther-King-Str. 13/3
5300 Bonn 2
phone 37 57 65
Roth served previously in Austria, Cze-
choslovakia, and Lebanon.
VAN DER RHOER, James Philip
Second Secretary, Science and Technology
Europastr. 17
5300 Bonn 2
phone 37 54 17
ofArR6PI8?1417M21140.00114)0050303454:1 in
Switzerland.
45
Approved For Release 2004/10/12: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
The following U.S. citizens, stationed
in the U.S. Embassy in Bonn or in
other U. S. Missions in the FRG or West
Berlin, have collaborated with the CIA
in a functional capacity. Given this fact,
it is possible that they might be reacti-
vated to perform services with the CIA
and/or other U.S. intelligence agencies
which makes them of concern to the
German people.
ANDERSON, David
(b. 1/3/37)
Assistant Chief of Mission, West Berlin)
Anderson has served in Yugoslavia, Mali,
West Berlin, Bonn, and at the NATO
headquarters in Brussels. (German
speaking).
KIRK, James H.
(b. 9/10/23)
Attache, Information Section
Martin-Luther-King-Str. 9
5300 Bonn 2
phone 37 35 64
Kirk has worked with the Peace Corps
in Ghana and with AID in Nigeria.
DALY, John J., Jr.
(b, 9/19/23)
First Secretary, Exchange Program
Martin-Luther -King -Str. . 3
53.00 Bonn 2
phone 37 48 40
Daly has partcipated in intelligence
work with emigrants from Eastern
Europe. In1965/66 he toolx. a Russian
language course in Garmisch Parten-
kirchen, and was stationed afterwards
in Yugoslavia, Austria, and Bonn.
(German speaking)
FRISBIE, Norman H. *
(b. 6/13/31)
Political Officer, Munich
Friable has served in England, Poland,
Lesoto, Czechoslovakia, and in an un-
specified position in the Department of
Army (which is.often used as a cover
for CIA officers). (German speaking)
Approved For Release 2004710/12
46
HERMBERG, Edward S.
(b. 6/1/24)
Attache, Financial Section
Martin-Luther-King-Str. 21
5300 Bonn 2
phone 37 48 46
Hermberg, who was born in Germany
in 1924, was - according to the State
Department's Biographic Register, 1966
- naturalized as a U. S. citizen in 1944,
while he was a member of the U.S.
Army. Herrnberg has worked with
CIA and the NATO. (German speaking)
SMYSER, William R.
(b. 11/17/31)
Attache, Political Section
Martin-Luther-King-Str. 38
5300 Bonn 2
phone 37 57 12
Srnyser, as a natural consequence of his
intelligence positions, has worked in
conjunction with the CIA throughout his
career. He served twice in the National
Security Council (an executive arm of
the CIA) and was stationed in Vietnam
from 1964-66. (German speaking)
LEHMANN, Wolfgang J. *
(b. 9/18/21)
Consul General, Frankfurt.
Lehmann, who was born in Germany,
joined the U.S. Army in 1942 and sub-
sequently became a major in the Mili-
tary Intelligence Service (MIS). He la-
ter worked in the State Department and
was detailed to the Army War College
in 1964. From 1965-68 he served as a
State Department liaison officer to the
MIS. Prior to the FRG, Lehmann was
assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Saigon,
Vietnam as a counsellor in March, 1974.
(German speaking)
LEHOVICH, Vladimir
(b. 9/28/39)
First Secretary) Political Section
Thueringerstr. 10
5300 Bonn 2
phone.37 89 00
: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
Lehovich has an extensive history' of
intelligence and intelligence related
work, and speaks Russian.
MILLER, William F. *
(b. 7/13/25)
Consul General, Stuttgart
Miller has been assigned to France, Lu-
xembourg, Belgium, the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament ,Agency, the
Ivory Coast, and Madagascar.
SCHIFFMAN, Irving I.
(b. 11/27/18)
Consul General, Bremen
Schiffman has been stationed in Munich,
Hamburg, Frankfurt, Rumania, Poland,
and Bonn. (German speaking)
*
SEMLER, Peter
(b.6/10/31)
Political Officer, West Berlin
Semler has collaborated with the CIA
throughout his career and held the po-
sition of intelligence research analyst.
(German speaking)
*
Propaganda, or more correctly, psycho
logical warfare, is an integral corn-
ponen of the CIA's affront and subver-
sion of a targetted society implemented
during war and peace. The following
U.S. citizens have participated in CIA
connected propaganda operations.
BRAYCICH, Joseph N.
(b, 5/31/22)
First Secretary, Information Section
Europastr. 17
5300 Bonn 2
phone 37 87 47
Braycicki has worked for the Voice of
America (V. O. A. ) in the 1960's, at
which time V. 0. A. was a CIA project.
(German speaking)
CLYNE, John P.
(b. 3/14/28)
First Secretary, Information Section
Martin-Luther-King-Str. 7/3
$300 Bonn 2
phone 37 59 66
Clyne participAgenifegsFynNegiCSIM19"
tions. (German speaking)
fare operations in Vietnam during the
U.S. 's illegal war there,
DICKERMAN, C. Robert
(b. 11/29/36)
First Secretary, Information Section
Martin-Luther -King -Str . 7
5300 Bonn 2
phone 37 59 70
Like Clyne, Di ckerrnan was active in
psychological warfare operations in
Vietnam.
KLIEFORTH, Alexander A.
(b. 12/31/18)
Attache, Information Section
Martin-Luther-King-Str. 40
5300 Bonn 2
phone 37 46 46
Klieforth was a program manager for
the V.0. A. , when it was a CIA pro-
ject. He also served as Director of
the Radio in the American Sector (RIAS)
in West Berlin, another U.S. propa-
ganda operation. (German speaking)
KOHL, Walter A.
(b. 3/6/22)
First Secretary, Press
Martin-Luther. -King-Str. 15
5300 Borm 2
phone 37 41 77
Kohl served for four years in the V. 0. A.,
when it was a CIA project. (German
speaking)
KRAMER, Wilford L.
(b. 5/3/19)
Public Affairs Officer, Stuttgart
Kramer participated in CIA-connected
psychological warfare operations in Viet-
nam. He also attended the Air War
College. (German speaking)
WARNER, Robert B.
(b.1/23/22)
First Secretary, Cultural Affairs
Martin-Luther-King-Str. 11
5300 Bonn 2
phone 37 43 88
Warner has served as an intelligence re-
search specialist in the State Depe.rt-
2 : eptapam-pi13 g0 SWPAilla opera-
*
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100350003-4
[The information about these officers is
as of October, 1978, unless indicated
with an asterisk (*) in which case as of
July, 1978.1
Traditionally, the U.S. has trained
police officers from "friendly" count-
ries; from 1962-75 they used the Off ice
of Public Safety (OPS). Through this
program, three FRG police officers
were trained: Rudolf HAERLE, Armin
KATZ, and Claus Walter SCHECK. They
attended courses in the International
Police Academy (IPA) in Washington,
DC and the Border Patrol Offices (BPO)
in Los Fresnos, Texas..
At the IPA, they were instructed in
the use of modern weapons and counter-
insurgency. At the BPO, also known as
the CIA's bomb school, they were in-
structed in the defensive and offensive
application of explosives. Both the IPA
and the BPO were subject to varying
degrees of CIA control and students to
recruitment as CIA assets.
In early 1978, the booklet, "CIA In-
sider: News Of The Facts From The
Agency Files" began appearing
throughout Europe, the United States,
and probably elsewhere.
Following several investigations,
we proceeded to reference the names
of journalists from this publicly-
available booklet on pages 22 and 53
of our December, 1978 issue. At
press time we received information
questioning the truth of various as-
pects of the booklet. We immediately
blackened-out the two lists and
additionally inserted a printed, re-
tracting statement. We took all rea-
sonable steps available to us at the
time to retract the lists. However,
we reaffirm the retraction of these
names and apologize for any incon-
venience to those involved.
CounterSpy expresses a special and
warm thanks to Allen Ginsberg and City
Light Books for permission to print
Allen's poem which we feel confirms
that there hassa be a CounterSiy.
The Magazine For People
Who Need To Know
cowiTERSpy
Th. ZIA is MS ii4WPga Ls.
111.1 Gowan ;Oh. C41.150.0.41,M1
C......dmiane or OPRA Ate..
tC,N Aisres?
Iticonows
d For Release 2004/1
"The CIA's nemesis"
Newsweek
-.Counterspy is self-descrtbed as a source of analyses and
Information on the practices, orgentzallon and o es of
U.S. Intelligence."
Federal Bureau of Investigation
"shocking. . . paranoic . cynical"
William E. Colby,
former CIA Director
aVol 2, issue 4 0
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dVol 3 issue .3 0
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