INTERVIEW OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BY STROBE TALBOTT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01314R000300150016-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: January 24, 1978
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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STROBE TALBOTT
76/
TIME
888 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20000
orFICE. (Sox) 268-4900
RESIDENCE, (202) 462.2002
INTERVIEW OF ADMIRAL STANSFITLD TURNER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BY
TIME r'14AGAZjlrL -R F E S}
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P R O C E E D I N G S
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what else the media are saying that is
incorrect. I regard
him as ,A poor manager of people. I have been in the people.
managing profession.for over 30 years, and Number One, I
don't think you can.have the record of success I have had in
the military without being a good people manager, and I ;pride!
4/hat people are saying in articles like this is,..
everybody isn't happy out at the CIA today, and that is
correct, but they are working, they are working hard, and they
are in better conditions today than they were six months ago,
before I made some of these changes, and we are going to be
effective out there, and over the long haul I predict we will
be happy, too, but what do you people want? Do you want
happy spies or do you want effective and well-controlled
spies?
The media have gone overboard in listening to the
gripers who have lost their jobs. It is unfortunate. I
don't like to ask people to lose their jobs, but it had to
be clone in the name not only of short-term effectiveness, but
in the name of the long-run good of the agency. In fact, we
mig.hL not have an agency of any effectiveness in five or ten
years i f we don't clo something drastic with tie personnel
situation, and it won't Ise long before it (lawns upon the
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35-year-olds in the organization that what I am doing is a
tremendous boon to them, the future of the CIA.
INTERVIEWER: In the sense that?
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ADMIRAL TURNER:
Today, in the four-top super-
grades of the agency, between three.of:them, there is only a
one-year spread in the average age of all the people in each
grade. We have pushed some marvelous people who came into
this agency in the wake-of World War Two and the Cold War
through the system, and they are all up at the top, and they
are all there, 50 years of age, and when they go, Strobe, in
a few years, as they will --- the average retirement age is
52 -- there is going to be a great void, so I am cleaning
some of that out and making room for the 35-year-olds to
begin moving, so that when we have to fill all those places
up there, we have people who have got some experience.
Otherwise, I am just going to have to jump them, because
there is a big difference.
If Time Magazine has all its
17 it
in a three-year period, you
presidents
to Newsweek and U.
World Report and a lot of other places, and you get good
/" 21 !i vice presidents. I can't do that in the
that has had these reductions in force. I cannot go out on
the street and get a trained spy. I have got to grow them
So, this painful process, which really was a small
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percentage cut of those who were forced to leave, is not
because I am mean and not a good people manager. It is
because I am really looking after the long-term people
for the 1980's and 1990's, because all these old fellows are
::interests, or I am not going to have trained, capable leaders
going to retire, all atone time, because they are all
bunched,up there... End of.speech.
I resent the s?pekficiality with which people are,.
passing judgment on what is good personnel management.
Because people gripe doesn't mean they are not being wel:L-
II
iI i m'~n cl "'t b 4- ~ 1'f
a
o
to o
..
g
Jc . in is not to make people happy.
If you can do that and be effective and have their respect,
that's great, and I will get there, and I'll guarantee you I
`' ,I will get there. You are writing your story a year too early,
but I atn going to get effective, and I am going to get their
respect, and then I'll get their happiness.
IUJTERVIEUER: Well, you understand that what we
are doing here is reporting, not passing judgment so much
ourselves.
shallow reporting, because
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there are no facts behind it. what are the facts behind that
statement that I an a poor people manager?
INTERVIEWER: These is widespread controversy and
criticism, and I hasten to add something that I pointed out
in one take in the story that I have already sent out, which
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is that every single one:of your predecessors,. especially
during the time of troubles'that has prevailed at the CIA
for the last five or six years, has had more than he con-
sidered his share of controversy to deal with. This happens
There are three charges made against you, and this
one of them. The other is that. you were, you know, empire
building, and trying to make yourself an intelligence czar
last year. I think I know the counterargument to that. I
LiiuL your
sweep or whatever you want to call it of the DDO was
s.
l= unnecessarily brutal or insensitive, or something like that.
Is Those are the three charges, and lots of people say
it, including people fairly high --- not the highest, but {
l3 ti at high levels in the relational Security Council and State
Department, and other than just at the agency. So, it is
something we have to report. That is our feeling on it.
ADMIRAL TURNER: You ought to put it in context.
You are getting mainly the gripes of those who were asked to
leave. I-low do you dismiss 212 people in a nice, pleasant:
way? You can go out on the street and talk to lots of those
212, and they have all got a different way, but "when you get
down to the bottom line, because I have talked to a lot of
there, the bottom line is, I wouldn't qo. You'd qo, and you'd
go, but I wouldn't go. That is the bottom line of how they
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would make it more pleasant, and in addition, the ones who
.get out on the street in an unprofessional way talking with
the media about their complaints have said it was cold. Each
one was addressed by his superior.: He wasn't given a two-
sentence letter. He was given a personal interview, of
which the letter was then-simply an affirmation that he had
go look. in the ' rest :of the agency for replacement, and he
will get a nice letter, when the time. comes if we:.don't,place
him elsewhere, but:-he was given a personal notice that he was
going. Nobody tells about that, because they are all unhappy.
It wasn't done as brutally as everybody says, and
it is just ironic that the media are so enthusiastic about
all these good old experienced spies who brought you all the
things that you railed against for all those years, and now
the fact that they are being asked to retire under a special
retirement program that the Congress set up just to ensure
ti that in an organization like this, where you must grow the
new executives from within -- you can't go outside -- that
`
you you have a pruning process at the top to make room for that
It is very similar to the military, who can't go outside and
get admirals and generals from the business world, and they i
11 have a pruning system. It is different. It is more
established. It is more understood.
The problem I have is that this is a new, youncr
organization. It is 30 years old.. It has never worried Let
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about its personnel situation for the long haul. You can..
run for 30 years holding your breath, and that is what we've
done, with excellent people, but they only last so long, and
there is a void now at the top. That is, there is a per--
,.ceivable..void coming-at the top,-and I am taking the action
to set up a.personnel management system, of which this:.is
just the first step, the most painful part of the step, that.
runfor.the long run, on an . endurance. run, until
we have intelligence for this country when your children.are I
interviewing my successor's successor's successor.
INTF.'RVIEWER: Maybe if I could. break in a little
bit, Strobe explained this article extremely well yesterday
I just haven't had a chance to talk to you -- and said that
this part of the article, DEC) cuts and past abuses, they
hope will be a very minor part. Maybe you can tell the
Admiral a little bit about that, as you did with Jack
yesterday, the kind of thing you have in mind.
INTERVIEWER 1: Yes,- I. would like to. : Right. . Let
me sketch what we are trying to do. Let me also say that
I can't say mea culpa on behalf of the magazine for including)
a sentence like that. It is a privilege to he able to sit
down with a hirfh Administration official so shortly after he
has had a chance to read an article about hint in Time
??1Igazine. I don't 1-now whether I should be glad or unhappy
I that only one sentence, has a red line on it. Maybe there are
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44
give me a dictionary. okay, go ahead. I'm sorry.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I didn't complain about over-
'f weeninq because I didn't understand it. You will
lots of others that would have orange lines or something.
ADMIRAL TURNER: That is the only one that bothered
me. I don't mind being criticized, and I don't do everything
_2 _L
INTERVIEWER 1: Well, criticism is part of the stor
and it is up to us to put it into-context, and part of puttin
this into context we'will now be able to do better as a resul'
of some stuff that Herb. and Dennis gave me yesterday, on the
background of the DDO thing, the fact that you inherited this
ADMIRAL TURNER: I didn't even propose the cut.
INTERVIEWER 1: -- from your predecessor, and so
on, and the fact that of the 820, only 45, is it, are
actually in any sense fired, the first 212, and that many
others are going to be relocated or retired, and so forth ands
so on, and if we spend any time on that at all, we will put
that into context, but the subject of our cover story is not
Stansfield Turner and whether he is overweening, or what kind!
of a people manager he is. It is what kind of --
INTERVIEWER 1: I am not sure it is entirely
uncomplimentary. I think you probably have to be -- to the-
e:;ten4 that I understand the word, you probably have to he
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overweening in a job like that or in the job you left.
We want to look at your --
ADMIRAL TURNER: You are going to get me off of
that, are you?
INTERVIEWER 1 Yes. We want to ask some big
questions, such as, what kind of intelligence community
should.a democracy have, specifically the United States, in
the ;late seventies and -1980's?.' What kind is it likely to
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have as a result of the constraints and the convulsions, the
constraints that have been imposed arid the convulsions that
it has undergone, during the last four or five years? That
really is the subject of our story. To the extent that there
is a face to attach to that story, it is yours, because
assuming you aren't on your way -out the back door within the
next couple of months -- and I believe on the basis not only
of what you have said, but what I have heard elsewhere in
town, that that is not the case, that you are going to be
around for a while.-- you are the guy who is going to have
to preside over at least an initial answer to those cluestions,i
and that is what I want to talk about.
AL) IRAL TURNER: Okay. I can describe it for you
in four sentences.
IrJ'1'1!RVIE IER l: Okay, shoot.
AD11IIZAL It: has got to be a well-coorjmated
operation across the many agencies involved in it. I t has
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has got to be an organization that operates under a system
of checks and balances, oversights and controls such that
got to be an organization that encourages differing and
dissenting interpretations. It has got to be an organization
that is as open as possible with the American people, and it
6 11 the American people have assurance we are doing what we are
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supposed to do and not doing what we are not supposed to do',
but with latitude within that ethical, legal constraint to
do the job effectively.
I believe that with the Executive order that was
} signed today by the President, with the spadework that has
countries can. no longer compete across the full spectrum of
r'? ` 22 perhaps
there is no way any other country besides
Union can have the type of intelligence
that we do, because it is so costly, so technical. Small
been doing on for the last 12 months under this Administra-
tion, we can achieve all of those objectives, but it won't be
easy. It is going, to take another couple of years of shake-
down, first to turn the Community into a true community --
my first point on coordination. Intelligence that we are
judging in your terms that you mentioned, Strobe, is not --
we are not building a system teat is fit for a democracy. We
are building a system that is fit for the largest democracy
in the world, and the difference in intelligence today from
.j many years past is,
intelligence operations that we do, so we bear a particular
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responsibility today to the whole free world.
do, but that causes us special problems that people
;:frequently don't understand in
because you
result of the new authorities that have in fact been mine
since August, when the Presidential decision was made of which{
I was it. It is a good budget. It is a tight budget. It
the order today was the embodiment, that the Community,
whether they be housed in Defense, or the State Department,
or the Department of Energy, or wherever it may he, want to
pull together, and are. doing so better.
I an very, very encouraged with this aspect of it.
I have put together the first budget that a DCI, Director of
Central Intelligence, put together without being conunitteed.
was hotly debated within the Intelligence Community,but it
ended up in an amicable situation in which people's interests!
were well represented, and I don't think anybody went away
disgruntled that he hadn't had a fair day in court.
We have a long way to go yet, to tie all these
ends together, to be sure that what everybathr is doing is
coordinated So that you don't drop between the cracks,, so
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I am not denigrating. other intelligence organiza-
Some of them are superb,--'I am-talking about free
now -- in.their own areas, but none have the breadth
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you don't waste the taxpayers' money by duplicating, so that
6
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when one person collects some information-,that-another one
needs., that it gets there.
The secondpoint. I.think we are making progress,
in the analytic side. I am very proud of some of the
national estimates we have done. It is s-a shame I can't
discuss them in detail in unclassified form, but I can assure.
you that we. have undertaken in the last six months some of
the difficult analyses, like the one that led to the Team A-
Team 13 fiasco last year at this time, and we have brought
together the Community's talents on these in a way that has
led to a harmonious resolution of the differences without
turning out pablum, without turning out intelligence by
compromise.
Where there are dissenting views, they are clearly
stated, but we haven't had people at each other's throats.
We have sat down, and I have forced people to say that we --
very few footnotes, which is the usual way of expressing
dissent. I am opposed to that. I want the dissent to be in
the text. I want the primary view to h- stated -- we
believe there are 22. missiles in this situation -- and then
I want the dissenting view -- we believe that there are .15
missiles in this situation. The reason for these differences
iS the .fol'l.o~uing, A, 13, C. Do you see what I mean? In that
way the dissenter's view is read by the reader, not just
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tucked in the corner, but.that way the'dissenter must also
express his reasons in the same terms as the assenter, if.
you see what I mean, and the reader may-compare them easily.
We are making real progress on this, and some of
the estimates that we have done in recent months, I believe,
general way,'but less general than you just have? What sort l
them in detail, but can you discuss them in any sort
INTERVIEWER: Well, you can't, of course, discuss
are exceptionally --
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, take the strategic balance,
the issue that was Team A-Team B of last year. We have
redone that. I will he briefing it to Congress starting
14 tomorrow. The dissenting views are there, but. they are
f .
1 clean laid out so that can
clearly people grasp them. There isn't
a.
15 '~ff this acrimony that existed last year, where people just took
.17 extreme positions in order to be sure the compromise came
were forced to write them down concretely. Those we couldn't
resolve, we have left and clearly elucidated.
out as close to their position as they could.
People have taken what they think is their position.,
We have been able to resolve some of them, because they were
really more of emotion than they were of substance when they
On top of that, we have found better ;,ways to
illustrate the comparisons of these forces.
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On m third angle, I am
my just so proud of what we
have contributed in the last nine months to the public debate
on major issues by a policy of greater openness. Look at
this morning's newspaper. One of them had a big, long story
about Soviet oil extraction problems. We triggered that off
last April by releasing. a. study on the Soviet oil problem.
Now it-has been germinating. People have been attacking it.
.People have been supporting it. Here is one that comes out
this morning-that comes to all the same conclusions and says
we're wrong. That's fine.
We put out a study on the Soviet economy and its
prospects, several of them, as a matter of fact, a study on
international terrorism, a study on the world energy situa-
tion, and all these have given the taxpayer a return on his
money for investment in intelligence. We have not compro-
of national debate on these key issues.
mised our central information base or the way we get our
information, and in my opinion we have enhanced the quality
I intend to keep on with this program. I will be
criticized sometimes for supporting the Administration's
policy, and I will be criticized sometimes for, not supporting
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it. I am'not doing either. I am giving the information that
we have.
Finally, I a-.u very encouraged by the progress we
have made in the oversig?it ~ireas. Our relationship with the
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 9 to now so that we don't get bandied back and forth between
10 two or three Committees who want to pull us in different
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I directions. Ile have somebody we can go to and say, I've got
12 a problem with another portion of the Congress, will you
13 help me? But they are also conducting very thorough over-
11a sight, and I am confident from the way this has evolved over
lu this past year that when we write the new charters, which
will be the legislative enforcement of many of the things
" that were signed today by the President in an Executive
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two Committees of Congress is very good, but "good" should not
be interpreted to mean anything but an oversight, and over-
view process. We report to them. They interrogate us.
They quiz us. But also, that process is very helpful to us.
We get a feel for what they, representing the people of this
country, want us to do,- and what bounds we can operate in.
We get advice. We get support when we need it
with other parts of the Congress.. We have a body we can turn
Order, that we will find the right balance between too much
control and too little, because there are clear risks in the
process of oversight.
_~-~--- `1 The first risk is that we will end u with
rte,; `` intelligence by temerity. We won't take any risks, because
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somebody might criticize us. The second is exposure. If
you } ave too many people Viewing a sensitive operation, it
may get blown into the public, and cost somebody's life- or
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abort the operation or whatever, but I have found under-
standing in the Congress with regard to how we set up the
rules for the disclosure, and I think they are finding that
we are. able to give them what they need for oversight while
retaining enough control to protect people and interests that
are vital.
INTERVIEWER:.' Could we talk about that for
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minute? I think.if there is a concern, a widespread
about the future of American intelligence, it is probably
focused on the whole area of covert action, and not on
whether the world's richest democracy -- whether it is the
largest or not I dont know -- is capable of gathering
information and analyzing it. It is a question of whether
the United States has left itself with what Bill Colby used
to call some option in between a diplomatic protest and
sending in the marines.
There is a widespread perception -- perhaps it is
a misperception -- that. the answer is, no, it hasn't left:
itself with that option, and that the Community over which
you preside is crippled in that respect.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I neither think it is crippled nor
14
that there is going to be undue emphasis on it. You are
treading a fine line in between. In the past, the country
not only wan tce~d us to collect iritell igence, they wanted us
to influence the events that we were getting intelligence
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about: Iran:-- Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, and all those that
tried to use the Central Intelligence Agency to take
political action to effect:the outcome of events. I don't
think the country wants: that much interference in other
people's affairs by:covert means today as it has in the past.
I don't think it is as effective today as it was in the past,
and frequently it was not effective in the past, as you well
The batting average is not. big league. But I am
dedicated_to'preserving for this country the capability to
turn to political action when, Number One, it suits the
purpose, and Two, it is properly authorized.
That doesn't mean by the intelligence people.
This is not intelligence business. This is an adjunct to
our business. It fits with it. We are the best qualified
to do it, but it is not our profession. We are happy to do
it when the country wants us to.
INTERVIEWER: The country in the person of the
President?
ADMIRAL TURNER: And the Congress. Congress passed
a law called the Hughes-Ryan Amendment which requires that wel
notify them when we are undertaking covert action, so there
A'`1 is a double check.. on anyone doing covert action in this
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.1 country. One is the whole National Security Council process,
culminated in the person of the President, and the other then
are the C onr.littee.; of the Congress, who are to be notified of
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 ADMIRAL: TURNER: It is.still theoretically eight
14 ;~ INTERVIEWER: There are two, one for each House?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes; That we will be able to
Committees spread the word to those others who need it.
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this and can presumably find ways to register objections
they feel as appropriate.
So, I think there are adequate controls. I will
certainly admit to you that I have some concern about undue.
amount of notification. I would like to see us notify fewer
Committees of the Congress, because you can't start an action
like this and in the middle of it have it go public.
INTERVIEWER: Is it. still eight?
that the Committees are understanding, and we hope that as
these Intelligence Committees get well established, and they
have representation from the other six Committees, if you
see what I mean --- the members overlap.
do less formal notification up there, and let the two
i
INTERVIEWER: Admiral, you will have :a lot easier tiJne
dissolving my skepticism or whatever criticisms entailed in
that article, the item that we talked about at the
?1 !i
r~ ;! beginning, than you will dissolving my skepticism on the
point we are talkin./ g about now. I
point } just do not understand how
it is possible to conduct in assured secrecy covert operation
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1 i ADMIRAL TURNER: We are doing it. We are doing it
2 j on a small scale today. We have not by any means abandoned
3 covert action. While it has been much scaled down from the
11 height of the fifties and sixties, it does continue. I
-I
arrived here in March, and we haven't had any leak of any
covert action operation ?since that time,-and I think that
the..congress is acting in a very responsible way here.
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INTERVIEWER: Are we doing as much as you feel we
ought to have' been doing, given the needs on the ground
abroad?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. Unequivocally, yes. I have
on a number of occasions gone to our covert action people and
I
said, I see the country has a problem in such and such an
1 area today, would you develop me a covert action plan, because)
I want to have it in my pocket when I o to a 1
g National
Security Council meeting?
17
I an not the guy who should push covert action. I
18 am not a policy-maker, but if someone who is a policy-maker
at a meeting like that says, Turner, what can you do for us
in the way of covert action here, I like to reach in my
21
pocket and nave it there, ready, and in all the times, which
are
quite a few, that I have asked for that support, I have
j not found' it such an attractive alternative that I thought
people 7ere r:1issinc/ tie boat.
A coup?le'_ of tines it has been accepted. I P1ea!I,
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 Kl
'A,
whole I have not found it a very attractive option. When I
was asked for it, I would present it, but would not be able
to argue strongly for it because it didn't look like it was
that good.
INT.ERVIE6?/ER: So we have been able to keep doing
it where you felt it was necessary? There has been no leak
ADMIRAL TURNER: That is correct.
of significance damagingly --
INTERVIEWER: 9-- about an ongoing operation while
you have been in this job?
An e.~,tcnsion of that question is, do you think that
you have the wherewithal and the necessary discretion from
Congress to do what might be necessary given all sorts of
hypothetical developments that I am sure your people have
presented you with in the form of contingency papers and so
on?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Only if there was in fact general
t
Congressional -- which almost means public -- support for the
nation's approach to the problem. I don't mean that the
public would know about the covert action, but I am saying
that if the flxecutivt Branch wanted. to go charciing off on a
covert action to accomplish Objective X, and the country as
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H the idea has percolated, and we have gone ahead, but on the
7
a whols c ic_l not approve of Objective as represented to th,
Congress, then I think wwwe would have a problem, but I think
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that is what the people want today in terms of some form of
restraint on covert action.
INTERVIEWER: Oh, I agree. I am glad we are. able
to keep the dialo'gue goingr because I realize it isboth the
most interesting and the most difficult aspect of the
subject that we are going.to try to address.
ADMIRAL TURNER:. . Yes. ; I hope you don't -devote
S~ whole piece to covert action, because as I say,, that.is such
9 small portion of
10 INTERVIEWER: VIell we are not. It is a small
portion. How big a portion? Is there any wa-v you can give
me some idea of the percentaqe or amount of resources,
ADMIRAL TURNER: About all I can say is that it is
al. Z very small, and it takes a limited number of people. It
15 takes. sort of a stand-by capability. I mean, what we are
doing today is operating in covert action rather modestly,
E ;J 11 human and financial, that are being spent in that area?
but retaining, not a large, but a cadre of skill to do
1'l different things if we are needed, if you see what I mean.
o ~0
TNTRRVIRWF.R ? WP1 1 - trnn as=,ca _ +-ha+- i
Are we operating modestly because of the climate and because
of the dead end of the past, of the last five years that is
on your shoulder, or are we operating modestly because we
ought to !)(,-. operating modestly?
.4
ADNI RAL TURNER: I can't see in many cases where
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there is a real good case for it, and part of it is the
greater visibility today of anything you do, and I am not
talking just about leaks. I am talking about the persistencei
quite proper, of the med,ia.in general, but let's say Country
X is having an election tomorrow, and we like. Party A and
don't like Party B. Don't you feel that if we go into that.
country and started to. feed money to people in Party A --
assuming we are totally free of leaks in the United States --~
INTERVIEWER: Big assumption.
ADMIRAL TURNI:E,R: Big assumption. That there is
also a high probability that there will be a leak in
Country A, or Country X. or whatever I called it, and if
there is a leak-in Country X that we have fed money to Party
A, they may prefer not to have ever had that money. It may
redound against them.
I don't think people worried about that 15 years
ago. Righ
INTERVIEWER: Playbe they should have.
ADMIRAL TURNER: There wasn't -- well, I don't
think it was exposed 15 years ago. Today we are getting
some exposures of what was done 15 years ago.
INTERVIEWER: And some of the personalities are
,;,-mot'.-"'---^- =.~?..
ADI.IP.AL TURNER: Iiut in a sense, you could sav, w,,Te
clo isray wiLA,-, it ill the past, lout today you probably
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wouldn't get the politicians in Party A in country x to
accept the money, for fear that if it became public they
would lose more than they would gain. So, I am saying, some
of the tools that have been used in the past have different
effectiveness in a different world climate.
INTERVIEWER: Are you saying that since you came
into this job, we have not, the United States has not
covertly funded friendly political forces in foreign
7 countries?
T0
4 ADNIIJ\L TURNER: I just don't comment on our
r y
operations one way or the other,'because that gets me into
12 1 CJ a corner. If I say yes or no to that one, why, you would
13 draw conclusions which may or may not be right, but I really
(n T
x plead with you that I should have perhaps added a fifth
characterization to what I see as the reshaping of American
16
intelligence today, .and that is moving away from the two
foci of intelligence for its first 20 or 25 years in this
M country.
r tY
ti The first was on covert action, which we have now
10
discussed pretty thoroughly, why I think we need to shift
away from it to some extent. The second was preoccupation
11 with the Soviet Union, and particularly military aspects of
the Soviet Union, and when you got past the Soviet Union,
there we e half a do z en countries in Eastern Europe that t~,jL e
their satellites that we were interested in, and when you got
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,=SL,. E-:aON C :,=1?r\NY. ENC.
 z
I am saying that today we have got to look at most 1
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past that you got. into the areas of the world where the
Soviets were making forays, which then led to political
action..
of the 150-odd countries of the world in some way or
another, because many, many, many of them we have legitimate
needs for good intelligence information on, and of course in
most of-those countries that far transcends military matters.
It gets into'economic as well as political. So, the
character of the whole organization has got to shift to
accommodate that.
Let me not leave any doubt. Soviet military is
the Number One intelligence issue, and must remain that, but
I am saying without neglecting that cardinal line of defense
we have got to be able to tackle how much wider a range of
subjects today, and that in turn means immense problems in
new techniques of analysis, new techniques of collecting
information, because you weren't interested in wheat ten
personnel programs, training people, recruiting people, and
I am chastised today because we missed the Soviet
grain harvest by 10 percent. rive years ago we didn't even
try. The Department of Agriculture misses by 5 percent of
the United S --ates frequently. I would like to do better.
I apologize .for not, hitting it on the rios?e. I ar,, Cjoincr to
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 25
1 1 try to do better, but we are going through these throes of
2! adjustment.
N
'4,
U)
Sj
!j about that in terms of past horror stories, but the question.
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That brings you back to where i came in at the
beginning. People are unsettled because the milieu is
changing, the tasking is changing, the whole environment is
changing, including the openness, including the oversight,
which hasn't been here before.
INTERVIEWER: I appreciate your admonition that I
not and that the magazine not dwell too much, disproportionately.
on the covert action thing. One of the reasons I am taking
the opportunity to ask you about this is because, of all the
people that I and my colleagues who
people
are talking to, both on the record, through Ilerb `s good
offices, and
only, one,
certainly
are working on the story
on our own, you are the
record you are the only one who
can talk at all authoritatively about
that.
So, the fact that I do put some stress on that
question doesn't mean that that becomes the exclusive
preoccupation of the story.
Don't get me wrong on that.
That said, I do have another couple of questions
on that, because, you know, we have been reading so much
_' remains,
has the pendulum swung too far the other way, so
that we ar deprived of being able to do t:hincj,==, that we really
ouc.J'lL'- to be able to 1J0 in certain e ,tromis situations that
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r LCESJCN Ra?OR':...Z :-M rANY. .NC.
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come up?
C:
monarchy is overthrown. by
a. Qaddaf i-like leftist pro-Soviet group. 'Do we have the
wherewithal to do something about that situation short of
~' 14
C
C4 1a
sending in the Marines?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, what would you like to do?
Give me an example. I mean, not in a particular country,
but the kind of thing you would like to do.
INTERVIEWER: All right, a country called Lower
Slabovia, which is a very large, mostly desert, Middle
Eastern kingdom which is terribly rich.in oil, and we are
xtremely dependent on that oil, and all of a sudden the-
,pro-American,,-fairly conservative
ADMIRAL TURNER: Did we ever?
INTERVIEWER: Yes, we did. We did with Mosedeq.
in Iran. So, yes, we did.
ADMI'2AL TURNER: All right.
INTERVIEWER: Do we now?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I am not sure, but I am not
persuaded that my uncertainty is a result of our lack of
capabilities in our closet.
INTERVIEWER: Yes. What is it?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think what you could do with
C
C 20
Mosedeq in 1953 and what you can do in a country overseas.
today, 25 years later, is quite different. The environment
; is so dii ferent. As I said in the previous illustration,
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evidence of external tampering, particularly from one
the
major powers, has tremendous internal ramifications in a
country like that today that it didn't back then, and it has
tremendous external ramifications today that it didn't back
then, particularly when we had.,..a. different relationship
.with.the Soviet Union in many ways than we do today, but I
r 1y
20 j
21
`think the skills, the capabilities that were available to us
those several quite.,successful covert actions. in 1953in
Iran and in 1.954 in Guatemala are still available to us today
if they are applicable to the situation, if they would in
fact have a high probability of being successful,
IINTERVIEWER: Is your confidence in the Congress
and the current oversight arrangement such that that would
not preclude you from using those tools if, all other things
being equal, you felt that it was necessary to use them?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes.
IiNTERVIEWER: Okay, the last question on this
trickiest of subjects. Are there any circumstances in which.
assassination is justified?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No. No, I shouldn't answer that
question in that way. I tried to answer it before you. used
your last word. I am not passing judgment on whether it is
justified or not. All I am telling you is that categorically
I am prohibited from doincj it, so I. haven't in my mind been
particularly worried .-about the moral question of whether it
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;~c~: nor: ..~=o :.?