IS WORST OVER FOR CIA?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01314R000300250004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 7, 1979
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

 ARTICLE APPEM D .Z
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SPECIAL REPORT
Scandals over assassination plots
and spying on Americans are a thing of the
past. But new troubles now are cropping
up to plague the agency that Is Washington's
yes and ears around the world,
President Carter in March of 1977 plucked an Annapolis
e
classmate out of the Navy and gave him the job of reviv
a battered and demoralized Central Intelligence Agency.
It was a daunting assignment that Adm. Stansfield Turner
took on-to repair the damage caused by revelations that
the 32-year-old intelligence agency had spied illegally on
Americans, planned assassination attempts against foreign
leaders and experimented with mind-bending drugs with-
out the knowledge of the people involved.
Now, two years later, a new controversy is raging around
the CIA. The basic question: Has Turner set the agency on
the road to recovery after five years of turmoil-or is he
plunging it into an even more crippling crisis?
On one side, critics charge that, under Turner, the agen-
cy today is in deeper trouble than ever before, with plum-
meting morale, a large-scale exodus of key officials and
serious strains in the CIA's relations with the rest of the
nation's intelligence community. They point out that Presi-
dent Carter himself has complained about the quality of
political intelligence, particularly in connection with the
revolution that toppled the Shah of Iran.
On the other side, Turner and his supporters contend
that the current turbulence is insignificant and, in effect,
healthy? They maintain that it merely reflects an overdue
basic reorganization that is adapting the CIA to cope with
vast political and technological changes in today's world.
What, in fact, is happening to the agency that is this
country's eyes and ears around the globe?
Why have there been "intelligence failures?" Have there
been any recent successes?
Have restrictions designed to avoid misdeeds of the past
emasculated the CIA, rendering it impotent to gather infor-
mation and influence events abroad?
Over all, is the CIA on its way up-or still on the skids?
To find answers to these and other questions, staff mem-
bers of US. News & World Report talked to scores of persons
in this country and abroad-veteran officials at the agency's
headquarters in Langley, Va., CIA operatives overseas, for-
eign intelligence experts, military commanders, members
of Congress and White House advisers. Here, told largely in
their oven words, is how these insiders see what has hap-
pened to the CIA and where it is heading:
Turner;: Triumph or Disaster?
Comment from within. the intelligence community be-'
gins, and often ends, with one man: Stansfield Turner. He
took over the CIA *A{Atil E #'(W#Re4daOw2004/=F0=
Rhodes Scholar to Pentagon "whiz kid," from innovative
commandant of the Naval War College to commander of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's southern flank.
"There were some misgivings about Turner from the
beginning at the CIA," says one intelligence professional.
"But he came in with as much good will as he could con-
ceivably get. No one had more open doors around town."
Many of those doors, this associate adds, are no longer
open to Turner. "He wants very tight categorical control
over the entire intelligence community and the CIA," the
expert reports. "He gets frustrated by any resistance. When
there has been resistance, there has been instant outrage,
great trauma. He is abusive, abrasive, autocratic."
Early in his tenure, Turner moved to consolidate his
control over the intelligence community-something none
of his predecessors had succeeded in doing. He received a
major boost when President Carter signed an order giving
him control over the budget not only for the CIA but for all
the intelligence activities of the Pentagon and other gov-
ernment agencies.
"Amateurs" at the top. "Turner has built a separate
corporation with a deputy and four senior vice presidents,"!
says a military-intelligence official. "They operate as though
they feel they are entitled to run the whole intelligence
community. All these six people are new guys on the street.
There isn't a one who knows anything about running an
intelligence operation. It doesn't work." He
adds about Turner: "IIe's the busiest direc-
tor of central intelligence I've ever seen-
and the least accessible. He has three of-
fices-in the Executive Office Building, an-
other
near the White House and Langley.
What does he do with three offices?"
Reports another intelligence execu-
tive about the CIA chief: "Turner moves
from one event to another with quickly
assembled fact sheets. He is prepared to
be very glib. But ask three questions,
and you've exhausted his knowledge. If
anyone tries to tell him that, he becomes
intensely angry. You then see his essen-
tial' and basic arrogance and ego. His
judgment of his own capabilities is not
shared by close observers.".
Mass exodus. Within the CIA, frus-
trations over criticism, new restrictions
and Turner's style of operating, coupled
with government incentives for early re-
tirements, have contributed to a flood of
departures: 400 retirements in 1977,
650 in 1978, nearly 200 just in January of
this year. Typical comments by those
getting out: "The mystique is gone." "Our teeth have been
pulled." "We've become pussycats in a den of lions."
One man with a good vantage point in the agency took a
l6Ook at the names of those retiring in January and termed
the situation "a disaster."
"The best people in the organization, the new generation
of leadership that Turner ought to be building and relying
on into the 1980s, are fading out because it has just gotten
flatly intolerable," he says. "I would say half a dozen of the
best people out there who should have been at the very top
of that agency in the early '80s have left
within the last six months. I know of at
least six more who told me they might
That's an indicator of how bad it is."
Frank Carlucci, Turner's deputy and a
CIA-RDP88-01314R00'O3UO 5 }W4aefvice officer who has
served as ambassador to Portugal, argues
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Agency Agency, =.
Collects intelli- Provides military
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Arm of the State
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gathers. foreign
political, eco-
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cal-military data,
problem we face." Carlucci adds that the agency has three
employes working full time to provide information de-
manded from his personal file by Philip Agee, a former CIA
official who now is writing books and articles disclosing
names and addresses of agency personnel in foreign cities.
Agee, however, is not the only problem for the agency. A
CIA official who recently completed a tour of agency of-
fices abroad complains of leaks of sensitive information. "I
have never seen leaking like this," he said. "You pick up the
newspaper, and you see things directly out of the NID-the
National Intelligence Daily. Just quoted, verbatim."
As a result of one recent leak, the official says, two
sources were lost in one country-one of them presumed
killed--and another source was lost in a second country.
Intelligence Hits and Misses
What do CIA "customers" think of its information?
A top Pentagon official says: "I have to say they do a good
job, although never perfect. They're great on current
events. The problems come with long-range interpreta-
tions. There, they don't. do as well. Some of the fault may lie
with policymakers like myself. Maybe we should be smarter
in asking our questions in the first place."
From an influential White House aide comes this com-
plaint: "We get lots of facts and figures and not enough
interpretation and assessment of what they mean. It's get-
ting more and more difficult to find people who, can write a
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Gathers intelli- Gets intelligence
genes of special -of interest to the
interest to the Aire- `Army, including
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Collects foreign
financial informa-
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vice, protects-the
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nuclear-weapons
tests and collects
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Gathers informa-
tion on foreign
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Collects and dis-
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and domestic as-
pects of narcot
Turner himself admits that the agency must bear down
on its long-range forecasts, saying: "I think the U.S. has got
to play its role in a longer-term, more subtle, more funda-
mental way than putting a finger in the dikes--to antici-
pate problems rather than react to problems."
Gun-shy agency. A top White House official offers this
overall assessment of the CIA: "Sixty to 70 percent of the
problems over there have nothing to do with Admiral
Turner or this administration. The CIA has been through a'
very rough period the last five years and as a result they are!
gun-shy, less willing to stick their necks out on forecasts."
Despite these problems, he adds: "What they give us is
good; it's very good. They were right on top of the China-
Vietnam thing, for example."
A ranking military-intelligence expert reports another
agency success: "When Argentina and Chile were disputing
over the Beagle Channel islands, Argentina was all ready to
go to war. But we had that covered. We passed the informa-
tion
on to the State Department, which was able to get the
Vatican to mediate and settle the dispute. This-was a case ;
where good intelligence prevented a war."
From a key administration official: "The CIA does a
remarkable job on strategic intelligence. The whole techni-
cal intelligence side, while not without some problems, is
remarkable. We couldn't even think of having a SALT
agreement without this capability
" The same official co
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the CIA to influence other governments rather than to
gather information. He contends: "The CIA's capability to
execute covert maneuvers has been largely neutralized.
This reduces by one whole dimension the community's
ability to effectively do its job."
Spies vs. technology. Does the CIA rely too much on
satellites and other gadgets and not enough on people-
that is, spies?
Senator Daniel P Moynihan (D-N.Y.) thinks so. Noting
that the CIA needs permission from the President and must
report to seven congressional committees to launch a co-
vert operation, he argues: "It means that what you have is a
place in Langley, Va., doing research-research that might
well be done by the Library of Congress." And a top Penta-
204 -Who , Peer Over CIA's Shoulder
the almost daily revelations of wrongdoing by the agency a
couple of years--ago,- there was real doubt up here- about
whether we should even have something like the CIA. But
there seems to be a feeling now of trust in the CIA by
people in the House and Senate-that the agency is being
run in a manner that won't allow abuses to occur."
Congress is still debating details of a new CIA charter
that will outline what the agency may and may not legally
do. An influential House staff member says of the legisla-
tion: "In the short run, it will free up the CIA in an oper-
ational way. Right now, because of the abuses of the past
several years, the agency is hunkered down, afraid to do
anything. It is being overly conservative, to the detriment
of our interests. We've seen the effect of this in Europe,
with our capability to collect data about political terrorists.
And, in the long run, absent a charter bill, the-CIA could
slip back into ways of the bad old days."
Representative Charles Rose (D-N.C.), a member of the
House Intelligence Committee, says: "There's no doubt
about it-the mood, the pressure for curbs is not at ali what
it was a couple of years ago. Most of us-and I've been a
real skeptic-were ready to throw a few babies out with the
bath water. But they are keeping their skirts clean these
days out at Langley."
Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.), a.member of the Sen-
ate panel and an outspoken critic of the CIA, reports:
"Sentiment for restrictions-at least the closely detailed
kind-is ebbing fast now. The idea now is to help the
agency get back on its feet, not discourage it from doing a
more competent job."
The View From Overseas
Europeans are dismayed by the damage inflicted on the
CIA by public criticism in the U.S. and exposure of agency
operations. The Germans call it Selbstzerfleischung, which
means self-laceration.
An analyst in the Mediterranean area reports: "Senior
foreign security men have complained privately to Ameri-
can officials, and at least one European agency chief react-
ed by starting to hold back certain information he had
previously shared routinely with the CIA."
One European official says: "We are also worried about
all the books and magazine articles by former CIA officers
in which they spill the agency's secrets. Such exposes can
compromise our sources and embarrass our governments."
Another European expert on intelligence makes this ob-
servation: "The disclosures in Washington seriously weak-
ened effectiveness of the agency. The security services of
other countries and individual contacts have been much
more reluctant to cooperate for fear of themselves being I
The `CIA mt st "report on its" activities to no fewer than
eight congressional committees
Intelligence's
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Foreign Affairs
Intelligence
`Foreign Relations_
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45
34,
gon official says: "Our technology is far better than that of
the Soviets. But human intelligence is so very important.
Technology can tell you about capabilities, but it takes
human intelligence to know intentions."
Another defense expert disagrees that too much is being
spent on technology at the expense of human intelligence,
declaring: "The charge that we are relying too much on
machines is a red herring. The hardware always looks like
it's dominating the intelligence operation because it's so big
in the budget. You could pour as much as you could into
analysis and human intelligence, and it still wouldn't
change the percentage' very much."
Turnaround on Capitol Hill
"Congress is in full retreat from the notion that it should
impose strict and detailed restrictions on the activities of
the CIA," an experienced analyst reports.
A key Senate staff member sums up the feeling: "With
exposed."
"No one minimizes the importance of what U.S. intelli-
gence chooses to concentrate upon," reports an Allied
spokesman. "It is what it misses, or in the end dismisses,
that worries foreign governments. The U.S. has yet to show
that it fully understands the importance in today's world of
'soft' intelligence-the reporting and analysis of not only
political, but also social, religious and economic develop-
Overage agents. Cutbacks in personnel have changed
the way the CIA operates overseas. In the Far East, for
instance, agency manpower was slashed by nearly half
shortly after Turner took over. Part of the gap was filled in
Japan by increased cooperation from Japanese intelligence
agencies.
Despite reductions in manpower, a top CIA official in
Washington asserts that the agency still has the world well
covered. He says: "We can do the job with the resources we
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have. There are lots of parts of the world that make me
nervous, but not because we are absent from them."
Of more concern to CIA executives than the number of
agents overseas is the fact that many of them are relatively
old for the cloak-and-dagger business. Twenty-seven per-
cent of field personnel are over 50. Says one agency official:
"Where we are short is on young blood. We let the pipeline
dry out. But we will remedy that."
What's Next for the CIA?
With all its troubles, most American and Allied intelli-
gence experts rate the CIA as the best in the world at what
it does.
From a senior European security officer: "The CIA works
hard and digs deep. Probably nobody else, including the
Russians, amasses a greater volume of information. Yet
there appear to be specific gaps and weaknesses in the final
product."
The CIA's Carlucci says: "I don't think there is any ques-
tion but what we are the foremost intelligence operation in
the world-over all. In technology, we're ahead. On the
analytic side, we're clearly ahead."
A top Pentagon official notes: "Our intelligence is still by
far the best in the world, far better than the Russians'.
You're never as good as you would like to be, but we're the
best in the world-better across the board."
A ranking military-intelligence specialist has some reser-
vations: "We clearly have the best intelligence-gathering
technology in the world. But I think the Soviet Union may
have the most effective intelligence apparatus in the world.
Their leaders kn
b
tt
h
t
d
i
h
ow
e
er w
a
we are
o
ng t
an
we know of what they are doing."
From these wide-ranging conversations with in-
telligence "producers" and "consumers" in the ``
U.S. and abroad, what overall conclusions emerge
concerning the current health of the CIA and its
prospects?
The intelligence agency under Turner has re-
covered much of the trust Congress had lost in it.
The lawmakers are less interested in imposing new
restrictions to guard against excesses than they are
in preventing, any further weakening of the na-
tion's espionage capabilities.
But there is still no sign that Congress is pre-
pared to allow the agency to engage again in the
kinds of covert operations abroad that a decade
ago constituted a major U.S. weapon against Soviet
machinations around the world.
Recapturing the confidence of potential agents
overseas and of foreign intelligence organizations
is a tougher proposition as long as former agency
staff members, as well as members of Congress and admin-
istration officials, continue to leak CIA secrets.
The jury is still out on the long-term impact of the
"Turner revolution"-whether it actually will lead to a
more efficient and effective intelligence operation. But
many doubt that the potential benefits will justify the con-
tinuing turmoil throughout the intelligence community.
There is a consensus that controversy will dog the CIA as
long as the former admiral remains at the helm. But the
prospect of a change is widely discounted. For Turner still
seems to command the confidence of the one man who
counts most-his former Annapolis classmate now in the
White House. 0
This article was written by Associate Editor Orr Kelly,
with assistance from other staff members in Washington
and overseas.
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Admiral Turner's
view: turmoil "Has
Been Worth it"
Sagging morale, mass resignations, too
many leaks, failure In Iran. To understand the
charges, says the nation's Intelligence
chief, it's necessary to grasp revolutionary
changes in the business of spying.
Q Admiral Turner, has the CIA been emasculated in the past
several years, as critics allege?
A Actually, I think it's muchbetter than in the past. The
technological collection systems have come along, and
they're constantly growing in capability. And our sophisti-
cation in utilizing them is increasing.
There is more productive activity in the human-intelli-
gence field today than there was last year or the year
before. It's just as important to us, and it's being empha-
sized more and more.
Q You have been criticized for filling most of the top jobs In
the agency with outside amateurs. Why
have you done that?
A I brought in a group of sea-
soned people, not amateurs. Frank
Carlucci, the deputy director of the
CIA, played an intelligence role as
an ambassador, as head of a country
team. John Koehler, who's in charge
of budgets, came from the Congres-
sional Budget Office and from the
Rand Corporation. He's well famil-
iar with the budgeting process. Gen.
Frank Camm, who is in charge of
tasking, is a man with 30-some years
of military experience. No military,.
man ever has been in command
without commanding intelligence
assets as well as combat assets. So
my "vice presidents" are not inex-
perienced in the kinds of things that
are needed here.
But the operating elements of the
CIA-the clandestine collection, the scientific collection,
fields where you need people who have been there for
years-are run by CIA professionals.
In addition, I believe that it was a good time to give a
new perspective on intelligence because there are pro-
found changes that affect the intelligence world.
Q What are these changes?
A First, the U.S. role in the world is changing. Second,
technology is changing in the way you do intelligence.
Third, the American public is much more interested in what
we in the intelligence community do than it was 10 years
ago. And fourth, the CIA is maturing. It's graduated its first
generation. We're coming into a new era in the agency.
In light of these changes, I think it has been important at
this stage to have people with an open mind.
Q Why do we hear so much about morale problems at the
CIA and early retirement of so many of your people?
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0- I've tried to point out there are a lot of frustrations as
you make substantial changes. And, yes, some people get
discouraged because they just don't know how to adjust to
these changes.
One of the factors is the maturing of the CIA that I
mentioned earlier. Twenty-seven percent of our clandes-
tine professionals are 50 years of age and older. We can't
tolerate that, because there's going to be a gap somewhere.
That's why I peeled some off a year ago-because I wanted
to start filling that gap sooner, instead of letting them all
stay another three or four years and then suddenly finding I
have over 30 percent who would be leaving within 2, 3 or 4
years of each other.
We've got a real problem here in that we've matured
without bringing along the replacements in adequate mea-
sure. And because of that, there are a lot of people leaving.
And, lastly, let me say that our government induces peo-
ple to leave. Take one of the fellows who retired last Janu-
ary 12--that was the magic date around here for a lot of
technical reasons. If he had stayed another year and a half,)
his annual retirement for the rest of his life would have
been a couple of thousand dollars less every year.
Q Your critics say that you've created a great deal of turmoil
in an agency that already was demoralized. Was It necessary?
A Oh, no question it's been worth it, in my view. You
don't adapt to the forces of change that I've described
without some unsettling.
Take,, for example, the greater openness and control. I
don't think any public institution can thrive that doesn't
have the support of the American people. We lost a great
deal of that support because of a strong suspicion that we're
doing things we shouldn't be doing.
We've become more open-publishing more, giving more
interviews, answering press responses more-so that the
American public will understand better what we are doing.
On top of that, the country has established a set of con-
trols for intelligence today such as has never been exercised
before in any intelligence operation in the world of this
magnitude. We have to expose much more of what we do
to the intelligence-oversight board, to the National Security
Council, and to the two oversight committees of the Con-
gress. These are very traumatic experiences for intelligence
professionals to go through.
Q Can you run an effective Intelligence organization with so
much accountability and openness?
A I think we can. But it'll be two or three more years
before l: can say we are doing it. It will take a refining of the
procedures in our dealings with the intelligence commit-
tees, with the oversight board and so on. In my opinion, this
is moving in a healthy direction.
Q Are foreign Intelligence agencies, such as the British and
Israeli, reluctant to cooperate with you for fear of compromising
their secrets?
A There's no question. that people are nervous about
that. Where we are most vulnerable is in what's known as
covert action-influencing events, not collecting intelli-
gence. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment requires us to report
to seven committees.on covert actions. We would like to
see that narrowed to the two congressional oversight com-
mittees. That would help.
But let me suggest that other countries are beginning to
face the same problem. In Britain, the Official Secrets Act is
now on weaker ground: The Germans have a Bundestag
committee that came over and talked to me about what we
are doing. The Italians have moved part of their intelli-
gence out of the military into the Prime Minister's office.
In short, democracies are no longer as comfortable with
unaccountable intelligence people around. We're blazing
the trail in finding out how to get the right balance be-
Approved
tween necessary secrecy and accountability. I trunk were
coming out well.
Q With so many congressional committees In the act, have
covert actions become impossible?
A No. But it is most difficult to undertake a covert activ-
ity where there's a high probability of a lot of controversy
over it.
Q So, for all practical purposes, potentially controversial co-
vert actions have been turned off--
A Yes. On the other hand, what this means is that there's
more likely to be a national consensus behind any covert
action undertaken today than there was in the past. I think
it should be that way.
Q Turning to the criticism of the agency's political analysis:
What do you say to charges that you are devoting too much of
your resources to day-to-day developments-competing with
daily papers-rather than working on long-term trends?
A They're right. We've been working for two years to
start shifting it. But it can't be done overnight. The intelli-
gence community-more so in Defense than in the CIA-
has a culture that's oriented toward current intelligence.
The rewards go to the quick-response people.
It's taking a while to shift that emphasis, and it's causing
turmoil. Some people are unhappy because they don't want
to get shunted off in what they think is a closet where
they'll be doing long-term research. That is just one of the
fundamental changes that must be made in the way we
handle the analytic process. And, of course, it's disconcert-
ing to people.
Q Wasn't President Carter expressing dissatisfaction with
the job you've done by writing a memo complaining of inadequa-
cies in political intelligence in the Iran crisis?
A The memo was addressed to three people-Cyrus
Vance, Zbigniew Brzezinski and myself. The thrust of it
was: "Are you guys bringing it all together?" Most of the
information that was lacking was available without a spy in
the system or a satellite. I'm not trying to absolve myself or
the agency or the intelligence community. This memo isn't
the first I've had that's been critical.
Critical memos are not the only ones I have received.
I've received handwritten memos in both directions, over
and above this one that got blown up unnecessarily. And I
would hardly think that I could go through two years in this
job without some constructive suggestion from my boss.
Q Where did you go wrong in Iran?
A It wasn't as though we were sitting here and saying to
the President, "Gee, it's sweetness and light in Iran." We
were reporting there were all kinds of problems. But most of
us felt they wouldn't coalesce into a big enough problem
that the Shah couldn't handle. I think most people felt that
here's a guy with a police force, with an army, with a one-
man government. What inhibitions does he have in sup-
pressing these things? The Shah himself didn't judge it right,
So the fact that we misjudged that the situation would
boil over is not a true measure of whether the intelligence
community is serving the country properly. I don't guaran-
tee that I'll predict the next coup, the next overthrow of
government,, the next election surprise.
More than making those predictions, what we're here for
is to be sure the policymakers see the trends that they can
do something about. Even if I'd told the policymakers on
October 5 that there was going to be a major upheaval on
November 5 in Iran, there was nothing they could do.
Q We've been hearing a great deal lately about a "mole" in
the CIA-that Is, a KGB agent who has penetrated your agency.
Does that worry you?
A Well, it's an annoyance. I have no evidence that makes
me concerned that we've got a mole. But I'll never say that
we don't have one, because I don't want to be complacent. 0
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For Agent. In: Moscow,
Snooping Is Risky Work
MOSCOW
Here in Russia, operations of. the CIA are shrouded in
mystery even more than usual.
Identities of CIA employes working out of the .U.S.
Embassy, in Moscow are- a tightly guarded secret. It is
doubtful that most personnel in the embassy, let alone
outsiders, know who the CIA officers are.
Nevertheless, incidents in recent years have disclosed'
enough about the,nature and scope of the agency's activi-
ties in the U.S.S.R. to-make it;possible to-put together this
a Much- of U S'.: intelligence=there involves electronic
surveillance-and interception of Soviet :: communications.
a CIA agents are, routinely assigned to the U.S. Eiiibassy
under cover as-, political"' and consular officers.
Estimates., of:> juste how-W navy Hof the embassy's 98 staff
members=:work for;the CIA rangefrom l0 to'45 percent.
^ -.Classiccloak and-dagger `:espionage is. still: part `::and
parcel of the work, one by Moscow-based. CIA- operatives.
ha one secant case, ampules of poison were involved
Contrary to; general: belief, the CIA does appear to
have?aE:numberofRussian citizens working for it: as agents
'inside th6-Sovietsystem.`
strains, between Russians rand Soviet minor--
'.ities, the tens, of: thousands of.- disgruntled
Jews - who wish to . emigrate,-;: the ruthless
nature of the Soviet state and the suppres-
sion of many basic human rights argue that
there should be plenty:; of scope here:,for:
foreign intelligence services.
In practice, the CIA and all other West-
earn agencies here operate under enormous- handicaps--:y
far greater than those limiting KGB activities in the U.S.
All, travel and contacts between Soviet citizens and
foreigners are tightly circumscribed. About 85 percent of
the U.S.S.R.. is ; effectively, ooff :,limits to foreigners. The
Soviet KGB employs unlimited: resources to, keep tabs on
a lll resident foreigners -
Closed and; secretive by instinct, .Soviet society itself
acts as-a natural barrier to the eyes of: prying outsiders.
What ,evidencewhere is-suggests that the. CIA tries to:get
while.
.around: this. problem . by=recruiting-Soviet citizens
they are abroad and by befriending potentially; anti-Soviet
Eastern Europeans stationed in Moscow
In , at ;least- one area ?of life -in the Soviet Union, the: CIA;
has been embroiled in controversy for some time This is!
the matter of dissidents. .~ f.,...,'. ~.
ti.on on closed scientific-research institutes. Soviet authori-
'tires frequently,:accuse;the,CIAof..trying to subvert dissi
dents to obtain. such data, and the CIA just as often denies
it has infiltrated the, movement: Whatever the truththe
allegation that the CIA has been in
volved with the dissidents has helped
to destroy them as a real force in So-
viet society, since they have become {'
linked in the minds of Russians with a
hostile foreign organization...
Twice in the last two years, the U.S.
Embassy has been publicly embar-
rassed by revelations-neither confirmed nor denied in
Washington-of CIA activities here. In July of 1977, Mar-
tha D. Peterson; supposedly a consular official in the em-
bassy, was caught. delivering espionage equipment to a
Soviet citizen... She was subsequently expelled. Two
months later, another embassy employe,= Vincent Crock-
ett,who was listed as an `archivist," was expelled after he 41
was caught trying to collect material left; at a."drop"
Moscow by a Soviet citizen later convicted as_a spy
In the nature of things, it- is -the. failures of. the CIA
rather than the successes that become. public knowledge.
But confidence ;that his identity,will not be disclosed is
essential before any Soviet insider, would come forward to
help the West, as did Oleg Penkovsky, a colonel in Soviet
military intelligence; who gave the British: important in-
formation. in the early 1960s--before being. found out and
shot. After allthat. has happened in. the last few years, it
would take 'a brave Russian. to emulate Penkovsky
This retw'rt was, written by Robin -Knight, chief af the
maga, ines.Moscowbureau
Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000300250004-2
 STAT Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000300250004-2
Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000300250004-2