LETTER TO ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER FROM JOSEPH FROMM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01314R000300270009-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 2, 1977
• Content Type: LETTER

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U. S. News & World Report
May 2, 1977
Admiral Staulsfield I`usner
Director of Central Intelligence
Washing ton, D. C. 20505
Ltinclozed is the edited version of the interview with you
which we are planning to publish in the next issue of the magazine.
Please go through it and make any corrections that are required.
In view of developments in Ethiopia iii recent days I
thiiilh that it is important that we deal with that situation in
connection with Soviet activities in Africa. I suggest that we
insert questions on page 10 before the question on the Cubans.
If you could dictate answers to the following two questions we will'
insert theca there: (1) What about Ethiopia? Are the Russians
establishing another toehold in Africa at the expense of the U.S.?
(2) IS this a serious setback for the U.S.?
I would appreciate it if we could have your corrected
copy o:f' the interview together with the additional questions and
answers by Tuesday night, if possible, or, at the very latest,
first t1ai_ng Wednesday morning. If you will have Herb iietu's office
phone me ..,- 333-.71i00, Ext. 575 ---- when the approved version of
the interview is ready we will arrange to have it picked up promptly.
Again, Stan, I'm most grateful that you were able to get
over here to our office for the interview, which, I think, provides
an authoritative and highly informative overview of the world scene.
With kindest personal regards:, I am
Sincerely,
3l-':h
Enclosure
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IT3T iVIBW WITH ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER
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Washington, D.C.
U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT April 22, 1977
Q Admiral Turner, do you agree with the view expressed
by some high officials in recent years that the Soviet
Union is an ascending power and the U.S. is declining?
A The Soviets have their strengths and they have their
weaknesses. X) their weaknesses are in economics and
politics. I don't see the Soviet economy i climbing,
to outdistance us. Our lead is so great that they cannot
hope to overtake us unless our percentage of growth eve
were to be
year/MX a lot smaller than theirs. And that is not hap
a1NAL
t ~~A S(RIPi
pening. So in terms of raw economic power we are not a
declining power.
As for ideology, the Russians may think it is a stren thx for them
but I am sure we would all agree that their ideology is
hamstringing them in many ways. After all, what's left
of pure Marxism? Where is it practiced or believed in?
You have a different brand of Communism in every country in
Europe -- and a different brand in Yugoslavia, a differe t
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brand in China. Even in the Soviet Union, they don't hol
to it very carefully. So -- no, I don't think the Soviet
are on the ascendancy ideologically. _
Q And militarily?
A They have a strong military position. One of the reas ns
they are putting such emphasis on their military strength
military power
is that they are trying to convertdt into1 political ad
vantage. They have no other strengths that they can expl it
that
:i..n Africa and elsewhere. Military is all/they have.
Q Is the U.S. falling behind Russia in military power?
A In my view, we still have the edge in the strategic
nuclear field as a result of our preponderance of warhead
the
and/ accuracy of our missiles. Hcrwever, the trends are m
ing in the other direction because of the substantial effort
the Soviets are putting into strategic weapons. If that
could
continues, they/XUX close the warhead gap and outdistanc
us in what is known as throw weight. The complex equatio}
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as to when those trends might give the Soviets a militari y
superior position is very difficult to state --- given the
fact that you're balancing numbers of warheads, accuracies
and throw weight in the same mix.
Are the Soviets near the point where they could knock
out our land-based missile force with a first-strike atta k
as some strategists claim?
A I don't see a first strike as being anything like a
rational calculation in the years immediately ahead by eiiher
aide
.Xi~4XlXAaX?7~~~D(XXX#~X9~XX{'??sXX'
kkgg XgX~XqX_?F What concerns me is the image that is creat d
axd the impact this could have on world opinion if there s
a perceived imbalance in favor of the Soviets in strategic
nuclear power.
that first,
So I think/ XXX.XX (we must understand the nuclear stra
second
tegic equation as best we can. Ands/XOXXR, the United StEtes
balance
must not let it get out of/O (k in fact or in perception
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that
I don't think/the people of this country are going to let
the Soviets outdistance us in a dangerous way. But we've
goy. to be vigilant as to that.
Q We've heard a great deal lately about Russia's massive
civil defense program. Is there any danger that this aril
give them a decisive strategic advantage over us?
A Certainly not at the present time. I don't believe thE.t
the Soviets are xtPiP~ near the point in civil defense
that
where they could think/they could absorb a nuclear blow
from us with reasonable loss -- that is, a loss they woul
be willing to accept. It doesn't seem to roe that the dam4ge
to the three ingredients that civil defense protects --
leadership} population and productive capacity -- could b
estimated by the Soviets to be small enough to make it an
acceptable risk for them to initiate a nuclear war with
deliberateness.
Q Aside from the idea of a "first strike" are the Sovi?ts
Ap
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fT
clear war rather than just deterring one?
A The difference that I note between them and us is this
The Soviets in their planning start with cold war and thi
the Izocess through all the way to a strategic nuclear w
and even to x postwar recovery. We, on the otle r hand, tend to
think W from cold war to deterrence. There's less emp'a--
sis incur thinking on what happens after the nuclear wea ns
start going off because the idea is so abhorrent.
It `s a different psychological attitude. Maybe it; coins
from the fact that the Russians are from a country that's
been attacked and overrun a number of times in their memo4y
So they have more of an inclination to think through the
implications of someone attacking them.
Q Are they more inclined to contemplate resorting to nuclear
war to achieve their political objectives?
A I think not. I think they have shown a rational,, sensi1'le
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thinking and planning in terms of actually fighting a nu--
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approach to the nuclear weapons problem -- a willingness,
for example, to negotiate SALT-type agreements.
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Q In your opinion, where do the Soviets pose the greates
threat or the United States today?
A Well, you have to break that down between where our
greatest interest is and where their greatest opportunity
We have .a vital national
is. interest 73.1 in Western Europe -- in
msainta ning the NATO fabric whole and strong. The Soviet
Union As trying hard to build up enough military power
in Europe to give the impression that they can dominate
an
that area. With/)CM intimidating force on their side,
they want to fracture the NATO alliance from within by
a
undermining the resolve of the NATO allies. That is,/Wi
lit serious threat -- but not the most urgent.
The Soviets are pressing hardest at the moment in Afri
So, in that sense, Africa is the most urgent threat. But
is not as vital a national interest
clearly Africa/ kxgxx gxhRxctxtb otxtxv3Qxtgxu to us )MM AMA-
as is
)dx txbQ act Europe L.
Q What's the Soviet objective in Africa?
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A I think that all over the world the basically imper-
ialistic thrust of the Soviet Union is one of opportunism.
They are very adroit in the sense of pushing their oppor-
tunities wherever they develop, but not pushing them to
the point where it involves a major commitment of Soviet
resources or prestige if they fail. They've found that
NATO has stymied their imperialistic expansionism in Wes-
tern Europe. And so they're probing each opportunity tha
comes up anywhere to get a foothold or friendship.
Somalia is an example of how this works. The Soviets
start with a fishing fleet calling in at a Somali= port.
Then they offer aid to the Somalixx Army. The army stage
a coup and a. general takes over as President of the count y.
Then the Soviets build the fishing port into a naval base
and on and on in gradual steps. They look constantly
for an opportunity for that first step -- a fishing agree
vent or a trade agreement -- and then they just keep push ng
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COMM tti ng
but without/Q0=16 k) a themselves in a major way.
Q How successful have they been with this strategy?
A Only moderately successful. They've established three
toeholds that seem to be useful to them in Africa. They've
had a toehold in Guinea for six years or so and seem to
be hadging on there. They've had one for a short time in
Angola and they're doing all right there. There's no maj
Soviet presence but the Angolans are still co-operating
with them. And the Soviets have had a fairly strong posi-
tion in Somalia for seven or eight years and it seems to
be holding. They're beginning to explore other oppcrtuni
ties for example, in southern and eastern Africa with
the visit of President Podgorny.
Or the other hand, the Russians have failed in Egypt.
Apprt
They've lost a major position there. Outside Africa, they
failed some years ago in Indonesia. Their relations with
Syria are not as warm as they were several years ago. So
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they are not always adroit enough to do this well. Basi-
cally they lack the economic foundation to be an imperia i s-
t i.c power.
Are the Russians using Cuba in black Africa as a Sovie
tool. or are the Cubans there for their own ends?
A I think it's a fine line. The Cubans are anxious to
establish themselves as a leader in the third world. The
of non-aligned nations. Thus
x.979 conference/will be held in Havana. /7th
Ap
the Cubans are anxious to raise their world image in Afri a
and elsewhere in the third world. However, I don't think
that they could afford economically to indulge in these
activities without considerable support from the Soviet
Union. The Russians, by operating with a surrogate, get
an opportunity to establish an African foothold without
necessarily commiting themselves too much.
Admiral Turner, why are we so worried about the India
Ocean considering the relative weakness of Soviet naval
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strength there?
A I wouldn't say their naval strength is relatively weak
there. X X x X J (X At the same time, I wouldn't
esence is formidable compare
l
pr
say thq.t the soviet nava
with ours, which is somewhat smaller. The difference is
not overwhelming. The asymmetry that impresses me is
that the United States as well as Western Europe and Jap
have a vital interest in the Indian Ocean ?-- in the oil
route which is vital to our future prosperity and sec:urit
-? while the Soviet Union does not have a vital interest
there .
Q Inthat case, why do the Russians maintain a naval
force ;there?
A I think their presence in the Indian Ocean is sympto
tic o1 their desire to leapfrog out to gain influence in
-other areas of the world while they're stalemated in Fu
Now, you can talk about their continuing naval presenc
Apo
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in the Mediterranean as a counter to the U.S. position in
the Mediterranean. You can talk about their continuing
naval presence in the Norwegian Sea and the Sea of Japan
as legitimate defensive concerns close to their homeland.
But you can only look at a continuing Soviet presence off
West Africa and in the Indian Ocean as >v1cft G9 kyx gunboat
da.pl.amacy,r~~rxri~ox~cx~~ixrsrxx I don't say that
this is malicious or bad. But I am saying it's indicative
of a change in strategy dictated by the fact that they ar
blocked on land.
() I)o you see any danger that the Russians will be able
to break the stalemate in Europe to their advantage?
A No, at this point I don?t, although I recognize that
some of our allies are facing difficult political and
economic problems today.
Q What about the situation in Eastern Europe? How dange
ous is it for the Soviets?
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 themselves overcommitted.
si
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A I. varies from country to country. Since Helsinki
there has been a stirring of thought behind the Iron Cur-
taint. Yet, basically one has the feeling that the dicta-
toria.l controls in those countries will be exercised ruth
lessly as requirements dictate. There could be internal
problems for the Soviets -- as there have been in Hungary
and Poland and Czechoslovakia. But I don't see a real
possibility of a major fracturing of the Soviet bloc.
Q Da you expect the Soviets to make a grab for Yugoslavi
after, Tito's death?
A I think that Yugoslavia is the most fragile point; in
the European scene today. I would think that the Soviets
wouldlook for an opportunity and probe without. getting
Ap
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Do you anticipate a Russian military move to force Yugcj-
slavia back into the Soviet bloc?
A That would be a very definite commitment by the Soviet
and it would be taken only as a last resort. They would
try a lot of other things first before they contemplated
that.
Turning to Russia's other flank -- in the Far East --
are the Soviets and Chinese likely to patch up their quarrel
in the near future?
1. That is always a possibility when you are dealing with
~ou.ntries that operate on such an expedient basis as the
Soviets did in their relations with Nazi Germany before
World War II. But I don't see it on the immediate horizon.
Even if it happened, I doubt if it would be anything more
than an expedient. The fissure between these two countries
is quite deep.
r
58
Q President Carter proposes to withdraw U.S. ground forces
 I
58
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from South Korea. Will that affect China's relations witti
Russia or its attitude toward this country?
would
A Of course, it/NiZ1 have an effect on Chinese attitudes
were
if that decision/ix made and executed. How important it
would!
be will be largely dependent on how and when a with-
drawa.1 takes place -- if it does -- and what changes occu
on the world scene in the interim. It's pretty difficult
to speculate in the abstract until some policy decision i
made here as to how and when it's going to take place
if it does.
Q, Will such a withdrawal be seen as an American retreat
from Asia by Japan and other U.S. allies?
A Again, it depends on how it's done and whether the pre-{
paratory steps can persuade those countries that its not
a retreat from Asia. Those who are looking to us for a
security function out there would be bound to think of it
as something of a retreat. But the status quo is not always
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the right answer. Anytime you change something it's going,
ko be approved by some and disapproved by others.
G One further point about the Soviet Union: What is you
reading of Brezhnev's health? Is he about finished as re-
cent reports suggest?
My reading of Brezhnev's health is that it's a sine c ive
chat goes up and down. Sometimes he wears himself out a
it or he has a particular problem, but I don't see this a
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a LHM curve that's constantly declining and has a termini 1
date tljiat can be anticipated. It's not such that we have
to sit here and plan, "Well, in 12 months or 24 months we're
IA No- 9i don't read the signs that way at this point..
lion in the Kremlin?
bound to have somebody new."
a Are: there any signs of a power struggle for the su.cces
Q Would a leadership change have any significant effect
on Soviet American relations?
A Yes, it's bound to. With a new Administration here in
Washington beginning to establish an understanding with t
Brezhev Administration tdx6Lfx in Moscow fx*6.).dx#5Kydi
we
AcxX { t c. Wg would have to start over and feel out a
new administration over there. There would bound to be
some slowdown in the development of enough understanding
to proceed with things like SALT.
Q Turning to your own situation at the CIA, Admiral Turn 1r:
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1URrir.;n IvU - L8
lre> you handicapped in countering Soviet and Cuban activities
in Africa by restrictions on covert operations?
No, I've not found them a handicap at this point. X-
Nr;.t~ 'there are no new limitations on our covert operatior
specific prohibitions on
s, other than,
(~:r.,'li fi' x :YfXX assassinations,t1~C~4xxh%~x~c~citx
I would not permit that kind of activity anyway.
X'AXYINN XPkx x xxxRrIck*rc rx Cxkcr Xk'NAkxg-Ryxxyx she point
before any covert ction
now is that there must be presidential app.~ova1/and G ?oy lunder? aker4
n;r=ass
must be informed in a timely manner.
Are covert operations --- dirty tricks of that sort
really necessary?
A. We can't abandon covert action. However, in today's
atmosphere, there is less likelihood that we would want t
use this capability for covert action. But I can envisages
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TURNER IVt1- 19
circumstances in which the country might demand some cover,
action.
Q What; circumstances?
For instance, let's say a terrorist group appears with
,a nuclear weapon and threatens one of our cities and says,
"If yoq don't give us some money or release some prisonerI
or do something, we will blow up Washington, D. C." :C th' k
the country would be incensed if we did not have a covert
action capability to try to counter that, to go in and get
the weapon or defuse it.
we
So although we don't exercise it today, I think/~~K
must covert actions
g , X ! retain some capability for/c}; X c9 t that range
from :mall paramilitary operations to r~X~xzc9c~~i~
actions
,,g*t c XXlother/that will influence events:.
What do you intend to do to rehabilitate the CIA after
58
these past couple years of scandals and investigations?
The first thing I want to do is to get people to conce -
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Insert new piece I
wrote
Irate on tomorrow -- focus on the future. Also I hope to
.Cares on more openness. I' d like to see the C:DIV give the
more visible and direct return for
t a payer/xxxx xxk rxx)oXa his money 32.X' x - by providing
unclassified information that we have and that the ci.tiaerts
of this country would find valuable. We can Make informa
tion available on subjects, like t e
strategic balance.
Finally, I hope that we can remove some of the ?:yst cuc1
covert actions
Pro.;-, the Cam. so that people understand tha yip.. ~sX>xx:~ .rsx
For -nstance,
under very close control. f any member of the Intel
ligence community thinks that I am doing, anything iraprope !
he can go directly to an oversight board without telling
me and say, "Turner is up to something he shouldn't be up
to." I intend to continue emphasizing strongly propriety
and legality.
(EI\'D INTERVIEW)
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
[phone]
Herbert E. Hetu
Assistant for Public Affairs
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Your declassification of the reports on energy appear to be part
of a new policy of using intelligence to support policy
decisions. Is that the case?
A. That is definitely not the case. This study was started over a
year ago, before even the election. The President did not know
of it until a few days before he mentioned it in a press conference.
Let me say, though, that I believe that the Intelligence Community
should make more information available to the public on an
unclassified basis. The public is paying for our work and deserves
to benefit from it within the necessary limits of secrecy. Moreover,
a well informed public is the greatest strength of our nation. I
also believe that declassifying as much information as possible
is a good way to provide better protection for those secrets we
must hold. Excessive classification simply breeds disrespect for
and abuse of all classified data. I intend to continue to declassify
and publish information of value and interest to our people.
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Q. What about Ethiopia? Are the Russians establishing another toehold
in Africa at the expense of the U.S.?
A. There is no doubt that Soviet ties with Ethiopia's present Leftist
regime are close. At the same time, however, the apparent Soviet
gains in Ethiopia may lead to a deterioration in its formerly
close relations with Somalia.
Q. Is this a serious setback for the U.S.?
A. The policy followed by the present. Ethiopian government since it came
to power in 1974 has been increasingly Leftist and anti-Western, as
well as being in violation of the most basic human rights within Ethiopia.
While we regret to see a loosening in our long-standing ties with the
Ethiopian people, it is unlikely -- given the present regime in Addis
Ababa -- that the U.S. could have prevented this cooling in relations.
We can hope for an eventual restoration of friendly links to Ethiopia.
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What truth is there to the report that the Russians have made a
breakthrough in developing a beam that could destroy all of our
missiles?
The question of Soviet dev8lopment of a charged particle beam
weapon has been the subject of intensive analysis for a number of
years. All the results of these studies have been made available
to high-level U.S. Government officials on a continuing basis.
The Central Intelligence Agency does not believe the Soviet Union
has achieved a breakthrough which could lead to a charged particle
beam weapon capable of neutralizing ballistic missiles. This
question is obviously of concern to the U.S. Government and is
continually under review by all members of the Intelligence Community.
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
[phone]
Herbert E. Hetu
Assistant for Public Affairs
S-y-cq
_V" ,~. ,,~
4,n~_ ~ A4 64v~
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
[phone]
Herbert E. Hetu
Assistant for Public Affairs
NA w'-r IC)
V 1~.- ~i \ / ~' V a tl E IZ.IZ
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
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Ctn3w S z ~1/J 'V 'S
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5.75 FORM 101 U ESE PREVIOUS
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