LETTERS TO THE EDITOR FROM STANSFIELD TURNER
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP88-01314R000300400011-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 26, 2004
Sequence Number:
11
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 30, 1977
Content Type:
LETTER
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Body:
Approved For Release 11Q@U&F. 01AaRIW8 314R0
WashinSton, D. C.20505
3 0 APR t 7f
Dear Sirs:
I would like to correct some of the impressions that your
readers might have received from the editorial of April 26
entitled, "The CIA and the oil shortage."
The editorial stated that "it came as a shock" that the
CIA had "moved into the tricky art of estimating international
oil and gas reserves." In fact the CIA report on the "International
Energy Situation" did not estimate the size of world oil and gas
reserves but rather projected oil demand and supply to 1985. Also,
it should not be a "shock" that CIA is involved in the strategic
considerations of the world energy situation as part of its
intelligence mission. The Central Intelligence Agency has been
studying international energy problems since its establishment
some 30 years ago. Originally the concentration was on communist
nations, but as the world energy shortage and higher prices developed
in the 1970's our analytical work in this area was extended to cover
other parts of the world. We would be derelict if we did not do so.
CIA's role in analyzing world energy trends is well known by
U.S. industry, the trade press, and international agencies concerned
with this subject. Indeed, every other week the CIA issues a widely
distributed, unclassified statistical survey, "International Oil
Developments," (attached) through the Document Expediting Project
of the Library of Congress.
It is simply not true that the CIA analysis is "almost alone."
Most private and institutional projections of energy supply and
demand are quite pessimistic, and in light of our analysis of the
USSR and China situations we would expect them to evidence greater"
pessimism.
We take exception to the remark that CIA has a "tattered
credibility" and is "an easy mark for White House manipulation." Our
analysts jealously protect their objectivity and neither they nor I
would accept manipulation, from any source, including the White House.
There is no evidence to the contrary.
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I am concerned that at a. time I am trying to make as much
of our material available to the public as possible you raise
the question of motives and credibility. The public should have
as much objective information as possible on issues such as the
energy situation, and we will continue to declassify such reports
on a variety of subjects whenever possible.
lsj Si;ansfi L ~ :_~~rr
STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Letters to the Editor
The Washington Star
Washington, D.C. 20061
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011
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International Oil Developments
STATISTICAL SUR VE Y
Prepared by
The Office of Economic Research
ER IOD SS 77-008
21 April 1977
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O:V PA GE
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As President Carter has acknowledged, a lot
of Americans don't believe in the energy crisis.
They think the wolf at the door is phony.
What, then, the President was asked at his
press conference April 15, might "jar the con-
sciousness" of skeptics? Well, he said, "the CIA
has just completed this week a long and detailed
analysis of international oil supplies, natural
gas supplies," which he found "quite alarm-
ing."
His ensuing, decision to declassify and share
that report with the American public is not the
least interesting feature of last week's
consciousness-raising sessions on energy. .
It came as a shock, in fact, to most of us that
the CIA had moved into the tricky art of esti-
mating international oil and'gas reserves. It
might be.expected, of course, that CIA analysts
would take a professional interest in the strate-
gic implications of a contest for oil; and if the
CIA is right such a contest might be in the off-
ing. But, is the agency right? Almost alone, it
appears, the CIA declares that the Soviet oil
industry is "in trouble," that its oil production-
"will soon peak, possibly as early as next year,"
that by the mid-1980s the Soviet. Union will be-
come a net importer of oil, and thus perhaps a
competitor for the oil wealth of the Middle East.
Almost alone, again, it predicts a net shortage
of oil by 1985.
These predictions, with their ominous implica-
tion that the problems of the Middle East might
be complicated by East-West. oil competition,
are, if warranted, of the most startling strategic
significance. But,. are they true? Or rather, are
they- authoritative enough to form the basis of a
major overhaul of American energy policy?
The predictions are not documented. The
White House would say only that the CIA made
use of studies by other public agencies; but none
of' these studies, we are told, is nearly so gloomy
about Soviet oil production. And others - for in-
stance, a United Nations study released early
this week - flatly discount the CIA's conclu-
sions.
It is at least as timely coincidence that a CIA
analysis, said to have been ordered last year,
should become available just as the President
took his case for conservation to the public..If,
as Mr. Carter said, the report was "just com-
pleted" it could hardly have been the basis: of
his energy-saving policy proposals, since they
26 APRT 1977
Thy CIA and the oil shortage
presumably have been on the drawing boards
for many weeks.
Considering all these puzzles, a lot of people
are wondering why the CIA's authority (at
least, the authority of its name, such as it is)
should be invoked. When last we noticed, the
CIA suffered from perhaps as much public
skepticism as the energy crisis. And one source
of its somewhat tattered credibility, according
to every recent study, is that in years past the
CIA became an easy,mark for White House
manipulation..
The "CIA says" approach to the world oil
crunch, in view,of the many conflicting assess-
ments from other sources, may not do much for
CIA credibility and its reputation for independ-
ence. We do not, for, our part, conclude out of
hand that the President's invocation of CIA au-
thority is calculatedly "political." We do
question the wisdom of using an apparently
undocumented intelligence analysis in this fash-
ion.
The natural assumption, we suppose, is ?that
when the CIA does not name the sources of its
alarm about a mid-1980s world energy crunch,
those sources are confidential. And if so, do not
the usual objections to possibly compromising
leaks of CIA estimates apply? If, on the other
hand, the report merely echoes - with highly
disputable worst-case conclusions superadded
--- already published and publicly available
analyses by other hands, what is the point of
dragging in the CIA? Does that not raise fears
of a return to the bad old days in which the intel-
ligence? professionals were suborned and corn-
promised by executive manipulation?
To raise these questions; we hasten to add, is
not to question the seriousness of the energy
shortfall that forms the premise of the Presi-
dent's warnings. If the coming world shortage is
as severe as the CIA report suggests, it will be
irrelevant whether the Soviet Union continues to
be a marginal exporter, 'or becomes a marginal
importer, of oil in the 1980s. Indeed, one key
point in the CIA analysis is _ that much will de-
Pend on the production and export policies of
Saudi Arabia.-
The. immediate American problem is our
,ungovernable thirst for imported oil,.and the,
need to get it under-control. Even a' looming
strategic rivalry for Middle Eastern oil is, for
present purposes, asideshow: an ominous one,
perhaps, but a sideshow all the same.
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