CIA'S NOW 'A MODEL OF OPENNESS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 86
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 16, 1977
• Content Type: NSPR

A RTICLE
I ON PACE.' 'Approved For Release 200 /I. 0-?ig1i88-01315R00020
16 November 1977
CIA's now
?a model of
open ess'
THE CENTRAL intelligence Agency, which *I
has taken its lumps since Watergate, has gone so 1
far in trying to improve its public image that it
now passes out information kits about the? super-
secret agency to reporters.
_ .
?
That,. and a-pew "openness"- about the CIA,? '
have made it a new model of American intelli-
gence, according to. Ache.. StansfieId Turner,
agency director. f--* ? ? ?
, .
Turner, in Chicago Monday to address a meet-
ing of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations,
said, however, "We must dill have secrecy in the
intelligence community." ? ?
"BUT WE are continuing to review what we
can make public, and what can be public will
be," he told reporters. His press conference and
address, part of a series he is making throughout
the country, was designed to convince the people
of the CIA's forthrightness. -
The information kit included background on the
CIA and a report it prepared on the international
energy outlook to 1985. The CIA's conclusions
were not encouraging for the United States;
It reported that oil and gas supplies will increase
little outside the OPEC nations.
I Turner, wha fired 198 employes of the CIA's
operations section, effective March 331, said anoth-
er 700 would be dropped by Oct. 31, 1979, adding
that there is "unanimity in the CIA that it is
overstaffed." ' ? i.'42ie;?i??????.- .* 4." `q,
"I found that my tWo'preiecessors" had been
planning a major reduction in the operation of
that section, and I made the decision to go-
ahead, and I also made additional cuts," he said. "
"It's never easy to tell someone that his services ??
are not required, but as a taxpayer I....cannot ,
condone excess personneL". 4.e.do
-oft
THE PRINCIPAL function or the operations
--
section, consisting of 4,000 *officers' and 4,000 sup-
port personnel, is tie gathering of intelligence. -
Turner said a good part of the CIA program is
research that is evaltated? by the government's.,
decision makers. - ? . ? .
He said he is hopeful that Russia will stop the?
microwave radiation of the U.S. embassy in Mos- _
cow that has been going on for years. -
25X1
330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9 -
Approved For Release NW101/91suclik-f0E88-01315R000200330001-9
15 November 1977
Turn r denles 1-6' ogY icfates
a ViIff reductiowj
- By Leon Pitt
Ad? m..Stansfield-- Turner,
Central Intelligence Agency di-
rector, denied here Monday
published reports that some
900 CIA agents are being fired
?? because the agency is using
? more efficient technical in-
, telligence-gathering processes.
? "We did not make the cuts
because I think technological
- intelligence will replace. hu-
man Intelligence. I'm merely
cutting the overhead," Turner
declared.
? He said the, staff reductions,:
announced last August, .were
-due to a. buliduji of personnel
during the Vietnam War: "Ex-
cess people are not good for el-
. ficiency and morale . .
Turner stressed at a press con-
ference before addressing a
luncheon of the Chicago Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations.
: Newspaper reports over the
weekend stated that although
CIA officials had said cutbacks
In personnel over the next two
? years Are being inade for rea-
sons of economy, it Is also be--
'iieved that technology is a fac-
tor..In recent years, the CIA 1
has relied increasingly _ on
teChn1cal...4. devices, including
satellites and electronic Inter-
ceptors-for collection of infor-._
roation '
The reports_ said the cut-1
:backs, which are expected to
be completed by Dec, 31, 1979,
, will cut, deeply into the. top
ranks of' the clandestine .orga-
nization. '
Turner' -also' said Monday
America's commercial micro-
wave telecommunications are
being intercepted at the Rus-
sian -Embassy In WaShington._
"whatever goes onto unse-
cured telephone links" from
transmitting microwave satel-'
!lies, he said :
H e said the monitoring
would be discussed with the
Soviets before long and that; in
- the meantime, confidential in-
formation should be -trans?
mitted by cable or_"encrypted
(coded)." _
"This problem., (microwave
Interception) ' is much mo-re
twidespreal" - Turner
s_addiagL. that 'Industrial .sPles_.
and even private citizens .are
intercepting microwave ttans--
:missions.
Turner said his visit to Chi-
cago was "part of the new
openness" of the. CIA as man-
dated by President Carter. He
said that since he assumed
leadership of the much-criti-
cized agency last March, it has
become _"pore Open and forth-
right"- with" the American
public.,
Howevei, Ttnner, a native of
Highland Park, stressed that
,"_we. must have secrecy. You
can't have Intelligence without
secrecy." 7
. -
He added that the bulk of in?
telligence gathering was not
; from "clandestine" operations
but through researchlust like _
'you would find In a. large cor-
poration or university." - ? '
Noting. that the CIA, reports
to at least eight congressional
. committees at various times,
- Turner said the practice gives
- "balance" - to the CIA but it
also entails risks. One risk, he
-said, is "timidity," another Is
"leaks. -
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R00
25X1
0200330001-9
PRESS CONFERENCE
CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
14 NOVEMBER 1977
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Q. Why wasn't CIA able to predict with any certainty the failure
of the Russian crops?
A. CIA missed the crop failure by some 10%--if Mr. Brezhnev either
is telling us the truth or in fact has good estimates of his
own. We don't like to miss by 10%, but we are pleased that in
the last four or five years since the country was sort of taken
by the great train robbery of 1932 we have developed a reasonably
good prediction. We were off more this year than before. But
it is a difficult technique when you are dealing against a closed
society which is not sharing its information with you. It is
fortunate that we have a capability to keep abreast of things
like this which do affect our own economy. But I'd like to say
we don't think the country was taken this time by the Soviets
because we were predicting on the first of July onward much larger
Soviet grain purchases than they were acknowledging. And we think
the market understood that.
Q. I would like to ask about the stories of the microwave radiation at
the American Embassy in Moscow and I suppose what I should ask you
to tell us what causes it? What can be done to stop it? Just how
serious is it vis-a-vis our own intelligence in Moscow?
A. What causes it is a different set of morals and standards by the
Soviet Union in the way they behave and standards that they'll go
to to collect intelligence information. There has been radiation
against our Embassy there for a number of years. I'm happy to say
that the power levels of it are low enough that we don't believe its
an endangerment to human life. It happens that the Soviet standards
of what radiation people can accept is about a 1,000 times smaller
than ours. They have not exceeded their standards so we don't think
it's injurious but it is infideous. It is obviously designed to
try to interfere with our activities or to obtain information from
our activities.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-2-
Q. Can you, with whatever mechanical means you have at your disposal,
stop this radiation?
A. That is very, very difficult to do from a purely mechanical point
of view. They have the territory around us--they could beam from
all kinds of directions at us. Technically we have great difficulty
in actually stopping that kind of thing. It has to be done by
persuasion rather than by brute force.
A report states that some of that microwave radiation is caused
by one of our own antennas on top of the Embassy and that we waited
a year and a half or so before we took that antenna off because we
didn't want the Russians to state that we were causing all the
interference.
Q.
A. You have better intelligence than I do. I've been away for a couple
of days and I don't know anything about that particular report.
Is there any indication that the Soviet intelligence operation in
this country is using anything like that?
A. We know that the Soviets in this country are intercepting our
commercial microwave transmissions. We don't have any evidence
of radiation against us like they have in Moscow.
Q.
Q. What is that, sir?
A. It's done from their embassy in Washington, D.C. and its a danger
to us. It's something that we've taken precautions on and on which
national policy is being formulated and I think will be enunciated
before too long. I'm not free to go much further until that is
available to us.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-3-
Q. How much could they pick up by interception of commercial
microwave here, in this country?
A. Did you all read the interesting report in the press--that
during the Lufthansa hijacking a man in Israel sat in his
apartment with an antenna and he listened to the German
commandos chase plane go into Mogadiscio. He turned that
information over and it was broadcasted on Israeli radio
before the raid took place, before the commandos operated.
Fortunately they managed to get it stopped before it went on
Israeli television. The information did not apparently get
to the hijackers. And then that man sat there and listened
to commando operations and how they were progressing. In
short, this problem is much more widespread in the world than
in our country, than just the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.
Whatever goes onto unclassified telephone links that go on the
microwave and a lot of it does go on the microwave today. In
Washington, D.C. you can make telephone calls from one side of
the city to the other and that call will go 22,000 miles up to
a satellite and back down again to go 10 miles across the city.
But if it is on a microwave link, hijackers, gangsters, foreign
intelligence operators, industrial spies and all work to get
that information. And it is a problem that the whole country
has and much more than in the intelligence sphere.
Is that the same category that is interfered with in Moscow?
Just how serious is their interference, with normal and/or intelli-
gence operations in Moscow? Is it just what goes out over telephone
lines by microwave? Are we able to circumvent this?
A. In Moscow we don't have any microwaves. We are not positively clear
what they are interfering with. They help themselves in ways that
are very technical and I can't answer that for you--I really can't.
4.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-4-
Q. (Was unintelligible, but had to do with DDO cutbacks.)
A. I came to this job in February and found that my two predecessors
and the incumbent professionals in the Central Intelligence Agency
had been planning a major reduction in force in order to get back
down from the large buildup in Vietnam. In August I made my
decision to go ahead with that reduction. I cut it back slightly
and I compressed the time frame to two years to avoid having a
prolonged period of uncertainty within the Agency. When I
announced that decision nobody objected to it. There is almost
unanimity of feeling within the organization that we are over-
staffed. I promised at that time that the first half of the cut
would be announced by the first of November and the second half
by the first of June. We announced those on the first of November
and now you get a lot of complaints. I'm sorry--it's never easy
to tell people that their services are no longer required. I
would like not to have done that. But as a taxpayer I cannot
condone keeping people on the payroll whom the government doesn't
need and as a man I'm very concerned with both the effectiveness
and morale of the Agency. (next few sentences unintelligible)
We made these announcements, we made these cuts, I think, in the
long-term interest of the Agency. We did not make them because I
think technical intelligence is going to replace human intelligence.
That's not the case. It's a false conclusion of the press to jump
to because I am not reducing anybody in the overseas components of
the Directorate of Operations which does our overseas human intelli-
gence collection efforts. I'm cutting overhead in the Headquarters
and it's been well announced--everybody has known this--that we've
tried to do it in as fair and humane a way as we can. I would only
say in conclusion that I'm so delighted that the media of this
country, after three or four years of intense criticism of the
Central Intelligence Agency, is now coming to its defense and
worried that it's going to be too small.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-5-
Q. With regard to the pirated microwave messages you said that
hijackers and other people have access to. How serious is
this? What can be done about it?
A. A number of things can be done about it. The most simple one
is to encrypt it all. Another is to be careful that you don't
discuss material that you don't want shared with the general
public on unsecure telephone lines. Another is to take as
much of your important transmissions as possible and take it
off the microwave and onto a cable. We are working in all
kinds of those directions.
Q. (Unintelligible but relates to WASHINGTON POST article on drug
testing.)
A. I stated publicly before the Congress to the extent that the
CIA at any time in its history did testing of drugs unwittingly
on human beings is abhorrent to me. We do not do it now. Any
research in that category that we sponsor is worked through
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare for its approval.
Let me also put into perspective two things: The program really
ended in the 1960s?there were little tail-offs that did not
involve human beings at a later period; and secondly, there's a
historical matter. The attitudes and standards of our country
were different then and we're judging now against today's outlook
and I think we've got to put it into some perspective like that.
Secondly, let me say, overall ARTICHOKE, MKULTRA, that whole
series of problems are almost entirely something that you and
I would still stand for today--very good research--very well
motivated and properly done. There were a few excesses that I
say I abhorred but the bulk of it was not.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-6-
Q. Is the CIA working with SAVAK here or in Amman, and if so
what is the purpose?
A. We lived on arrangements with many intelligence organizations
around the world where we share information; we're helping
each other in collecting foreign intelligence against third
parties within the Communist Bloc. We do not have any
arrangements with SAVAK, KCIA or anyone else that permits
them to do things in this country in exchange for our doing
anything else anywhere. That is not part of our arrangement
and we would not tolerate anything of that nature.
There have been reports of links between the CIA and the Shah
of Iran. What relationships exist now between the Shah of
Iran's country and ours?
A. I think I just answered that question as best and as fully as
I can. We do have liaison relationships with numerous foreign
intelligence organizations and they are of mutual benefit to
us and in no way compromise the American standards and values
and privacy.
The Japanese news agency a couple of days ago confirmed that the
Soviet Union has been working on a satellite destroyer. What
information do you have with regard to the Soviet program in
that area?
Q.
Q.
A. No question the Soviets have been testing an anti-satellite device
and the question of how operational it is at this time is difficult
to define or to disclose. But they have been conducting tests
over a number of years. The tests have intensified somewhat in
the last year and a half. So they are clearly moving to achieve
that capability.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-7-
Q. Are the COSMOS satellites that they seem to launch every
month at least--are they being used to target these programs?
A. I'm not sure which satellites are being used for the targets
by name. Yes, they put up a target satellite and they put up
a killer satellite and they simulate destruction.
Q. Can you confirm that Japanese news agency report? Have they
killed another satellite?
A. I can only confirm what I told you. The Secretary of Defense
made a similar statement about two or three weeks ago on that.
It also said that they had been conducting this test. Some
of the tests are successful; some of them are not--as in any
test program. I don't think you can wave from that.
Q. Will we develop a similar program?
A. Will we? That's the Defense Department's problem and they have
made a statement on that which I think does indicate they are
developing an anti-satellite. But I really don't want to get
into that because I'm only here to talk about foreign intelli-
gence, not U.S. programs.
Q. Admiral, why did you decide to hold a news conference here in
Chicago?
A. Because I believe that the Intelligence Community must be more
open, more forthright with the American public today and therefore
I'm here to make a speech, several speeches. I'm trying to do
that as my time permits around the country, and when you come to
a major center of media operations like this, I think it is
only desirable from your point of view and mine that I try to
share with you what I can within the limits of our secrecy. But
I think today there is more that we can do to share with the
American public. We have produced a lot of unclassified studies
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
in the the last six months on Soviet economy, world energy situation,
world steel market situation and we're doing this with deliberate
intent to try to help the American public be better informed
and to benefit by the taxes that they put into our operations.
At the same time I hope it will keep us in closer touch with
the American public and its value and standards because if we
do not operate intelligence in this country in ways that conform
with those ethical values and standards we're not doing our job.
Q. Is this new openness a directive from the President?
A. Yes. Part of the overall policy that Carter announced before
he became President even.
Q. What is the main thrust of your speech?
A. You just heard it--just part of it. It's to talk about the new
model of American intelligence which is different, in my opinion,
than the old traditional model of intelligence. The old model
said that intelligence agencies should preserve maximum secrecy--
we should operate with minimum supervision. The new model, which
I think conforms to the standards, outlook and culture of America,
has more openness as our society is open. And it has more super-
vision as we have checks and balances built into our governmental
process. Now don't let me overstate this--we must have secrecy.
You cannot conduct intelligence without secrecy. But we're trying
in these studies we've produced publicly to review what we do and
say, can it be made public without doing harm to the country's
interests and when it can we'll publish and when we can we'll tell
you about the process of intelligence. But there are some things
we can't tell you--the names of agents, exact techniques of various
collection devices, but we can tell you, for instance, that a very
large part of intelligence is not a clandestine spying-type operation.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Q.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-9-
It is what you would term at any normal university or any
major corporation as research. We have lots of analysts who
research and take the pieces of intelligence and pull them
together into a picture puzzle and try to evaluate it and
give our decisionmakers in this country a better basis for
making their decisions.
(Unintelligible.)
A. I don't think we can change the American standards and jeopardize
the values for which we stand to accommodate lesser standards
of other people. I don't believe that it is necessary in this
new openness and morality to get to a level of ineffectiveness
that will endanger the country. It is always a very difficult
judgmental decision to be made here and part of what the
President has sought and directed in a recent reorganization of
the Intelligence Community is a proper balance between more
oversight and yet preservation of secrecy. It is a difficult
balance that has to be worked out carefully. We are doing that
and I'm confident that it is going to come out well but I'll tell
you very sincerely I think it will take several years to do it.
It will take several years to work out these procedures. For
instance, with the new intelligence oversight committees in the
Congress. Senator Stevenson of our state is a member of the
Senate Committee and Representative McClory of Lake Forest is a
member of the House Committee. We work very closely with those
people today in establishing the rules that will govern our
judgments on what the country's willing to do--what risks we're
willing to take to get information that is not available to open
sources.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Q ?
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-10-
In relation to that, the amount of work that is going to be done
with the members of the intelligence staff. Obviously when
they make an approach to Capitol Hill many people become involved
In an information process; the staff assistants, the secretaries,
etc. That information could go through different facilities; how
are you going to keep it limited?
A. We've not had major problems thus far. We make a judgment on each
piece of information we pass. Sometimes we have to narrow it
down and have one or two staff members only to the council to the
committee. Sometimes we have no staff members. We have to treat
it in accordance with the delicacy of the information. We have
to feel our way into this relationship so that they are comfortable
with what we're giving them and we're comfortable that it isn't
going to leak out. There are two risks in this whole operation
of being more open and being under more supervisory control. The
first is the risk of timidity. That we make at least common
denominator intelligence that we may be unwilling to take risks.
The second is the risk you pointed out of leaks from the number
of people involved. I believe that we have and are developing
an adequate balance between the risk-taking of timidity or leaks
and that level of oversight that will give us assurance against
abuse, assurances in performing in the way the country wants.
I'm pleased and confident at the direction we're moving and I
think they will let us keep the secrecy we need and at the same
time perform only in ways that will strengthen our society rather
than weaken it.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
I
Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP8
25X1
-01315R000200330001-9
ADDRESS BY ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, USN
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
14 NOVEMBER 1977
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
It is really a great treat to be here and I most appreciate
your asking me to be with you to talk about what we are doing in the
world of intelligence to serve you and to serve the country better.
We're reshaping the intelligence structure of your country. President
Carter directed a major effort in this direction in February and after
six months of scrutiny and close study, in August the President issued
directives to make changes in the way we are organized. And as a
result of this, we are starting an evolution today toward what I
would call a new model of intelligence--an American model. This
model contrasts with the old or traditional model in which intelligence
organizations always operated in a cloak of maximum secrecy while
attempting to operate with minimum of supervision. We hope today to
develop a new model which is built to conform with American standards
and culture. On the one hand it will be more open as our society is;
on the other hand it will be more controlled with a system of checks
and balances which characterize our governmental process. So I thought
It might be of interest to you today if I discussed some of the actions
we're taking to move toward this new model.
The President's directive of last August had two fundamental
tenets in it. The first was to strengthen control over the entire
intelligence apparatus of our country, thereby hoping to promote greater
effectiveness. The second tenet was to assure stringent oversight
control thereby increasing accountability.
Now, let me point out that I am the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, but this is only one of the many intelligence
agencies of the government. There are intelligence activities, of
course, resident in the Department of Defense, Department of State,
Treasury, FBI, and even the new Department of Energy. But I am also
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-2-
the Director of Central Intelligence. And in that capacity my task
is to coordinate, bring together into one effective, harmonious
operation the activities of all of these intelligence organizations.
The reorganization the President directed in August strengthens
my hand in that regard in two very specific ways. It gave me full
authority over the budgets of all of these intelligence activities
I've enumerated and secondly, it gave me full authority to direct
the tasking--the day-to-day operations of these organizations. This
should enable me to better control, to coordinate this total effort
of collecting intelligence, analyzing and producing it. And this is
really what was intended, in my opinion, in the National Security Act
of 1947 which first established the Central Intelligence Agency.
Some of the media have portrayed this as a creation of a dangerous
and potential intelligence czar and I think this represents a misunder-
standing of the intelligence process as such. Let me explain that
intelligence is divided into two separate functions. The first is
collecting information and that is the costliest and riskiest of our
operations. Here you want good control. Here you want to be sure
there is a minimum of overlap because it's very costly and to be sure
there is a minimum of possibility of a gap in what you are collecting--
because that can be very costly in a different manner. And only
centralized control, in my opinion, will ensure this collection effort
is well coordinated. The second half of intelligence--on college campuses
It would be called research--is analysis, estimating, pulling all the
little pieces of information that are obtained by the collectors into
a puzzle and trying to make a picture of it. Trying to give the decion-
makers, the policymakers of our country a better basis upon which to
make those decisions.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-3-
Now let me make it clear that I do not, under this new
reorganizations, control the people who do all this analysis. I
control those in the CIA but there is a strong analytic capability
in the Department of Defense and again in the Department of State
and our quest is to see to it that there is competitive, overlapping
analyses. The Department of State specializes in political inter-
pretation with a second suit in economics. The Department of Defense
specializes in military with a second suit in political. The CIA
covers the waterfront. So we have assurance that there will be
divergent views come forward if they are warranted. And we encourage
that and we want to be sure that the decisionmakers don't get just
one point of view when several are justified.
Just let me remind you that should I try to be a czar, should I
try to shortchange the dissenting and minority views, there is a
Cabinet officer in the Department of Defense and a Cabinet officer
in the Department of State who manage those intelligence analytic
operations and if I try to run roughshod over them, I'm sure those
Cabinet officers are not going to fail to take advantage of the
access they have to get their amendments forward. So we are not
trying to setup a centralized control over the important interpretive
process, but over the collecting process. And I sincerely believe
that this new organizational arrangement is going to assure better
performance in both collecting and interpreting our intelligence for
this country.
The fact that the President, Vice President and many other top
officials spent so much time in working on this new reorganization,
I believe is indicative of a keen awareness throughout the top
echelons of our government that good intelligence is perhaps more
important to our country today than in any time since the creation
of the Central Intelligence Agency thirty years ago.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-4-
You remember thirty years ago we, of course, had absolute
military superiority. Since then the failure of the Soviets to
make their system grow adequately in other areas of the military
has led them to accent that particular competition. They have, I
believe, achieved a position of reasonable parity in most areas
of the military. That makes the value of our intelligence product
much more important. When you know your enemy's potential and
something of his intentions, you can use your forces to much greater
advantage. Now, he doesn't give that information away but we can
pick up pieces here and pieces there and over a long period of time
you can bring that together. It gives your military commanders a
sense of leverage for their somewhat equal forces.
Now, let's look past the military scene. Thirty years ago
we were also a very dominant and independent economic power. Today
we are in an era of economic interdependence, a growing inter-
dependence, and the impact on our economy of events of other economies
is more and more apparent. And here, too, I believe we desperately
need good intelligence in order to make sure that we don't lost our
shirt in the international economic arena.
Also, on the political side, thirty years ago we were the
dominant political influence in the world. Today even some of the
most pipsqueak nations insist on a totally independent course of
action. They go their own way and they don't want to be dictated to
by Soviets or ourselves. Here again we must be smart, we must under-
stand the attitudes, the cultures, the outlooks, the policies of these
countries so that we are not outmaneuvered in this process.
Now at the same time that we are trying to produce better intelli-
gence in all three of these fields we must, of course, be very careful
that we do not undermine the principles, the standards of our country in
the process of so doing. Thus, the second leg of the President's
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-5-
new policy--which is better oversight. Some of the mechanisms to
conduct that oversight are, first, the keen and regular participation
by both the President and the Vice President in the intelligence
process. I can assure you they are both very much on top of it. But
beyond that, we have a formalized procedure now in the intelligence
oversight committees in the Congress. We have a committee called
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and we are working very
well with it. Our own Senator, Adlai Stevenson, is a member of that
Committee and I really enjoy working with him. But we have the
relationship here of closeness but yet aloofness. Closeness in that
I feel very free in going to them for help and advice, particularly
when I'm involved with other committees of the Congress and there may
be boundaries that are being encroached upon. But aloofness in that
I very definitely report to them when they call and want to know what
we are doing and how we're doing it and why. It is a good oversight
procedure.
The House of Representatives last August set up a corresponding
committee. Representative McClory from Lake Forest is a member of
that and a very fine and active one. And we hope and are sure that
that relationship will develop as has the one with the Senate.
Beyond this we have oversight in what is known as the Intelligence
Oversight Board, comprised of three distinguished Americans; ex-Senator
Gore, Ex-Governor Scranton, and Mr. Tom Farmer, a lawyer from Washington.
They are appointed by the President. Their only task is to oversee
the legality and the propriety of our intelligence operations. They
report only to the President. Anyone may go to them, bypassing me,
saying, look, that fellow Turner is doing something dastardly or
somebody else in the Intelligence Community is doing something he
shouldn't be doing. The Board will look into it and let the President
know whether they think he should do something in response.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-6-
Now let me be perfectly clear and perfectly honest with you.
There are risks to the oversight process. The first is that of
timidity, I would say. Timidity in that it's easy when you're
overseeing something to decide not to take a risk, not to take a
chance and we could fail to do things that may be very important
to the long-term benefit of our country. It may put avoidance
of current risk over gaining of long-term benefits. And secondly
the risk of security leaks. The more you proliferate the number of
people involved in sensitive secret intelligence operations, the
more danger there is of some inadvertent leak of release. I am
confident at this time that we are moving to establish that
right balance between the amount of oversight and the amount of
danger that it entails. But it will be two or three years before
we shake this process out--before we establish just how those
relationships are going to exist. And in that time, in that process,
we are going to need the understanding and support of the Congress
and that, of course, means the support and understanding of the
American people.
Accordingly, we are now reappraising the traditional outlook
toward secrecy, toward relationships with the public and we are
adopting a policy of more openness, more forthrightness in the hope
that we can do this at the same time as we ensure preservation of
that secrecy which is absolutely fundamental. As a first step we've
tried to be more accessible to the American media. We have appeared
on GOOD MORNING AMERICA, 60 MINUTES, TIME magazine and also we
respond more readily now to inquiries from the media. We try to
give substantive, meaningful answers whenever we can within the limits
of our necessary secrecy.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-7-
But perhaps more interesting to you who are so concerned
with international affairs of this country, we are also today
trying to share more of the product of our intelligence efforts--
more of the analyses, the estimates, the studies that we do.
In fact, we have a policy that when we do a study and it comes
out secret, top secret, or destroy before reading or whatever we
may label it, we try to reduce it down to an unclassified form
and ask ourselves the question, "Will this product still be useful
to the American public?" If it is, we feel we have an obligation
to print it and publish it. We are doing that to the maximum extent
we can.
You have heard of our study last March on the world energy
outlook. We've recently done one on the world steel prospects,
whether there is over-capacity and what the expected demand is.
We've done studies and published them on the Chinese and Soviet
energy prospects. And under the aegis of the Joint Economic
Committee of Congress last July we published one on the outlook
for the Soviet economy itself.
Let me describe that just very briefly to give you the flavor
of what we think we can put out in unclassified form what we hope to
be of value to you and other Americans and perhaps help improve the
general quality and tenor of American debate of major issues affecting
our country. Previously, CIA has looked at the Soviet economy and
felt that generally it had a capability to achieve three things; to
sustain the level of military growth that they were trying to do to
catch up with us generally; to make improvements if not spectacular
improvements, in the quality of life inside the Soviet Union; and to
sustain enough investment to carry on a generally growing economy.
Our most recent study reexamines these premises and comes to the
conclusion that the outlook for the Soviets is perhaps more bleak
today in the economic sphere than at any time since the death of Stalin.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-8-
This is based on our belief that the Soviets have maintained
their levels of productivity over these many years primarily
by infusing large quantities of labor and capital and we think
they are coming to a dead end here. For instance, in the 1960s
they had a very big drop in their birth rate. In the 1980s the
rate of growth of their labor force is going to drop markedly from
about 1.5 percent to about .5 percent. They are not going to be
able to find the additional labor to go into increases, keep up
their productivity. A lot of the growth of their labor force
also today is coming from the central Asian areas of the Soviet
Union where they just don't like to go on into the big cities.
Secondly, as far as investment is concerned--capital--their
resources are becoming more scarce and more difficult to obtain.
They're having to reach for minerals further into the Siberian
wasteland which is costly. They can't bring in as much as they
have before, particularly in the area of petroleum where we have
made this forecast that their emphasis in recent years on current
production has been at the expense of developing reserves and new
supplies.
Now if you look carefully at the Soviet's five-year development
plan you'll see that they are the ones who predict they are not going
to be able to make the same infusions of capital and labor as they
have in the past. They, however, do come to the conclusion that
somehow and nonetheless they are going to increase productivity.
We don't think that is in the cards. We see no sign of increasing
efficiency, no sign of any willingness to become less shackled to
their economic doctrines which are harnessing them back. Instead,
we think the Soviets in the years ahead between now and the early
1980s are going to be faced with some difficult pragmatic choices.
One may be a debate over the size, the amount of investment in their
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-9-
armed forces. Clearly, this is one avenue to find labor and
capital. Another may be over whether they will continue to
fulfill their promises for the delivery of oil to the Eastern
European satellites. Will they be able to afford doing this
when it becomes more and more difficult for them to obtain hard
currency. And the third may be, what are they going to do to
obtain the necessary foreign exchange to sustain the rate of
infusion of American and Western technology and equipment which
they are currently depending upon to increase and improve their
economic position. Interestingly, when they face these and other
decisions there is a high probability that they are going to be in
the midst of a major leadership change. It could be a very difficult
time and situation for them. It may go very smoothly--we just can't
tell
One of the important points that comes out of all this is
that we believe as they make these policy decisions it's not going
to be remote from you and me--it's going to be important to us.
What they do with their armed forces obviously impacts on what we
do with ours. What they do with their oil inputs to the Eastern
European countries and whether that area remains politically stable
is going to have a major impact on the events throughout the European
scene. If there is too much competition for energy because they
don't produce what they need, what is that going to do to the overall
world prices of petroleum? If they enter the money markets in an
attempt to borrow more from us and others in the West, what is going
to be our response? What is going to be our policy in that regard?
Now let me say that when we produce a study like this we are not
so confident that we don't want to have a good debate with the others
in the American public as to the quality of what we've done. And
therefore we find that publishing these studies is also helping us to
maintain a good dialogue with the American public. When we did the
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-10-
oil study last March, for instance, and it received criticism
from the press, we wrote to professors, to oil companies, to think
tanks who had come out with criticisms and we said, "Detail those
for us--we'd like to have them." When they did we invited them to
come into the Agency and discuss them with us and we had some very
interesting and stimulating dialogues of the results. It's very
beneficial to us to publish these studies as well, I hope, as to
the American public. We hope as more of them come off the press
we will have more dialogue with the business community and with
academia.
Let me assure you, however, while we're on this subject of
openness, that we cannot and we will not open up everything. There
clearly must be a degree of intelligence that remains secret.
Some of the information behind the Soviet oil and economic studies
clearly was derived from very sensitive sources. They would dry up
if we made them known. Thus, we can't forget that while we're
moving ahead with this dialogue with the public and trying to build
up more public understanding and respect for what we do in defense
of our country, we must also obtain the public understanding for
preserving that level of secrecy which is essential for these
activities. In short, we're moving in two directions at once today.
On the one hand, we're opening up more, but in that process we expect
to obtain greater secrecy for what remains classified. When too much
is classified it is not respected and not well treated. The other
direction we're moving is simply to tighten the noose of security
around those things which must be kept secret.
What I'm really saying in summary is that we're trying to
develop a model of intelligence uniquely tailored to this country,
which on the one hand balances an increased emphasis on openness with
a preservation of that necessary secrecy where it truly is necessary.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
-11-
And the model which also combines an emphasis on continued
effectiveness in getting the job done and obtaining that informa-
tion which our policymakers require while on the other hand
exercising effective control. I am confident that while this
model is still evolving it is moving in a direction in which we
can preserve the necessary secrecy while at the same time conducting
our necessary intelligence operations only in a way which will in
the long run strengthen our open and free society.
Thank you very much.
-END-
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
GROSS INDEX
OR 1 Coundil on Foreign Relations
(Houston)
For additional information on the above, see:
FILES
CIA 1.01 Turner, Adm. Trip file 31 Jan ? 6 Feb 78
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
DATES
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Council on Foreign Relations
v
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For %lipase 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315ROleg200330001-9
6 October 1977
,Mr. Zygmunt Nagorski
Council on Foreign Relations
The Harold Pratt House
58 East Goth Street
New York, New York 10021
Dear Mr. Nagorski:
Just a short note to send along
some recent declassified Central Intelli-
gence Agency publications.
It was a pleasure meeting you last
night--our visit to the Foreign Relations
Council was most enjoyable.
All the best.
Sincerely,
Herbert E. Hetu
Enclosures
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
STAT
Herb Hetu
Approved F-446Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-013/KR000200330001-9
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.
Meeting in honor of
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, USN
Director of Central Intelligence
SECRECY AND MORALITY IN INTELLIGENCE
Wednesday, October 5, 1977
5:15-6:30 pm
McGeorge Bundy
President, The Ford Foundation
Presiding
Admiral Turner's Personal Staff
Admiral Turner's Personal Staff
AS A COURTESY TO THE SPEAKER
MEMBERS ARE REQUESTED TO REMAIN UNTIL THE TERMINATION OF THE SESSION
THE MEETING WILL END PROMPTLY AT 6:30 PM
Members and Staff of the Council
Elie Abel
Robert J. Alexander
F. Alley Allan
Charles Allen
James B. Alley
Graham T. Allison "
Richard C. Allison
Arthur G. Altschul
Norbert L. Anschuetz
Anne Armstrong
William Attwood
William B. Bader
Charles W. Bailey, II
Charles F. Baird
Robert R. Barker
Deborah Barron
Whitman Bassow
Philip Bastedo
Alan Batkin
Louis Begley
Robert Bernstein
John P. Birkeland
To encourage forthright discussion in Council meetings, it is a rule of the Council that participants will not
subsequently attribute to other participants, or ascribe to a Council meeting, any statements that are made in
the courARIMVedelFiegRelease 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R*0200330001-9
Joseph E. Black
Stephen Blank
John A. Blum
Richard Blys tone
Robert Bond
J. Dennis Bonney
Dudley B. Bonsai
Paul J. Braisted
Henry C. Breck
Henry R. Breck
Donald G. Brennan
Lorna Brennan
Mitchell Brock
George P. Brockway
Judith Bruce
John C. Bullitt
William A. M. Burden
Benjamin J. Buttenwieser
William D. Carmichael
James Chace
W. Howard Chase
Patricia Hewitt Christensen
Robert C. Christopher
Edgar M. Church
Kenneth B. Clark
Harlan Cleveland
Richard M. Clurman
James S. Coles
Emilio G. Collado
Sydney M. Cone, III
John T. Connor, Jr.
Donald Cordes
Norman Cousins
Gardner Cowles
Winthrop Crane
Robert D. Crassweller
Charles F. Darlington
Eli Whitney Debevoise
Jose de Cubas
Christopher DeMuth
Charles S. Dennison
Lucy Despard
Thomas J. Devine
Henry P. de Vries
Bita Dobo
Arnold Dolin
J. R. Drumwright
James H. Duffy
Kempton Dunn
Julius C. C. Edelstein
Irving M. Engel
John Exter
Larry L. Fabian
Mark C. Feer
Mary Frances Fenner
Glenn W. Ferguson
Thomas K. Finletter
Paul B. Finney
Joseph G. Fogg
Nevil Ford
Doris Forest
Joseph C. Fox
Albert Francke, III
George S. Franklin, Jr.
Gerald Freund
Henry J. Friendly
Alton Frye
William R. Frye
Stephen Fuzesi, Jr.
Robert Gard
Murray Gart
Richard L. Garvin
Patrick Gerschel
Patsy Gesell
William T. Golden
Harrison J. Goldin
Maurice R. Greenberg
James R. Greene
Joseph N. Greene, Jr.
Thomas Griffith
Peter Grimm
Najeeb E. Halaby
Morton H. Halperin
George Hampsch
Selig Harrison
Richard Head
H. J. Heinz, II
Robert C. Helander
Jean Herskovits
Charles M. Herzfeld
William M. Hickey
Keith Highet
James T. Hill, Jr.
Frances P. Himelfarb
Susan Hirsch
George Hoguet
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 rttA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For ftitease 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315Ret0200330001-9
Robert Hoguet
John Hughes
Thomas L. Hughes
J. C. Hurewitz
John K. Jessup
William Josephson
Arnold Kanter
Gail Kay
Robert Kleiman
David Klein
Antonie T. Knoppers
Winthrop Knowlton
Robert P. Koenig
Louis Kraar
Betty Lall
Raymond A. Lamontagne
David E. Langsam
Eugene Le Baron
John V. Lindsay
Kenneth Lipper
Thomas H. Lipscomb
Amy Litt
Edwin A. Locke, Jr.
Natalie Lombard
Winston Lord
Edward C. Luck
David L. Luke, III
John J. McCloy .
Elizabeth McCormack
Walsh McDermott
Bruce K. MacLaury
Robert Macy
August Maffry
Bayless Manning
John Masten
Lawrence A. Mayer
Dana G. Mead
John Merow
Herbert E. Meyer
Drew Middleton
John Millington
Leo Model
Judith H. Monson
Jan Murray
Forrest D. Murden
Daniel Rose
Robert D. Murphy
Anne R. Myers
Zygmunt Nagorski
Clifford C. Nelson
Rodney W. Nichols
Richard Nolte
Alfred Ogden
Michael J. O'Neill
Andrew N. Overby
George R. Packard
Maynard Parker
Hugh B. Patterson, Jr.
Robert M. Pennoyer
James A. Perkins
Roswell B. Perkins
Hart Perry
Gustav H. Petersen
E. Raymond Platig
Francis T. P. Plimpton
Joshua B. Powers
Thomas F. Power, Jr.
John R. Price, Jr.
George E. Putnam, Jr.
Leonard V. Quigley
Jack Raymond
Jay B. L. Reeves
Michael M. Reisman
Marshall A. Robinson
Jane Rosen
T. W. Russell, Jr.
Dankwart A. Rustow
Mildred Sage
Richard E. Salomon
Howland Sargeant
John E. Sawyer
Warner R. Schilling
Enid Schoettle
Harry Schwartz
Nancie Schwartz
Stuart N. Scott
John 0. B. Sewall
Ronald K. Shelp
Walter V. Shipley
Benjamin R. Shute
Laurence H. Silberman
Adele Smith Simmons
Datus C. Smith, Jr.
-3-
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
?
Approved For** lease 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-01315V600200330001-9
Theodore C. Sorensen
Elinor Spalten
Kenneth Spang
John H. Spencer
Harold E. Stassen
James H. Stebbins
Daniel Steiner
Charles R. Stevens
J. B. Sunderland
James S. Sutterlin
Francis X. Sutton
Eric Swenson
John Temple Swing
Stanley M. Swinton
Arthur R. Taylor
William J. Taylor, Jr.
Evan Thomas
Martin B. Travis
Barbara Tuchman
Maurice Tempelsman
Robert Valkenier
Sandra Vogelgesang
Paul A. Volcker
Alfred H. Von Klemperer
William Walker
T. F. Walkowicz
Martha R. Wallace
Bethuel M. Webster
George B. Weiksner
Jasper A. Welch, Jr.
Richard W. Wheeler
Taggart Whipple
Donald M. Wilson
John D. Wilson
Henry S. Wingate
Philip S. Winterer
Donna Ecton Young
Ezra K. Zilkha
-4-
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
STAT Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved Fo,?Delease 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01314P000200330001-
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE 1.58 EAST 68TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 1 TEL. [phone] CABLE: COUNFOREL, NEW YORK
The Thomas J. Watson Meetings
You are cordially invited to attend
,A Meeting
in honor of
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, USN
Director of Central Intelligence
at the Harold Pratt House
Wednesday, October 5, 1977
5:15-6:30 pm
SECRECY AND MORALITY IN INTELLIGENCE
McGeorge Bundy
President, The Ford Foundation
will preside
MEMBERS ACCEPTING THIS INVITATION WILL BE EXPECTED TO STAY UNTIL THE END OF THE SESSION.
MEMBERS ARRIVING AFTER 5:30 ARE REQUESTED TO REMAIN IN THE MARBLE HALL
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
ApproltectEalliflkelliasts32804/14/81 : CIA-RDP88-013h1400020033 001-9
Washington.D.C.20505
I 'T
7 July 1977
Dear Zyg,
Thanks so much for the invitation to
address the New York Council on Foreign Relations.
I accept with pleasure.
I understand my staff has been in touch and
Wednesday afternoon, 5 October, is amenable to all.
My staff will continue to be in touch with you to
coordinate the final details.
Thank you again for the invitation and I look
forward to meeting you in October.
Yours sincer
STANSFIELD TURNER
Mr. Zygmunt Nagorski
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
The Harold Pratt House
58 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021
uive Registiy
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved Forigliplease 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-0131
COUNKILONFOREIGNRELATIONS,mc.
TEE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE I 55 EAST 65TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 TEL. tH2) 734-0400
The Thomas I. Watson Nfertino
ZYGMLINTNACORSta.
CABLE: COUNFOREL. NEW YORK
March 21, 1977
Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Stan:
Your appearance on "Face the Nation" yes-
terday once again whetted my appetite.
Could we fifila up a date to have you visit
the Council sometime next Octo&er -November
so that we could have a datt"PeserverM'
both of our calendars?
The formulating of a subject and other
logistics we can leave until a later date.
ZN.es
?
Sin
cL
Zygmunt Nagorski
002003300 1-9
Very respectfully,-
Approved For Release 201T4/11/01-:'CIA-RDP.88-01315R000200330001
? .
Approved For NI&lase 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-01315ROW200330001-9
DCI SCHEDULING ITEM
DATE RECEIVED: 10 May 77
DATE OF EVENT: last week, Dec 77
1. INFORMATION REGARDING THE APPOINTMENT:
a. Source: Tel :[phone] Ltr Fm:Mr. Zygmunt Nagorski
b. Type of event:
Council on Foreign Relations meeting
c. Special occasion: Asks DCI to speak
d. Date/Time: last week in December 77
e. Location: NYC
f. Significant info: The meeting is held for college
of Council members.
2. SCHEDULE:
age
sons and
daughters
3. RECOMMENDATIONS:
AIDE
Schedule Regret
Remarks
PAO
EA
4. DCI DECISION:
a. SCHEDULE
b. ADDITIONAL ATTENDEES
c. PASS TO: DDCI
5. AIDE FINAL ACTION:
NO SEE ME
D/DCl/IC
D/DCl/NI OTHER
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved Fofjaelease 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-0131SIR000200330001
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS INC
THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE 58 EAST 68TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 TEL. [phone] I CABLE: COUNFOREL, NEW YORK
The Thomas J. Watson Meetings
ZYGMUNT NAGORSKI, Director
Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Stan:
May 3, 1977
Following on our earlier correspondence, I want to explore with you
an idea which I hope you will find acceptable.
Every year during the Christmas college vacation, the Council holds
a meeting to which members may bring their college age sons and
daughters. The purpose is to expose young people to the kind of
intellectual climate which exists at the Council. It also gives
them access to people they usually do not have the opportunity to meet.
The thought occurred to me that in view of the crisis in confidence
which has developed over the years between younger Americans and the
intelligence community, you might want to be our annual speaker for
the occasion. A topic related to the role of intelligence in an open
society would perhaps be an appropriate one for the meeting.
Please let me know if you would consider this invitation favorably.
This meeting is usually held during the last week in December.
With kind regards,
ZN.es
Sin rely,
Zygmun J Nagor ski
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
STAT
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
INTERNAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-0
25
1315R000200330001-9
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTat
WASFIINGICN, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Of ficers
7 September 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCl/NI
FROM: James R. Lilley
National Intelligence Officer for China
SUBJECT: Invitation to Speak on China to
Council on Foreign Relations
This is to amend my memo of 26 July 1976 (copy attached).
The Council on Foreign Relations has asked me to speak in
Tampa Bay Florida rather than in Louisville on 28 Septmber.
I have accepted this change.
Attachment:
As stated
NIO/CH-JRLilley:fmt
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee, w/att.
1 - Asst. to DCI, w/att.
1 - D/Sec., w/att.
1 - C/CCS, w/att.
2 - NIO/CH, w/att.
1 - Nb/RI, w/att.
James R. Lilley
7 September 1976
INTERNAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
X1
STAT
11N11A11.1111.1.1tJJLvIvJAJ.
0 No. 1215-76
Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCl/NI
VIA:
26 July 1976
Assistant to the DCI
Director of Security
Chief, Central Cover Staff
SUBJECT: Invitation to Speak on China to
Council on Foreign Relations
1. Rolland Bushner, Program Director of the Council on
Foreign Relations, has invited me to speak before the Nashville
Committee on Foreign Relations which is affiliated with the
Council. He would like me to speak on Developments in China.
As is the custom with the Council my remarks will be on a not-
for-attribution basis and there will not be publicity.
2. Mr. Bushner has suggested that my talk at Nashville
take place at a date of my choice after mid September 1976.
He has also asked that I consider speaking before several
other committees such as those in Louisville, Indianapolis
and St. Louis.
3. I propose that I accept his offer to speak in Nash-
ville on 27 September and Louisville on the 28th of September.
If these go well and We believe it worthwhile, I can return
later to talk at Indianapolis and St. Louis.
4. I will use some classified data through Confidential
but will blend it in to my talk.
Japes R. Lilley I
National Tntelligence Officer
for China
CL BY
Approved For Release 206104/0411?Lblk-kbFral6N315R000200330001-9
STAT Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
INTERNAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R1110206030GC1k9- 76
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCl/NI
VIA:
26 July 1976
Assistant to the DCI
Director of Security
Chief, Central Cover Staff
SUBJECT: Invitation to Speak on China to
Council on Foreign Relations
1. Rolland Bushner, Program Director of the Council on
Foreign Relations, has invited me to speak before the Nashville
Committee on Foreign Relations which is affiliated with the
Council. He would like me to speak on Developments in China.
As is the custom with the Council my remarks will be on a not-
for-attribution basis and there will not be publicity.
2. Mr. Bushner has suggested that my talk at Nashville
take place at a date of my choice after mid September 1976.
He has also asked that I consider speaking before several
other committees such as those in Louisville, Indianapolis
and St. Louis.
3. I propose that I accept his offer to speak in Nash-
ville on 27 September and Louisville on the 28th of September.
If these go well and we believe it worthwhile, I can return
later to talk at Indianapolis and St. Louis.
4. I will use some classified data through Confidential
but will blend it in to my talk.
a es ey
National ntelligence Officer
for China
Approved For Release 20?ItH,M0AAEItttpP(5g101315R000200330001-9
STAT Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315 000200330001-9
December 25, 1975
Mt. Rolland Bushner
Director
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
SS Bast 68th Street
New York, New York 10021
Dear Mr. Bushner,
Thank you very much for your kind letter
about the possibility of speaking at
Charlottesville on January 10th. I am afraid
I must regret that I cannot undertake this
engagement, as I have some other plans for
that day. I do appreciate your thinking of
me, however, and thank you for passing the
word along.
Sincerely,
W E. ,Cotbz
W. E. Colby
Director
WEC:lm (23 Dec 75)
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
I - DCI (w/Basic)
1 - Asst/DCI
1 - ER
DEc S4 1' si ti
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
25X1
28 Feb '75- Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88- 315R000200330001-9
Mr. Bushner cil for Foreign .R=.z.:"IienameromoNY
Called us to remind that M. Colby was going to address San Francisco
Committee on Foreign Relations last December, but that he called it off
and. promised to reconsider later. Would DCI accept now?
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
. Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01 15R000200330001-9
?
4r4rs
31 December 197
Mr. payie_s_s_Manning_
Pros en
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
58 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021
Dear Mr. Manning:
Please let me supplement my letter accepting
your kind invitation for membership with one
expressing my appreciation for your letter of
December 27th. I understand your concern over
the breach of the house rules, but I assure you
that the incident does not in any way reduce my
high opinion of the Council and its membership.
This kind of slip must be accepted as a part of
our life style today, and it is my responsibility
in any event to avoid divulging classified infor-
mation outside authorized channels. Thus, please
let me thank you for your letter but assure you
that it will in no way restrict my willingness to
speak before the Council on future occasions if
I am ever asked.
WEC:jlp (21 Dec 74)
Distributin:
Original - Addressee
1 - DCI w/basic
1 - ER
t.'
Sincerely,
WW. E
W. E. Colby
Director
ssr\;????:, St".
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved Foc1t*TENclq9zON0FORPErlif-Rp315AloiceqqNqppi -9
Execlativ4
THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE 38 EAST 68TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 TEL. [phone] CABLE: COUNFOREL, NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
December 27, 1974
Dear Mr. Colby:
I am enclosing for you a copy of a letter I have sent today to all
Council members who attended the meeting and dinner with you on Decem-
ber 16.
The letter speaks for itself. But I wanted to let you know personally,
and on behalf of the Council, how sorry we are for the breach of our house
rules that followed your talk. I can only assure you that we know of only
two or three such infractions that have occurred in the entire 52 year
history of the Council and that our non-attribution representations made
to you in our invitation to speak here were made in the best of good faith.
It is an odd quirk of timing that I should be compelled to write an
apology to you just after sending you the board's invitation to become a
Council member. Despite the inauspicious circumstances, I hope we can
look forward to your acceptance of Council membership.
Mr. William E. Colby
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
BM/jg
encl.
Very truly yours,
14"*7
3
OFFICERS
BAYLESS MANNING
President
JOHN TEMPLE SWING
Vi" PresideitadirsOVerd'For
GABRIEL HAE.A.A
Treasurer
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
DAVID ROCKEFELLER CYRUS R. VANCE
Chairman of the Board Vice Chairman
ROBERT 0. ANDERSON
Releasek2C104ffIlt141-:
ZBIGNFEW BRZEZINSKI
DOUGLAS DILLON
HEDLEY DONOVAN
ELIZABETH DREW
GABRIEL HAUGE ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON
OIALRaD130844711315R0MOTWALW
o?icio
HARRY C. McPHERSON, JR. MARSHALL D. SHULMAN
ALFRED C. NEAL CYRUS R. VANCE
JAMES A. PERKINS MARTHA K. WALLACE
_
HONORARY
JOHN J. McCLOY
Honorary Chairman
HENRY M. WRISTON
Honorary President
FRANK ALTSCHUL
Honorary Secretary
Approved FOWLAUG44Q4kMialigiki-Rals4AQMOIMI1-9
? THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE I 58 EAST 68TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 I TEL. [phone] I CABLE: COUNFOREL, NEW YORK
BAYLESS MANNING
President
December 27, 1974
Dear Council Member:
I write to report to you, as one of those who attended the December 16
meeting at which the Council's guest was Mr. William Colby, that a recent
article in the New York Times attributes certain statements to Mr. Colby and
identifies them as having been made at the Council meeting.
As you know, while meeting participants are of course encouraged to
draw freely on the increased understanding that comes from Council discussions,
in order to encourage forthright expression it is a rule of the Council that
participants will not subsequently attribute to other participants statements
made in the course of a Council meeting, nor identify the source as having
been a Council meeting.
The Council's non-attribution rule is regularly brought to the attention
of persons invited to speak here. There is reason to believe that the rule
and its observance are important considerations in the ability of the Council to
attract outstanding speakers and that they contribute to the willingness of
visitors to speak freely. The rule is also, as you know, routinely brought
to the attention of Council members at the outset of each meeting and is considerec
an important factor encouraging uninhibited expressions of opinion by Council
members. It is thus of great importance to the Council's program that the
non-attribution rule be honored by all Council members.
The recent statements that appeared in the press can only mean that
some member or members of the Council have committed a violation of the
non-attribution rule. This incident has been a matter of embarrassment
to all of us and I have written a letter of apology to Mr. Colby. I hope that
this letter, which I am sending to all of the members who attended the meeting
on December 16, will serve as an indication of the very serious concern with
which this matter is viewed, and an expression of trust that such a breach
will not be repeated.
Very truly yours,
BM/kiApPrOved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
LiJ.rn J. V 4.11%., ,L01.1;....,
22 DEC 1974
Approved For Release 2004/11/ 1 ?
T?1 OPERA LLLA r ,
I t
.
S
JJ
V br t't 'IS .
/ i V
l, ,,, 0 . , 3 .; i
1
1:1,NTS IN NIX
,
Richard Helms
James R. Schlesinger ?
The New York Times
William E. Colby
FILES ON CITIZENS i
In addition, the sources said,
a check of the C.I.A.'s domestic
files ordered last year by Mr.
Helms's successor, James R.
' Schlesinger, produced evidence
Helms Reporcedly Got of dozens of other illegal activi-
, ties by members of -the C.I.A.
Surveillance Data in , inside the Uhited States, be-
ginning in the nineteen-fifties, ,
Charter Violation including break-ins, wiretap-? I
ping and the surreptitious in-
spection of mail.
? By SEYMOUR M. HERSH I A Different Category
Sprcial o7;e? New Yok TIrno . Mr. Schlesinger was suc-
WASHINGTON, Dec. 21?Th& ceeded at the C.I.A. by William
Central Intelligence Agency, di- E. Colby in late 1973.
rectly violating its charter, con- Those alleged operations,
ducted a massive illegal do- while also prohibited by. law,
raestic intelligence operation were not targeted at dissident
during the Nixo.n Administra-. American citizens, the sources
tion ag,ainst'the antiwar move-
moot and other dissident
groups in the United States,
according to well-placed Gov-
ernment sources.
An extensive investigation by
The New York Times has estab-
lished that ietelligence. files on
at least 10,000 American citi-
zens were roei-n-iieed by a
special unit of the C.I.A.
'.v .as repo :nine d'necny to Rich- or internal security functions" ?
ard t'ese. 'he Directes of inside the Unite-.1 States. "I hese
nein-cal ane raw re-ipensibilities fah to the F.B.I.
the Ari,b_nizeser to Inn ApproaiedA*Reledte2b0I/11/01 : CIA-R0P88-0131
said, but were a different cate-
gory of domestic activities that
were secretly carried out as
part of operations aimed at
suspected foreign intelligence
agents operaine in the United
States.
Under the 1947 act setting
up the CIA. the agency was
forbidden to have "police, sub-
poena, law enforcement powers
25X1
5R000200330001-9
Mr. Helms, who left the
C. I. A. in February, 1973, for
his new post in Teheran, could
not be reached . despite tele-
phone calls there yesterday !
and today.
" Network of Informants
Charles Cline. a duty officer
at the American Embassy in
Teheran, said today that a note
informing Mr. Helms of the re-
'quest by The Times for corn-
ment had been delivered to Mr.
Helms's quarters this morning. -
By late evening Mr. Helms had ;
not returned the call.
"This is explosive, it could
destroy the agency," one offi-
cial with access to details of
the alleged domestic spying on
dissidents said in an interview. ,
He described the program as1
similar in intent to the Army:
domestic surveillance programs
that were censured by Congress:
four years ago.
"There was no excuse for,
what the agency did," the
source- said. "Whet you had
an insulated secret policej
aeen?ey not under internal ques-.
tier- or audit."
ternal seeticiee unit to dee
ized agents to follow and pho-
tograph participants in antiwari
and other demonstrations. The:
CIA: also set up_ a network of ?
informants who were orderedi
to penetrate antiwar groups,1
the sources said. .
At least one avowedly anti-
war member of Congress wasj those placed under sur-
veillance by the C.I.A., the:
sources said. Other members of:
Congress were said to be in-.
eluded in the C.I.A.'s dossier,
on dissident Americans.
?-Th. names of the various
Congressmen could not be-
learned, nor could any specific,
information about domestic
C.I.A.break-ins and wiretap-
pings be obtained.
It also could not be deter-
mined whether Mr. Helms had
had specific authority from
top aides to initiate the alleged
clornestic surveillance, or
whether Mr. Helms had in-
formed the President of the
fruits,-if any of the alleged
operatons.
Distress Reported
These alieged activities are
known to have distressed both
Mr. Schles'Jneer, now the Seere-
tary of Detense, and Mr. Colby.
Mr. Colby has r.Tortedly told
associates that he is consider-
ing the posi-ibility of asking the
Attorney General to ineritute
legal action nesiest sena en'
those who had heni
itk the clandestine nr.eneAte
One ofFiciel, who wes cliseen
ly ie the le,Lee!
incuhee e-iae irno
5R0Q6200a3000419'".
Mr. Sen,:neeser ?
for,:feen c 11t'eredts.
te:-;
- ? ? 1?. !fir t
T.
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL
THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE I 58 EAST 68TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 I TEL. (
ROLLAND BUSHNER
Pirector
Committees on Foreign Relations Program
December 17, 1974
The Honorable William E. Colby
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
McLean, Virginia
Dear Mr. Colby:
The officers of the San Francisco Committee on Foreign Relations were delighted
to learn that you had agreed in principle to meet with that group in conjunction
with your trip to San Francisco for a luncheon with the Commonwealth Club on
January 17. They proposed that you meet with the Committee at dinner on Ianuary
16, or if that would not be possible they would suggest a reception from about
5 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. or a luncheon from 12:00 to 1:30 p.m. on the same day. If
that would not work and you will be in San Francisco on January 15, a dinner or
reception on that day would be another possibility.
Committee meetings are informal and off-the-record like the roundtable dinner that
followed the general meeting here at the Council yesterday. As with that group,
the wider perspective to be gained from your frank but considered comments to the
leaders who belong to the Committee would be reflected widely.
In a few days I shall telephone your secretary, as you suggested, to see where a
meeting with this Committee could be fitted into your San Francisco visit.
Sincerely,
Rolland Bushner
OFFICERS
BAYLESS MANNING
President
JOHN TEMPLE SWING
Vice President and Secretary
BOARD
DAVID ROCKEFELLER
Chairman of the Board
OF DIRECTORS
CYRUS R. VANCE
Vice Chairman
ROBERT 0. ANDERSON GABRIEL HAUGE ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON
W. MICHAEL BLUMENTHAL BAYLESS MANNING, DAVID ROCKEFELLER
GABRIEL HAUGE ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ex officio ROBERT V. ROOSA
Treasurer DOUGLAS DILLON HARRY C. McPHERSON, JR. MARSHALL D. SHULMAN
Approvedftritteleasev2004/11/alasui.88-0131calantagi01-9
_BEDLEypoNovAN ALFREB.C_NEAL. ?
GEORGE S. FRANKLIN PETER G. PETERSON PAUL C. WARNKE
EDWARD K. HAMILTON LUCIAN W. I'VE FRANKLIN HALL WILLIAMS
CARYL P. HASKINS CARROLL L. WILSON
HONORARY
JOHN J. McCLOY
Honorary Chairman
HENRY M. WRISTON
Honorary President
FRANK ALTSCHUL
Honorary Secretary
Approv
4.:K
UNCLASSIF ED CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLI
- 7 a 56
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
Mr. Thuermer
2
-
.
3
H
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
Per our telephone conversation, Mr. Colby
asked that you get him out of this. As I mentioned,
this matter had been raised with the Director when
he was at the Council on Foreign Relations in New
York.
Mr. Bushner followed up his letter with a tele-
phone call to me on Monday, 23 December. At
that time, I explained that Mr. Colby had been
planning on leaving Washington on Thursday, 16
January, stopping in Ohio at Wright-Patterson and
then going on to San Francisco that evening; in
this connection, I asked if his meeting with the
(QVEI)
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
initbr?T: NAME. ADDIrtESE AND PIHONE NO.
DATE
0/DCl/
Ed For ReIea.-
?
30 Dec 74
, 1....?- UNCLASSIFIED CO I A
00cOpfif-g
?Muir. '3.7 Use previous editions
(40)
Approved For kelease 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Council could be diitriday night, the 17th, rather
than on the 16th. - He commented that Friday is not
usually a good day but he'would check it out and be
bacck in touch with me. None of this makes any dif-
ference no*, but I wanted you to know of his conver-
sation with me. J
STAT Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES Approved For Release 2004/11./01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200
? 536,108
? 709,123
MAR 2 3 1972
tit-C4 4
r OID
? By Thomas B. Ross
. Sun-Times Bureau
. WASHINGTON ? The Sen-
ate Foreign Relations. Com-
mittee agreed Wednesday to
' look into the secret role of in-
ternational corporations in
- U.S. foreign policy.
But it deferred a decision on
whether to order a full-scale ,
staff investigation or to call
'witnesses from the Interna-
tional Telephone & Telegraph
Corp. and other large corn-
panics.
After a closed-door meeting
,
With Sec. of State William P. "
Rogers, Sen. J. William Ful-
bright (D-Ark.), the chairman,
. said the committee decided
only to make a general
"study" of the problem.
- Several committee members
obviously were reluctant to
'delve too deeply into the ex-
plosive issue, despite the reve-
lation by columnist Jack An-
derson of confidential ITT
memos on its dealings in Chile.
kn. Frank Church (D-Ida.),-.
chairman of the Latin Amer--
can subcommittee, urged a full
investigation, including testi-
mony from ITT officials.
A number of present and for-
mer government officials are
understood to have volun-
teered to provide information
on the extensive relationship
, bet ween the Central In-
telligence Agency and U.S.
corporations with operations
abroad.
If a n investigation is
launched it would be the sec-
ond involving ITT at the Capi-
tol. The Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee already is conducting
an inquiry into Anderson's al-
I,Tations that ITT pressured
administration into an out-
of-court settlement of a major.
Antitrust case last year.
Anderson's memos described
extensive ITT dealings with
the Latin American division of
the CIA's ServicesV
as pait. of an alleged plot to
prevent the installation of left-
ist Salvador Allende as presi-
dent of Chile.
The documents also include
purported reports on the Chile*
maneuverings to 1TT director
John A. M.cCone, former head/
'of the CIA
, The CIA's efforts to operate
through U S corporations and
. . fl
other private organizations
abroad was the subject of a '
confidential Council on For-
eign Relations report revealed
by The Sun-Times last Septem--
ber.
The report, based on a se-
cret discussion among several
ormer ranking CIA officials in
1968, declared: "If the agency
Is to be effective, it will have ,
to make use ?of private In- -1
stitutions on an . expanding
scale.. . . CIA's interface with
the rest of the world needs to
be better protected... .
"It is possible and desirable,
although difficult and time-
consuming to build overseas
an apparatus of unofficial cov-
er. . . If one deals through
U.S. corporations with over-
seas activities, one can keep
most of the (CIA's) bureau-
.cratic staff at home and can
deal through the corporate
headquarters,- perhaps using
corporate channels for over-
seas communications (in-
cluding classified commu-
nications)."
VI
Fulbright described ITT's '
activities in Chile, as alleged
by Anderson, as "very bad
business" but "probably a nor-
mal course of conduct" for
corporations with major in-
vestments in a f oreign
country.
Church said Anderson's
charges were "very disturbing
(and) suggest our policy may
be mainly concerned with the
protection of large American ?
companies."
However, he praised the Nix-
on administration. for showing
-, "admirable restraint" in deal-
ing with Allende.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
STAT Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
LIBERTY LOPI'M
Approved For Release 2004/11/Me q_k?trFDP88-01315R00
EDITORIALS
THE SUBVERSIVE C.F.R.
When President Nixon appointed
Henry Kissinger as his assistant for na-
tional security affairs we pointed out that
he was hardly qualified for his job be-
cause he was a security risk himself. And
we proved it.
Many people thought that we were
crazy, or "extremists," to say such nasty
things about a man appointed to such
a high position by an allegedly "conserva-
tive" Republican.
HENRY KISSINGER
is the architect of President Nixon's pro-
Red China policy, which has already
caused our most massive foreign policy
defeat since the recognition of the
U.S.S.R. by Roosevelt. He was hand-
picked for his job by the subversive
Council on Foreign Relations..
The CFR is a private organization
which controls our foreign policy. It is
itself run for the benefit of the multi-
billionaire internationalists who profit
from our continuing sellout to con?-
munism. They picked Kissinger for
Nixon and had Nixon put him in control
of our foreign policy because they wanted
to be certain that "American" policy con-
tinues td be made for their benefit, rather
than the benefit of America.
Kissinger has been So successful in do-
ing a job for his bosses in the CFR that
on Nov. 6 Nixon signed an order putting
him in charge of all intelligence opera-
tions?the FBI, CIA, Military Intelli-
gence, Departments of Treasury, Defense,
and State, and Atomic Energy intelli-
gence. Now, through Kissinaber's National
Security Council, the CFR can plug in
to medtings of patriots who may be plan-
ning to overthrow at the polls the inter-
nationalist regime in Washington. Soon,
it will'be a "crime" to read an editorial
like this unless the people wake up. But
200330001-9
1 There is only One answer to this. I
is to organize a political counter-force
land we don't mean the Republican o
-Democratic party. Both of these are part-
of the problem and any politician who
calls himself either is in some degree con-
trolled. If he's honest, he will admit it.
LIBERTY LOBBY
_
is the answer?a political force which is
completely independent of all pressure
groups and 'parties.
And when we say LIBERTY LOBBY,
we don't mean an imitation, such as
"Common Cause" or some other phoney
organization which, has been set up by
the CFR to lead you down, the road a
little further. The CFR-Zionist cabal is
expert at setting up this sort of thing to
confuse its opposition. .
There is plenty of evidence that
Nixon's fiasco in the UN and forced
busing of kids to integrated schools are
waking up the voters as nothing else ever
has. Public apathy is giving way to.alarm.
The people 'are looking up from their
boob tubes and wondering what is going
on.
Let's tell them--and let's tell them
that there is only one way to fight ef-
fectively?LIBERTY LOBBY,_.
THE PEOPLE ARE CATCHING ON
to the fact that ihe government is in the
hands of ruthless pressure group bosses
who wish to run our country for their
exclusive benefit. They want to steal all
your wealth "legally," through confisca-
tory taxes (the super-rich very seldom
pay any taxes at all), inflation and in,
terest on their Federal Reserve Notes,
which they force us to use as "money."
A poll. reports that in 1964, 62% of
the people believed that the government
was run for the benefit of all. After John-
son and Nixon that figure is now down
to 37%. Which proves that you ?caq't
fool all of the peopotopircbtegIA-pielease 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
?
NEW YORK r2i.i.,IES MAGAZINE
. Approved For Release 213114/1101A1 ISITA-RDP88-0131
57
T 1 ' '
. ? ?
r ,..?.?\ La
i tear) ran
1'3
LI Laa,
P nri r1
Lai I L._ a Ea tan
N March 26, 1969, eleven places
were set for lunch at the
oval table in the Council on
'Foreign Relations' 'Stately meeting
room overlooking Park Avenue. The
,guest list was not quite so distin-
guished as some froin the past, judg-
ing by the photographs hanging on
the _black walnut paneling: Harold
Macmillan chatting with Henry-
Wriston; John Foster Dulles wedged.
stiffly between John 3. McCloY and
Avtrell Harriman; John W. Davis
towering over the King of Siam. But
for a weekday working lunch, It was
an impressive assemblage.
There ..was Cyrus Vance, recently
returned deputy negotiator at the
Paris peace talks; Robert Roosa,
former Under Secretary of the Treas-
ury; Chester Cooper, former special
assistant to Harriman; Janes Grant,
former assistant administrator for
Vietnam in the Agency for Inter-
national Development; Roy Wehrle,
former deputy assistant AID ad-
ministrator for Vietnam; Paul War-
necke, former Assistant Secretary of
Defense; Robert Bowie, director of
Harvard's Center for International
Affairs; Samuel Huntington, profes-
sor ? of government at Harvard; Lu-
cian Pye, professor of political sci-
ence at and Harry Boardman
and David MacEachron, Council
staff ?members. .
The lunchers all. knew each other.?
Most had worked together in Gov-
ernment; all except Wehrle were
.Council meabbers. So they wasted
little time on small talk over the..
soup; plunging right into their sub-
ject: an effort to devise a formula
that., might break the. deadlock in
Paris. The suggestion that the Council
might .help evolve such a formula.
had come from Harriman. Although
the Council's stall rejected, any for-
mal role, it permitted Boardman' to
invite appropriate members to
lunch at which the matter might be
discussed. ? - -.1
Over .the next five weeks, the
group met several times at the
council's headquarters at t 8 East .
a
J. ANTONY LUKAS, a stafF writcr for
rna5azine, 4 the author of "Don't
JYf,Arr Yntfr 01;k6n!"
69th Street, at the Center for Inter-
national Affairs in Cambridge and
the Cosmos Club in Washington.
From its deliberations grew a pro-
posal endorsed by eight members. It
envisioned a standstill cease-fire
and a division of power based on a
recognition of territory controlled by
the Saigon Government and the
Vietcong?a formula the framers
conceded was "rigged" to favor the
Government.
-
In May, the remaining participants
met for dinner at the Cosmos Club
with Elliott Richardson, then Under
Secretary of State, and Henry Kis-
singer, ? Special Assistant to the
President for National. Security Af-
fairs (and the Council's most influ-
ential member). A participant recalls:
"Elliott seemed interested; Henry ob-
viously wasn't,, and. it's Henry who
counts." An official says: "The pro-
posal was received with all the pomp
and circumstance accorded a com-
munication from a foreign govern-
ment, then filed and largely for-
gotten."
But apparently not completely
forgotten. At Richardson's request,
Boardman, Coqper, Huntington and
Wehrle submitted further elabora-
tions. Vance continued to push the
concept with his many influential
friends in Washington, For 18
monthsthere was no sign of accept-
ance. But when President Nixon an-
nounced a five-point peace initiative
on Oct. 7, 1970, it included the first
American call for a standstill cease-
fire as a prelude to a political settle-
ment based on "the existing rela-
tionship of political forces in South
Vietnam." Although many aspects
of the Council group's plan were
clearly absent, the concepts bore
sufficient similarity that a year later
Cyrus Vance could say, "I think we
had some influence."
? .
,L1,1117, "peace initiative," although
in some respects unusual, illustrate
the intricate fashion in which the
powerful men who snake up the
Council still influence the develop-
Reletaset 200411400119CIALREPPB6-0
In an administration that often
regards New York's lite with dis-
s-ntt a eirrof nolicv nronosal may
fall
dark
the
meat'
foreiL:
dence
tutior
Wash
ever
But
mind(
ships
then
influe
in tile,
forge(
have
locke:
ulty
MOM:
and
in flue
that it does----then it is the influence
its members bring to bear through.
such channels.
In an age when most. traditional
institutions are being challenged, the
network 'of influence the Council
symbolizes is increasingly coming
under attack. Critics, within and
without, are asking whether Amer-
ica can any longer afford :such
cozy, clubby approach to the nicking
of .foreigri .policy. In recent months,
the attack has focused on the ap-
pointment of William- Bundy ? a
leading member of the "club," but
also aa prime implementer of a dis-
credited; Vietnam policy?as editor
of the Council's journal, Foreign Af-
fairs.' But the challenge goes well
beyond the Bundy appointment. And,
ironically, as the Council's leadership
moves to bead it off by admitting
younger, dissident members, it only
intensifies the internal debate. In
months to come, the Organization
that has coolly analyzed power strug-
gles in the Kremlin and -Leopoldville
may face an increasingly bitter
struggle of its own. -
ONE. of the most remarkable as:
pects of this remarkable organiza-.
1315R000260-330001-9
R000200330001-9
STAT Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9
Approved For Release 200t1-E491 :19A-RDP88-01315R000
200330001-9
25X1
G-f) 'i -
._-..k , Pic - : , - (-.. i -I- l''' ';:-% Q '4' 1 V -i:TA rfo.olt 0.)_ .:,.."---,..L,,,------- L ?
,
. - - -4' I ? . ? - f-t . 0 k.' t.., .