THE CIA ON AMERICAN CAMPUSES: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000300550015-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: May 1, 1979
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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The CIA on American
Campuses: Massachusetts
These excerpts are from the "lrtterirn Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on M.I.T. and the hnteltigeirce Agencies... pub-
(lished in Masssachusetts Institute of Technology Tech Talk,
1 April 11. 1979, Vol. 23, No. 30.
Institute of Technology
Editor's Note: M.I.T. has become the latest in a growing line of
American universities to reexamine the relationship between the
intelligence community and the academic community.' The
M.I.T. Report provides a detailed and thoughtful discussion of
some of the problems, conflicting values, and solutions. The
INTERIM REPORT of the
AD HOC COMMITTEE ON
MIT AND THE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES
excerpts which are reprinted below explain why the covert
intelligence role is in fact a serious threat to the well-being of the By Kcrnreth Hoffman, chairinan; Lords Menarrd 111; Ascher H.
academic community. Shapiro; Phyllis A. Wallace: Myron Weimer and John M. Wynne.
But a few words should also be said about another, related set
of problems, which the Report does not deal with directly but
which are reflected everywhere in its recommendations that
academics exercise caution. For instance, while one recommenda- The MIT Report defines the critical issues:
Lion that we reprint makes it clear that no one connected with
M.I.T. should knowingly become a covert operative for the CIA, There are a few issues, however, which almost uniquely
the Report's discussion of gray areas shows that there is a limit to involve our relations with intelligence agencies, and with
what the well-intentioned academic can do in the. face of the intel- the Central Intelligence Agency in particular. Most of these
ligence community's clandestine habits. concern the clandestine recruitment and/or surveillance of
How, for example, is an academic to know if a State Depart- foreign citizens who are members of the MIT community.
ment official who wants to chat about some foreign country is In our opinion, these are simultaneously the most serious
really a CIA operative using a State Department cover? And how issues we face and the most difficult ones to deal with.
is an academic to decide what to do when a friendly and knowl-
edgeable contact is rumored to be a CIA agent? Or, in the case of
recruitment, an academic might offer information about students The MIT Report cites responsibilities
to an intelligence operative using a private organization as cover. within the academic community:
In such situations, safeguarding academic freedom depends not
only on the good faith of the academic community, but on the ,..
willingness of the clandestine agencies to abide by university
guidelines. As a second principle we cite the need to maintain a high level
This brings us to the context in which the M.I.T. Report, like of mutual trust among the members of our university community.
comparable sets of university guidelines around the country, ap- Without it, the kind of openness we seek is not possible. We
pears. When Harvard University became the first institution to would like to comment on three aspects of the trust we should
follow the Church Committee's recommendation and to set up have in one another.
guidelines for the members of its community to follow, it also (i) The foundation of this trust is the knowledge that the
became embroiled in drawn out discussions with the CIA. In primary dedication of each member is to the intellectual
these, CIA Director Stansfield Turner has made it clear that the enterprise which we pursue. Hidden motives tend to break
CIA will not honor the standards set up by a university. Ap- clown the bonds of trust that open communication
parently, if the Agency can induce professors, administrators, or requires. This is true whether the hidden motive is the
students knowingly to violate a university code of conduct, the coveting of personal gain and recognition or the patriotic
CIA will do so. And that being the case, it goes without saying desire to help an outside agency gather information about
that the Agency's options with unwitting academics are likewise other members of the community. The special kind of
open. openness which surrounds our activities is something
The M.I.T. Report does not mention the Turner intransigence, which requires a very special kind of dedication, a dedica-
but its discussion of gray areas implicitly acknowledges that the tion which is almost total.
CIA will not cooperate with university guidelines. As it stands, (ii) Members of our academic community should be able to
the hapless academic cannot determine who is or is not a CIA rely on the fact that the views they express, whether they
agent. Only CIA agents know who they are, and if they are be on physics, philosophy or politics, will be judged in the
under instructions to disregard university guidelines, the integrity community solely on the basis of their intellectual merit
and reputation of American institutions of learning will be com- and will be used only as part of the intellectual enterprise.
promised in the world community. Should we become aware, for example, that some
And indeed, as the M.I.T. Report also points out, this is not a members of our community were transmitting to outside
purely hypothetical concern. The M.I.T. community has already agencies political views which other members had, ex-
had the experience of foreign sources refusing to discuss matters pressed in the course of our ongoing dialogue, it would be
of scholarly interest for fear that the scholar was really working quite destructive of trust.
for the CIA. Approved For Release 2004/10/13 :CIA-R 1 p& O()080(6514046k?rgues that we work
 p p ove WaSe 2 _ _ /10t1-3-
toward the elimination of secrecy, not only in the conduct
of the intellectual enterprise but in all matters we deal
with except those which are clearly private or personal.
To put it simply: in general, the more things about which
we are open, the more each of us will believe that open-
ness obtains in our intellectual discourse.
Our third principle is of a different character. It concerns a
basic responsibility to which we must devote special attenticin,
because it is important for maintaining an atmosphere of open-
ness and mutual trust: not putting other individuals at risk or in
jeopardy. TF.ere are several ways in which we have to be careful
about this, many of which apply quite broadly to our scholarly
contacts, both here and abroad. We shall mention the two most
basic ones now.
(1) The bonds of mutual trust which we develop become, in
many cases, almost familial in nature. The private or per-
sonal information we thereby acquire about another
member of the community should not be shared with
others without the consent of the individual involved. We
must be particularly cognizant of this in an age during
which centralized information storage and retrieval are
growing so rapidly. If, for example, a security clearance is
conducted on an individual, it is virtually impossible for
anyone to say with certainty exactly who will have access
to the information gathered and (therefore) for what pur-
pose it ultimately may be used. This is true of many less
formal inquiries as well. We believe the sound posture to
adopt is that the transmission of personal or private in-
formation about an individual-whether it is given to a
government agency, an industrial concern, another univer-
sity, or even another person-potentially exposes the indi-
vidua.i to risks and the decision as to whether those risks
are to be taken should be made by the individual in-
volved.
(ii) The openness which surrounds communication in a
university is not common to many other parts of society,
nor is the style in which debate is carried out. We must,
New
Documents
CIA/POLICY ON RELATIONSHIPS WITH
JOURNALISTS 'MATERIAL SENT TO INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMITTEES; 1973-1976; 47
pages. After liti:ration under FOIA, these doc-
uments were released to Judith Miller in
response to a request for all material on CIA
use of journalists sent to the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees and the Rockefeller
Commission. The file consists mostly of mem-
oranda organizing the Agency's response to
Senate Select Cc-mm. requests for information,
but also include, statements of CIA policy.
Certain comments in the file raise the possi-
bility that CIA contacts with journalists were
more extensive than reported to the Commit-
tees. (Order CNSS Library No. C-47,
r $4.70; copy)
CIA/RESISTANCE/PEACE AND FREEDOM
PARTY; 1968-1474: 85 pages. This file was
obtained by the Peace and Freedom Party
under FOIA. Th,! party was an object of CIA
domestic surveillance under Project Resistance.
This file shows taat more than 50,000 names of
therefore, exercise caution in commenting on the views of
other members of the academic community unless we
comment openly and as part of the on-going intellectual
discourse. A portion of the views which one of us has
about nuclear power plants, recombinant DNA or Karl
Marx may be used by others in unpredictable ways. The
transmission of an individual's views, especially out of
context, can expose the individual to risks. Let each indi-
vidual decide whether the risks should be taken.
The MIT Report on participation
in covert operations:
There is one possible limitation on consulting for an intelligence
agency which we think should be addressed institutionally. We do
not think that any member of the MIT community should (know-
ingly) act as an agent for an intelligence organization. This point
will be ;made several more times in this report, when we discuss
Briefing/Debriefing, Recruitment, and Surveillance. It arises in
connection with consulting in cases where the consultant passes
from the role of advisor/analyst to the role of information
gatherer, i.e. the agent for gathering intelligence: "On your next
trip to 0z:, why not bring back the following pieces of informa-
tion we need in addition to the things you need for your scholarly
work?"---that sort of thing. It is our belief that engaging in such
activity places an academic in a compromised position. His or her
presence and "assignment" will be known to US government per-
sonnel in the other country, activities probably will be monitored
and thus scholarly freedom compromised. We are well aware that
there are gray areas in this type of matter, and we want to
discuss these with members of the MIT community. But we feel
strongly that the general principle is sound: none of us at MIT
should act: as agents for an intelligence organization, because the
bonds of mutual trust we depend on will thereby be weakened.
These indexes were retained at least as late as
May 1974. (Order CNSS Library No. C-46,
C $8.50/copy)
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA)
DOCUMENTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY
NEWSLEAKS SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE; 1973-1977; 71
pages. This file, released to CNSS through the
FOIA, contains nine instances of apparent na-
tional security newsleaks to Fred S. Hoffman and
other reporters. In each case the original news
story is reproduced, followed by records of DoD
investigations. The source of the leaks was not
located in any of the eight cases found to involve
unauthorized disclosures of classified informa-
tion. (Order CNSS Library No. A-17,
$7.10/copy)
DOCUMENTS REFERRED TO IN "COVERT
ACTION IN CHILE 1963-1973"; September
1970 and undated; 11 pages. This file contains
three CIA documents released to CNSS
through the FOIA, which describe events in
Chile during September 1970. The reports de-
scribe alleged attempts by the Chilean Com-
munist Party to take over media outlets, splits
FBI/MEDIA MANIPULATION/INFOR-
MANTS/WILLIAM TURNER; July 1962-
August 1973; 123 pages. William Turner is a
former Special Agent who was dismissed from
the FBI in 1961 for his poor attitude toward
Hoover and the Bureau. Subsequently he made
a career as an author, writing extensively (and
critically) about the FBI. These documents,
obtained under the FOIA, focus on the
Bureau's 11-year long attempt to discredit
Turner and his writings. (Order CNSS Library
No. 1-18, $12.30/copy)
FBI/REQUEST FOR MAIL COVER ON SWP;
January 1973; 5 pages. These documents,
released through discovery in Paton v.
LaPrade, consist of FBI memoranda and a for-
mal request for a mail cover from L. Patrick
Gray to the U.S. Postal Service. The stated
purpose of the cover is to develop general
information about the SWP and its contacts,
rather than to gather evidence of crime. (Order
CNSS Library No. 1-30, $0.50/copy)
PFP members from a single roweidef;dr Re be&Beo2Qf34/l,9Lt3rialFti" lPi 6,TO1315MONG 55S Or1t"udies Library. Prepaid
by Resistance: the figure given by the Church /character and career. (Order CNSS Library No. , orders only. For complete list of available
Committee was 1.2-16,000 names nationwide. l C-31, $1.10/c6py) documents, order Abstracts, p. 15.
 Approved For Release 2004/10/13 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300550015-6
Approved For Release 2004/10/13 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300550015-6