Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 4, 2004
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Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 30, 1972
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PDF icon CIA-RDP88-01315R000300630010-2.pdf183.76 KB
Approved For Reliase5/01/11: CIA-RDP88-01315R000300630010-2 ILLEGIB MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller SUBJECT: Intelligence Museum Concept effort would involve documents, photographs, hardware and other materiel, vehicles and miscellaneous memorabilia, all henceforth called "historical material." ianal development, before the material finally vanishes. This I material which is important to the history of CIA's opera- out a museum, is to identify, and tag for non-destruction, 2. The task we must undertake then, well before we talk The attached concept paper by STAT identifies a set of principles connected with the establish- ment of an historical museum which I would like to recommend to you. They are: 1. Some offices - Communications is an example - have taken an historical view and already have begun to preserve technical gear which in its day raised the technology of communication to a higher plateau, or gear which has been used in notable operational cases. Other offices with less sense of history have, no such program, and already may have lost or destroyed material which played a significant role in CIA's history, then became outmoded and was discarded. ~y exhibiting in a museum. For this reason we see the museum 3. Exhibition - the concept of a museum - is a by-produ ~ o _,preservation. At least initially em iasis sh ould be given to the primary task of identifying historical material in order . to arrange or i s preerv on, rather than to the luxurv of _exhibx,;t t This sequence show d he p de: ect a natural concern that the security of a sensi- tive device, even an outmoded one, machined into one or another piece of intelligence collection may be threatened as evolving slowly, and perhaps at several security levels. 4. The basic museum as we visualize it would not be a static collection. would be a series of displays using declassified historical material which would be Cn Approved For Release1 5~J I/ 'r_...I~A I,DP88-01315R000300630010-2 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300630010-2 rotated in and out of the conservancy collection. (The forthcoming exhibit of Cuban Missile Crisis photographs and hardware is a good example of endlessly interesting material h' hl classified but now can be shown in which once was ig J this way.) A possible adjunct to the basic museum collection would be a small museum which we understand the DCI wants near his office, in which he could show Agency achievements Other additions to the basic museum rs it i o s to selected v . STAT would be the small s-pecialized museums which already exist. uc satellite museums in our opinion ou co , should not be superseded by a central museum. In fact we would expect these satellite museums to provide exhibits to the central museum, and to whatever small classified museum is created for the DCI. 5. No central repository need be established .f or all material which is designated as historical. Offices which have the space and interest in housing their own histori- cal material (Commo, OTR, and TSD are examples) may wish to retain custody of it, so long as all items which have been accorded historical material status are recognized as being under the ultimate control of the central Agency collection. Nevertheless, at least one storage site will the historical material from for ~ have~. to be offices which lack storage space of their own. have a t y m is a possible site. Special storage arrangemen to be made from time to time for especially sensitive items. In summary we see the problem as the following: l P17.J a. Identifying, cataloguing and preservig documents, photographs, hardware and other materiel, vehicles and miscellaneous memorabilia which have been significant in the development of CIA and its operations; b. Arranging for their progressive declassifi- cation, on terms agreed to by whichever directorate used the material operationally; and c. Exhibiting the material when exhibition would have a salutary effect on employee morale, on training, or on special problems the DCI identifies. -2- Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300630010-2 Intel use C Approved For Release 2005/01/11: CIA-RDP88-01315R000300630010-2 We believe that a one-shot exhibit such as the Cuban Missile e lli genc Crisis can be arranged under the aegis of the Inte Museum Committee, as is being done, but that the larger problem needs the attention of a separate commission which will attend not just to the last but to all three of the foregoing functions. Furthermore, we think it important to find a senior officer to chair the historical material commission and actively to head the program, whom the 4.,-.,4 .. -F hi stori ca o imaterial items which in some cases may be politically sensitive as dell as highly classified. Our guess is that i#her the commission` chairman or alternatively a curator working under his guidance will have to be employed full- time. 6. If you agree that the foregoing principles are a reasonable basis for further action I suggest that they be distributed to the deputy directors for comment, and for., their recommendations of candidates to take the commission chairmanship and get the pro Chairman,.Fine Arts Commission -3- Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300630010-2