[CIA DIRECTOR STANSFIELD TURNER SAID TODAY INTELLIGENCE LEAKS HAVE CAUSED U.S. ALLIES TO LOSE CONFIDENCE]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: October 25, 1978
• Content Type: PREL

Approved For Release 200411'101: 4A-VDP88-01315R49*6OOfW-e
otn -.r tt-
.--?. r. wo r, r
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
National Press Club
Washington, D. C.
Wednesday, 25 October 1978
PROTECTING SECRETS IN A FREE SOCIETY
In the nineteen months that I have been Director
of Central Intelligence, I have come into the habit of
screening the press clips first thing every morning.
I almost hold my breath until I know if today's disclosures
include some of our sensitive sources of intelligence.
Sometimes it comes out through a leak, sometimes from
the forced testimony of one of our officers in court
and sometimes from the subpoena of a document or notes.
As a result, I have almost come to think of you in the
media and we in intelligence as being adversaries. In
recent months, however, I find that we are really in
the same plight together. As often as not, the press
clips disclose that it is you, the media who are being
taken into court and forced to defend the secrecy of your
sources or it is you who are receiving the subpoenas.
At least if I understand it, the essence of the court
cases involving Mr. Farber, the Stanford Daily and others
is whether preserving the confidentiality of a newsman's
sources is essential to meeting his obligations and to
the continued success of your profession.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
Let me assure you that if this is anything of a
problem to you, the danger of disclosing sources is the
number one threat to our American intelligence community
today. The focus of the media with respect to intelli-
gence for almost four years now has been on actual and
alleged abuses of the past. I sincerely believe the threat
to our country of excesses in intelligence operations is
far less today than any time in our history. The real
danger is that we will be unable to conduct necessary
operations because of the risk that they would be
disclosed. Let me give you some examples of why I say this.
First, allied intelligence services are losing confidence
that we can keep a secret. We suspect that some are holding
back information. One recently withdrew a proposal for a
joint covert action which would have been beneficial
to both nations. It did so when reminded that I must
notify eight committees of the Congress of every covert
action. They could not imagine that the plan would not
leak.
Beyond this, agents overseas who risk their lives to
support our country even though they are not even citizens of
it ask, "When will my name appear in your press?" This is
not a transient problem; it is a trend that could under-
mine our human intelligence capabilities for a decade or
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
more. In this kind of a climate there simply may be fewer
volunteers to be sources for us in the future.
Finally, with respect to the dangers of a lack of
secrecy too many leaks can lead to intelligence by timidity.
A timid reporter will never land the big story. A timid
intelligence officer will not take the risks which are a
part of his work if he must add the high probability that
his sources will be exposed in our media. All three of
these examples are part of the same fundamental question of
question of protection of sources, and are not at all
different from the problem which you face.
I do not know what your profession is doing about
this problem we have in common. I would like to describe
our response thus far. First, we recognize that a lot
of the problem is right on our own doorstep. Sometimes
it is our own people who provide the leaks. Sometimes it is
former employees. Sometimes we are vulnerable to deliberate
espionage. Accordingly, we can and are tightening our
internal security procedures. You can always tighten up,
but it is a matter of compromise between having such tight
controls that we cannot do our job with reasonable
efficiency and striving so much for efficiency that we
do not properly control our secrets. The tables today
are perhaps tilted a bit too much in the direction of
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
efficiency. I am working to turn them back and I hope
that will make it more difficult for you to obtain our
secrets.
We are also doing things externally. We have a
policy of greater openness. My presence here is evidence
of my personal commitment to keep the public better in-
formed by being more open about intelligence activities
where and when that is possible. How will openness help
us preserve secrets? Well, simply by reducing the ex-
cessive corpus of secrets that now exists within our
government. Today so much information is unnecessarily
classified that we have lost respect for the classified
label. By making as much as possible available to the
public, we reduce the amount that is kept secret. In
turn this makes it easier to engender resp.ect for that
which remains classified.
It takes more than openness, however, to preserve
secrets. Basically there must be some renewed acknowledgment
in the media and in the public that secrecy is legitimate.
Clearly there is a very fine line which we must tread. Too
much secrecy can impede justice or staunch the flow of in-
formation within our society. Too little secrecy can
give away data that is of vital importance to our nation.
It is a delicate balance between a government that serves
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
its people poorly because it does not keep them informed
and one that serves them poorly because it does not
maintain necessary secrets. No government, no business,
no newspaper, no private individual can conduct his life
or business without some element of secrecy. Newsmen
feel that the release of their notes even to prosecute a
charge of murder would endanger an obligation to
individuals who help them and would set a precedent
adversely affecting the future of their profession. So,
too, do we in the field of intelligence react almost
daily. But, there is one difference between our attitudes
and obligations. Your case rests upon an interpretation of
the Constitution which today is being seriously challenged.
My obligation rests upon a law--the National Security Act
of 1947 which requires that the Director of Central Intelligence
in his person "shall be responsible for protecting our
sources and methods of collecting intelligence from un-
authorized disclosure." I must comply to the best of
my ability and conscience.
Still another difference in your perspective and
mine is that protecting sources is only one of my
problems of secrecy. It has become very suspect these
days to even refer to withholding information in the
name of national security. Abuse of this principle
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
in the past, however, does not make it invalid today.
Quite simply, there is information which it is not in
the national interest to disclose. We cannot negotiate
a SALT treaty if w.e cannot maintain the privacy of our
negotiating position. We cannot afford to develop ex-
pensive weapons systems or devices for collecting intel-
ligence and then tell those against whom we might have to
employ them what their precise characteristics are.
Because, however, we in the world of intelligence
are in the risk-taking business, and because there are
dangers to our national fabric from the improper use of
the intelligence process, clearly there must be special
checks on us. I believe that there are such checks today
and that the public can be more confident today than ever
before that the abuses of the past will not reoccur. Out
of the crucible of the past four years of public criticism,
a whole new regimen of controls and checks has been con-
structed. These begin with the policy of greater open-
ness that I have cited to you.
Beyond this, we have established a thorough system
of control mechanisms to govern our day-by-day activities.
These start with two basic guidelines which are the frame-
work within which all intelligence professionals now
work. The first of these is that espionage must be
considered an extraordinary remedy. Clandestine means
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
of gathering information should never be utilized when
the same information might be available openly. The
second guideline is that actions which we take in secret
must be defensible, in principle, in public. Clearly, we
cannot lay out publicly all the details of each instance
of espionage which we undertake, but we can in public
defend the general classes of actions we utilize.
Beyond these guidelines, we have also established
a series of prohibitions. Some activities, such as
assassination, are so repugnant to our national stand-
ards as to warrant prohibition without exception. In
some cases, however, total prohibition Is a bit too rigid
a position. Instead, we have injunctions which generally
prohibit certain activities unless there is a specific
authorization for them. This is analogous to law en-
forcement procedures in common use in our country. We
all recognize that there is an injunction against a law
enforcement agency invading the privacy of our homes,
except with the specific authorization of a search war-
rant. We too, in intelligence are establishing similar
procedures, sometimes with warrants, sometimes with other
provisions for approval. The utilization of members of
the US media for intelligence purposes is one example..
This is proscribed unless I personally make the exception.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
The most significant change in American intelligence
in recent years, however, and one that is truly revolu-
tionary is the introduction of effective external over-
sight from both the executive and legislative branches.
This oversight is intended to check on how the guidelines,
prohibitions and injunctions are being carried out, and
to relate the nature of our intelligence activities
to the attitudes and mores of the country as a whole.
An Intelligence Oversight Board has been function-
ing for almost three years. Composed of three members
from outside the government, presently former Senator
Gore, former Governor Scranton, and Mr. Thomas Farmer,
it reviews Intelligence Community activities and serves
as a place where anyone can report activities they sus-
pect may be illegal or improper. The Board reports its
findings directly to the President.
Oversight committees have been in place in Congress
for two years in the case of the Senate, and a little
over one year in the House. In both instances the re-
lationship between the Select Committees on Intelligence
and the Intelligence Community has been one of coopera-
tion and help, but at the same time definitely one of
oversight and supervision. There is no question that we
are answerable to these committees.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
Many in the Intelligence Community have come to
recognize the positive values for us in the oversight
process. Ultimate accountability is essential to re-
sponsible action. When the stakes are high, when pa-
l5
triotism?a driving force and when risks must be taken,
it is good to have the element of accountability hanging
over us. Oversight is forcing us to be judicious, to
think out both the risks and benefits of what we propose
to do.
The Congressional Oversight Committees are now in
the process of legislating guidelines, prohibitions, and
injunctions and further refining the oversight procedures
themselves in what will be known as Charters for the
Intelligence Community. I strongly support this under-
taking. In the first place it will provide the legal
foundation for our activities. In the second place, it
will provide guidance so that the US intelligence officer
on the street in a foreign country and those of us
in the headquarters will have a better idea of what is
expected, what may not be done and what, if done,
must be justified convincingly to our overseers.
On top of all these governmental checks and controls,
we also, of course, view you, the media, as another important
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
oversight mechanism in reassuring the public and in
preventing abuse. My plea to you, however, is to recog-
nize the similarity of our plights. We in intelligence
are professionals dedicated to secrecy who are constantly
having to defend ourselves against being pressed into
excessive openness. You are professionals dedicated to
openness who are now facing great pressures to dispense
with your secrets. I hope that you will recognize that
when we balk, for instance, at disclosing all the secrets
necessary to prosecute a case in court, we do not do so
in an arbitrary manner. We study these cases very carefully.
Moreover, we must be prepared to justify our positions
not only to the Attorney General but to our oversight
committees. Yet, it is right for you to question these
judgments, but please bear in mind that your over-
sight is frequently hampered by only having part of the
picture. You are at a severe disadvantage compared
with our Intelligence Oversight Board and our Congres-
sional committees since we cannot share our secrets with
you. This, indeed, places you in a difficult position.
With data that is incomplete, you must be concerned about
misleading the public or making disclosures injurious to
the national interest. You must constantly balance
those dangers with your obligation to keep Americans
well informed and to uncover malfeasance in government
where it exists.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
Another area of delicate responsibility for you is
in judging the validity of so-called "whistleblowers"
who come to you with tales of impropriety or inefficiency.
Many of these appear to have only the most altruistic
motives, and probably bring reassurances that what they
are disclosing is not justifiably secret. Let me sug-
gest that what is legitimately secret or sensitive is
not always obvious on its face, especially to former
officials who were third or fourth echelon at best and
who were never in a position to assess all of the equi-
ties involved. The potential in these situations for
abuse of you and your role is immense. What better way
to promote a forthcoming book than to titillate the
public through encouraging you to issue samples of un-
authorized revelations. How many so-called "whistle-
blowers" go through the oversight mechanisms that I have
described where abuses and undue secrecy can be ques-
tioned without compromising legitimate secrets? Frankly,
I have yet to see a whistleblower use these relief valves
fully before going to the court of last resort--you, the
public press. I am suspicious as to their motivation and
suggest that you might well be also. Further, when every
elected or appointed public official is suspect and every
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
renegade whistleblower is automatically accepted as a
hero; when there is greater emphasis on criticizing and
tearing down our society than on building it up, I sug-
gest that we are heading for real trouble.
I do not envy you the difficult job of conducting
oversight and assessing the validity of your sources
without access to all of the information you need; or of
making the choices which you face in steering a course
between the Syclla of undue emphasis on criticism and
the Charybdis of taking. too much on face value; or of
deciding whether the national interest is better served
by printing a secret or by withholding it.
I do not, however, accept the thesis sometimes
proferred that your responsibilities leave you no choice
but to print whatever you receive; or that the possibility
that someone else will print it anyway makes the question
moot. Nor do I agree that if you possess some information
it can be assumed that the KGB or other foreign intel-
ligence services have it too. But, in the end, those of
us in government who are involved in protecting secrets
are not the ones to pass judgment on the actual choices
you make. It is the public who should and will.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
The recent court decisions on Farber and such may
indicate that neither the public nor the courts agree with
some of the premises under which you have traditionally
labored. Your unfettered right to print and disclose is
clearly being questioned; just as has.our indiscriminate
right to classify. Accordingly, we both, it seems to me are
in the midst of a reassessment of our roles and the way
we carry them out.
The Intelligence Community has been about this task
for several years now. I suggest that there is something to
be learned from our experience. I would not suggest
how you ought to resolve these issues as they affect your
ability to play your role. From my point of view, tXrough,
as this country's chief intelligence officer, what I expect
from the nation's media is a greater understanding of the
commonality of our problem of protecting sources; less
suspicion and reliance on inferences and more quest for
facts, especially about alleged improprieties; fewer headlines
about intelligence abuses of 25 years ago played as though
they were new revelations and more concern for today; and
more discretion as to what is relevant to our society's
needs and what is pure sensation. Yet I again acknowledge
that it is by no means easy for you to strike these balances
precisely when you have only partial Information. In the
final analysis we both serve the same master and will be
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1
judged by the same jury--the public of the United States.
Within the framework of our uneasy relationship, I
believe there is room for mutual respect and for us to
work closer together rather than farther apart. A
greater degree of communication and perhaps even trust
will benefit us both and will permit us jointly to serve
that American people more effectively.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300680016-1