PROGRAM - 'RED CHINA'S MILITARY CAPABILITY' ETC.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000300710006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 73
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: FORM

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THE FIRST
INTERPROFESSIONAL
FORUM
ON PRIORITIES
FOR PEACE
PROCEEDINGS
NEW YORK CITY
DECEMBER 6, 1966
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PROCEEDINGS
OF
THE FIRST
INTERPROFESSIONAL
FORUM
ON PRIORITIES
FOR PEACE
HELD IN
NEW YORK CITY
DECEMBER 6, 1966
NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER, INC.
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CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
THE FIRST INTERPROFESSIONAL FORUM ON PRIORITIES 5
FOR PEACE
ARE LENIN, TOJO, AND GOEBBELS DEAD? 7
Frank R. Barnett
MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISE: THE LESSONS 12
OF PEARL HARBOR
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN (Ret.)
THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE 14
Theodore C. Achilles
PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES POLICY IN EUROPE 17
Henry A. Kissinger
COMMUNIST CHINA'S MILITARY CAPABILITY AND THE 22
STABILITY OF ASIA
Ralph L. Powell
ABM SYSTEMS AND INDETERMINATE OUTCOME DETERRENCE 26
Richard B. Foster
THE FUTURE OF SOVIET CYBERNETICS 29
John J. Ford
CYBERNETICS IN THE SERVICE OF COMMUNISM 32
Colonel Raymond S. Sleeper, USAF
SOME REFLECTIONS OF CYBERNETICS 38
Harry D. Gideonse
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 40
Edward L. Katzenbach
THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT 42
William C. Doherty, Jr.
AMERICA'S THIRD FORCE 44
Richard C. Cornuelle
APPENDIX
VIETNAM: THE CONTINUING FIGHT FOR FREEDOM 46
Frank N. Trager
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF SPACE ACTIVITIES 50
Charles S. Sheldon II
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INTRODUCTION
THE FIRST INTERPROFESSIONAL FORUM
ON PRIORITIES FOR PEACE
December 6, 1966, was the 25th anniversary of Pearl Harbor Eve-that moment
when America slept, indifferent to the strategies of foreign dictators, taking false
comfort from the assumed security of her great ocean moats, unaware that the
carriers of Imperial Japan were readying a first strike, and ignorant also of the
ideology and global war plans of Nazi Germany.
In the nuclear age, it is imperative that Americans never again misread the
intentions, or underestimate the capabilities, of totalitarian Party elites. It is vital
that civilian opinion-leaders understand the complex formulae of national defense
and security affairs which include factors of technology, diplomacy, economics,
and national will.
In order to consider some of these issues systematically and in depth, the
National Strategy Information Center, Inc., sponsored The First Interprofessional
Forum on Priorities for Peace at The Plaza Hotel, New York City, on December 6,
1966. The purpose of this Forum was not to look backward towards December of
1941, but to focus on the requirements of a sophisticated "forward strategy for
freedom" that will enable the United States, in the next 10-15 years, to (a) keep
aggression at bay, whether through insurgency or space warfare, and (b) help less
fortunate nations build the institutions required for genuine peace and human
betterment. We sought educational substitutes for Pearl Harbor and searched for
new organizational skills by which the private citizen can more effectively answer
the question: "What can I do for my country?"
The conference was attended by more than 400 participants who comprised
a cross section of distinguished leadership from business, the professions, and the
military services.
The Co-Chairmen of the Forum were Ambassador Theodore C. Achilles,
Vice Chairman of the Executive Committee, The Atlantic Council of the United
States, Inc.; Joseph D. Ardleigh, President, The Research Institute of America,
Inc.; and Major General Alfred G. Tuckerman, USAR (Ret.), Administrative
Partner, William E. Hill & Company, Inc.
Honorary Co-Chairmen included Samuel Belkin, President, Yeshiva Univer-
sity; Albert H. Bowker, Chancellor, The City University of New York; Bernard
E. Donovan, Superintendent of Schools, The City of New York; Harry D. Gideonse,
Chancellor, New School for Social Research; Richard H. Heindel, President, Pratt
Institute; R. Gordon Hoxie, Chancellor, Long Island University; and Rev. Leo
McLaughlin, S. J., President, Fordham University.
The following professional and educational institutions joined with the Na-
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ARE LENIN, TWO, AND GOEBBELS DEAD?
Preface to a Pearl Harbor Anniversary
BY FRANK R. BARNETT
Summary of Remarks
Mr. Frank R. Barnett is President of the National Strategy Information Center, Inc.
Since history never repeats itself exactly, one should not belabor the fact that this
December 6th is the 25th Anniversary of Pearl Harbor Eve. On the other hand,
while all analogies are misleading, some may still be instructive. Perhaps two lessons
can be derived from the remembrance of Pearl Harbor. The first relates to the sin
of pride. Americans did not win World War II in the Pacific in six weeks, or even
six months. Our "Asiatic" opponent was more tenacious, more skillful, more courag-
eous, more inventive than he had been pictured in the comforting mythology of the
Anglo-American peoples.
Have we yet overcome our sins of pride? In Korea, against another "Asiatic"
opponent, we were going to "bring the boys home by Christmas." In Vietnam, it is
taking half a million men to finish what some politicos thought was a job for only
a few thousand. And it was only yesterday we were told that American industry
had nothing to fear from the competition of the "oxcart economy" of the Soviet
Union. On at least four subsequent occasions we have underestimated the capability
of that oxcart economy: first, when Stalin's scientists acquired the hydrogen bomb
five years sooner than most of our experts predicted; second, when Sputnik aston-
ished the West with the payload Soviet rockets could hurl into space; third, in 1961,
when Khrushchev's test of a multi-megaton hydrogen bomb may have given Russia
insights into ways to black out military communications and/or to fuse the guid-
ance systems of American rockets into impotent lumps; and fourth, today, when
the commissars have displayed the "economic will" to deploy a fantastically ex-
pensive ABM system.
As a footnote to our sin of pride, we might recall that, as little as three years
ago, many American experts were untroubled by Red China's nuclear ambitions. It
seemed clear to them that nothing substantial in the way of nuclear weapons was
to be expected from that "primitive" quarter before 1972 or even 1975. Today,
the Pentagon concedes that Peking may have some nuclear-tipped rockets in place
by late 1967, a prospect which should also give pause to Europe, some of whose
cities are less than half as far removed from Chinese launching sites as San Francisco.
The second lesson suggested by Pearl Harbor was that, while the immediate
strike came from the Far East, an even greater threat had already reached almost
overwhelming proportions in Europe. The unambiguous provocation from Japan
triggered our belated response to the much more serious danger from Nazi Germany.
How different the fate of the world if America's "peaceful coexistence" with Hitler
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had been prolonged for another four years! German science and industry, immune
from the ultimately massive weight of American airpower and the shock of Allied
invasion, might well have succeeded in asserting domination over Britain and all
the Eurasian land mass.
Is there a moral for today in the strategic lessons of World War II? I believe
there is. A geopolitical axiom for our own time might be expressed in this way:
"Police the perimeter of the Far Pacific; but remember that whoever masters the
military-industrial-scientific resources of Europe menaces four continents." And a
corollary to that precept is: "When you recognize that an adversary's capabilities
are formidable, do not discount his intentions in order to suit the current fashion of
ill-informed opinion or the misguided expedience of politicians."
Everyone can agree that the world is changing and, with it, even the Soviet
Union. The operational questions are: How much change? In what precise direc-
tion? By what fraction of the total party bureaucracy? In what time span? In rela-
tion to what threats or incentives? In what context might positive tendencies reverse
themselves? For example, no iron law of progress guarantees an upward curve in
the peaceful intentions of the Soviet leadership, as one generation of rulers succeeds
another. Since the violent internal politics of a Communist dictatorship could readily
return another Stalin to power, it would be prudent for the West to preserve its
defenses intact, pending an evolution of the Soviet system that would give Russian
public opinion and a loyal political opposition some meaningful leverage against
Communist careerists.
It is conceivable that a future generation of largely non-ideological Soviet
managers may conclude that such Russian war games as Nuclear Roulette (a la
Cuba) and Fifth Column (d la Syria) are too dangerous for the last quarter of the
twentieth century. But those managers are not likely to share policymaking author-
ity with the entrenched ideologues for another fifteen years, if then. Even a casual
reading of Communist Party journals, or the most cursory examination of recent
Soviet initiatives in the field of foreign affairs, reveals the imperialist objectives of
the men in power in Moscow today, tommorrow, and probably until 1975. They
are latter day Cromwells whose zeal and invulnerable self-righteousness are still
fed by the writ of Lenin.
It is alleged by some that Khrushchev's heirs no longer wish to bury capital-
ism, but would much prefer to inter the Cold War. If this were so, why there's an
easy end. But is it so?
Those who postulate the death of Marxist ideology often cite as evidence such
stuff as the whispered confidence of a Soviet scientist as a Pugwash Conference; or
an epic of political protest penned by some favorite Russian poet; or the enthusiasm
of Soviet factory managers for automation and techniques of cost control (as if Hit-
ler's industrialists had not also been deeply concerned with production efficiency).
But what is the relevant evidence about the aspirations, not of Russian writers,
some of whom are now in prison for criticizing socialism, but of the Soviet power
elite? Do they disclose the mainsprings of their behavior to random Canadian
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journalists, or rather to U-2 cameras which sometimes see the evidence of Moscow's
deeper purposes?
What, for example, is -the percentage of increase in the Soviet defense budgets
for the new Five Year Plan? Are the hidden components of those budgets chiefly al-
located to conventional armament, to defensive space warfare, to more exotic of-
fensive weaponry, or to all of these? Are the men in charge of the Soviet space
effort civilians? Are they oriented professionally towards the peaceful uses of outer
space, or to the military potential of inner space? Have the rocket marshals been
demoted? Are Soviet anti-ballistic missile systems intended only as insurance against
Red China? Has Moscow deactivated its guerrilla warfare training schools? Has it
reduced subsidies for anti-American propaganda in Latin America? Or stopped
arms shipments to the Middle East? Or cut back industrial espionage inside the
United States? Or curtailed the construction of submarines and a military trawler
fleet?
Whether uttered in Paris or Moscow or Vienna, the words of those who actu-
ally rule the USSR give scant support for the assumption that Soviet leaders have
changed their long term goals. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, Suslov-indeed, all
high Party officials-hammer incessently at three themes: first, that German mili-
tarism and "revanchism" must be squashed-and that, therefore, it is just up to
Washington to prove its peaceful intentions by severing military ties with Bonn;
second, that the Vietnam War can only be settled by the withdrawal of American
troops, and the formation of a Saigon coalition government in Saigon that will en-
sure an eventual Communist takeover; and third, that Russia is a European power,
and would join a "neutralist" Europe in the pursuit of peace once NATO is dis-
solved and an "alien" America has been encouraged to retire to its own continent.
Thus, if one applies a "management audit," rather than intuition, to the assess-
ment of Soviet goals, it is clear that Moscow adheres to the simple Stalinist objective
of expelling American power from both Europe and Asia (albeit with a mix of
diplomacy, threats, and propaganda instead of naked force). Indeed, the commis-
sars scarcely need change or conceal their tactics, so anxious are certain Western
statesmen to divine portents of "relaxation and reform" in the contrails of the
Eastern heavens.
Do the Soviets send ground-to-air rockets to Hanoi, and Russian technicians
to give instructions on how to launch them against American planes? No matter.
We should infer, from the firm handclasp of the Commissar for Trade, that Russian
weapons are sent to Hanoi reluctantly.
Did Soviet leaders subsidize the 1966 Tri-Continental Conference in Havana
and further its export trade in guerrilla warfare? Do they today intensify their sub-
version of the Middle East? No matter, they have not threatened Berlin at all this
season (although those who try to flee from "mellowing" totalitarianism are still
shot down at the Wall).
Does massive Soviet propaganda exploit the unpopularity of the Vietnam war
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to isolate America from our friends in France and Britain? Does Brezhnev resist all
British suggestions that Moscow use its good offices to bring Hanoi to the negotiat-
ing table? Do the commiissars ship arms to Syria, Algeria, and the UAR for re-
volutionary re-export? No matter. Though they persist in their propaganda . . .
though they seek to re-establish a Popular Front in France and Italy . . . though
they vilify our West German ally and accelerate their expenditure on missiles .. .
we may yet civilize the Soviets by sharing with them the fruits of Western technol-
ogy which (by manipulating semantics) can even be re-classified as "non-strategic."
In such a world of apolitical largesse from the United States, what incentive
could any Soviet leader have for altering his hostile stance on the future of a unified
Germany, or the fate of Vietnam, or the stability of the Middle East (threatened
by terrorists paid as Nasser's proxies from Moscow's exchequer)? In today's climate
of illusion, stubborn facts are rejected by the even more stubborn dogma of detente.
For, despite Moscow's determined effort to overtake and leapfrog American mili-
tary technology and notwithstanding the undiminished scale of worldwide Com-
munist agitation, some Americans seem willing to assist General de Gaulle in dis-
mantling those proud towers of NATO which, for 17 years, have barred the Tartar
horde from Europe.
The debate over Russian intentions and the continued utility of a reconstructed
NATO is, perhaps, the gravest problem we face in foreign policy; but it is by no
means the only one. The statistics on world poverty and the population explosion
stab the imagination and cry out both t:o conscience and common sense. Unless the
industrialized nations of the northern hemisphere (the United States, Canada,
Western Europe, and Japan) can transfer more efficient packages of capital, man-
agement know-how, food technology, public administration, vocational training,
agricultural science, and sheer motivation to Afro-Asia and Latin America, three
quarters of the earth may be a rural slum in the year 2,000; and from that slum will
bubble perpetual revolution guided by Maoists., Leninists, Castroites, or the would-
be Sukarnos and Nkrumahs of the 21st century.
The problem is so vast that it challenges the private sector as well as govern-
ment. In the long run, only private capital. has enough dynamism to create the
jobs, technical expertise and tax base desperately required by the underdeveloped
continents if they are to endure the ordeal of modernization. Universities and labor
unions, foundations and international corporations, professional societies and the
missionary branches of organized religion-all have a larger role to play if billions
of human beings are not to drown in the quicksand of ignorance, terror, and
disease. What irony it is that a tragedy of such cosmic magnitude might occur in
the century which may yet witness, before its close, the healing of ancient religious
schisms and the liberation of man from earth.
To be wary of the unrepentent Bolshevik myrmidon, while extending a friendly
hand to the non-Communist Russian majority; to stand guard against the Maoist
guerrilla, while aiding the peasant whom the Communist revolutionary seeks to
subvert; to make truth prevail amidst massive misindormati.on; to carry the sword
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in one hand and the agricultural instrument in the other; to discriminate between
the totalitarian zealot and the dissenter who yet believes in pluralism; to contain
hatred without surrendering to hate; to overwhelm libel in the court of world opi-
nion with social justice and fair play (but also with more vigprous communications
techniques); to demonstrate and advertise that the American military-industrial
complex already employs its systems analysis, management efficiency, and multi-
disciplinary operations to improve social and economic conditions as well as to
strengthen defense; to prove that modern realpolitik is not bereft of humanitarian
concern, and that latter day American capitalism is generating a progressive social
ethic; to show that realists are not without compassion and that idealists can be prag-
matic-here are the endless challenges and paradoxes than can excite and ennoble
us all.
Let me conclude with a paradox that is the premise of this conference. It is that
the serious study of war and an intelligent strategy for peace are complementary,
not antithetical. Both national defense and wars on poverty, whether at home or
abroad, require unsentimental analysis, skillful resource allocation, and a trained,
professional cadre with good hearts and souls tranquil in the conviction that our
cause is just. The baffling formulation we must learn to cope with over the next
fifty years is "neither war nor peace;" and to solve it we must study both war and
peace.
Since 1945, there have been no fewer than forty wars, large and small, on this
earth. In that same period, the American people have spent $842 billion on defense
and an additional $120 billion on foreign aid. The current defense budget calls for
$73 billion more; which means that, by June 1968, our nation will have allocated
more than one trillion dollars to containment of Communist aggression and to sup-
port of the social and economic reconstruction of less fortunate nations.' To those
who ask, Why hold an non-governmental Interprofessional Forum on international
security? one can only reply that it is scarcely plausible for a great Republic to
pride itself on civilian control of the direction of the ship of state unless commercial,
voluntary, and non-profit private organizations address themselves professionally
to the one trillion dollar question.
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MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISE:
THE LESSONS OF PEARL HARBOR
BY ADMIRAL ARLEIGH A. BURKE, USN (RET.)
Summary o f Remarks
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN (Ret.), is now Director of The Center for Strategic
Studies, Georgetown University.
There are essentially three levels of military surprise: strategic, tactical, and tech-
nological. At Pearl Harbor the Japanese achieved tactical surprise. They won an
engagement, but not the war. Pearl. Harbor taught again an old lesson of history,
namely, that surprise alone on any single level, or even on a combination of levels,
is not enough for victory unless an irreparable proportion of the enemy's power-
or of his will to fight-is destroyed by the surprise itself.
Of all the factors involved in a surprise event, the reaction of the recipient is
clearly the most important, and yet probably the most difficult to understand. Sur-
prise strikes the individual at many layers of his being; simultaneously. It stirs his
emotions; it stimulates his mind; and at its most effective, surprise will smother the
ability to act. Mankind has struggled over the generations to understand these
elements that stir within us in moments of great surprise. Yet, even since Pearl
Harbor, there is little evidence of progress toward really comprehending how these
forces work or how they can be controlled. Perhaps the study of cybernetics is a
step toward understanding and controlling the reactions of masses of people. But,
if so, it will be full of unknowns; and in the end, it may actually increase the effec-
tiveness of surprise as a weapon instead of leading to its control.
If our quest for an understanding of the human elements of surprise has not
made much progress since Pearl Harbor, our quest for technological innovation
certainly has. Indeed, technology has in some ways advanced to the point where
it can be confused with human understanding itself. To cite a single example, our
technical ability to collect and transmit information has gone through an amazing
revolution since 1941, and rapid progress in this area will probably continue far
into the future. The computer, the communications satellites, high speed trans-
mission--these are but a few examples of this revolution. Their combined ability
to transmit and manipulate information is an achievement few of us dreamed of in
the days before Pearl Harbor.
But again let us learn a lesson from Pearl Harbor, It is that the mere posses-
sion of vast quantities of information is not enough. In the weeks before the attack
on December 7, 1941, an enormous amount of intelligence was at our disposal.
One of the great tragedies of that occasion was that we literally had more informa-
tion than we knew what to do with. We failed to evaluate the data we had. We
should not confuse our ability to collect information with our capacity for using it.
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And further, as we look into the 1970's, let us not misread the relationship
between our ability to gather information and our vulnerability to surprise. Infor-
mation will not save us from surprise unless it is properly used. On the contrary,
the very volume of information available to us may make the possibilities of surprise
even greater.
For example, our greatly improved information capability has made the possi-
ble employment of our military hardware much more flexible than ever before.
Much of this flexibility comes from vastly improved information technology. There
is no reason why, through the development of a similar technology, our potential
enemies cannot gain an equal capability. Moreover, underdeveloped societies can
also imitate the technical achievements of our own society. We do research, we
develop and devise, and they copy. This may be very beneficial for mankind. But
it also means that because we live in an open, individualistic, pluralistic society,
we are at a disadvantage. Totalitarian societies have relatively free access to the
fruits of our labors. But they do not accord us the same freedom. In consequence,
our technological achievements, plus those in the totalitarian world, multiplied by
the number of people making their first leap into the age of technology, increase
the possibilities of surprise many times over.
We must not mislead ourselves about the ability of any other nation in any
other part of the world to imitate and use the military tools that we have worked
so hard to invent. We must persist in developing new tools and improving our old
ones, and we must make the extended effort and sacrifice of actually producing
them. The totalitarian society, having the benefit of our pioneering work, need only
suffer through the imitation gap; whereas we would have to start from scratch,
without the benefit of their labors, if we allowed them to get the technological
jump on us.
In short, surprise is not only possible; it is now easier to achieve, and it is
deadlier. We must, therefore, prepare ourselves with the understanding that surprise
itself is not the overwhelming danger. Rather, it is the inability to deal with a sur-
prise situation. Above all, we must not live in the illusion that great surprises
cannot now occur. We have been surprised in the past. We will be surprised in the
future.
We must be so experienced and so alert that the surprises we shall inevitably
receive will not prove disastrous to the nation.
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THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
BY THEODORE C. ACHILLES
Summary o!? f Remarks
Ambassador Theodore C. Achilles is 'Vice Chairman of the Executive Committee, The
Atlantic Council of the United States, In.c.
Ilopefully we have learned two political lessons from the tragedy of Pearl Harbor.
One is negative, namely, that the surest way to invite attack is to give the
impression of being unprepared for war, or unwilling to fight back, of being afraid,
divided, or committed to neutrality. We have had to learn this lesson the hard way,
particularly during the years 1914 to 11917 and 1931: to 1941. I hope we have
learned, although twice already since World War II we have slipped in Asia: first
in 1949 and 1950, when we allowed the Communists to believe that we did not
consider Korea important to our security; and again in the 1950's, when we failed
to make clear our interest in the preservation of an independent South Vietnam.
The other lesson is a positive one. It is that the surest way to prevent attack,
by surprise or otherwise, is to make clear our ability and determination to reply to
any attack with all our massive power. That lesson was reflected by the Senate in
the famous Vandenberg Resolution of 1948, which requested the President to
"Contribut(e) to the maintenance of peace by making clear (this country's)
determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under
Article 51 (of the United Nations Charter) should any armed attack occur affecting
its national security." It was reflected again in the NATO and SEATO alliances, in
our treaties with Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, and in a variety of arrange-
ments with other countries.
And having thus demonstrated our willingness, we have also developed and
maintained our ability to defend ourselves, through the steady development of our
conventional and nuclear power, through military assistance to our allies, and
through the NATO system of integrated command, planning, warning, communica-
tions, and logistical systems. This method has worked effectively in Europe.
Not only has there been no aggression in Europe, but the Kremlin has been
led to modify its threatening tone toward the West, to the point where many
in Europe, and some in this country, are reluctant to pay the price of con-
tinued vigilance and preparedness. It has worked so well in Europe that it has also
forced the Kremlin to shift the target of its major efforts to other parts of the world,
and its methods from aggression or the threat of aggression to encouraging local
"wars of liberation," infiltration, and subversion.
But we still have much to learn. Vietnam is a warning that we cannot single-
handedly police the whole world. There may well be other and bigger "Vietnams,"
and more than one of them simultaneously. Nor can we expect much help from
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our European allies in such episodes, so long as they consider these problems as
unrelated to themselves, as solely American dilemmas. They certainly do now. Our
European allies, recently shorn of their own colonial possessions, complacently
enjoy an unprecedented prosperity and the sure protection of our nuclear umbrella,
while at the same time charging us with a desire for political "domination" and,
with considerable justification, with an inability to exercise effective international
leadership.
How can we best combat Communist subversion and indirect, creeping aggres-
sion, which can be just as dangerous and far more insidious than direct armed
attack? How can we enlist the wholehearted cooperation and the military, industrial,
political, and psychological support of our allies in doing so?
During the debate on ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, Senator Van-
denberg made a prophetic statement. "Unless the Treaty becomes far more than a
purely military alliance," he said, "it will be at the mercy of the first plausible
Soviet peace offensive." NATO's present troubles prove the wisdom of his words.
The alliance has failed to adapt to changing circumstances, and thus far has proved
unable to develop the positive political, economic, and psychological potential of
the North Atlantic Treaty.
How do we go about these tasks? Certainly we cannot afford to let down our
guard, so long as the military capabilities of the USSR continue to be, and those
of Red China seem likely to develop into, a threat to our national security. But
even more important is to get on with the positive effort of building the kind of
world we would like to see even if Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao had never lived.
The United States cannot do it alone. On the other hand, we and our allies of the
Atlantic community constitute the greatest bastion of military, industrial, scientific,
intellectual, and moral power in the world, if we can but learn to use it effectively
together. In President Kennedy's words:
"Acting on our own by ourselves, we cannot establish justice
throughout the world. We cannot insure its domestic tranquility, or pro-
vide for its common defense, or promote its general welfare, or secure
the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. But joined with
other free nations, we can do all this and more. We can mount a deter-
rent powerful enough to deter any aggression and ultimately we can
help achieve a world of law and free choice, banishing the world of war
and coercion."
We can move steadily in this direction by quiet but determined United States
leadership to seek common or harmonized policies with our allies, and concerted
action on major matters of mutual concern in the political and economic as well as
the military field. This means listening as well as talking, taking the interests of our
allies into account in the process of policy formulation, demonstrating in practice
that we seek not "domination" but rather the joint use of the power of the Atlantic
community in the pursuit of common objectives.
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Indeed, we can move in this direction even without radical change or innova-
tion. But this may not be fast enough for the next generation. In the 1968 presi-
dential election, there will be 26 million eligible voters who were not yet born at the
time of Pearl Harbor. I hope this new generation will remember the main lesson
of Pearl Harbor. It is that the surest way to avoid aggression is to make clear in ad-
vance that we have both the determination and the ability to respond overwhelm-
ingly. I also hope that they will do far better than we have done to build the kind of
world we and they want to see, the kind of world in which freedom can endure and
prosper, the kind of world President Kennedy envisaged and that President Eisen-
hower had in mind when he stated in his farewell message to NATO:
"Together we must build a Community which will best safeguard
the individual freedom and national[ values of our various peoples and
at the same time provide effective means of dealing, with problems with
which none of us, alone, can now deal effectively."'
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PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES POLICY IN EUROPE
BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
Summary of Remarks
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger is Professor of Government at Harvard University and a staff
member of the Center for International Affairs.
The current NATO crisis was touched off by the peremptory French decision to
withdraw from the integrated military commands of the alliance. But the sources of
the crisis go much deeper than this. In many respects, our present difficulties stem
from the success of previous policies. The original concept of NATO was correct
for the situation which then existed. But we must recognize that the relationship
between Western Europe and the United States, as it has developed since World
War II, now stands in urgent need of revision. The whole structure and priorities
of the Atlantic Alliance must be reconsidered.
Some Policy Issues Before the Atlantic Alliance
It may be useful to begin by summarizing some main threads of United States
policy toward Western Europe since World War II. First, we have supported the
notion of an equal partnership between the United States and Western Europe,
with an equitable sharing of responsibilities as between the twin pillars of this
Atlantic partnership. Second, we have conceived of the political and economic in-
tegration of Europe as a prerequisite to formation of an effective Atlantic partner-
ship, and we have viewed such integration in terms of the evolution of supranational
federal institutions controlled by a European parliament. Third, while the United
States has advocated a twin pillar concept in the political and economic spheres,
we have consistently urged an integrated military defense, including the central
command and control of nuclear weapons.
A great advantage of this overall approach was that the United States offered
a clear-cut policy at a difficult stage in postwar history. But unfortunately, we have
tended to look upon it as the only conceivable pattern of relationships, which it is
not. Moreover, the American view has always contained some inconsistencies, such
as the depreciation of the value of the nation state in Western Europe (where the
idea of nationalism first originated), at a time when the nation state was still viewed
by us as perfectly natural in the emerging areas of the world, and nationalism as a
positive good in Eastern Europe. Another inconsistency was our insistence upon
the general validity of the American experience in federal institutions, which ignores
the unique circumstances that have made possible the success of the American
federal experiment, and also overlooks the strong sense of national identity among
the states of Western Europe, especially France and Britain.
President de Gaulle has proclaimed a profoundly different view of Atlantic
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relationships and European unity. In part, no doubt, his brutal. tactics and arrogant
style have been designed to restore to France a sense of self-confidence and national
power, which were all but destroyed by defeat in two world wars and by the bitter
disappointments of the early postwar period. In a sense, the object has been to
teach his country and his continent the attitudes of independence and self-reliance;
and this is, indeed, an act of historic importance. In substantive terms, de Gaulle
is wary of integration in any sphere, but particularly in the military field. Where the
United States believes in the obsolescence of the nation state, especially in Europe,
de Gaulle passionately affirms its continued role. De Gaulle's concept of Europe is
based upon the free agreement of governments. He insists on autonomy in matters
relating to nuclear weapons. Recently, apparently having despaired of the long
term prospects for Franco-German cooperation, which would be essential to his
overall approach, he has begun to resurrect the notion of an historic Russo-French
understanding.
De Gaulle's tactics should not blind one to the deeper challenge of his policies.
There is much to be said, for example, for his view that a political unit must mean
something to itself before it can mean much to others. Unfortunately, his imperial
style has often blinded others to the substance of his views, and his brutal tactics
have thwarted the accomplishment of his aims.
The main victim in the current crisis of NATO, however, has been the Federal
Republic of Germany. Whether by accident or design, Bonn has become the focus
of almost every aspect of the crisis. Here the question is whether the fundamental
balance and prospective solidarity of the Federal Republic since World War II can
stand such persistent pressure. Behind the facade of prosperity and well-being, the
sense of impermanence and insecurity in West Germany is absolutely central. The
present German nightmare is a reappearance of the historical isolation which for
most of its history has forced Germany to confront hostility on all its borders. Today
the dominant German aspiration is to escape the burden of difficult choices. If the
Federal Republic becomes the focal point of all European tensions, the Germans
are likely to turn upon the apparent cause of their isolation. We in the United
States must not find ourselves in this position.
Alone among the Atlantic powers, Germany cannot be satisfied with the
territorial status quo. But since the Berlin Wall in 1961. Germany's hope that the
ultimate goal of unification could be achieved by progressively closer integration
within the Atlantic Alliance has been shattered. NATO is no longer the clear road
to reunification. It is in this context that efforts to relax East-West tensions are
judged by the Germans. They are uneasy lest the relationship between East and
West Germany become frozen. Hence their concern with "central agreements"
affecting East-West relations unless they bring about some visible progress on the
German question.
West Germany has emerged as the balance wheel of the Atlantic Alliance.
l;very crisis seems to focus on Bonn. But West Germany's internal structure may
not be equal to this strain. The dominant political parties, now restrained by their
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desire to act as responsible trustees of an acceptable concensus. could well be torn
apart, and extremist tendencies liberated thereby. Incipient schizophrenia is an
integral part of political life in West Germany. The volatility of the situation im-
poses a requirement of great circumspection on American policy. The insecurity of
German leaders and their desire to be good allies cause them to go along with many
American proposals. But there is a limit to how much they could take. A break
with France which could be ascribed to American pressure might, for example,
easily backfire on us. The same could be true of the possible frustration deriving
from overtures toward East Germany. What the Federal Republic needs above all
is solid, reliable allies. It cannot stand to be the focal point of all international
pressures.
The nuclear problem has been at the heart of NATO debate in recent years.
But this misconceived the central issue, which is to adjust United States relations
with Western Europe, and relations between the Communist bloc and the free
world, to new conditions. The nuclear control issue cannot be solved by any so-
called "hardware" solutions. In any case, the question diverts attention away from
the cardinal problem of political cooperation to an intensely divisive side issue. If a
coordinated diplomacy could be achieved, the problem of nuclear control would
seem less crucial. If such cooperation cannot be developed, theoretical voting
formulae for entering nuclear war will prove empty. The primary guarantee for our
allies is a harmonization of political objectives so that their concept of their vital
interests is virtually indistinguishable from our own.
Where Do We Go From Here? Some Policy Suggestions
Let me briefly summarize some of the long term goals which should guide
United States policy in the period ahead.
First, we should encourage a greater degree of political and military autonomy
for Europe. This is essential for the cohesion of the West, and is in our own long
term interest as well. Any attempt by the United States to play a major role simul-
taneously in every part of the globe is beyond our psychological resources, however
great our physical resources may be. We should encourage Europe to take a greater
responsibility in the world, for our sake as well as its own. Moreover, we would
benefit from a political counterweight which would discipline the occasional im-
petuosity of American policy and supply historical perspective to our penchant for
abstract political solutions.
The central task is to encourage a European sense of responsibility. Europe
as a Third Force in the sense of being powerful and active in world affairs is in our
interest, even if its internal structure does not follow our preferred prescriptions.
There is little to fear in the outcome. A Europe assuming greater responsibility for
its own foreign policy and defense will be bound to recognize that only one potential
threat to its security exists, and that in every conceivable case this threat could be
met more effectively with United States assistance than without it. It is hard to
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visualize a deal between the Soviet Union. and Europe which jeopardizes our inter-
ests or security and which did not jeopardize European interests and security first.
Such an approach requires, however, great restraint on the part of the United States
and a high degree of tolerance and wisdom in coming to terms with a more dynamic
Europe.
How much integration do we really want in Europe? Many argue that Europe
is reluctant to play a global role today primarily because: of the inadequate resources
of the individual states. They argue that a unified Europe would assume greater
global responsibilities, and that, therefore, the proper policy is to urge more in-
tegration and to press for European unity., This view is vastly oversimplified. There
is no automatic relationship between power and a willingness to play an inter-
national role. Having just relinquished their overseas possessions, the European
countries no longer consider their security to be directly affected by what happens
in such remote corners of the globe as Southeast Asia. They are quite willing to
shift the risks and burdens to us. Our allies may be expected to assume their por-
tion of the responsibility only when we all. share the same view of the international
political. environment, at least as it affects Europe, and when they are persuaded
that the United States will reduce its contribution unless they play a greater role.
Thus it seems appropriate to consider how much integration we really want.
Progressively greater integration will generate increasing demands for European
participation in global decisions. This leads to the curious position that our allies at
one and the same time reduce their defense contributions while pressing for in-
creased political influence. In such a system policy may grow stagnant. The alliance
will be able to agree only on doing nothing. Of course? we should cooperate with
the Europeans wherever possible. But in the long term, excessive concentration of
decision making may deprive our allies of the incentive to act responsibly, and may
open up political fissures when a conflict of interests becomes apparent, especially
in crises outside of Europe.
With respect to military integration, steps should be taken to reduce the
dominant position of the United States in the NATO Alliance. In the 1950's, a
dominant position for the United States seemed to our allies the best guarantee of
our commitment to the defense of Europe.. Their interest was in the symbolic, not
the substantive, aspect of NATO. Such a state of affairs cannot be healthy in the
long run. An area so rich and potentially so powerful as Europe should not leave
its defense to a country three thousand miles away. The present system encourages
too many of our allies to shift the costs and responsibilities of the common defense
to us.
Europe will not assume a larger share of the burden until it also shares a larger
responsibility. While modern technology requires the maintenance of integrated
military commands, the relative weight of Europe in the command structure and
in the NATO organization should be increased. In every other field, American
policy has deliberately sought to reduce Europe's dependence on the United States.
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In the military field, by contrast, the United States has not encouraged the emer-
gence of a specifically European point of view.
As already indicated, so-called "hardware" solutions to the nuclear issue do
not seem fruitful. Since the problem is essentially political, the Special (McNamara)
Committee should be given the task to formulate common strategic doctrine and
common disarmament policy. Within its framework, the European countries could
begin to build a closer association if they wished to do so. As Europe gains stature,
the Special Committee could draw nearer to the twin pillars concept. Atlantic
partnership and increased European cohension thus could be pursued simultane-
ously, with no commitment in advance to giving priority to either course.
If this solution does not satisfy our allies over the long term, a European
nuclear force would be preferable to any apparent "hardware" solution that has
been discussed. Indeed, it is likely that nuclear autonomy would be the least di-
visive form of European unity, and would include few risks for the United States.
Whatever their formal autonomy in the nuclear field, it is highly improbable that
our allies would prefer to go to war with the relatively small nuclear forces that
would be available to them without the support of our necessarily preponderant
arsenal. Close cooperation between Europe and the United States in the nuclear
field is dictated by mutual self-interest, and Europe has more to gain from it than
the United States.
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COMMUNIST CHINA'S MILITARY CAPABILITY
AND THE STABILITY 01-1 ASIA
BY RALPH .L.. POWELL
Summary of Remarks
Dr. Ralph L. Powell is Professor of Far Eastern Studies at the School of International
Service, The American University.
I should like to shift your attention from Europe and NATO to the growing prob-
lem of security in Asia. I shall consider very briefly the following four points: first,
the conventional armed forces of Communist China; second, and more important,
their development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles; third, some indication
of what they may plan to do with this increasing military capability; and finally,
the impact that all this is having on our friends and allies in Asia.
It is, of course, impossible to present a completely accurate picture of the
armed forces of Communist China. But I believe that it is possible to offer an
evaluation that will outline the general parameters of their military strength and
capabilities.
The conventional armed forces of Communist China are the third largest in
the world, next only in size to those: of the United States and the Soviet Union.
This includes the largest land army in the world, a force of about 2.3 million men.
it is still essentially a World War II or Korean-type army, with modern arms but
not the most advanced military weaponry. It is, however, a tough and well-trained
military force.
The air force of Communist China is the world's third largest. It has become
increasingly obsolescent since the Soviets withdrew their military assistance in 1960.
But, as in other fields of military development, the Chinese Communists are de-
veloping an increasing capability for manufacturing jet aircraft themselves, and the
quality of their air force is now improving again. They now have about 2,300
planes; somewhat less than 2,000 of these are jet aircraf.`it, mostly obsolescent MIG
15's and 17's, but there are an increasing number of supersonic MIG 19's and some
high-performance MIG 21's.
The navy has always been the weakest of Communist China's armed forces.
It is essentially a coastal defense force. Yet Peking does have a fleet of about 30
submarines which, as their crews receive more deep water training, could become
it serious threat. Also, Communist China is now reported to have operational a
"G" class Soviet-type submarine with three missile tubes capable of firing ballistic
missiles with a radius of about 400 miles.
The conventional forces of Communist China have certain special strengths.
First, of course, is their very size, and the availability of almost limitless military
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reserves. The mere size of these forces tends to frighten mainland China's small
Asian neighbors. Furthermore, Peking's senior military commanders are probably
the most experienced combat leaders in the world; many of them have had more
than twenty years of almost constant combat experience. The younger officers have
been carefully trained in a whole hierarchy of modern military schools. The enlisted
personnel are intelligent and tough. Finally, the whole force is certainly the most
highly indoctrinated military establishment in the world.
Yet, despite their great strengths, the armed forces of Communist China still
have some very important weaknesses. Of course, the primary weakness is that they
still do not have a meaningful nuclear capability, although they are rapidly develop-
ing one. Secondly, the Chinese economy is still only partially developed, and
remains incapable of producing all the advanced conventional military hardware
necessary for large scale war. But here again, they are producing more and more
sophisticated materials in the conventional hardware field every year. Finally, the
Chinese Communists have a vast conscript force in being, but they suffer from many
of the problems characteristic of large garrison forces which have long been at
peace-at least, as far as the bulk of their forces are concerned.
Much more critical to the security of the United States and to the peace of
the world is the development of a nuclear capability and a missile delivery system
by the Chinese Communists. Western specialists have seriously underestimated the
capacity of the Chinese Communists in these respects. Since October 1964, the
Chinese Communists have carried out four atomic tests, and Washington has
recently announced that they are preparing to carry out a fifth. The first two tests
were essentially of atomic devices similar to the Hiroshima bomb of 1945. But the
third test, in May 1966, was a weapon ten times as powerful, in the range of some-
thing over 200 kilotons; and the fourth test, which took place in October, is
believed to have been a weapon capable of delivery by a missile having a range
estimated at about 400 miles.
Thus the Chinese Communists are rapidly building up a meaningful nuclear
capability. They are testing warheads, and it is obvious from the experiments they
have been carrying out in the missile field, that they are going to put heavy empha-
sis on the development of missilry. Indeed, Secretary of Defense McNamara has
stated that the Chinese Communists will probably begin to deploy medium range
ballistic missiles capable of threatening their Asian neighbors by 1968 at the latest;
and that by 1975-80, Communist China will probably begin to develop ICBM's
capable of striking at the continental United States.
Now that the Chinese Communists are beginning to develop a real nuclear
weapons capability, what are they apt to do with it? What is their doctrine in this
field? While their doctrine has not yet been fully enunciated, there are several
things that we do know about it. First, in terms of general foreign policy, both the
imperial heritage of the Chinese Communists and their Communist ideology tend
to make them expansionist and aggressive. But this must be understood in a revolu-
tionary sense. They have as an announced objective the support of revolution in all
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the underdeveloped areas of the world, and presumably they will attempt to use
their weaponry to support these objectives. And yet, the Chinese Communists are
not irrational, despite the violent and vitriolic character of their propaganda. In
actual practice, the conduct of foreign policy by the Chinese Communists since the
Korean War has been more prudent, more cautious, than their violent propaganda
would indicate. I would assume that this element of prudence, which is actually an
integral part of Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary doctrine, would continue to have
some bearing on the future. Hence it was not really necessary for Khrushchev to
inform Mao Tse-tung that the American "paper tiger" had thermonuclear teeth.
The Chinese Communists were already aware of it. Indeed, it is part of their doc-
trine that although the enemy should be despised strategically, he must under all
circumstances be respected tactically. Up to this point in time, they have followed
their own military doctrine in this respect with great care.
Hence, specialists tend to believe that the Chinese Communists will utilize a
relatively small nuclear capability primarily to support political and psychological
strategies, including atomic blackmail. During the next decade, they may very well
attempt to use a limited nuclear capability to make nuclear hostages out of our
friends and allies in Asia. One of their basic objectives, frequently stated by them,
is to force the United States out of Asia. I believe they will use their increasing
military capabilities in an attempt to achieve this objective, but primarily by at-
tempting, to put pressure on our friends and allies so that they will force the United
States to give up its bases in the Pacific islands and on the Asian continent. Further-
more, since they claim that their official policy is to support all so-called "wars of
national liberation"-what we would call revolutionary wars or insurrection-
throughout the world, they may in the coming decade be more willing to risk inter-
vention with their own conventional forces in conflicts around their frontiers. (This
assumes that the West would not be willing to use atomic weaponry against Chinese
forces if the latter have some nuclear capability.)
What, then, has been the reaction of our friends and allies in Asia to the
development of a nuclear capability by Communist China? Interestingly enough,
following the first two tests of Hiroshima-type devices, there was much less
reaction than we had expected. In part, this arose from the fact that in each case
the United States government had announced in advance the Chinese Communists'
intention. to carry out a nuclear test. (Washington has done this again in the case
of the upcoming fifth test.) This advanced warning tended to take away the psy-
chological "shock" impact of the tests. Also, we were attempting to inform our
Asian friends that there is a tremendous difference between an initial atomic test
and the development of a sophisticated nuclear capability. Sometimes I think we
have almost overeducated our Asian friends on this subject.
Asian reaction to the third and fourth tests, however, has been considerably
more serious, and for good reasons. This was partly because the third test was so
much more powerful than the first two, and partly because the fourth test was
delivered by a ballistic missile. Still, there has been no panic among our Asian
friends. But it is clear that the development of a nuclear capability by the Chinese
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Communists is going to create some serious problems for the United States in Asia.
One of these, incidentally, is the question of proliferation. The development of
nuclear weapons by Communist China is putting increased pressure on the govern-
ments of Japan and India, especially, to develop atomic weapons themselves.
Second, in the long run the development of a nuclear weapons capability by Com-
munist China will probably produce two very different reactions among our Asian
friends and allies. Some of them, fearing that United States determination to defend
them may falter, may seek an accommodation with Communist China, in which
case they would probably demand the withdrawal of American bases from their
territory (this being a primary objective of the Chinese Communists). On the other
hand, a more widespread reaction would probably be a demand on the part of our
friends and allies for greater protection against Communist China, for the extension
of a stronger nuclear umbrella over them.
Hence the development of a nuclear weapons capability by Communist China
is going to have several important implications for United States policy. It will im-
pose a major test on the credibility of the United States nuclear deterrent in Asia.
I would doubt whether our Asia friends and allies will put as much faith and
credence in the United States deterrent, and in American willingness to defend
Asia, as our European allies, in general, have placed in our readiness to defend
Europe. As the Chinese Communists develop a capability to destroy Tokyo, or
Manila, or New Delhi-and especially when they develop an ICBM capability to
strike the United States itself, our Asian friends may understandably question
whether the United States would be willing to endanger San Francisco, or New
York, or Washington to defend Tokyo, or Taipei, or New Delhi.
And in the longer run-but certainly in less than two decades, the Chinese
Communists will probably develop a capability actually to threaten the basic and
fundamental security of the United States itself. This is going to be a much more
serious problem. In short range terms, this involves us deeply in the whole debate
over the development of an anti-missile missile program, that is, an ABM program
within the United States. One of the major arguments is going to revolve around
the question whether we should develop an anti-missile missile program aimed not
so much at the Soviet Union as at Communist China's much less sophisticated
nuclear capability.
In short, during the decade ahead the development of a significant nuclear
capability on the part of Communist China is going to have a serious impact on
our foreign policy, particularly our policy in Asia. And later on, its impact will be
felt on basic national security policy itself.
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ABM SYSTEMS AND INDETERMINATE
OUTCOME DETERRENCE
BY RICHARD B. FOSTER
Summary of Remarks
Dr. Richard B. Foster is Director of the Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research
Institute.
The fundamental basis for the defense of the United States. and also Europe, from
direct nuclear attack by the Soviet Union or Communist China is closely related to
the concept of deterrence. But we sometimes forget that the nature of deterrence
changes over time. Deterrence today, as between the Soviet Union and the United
States, is based on a belief shared by both sides that either side can inflict un-
acceptable damage upon the other by destroying cities----with their population,
wealth, and cultural values. ]inhibitions against the use even of tactical nuclear
weapons for limited purposes is closely related to this. That is, both sides are de-
terred from initiating the use of tactical nuclear weapons in military conflict largely
because such a conflict might easily escalate into general war; and general war in
the nuclear age could result in the obliteration of both societies. In short, both sides
have been deterred from the use of nuclear weapons through fear of national
destruction.
But the deterrence implicit in this balance of tenor can change. There are
possibilities within technology today that may alter the very nature of deterrence
from a guarantee of mutual destruction, to a deterrence based upon the concept of
the uncertainty of outcome either of general war or of limited nuclear conflict. This
prospective change derives from the possibility of developing an effective defense
against ballistic missiles, that is, the so-called ABM defense system.
I f the Soviets continue to deploy an ABM system which they consider to be
reasonably effective, and thus in their judgment achieve some balance between
missile offense and defense; if they also proceed with a greatly increased rate of
deployment of their ICBM's; if, finally, they deal with fallout problems, at least to
some extent, through increased efforts in civil defense; then they could conceivably
achieve a military posture in the 1970's 'which would give them a fundamental
strategic advantage over the United States. This country would necessarily con-
tinue to base its nuclear strategy on the concept of assured destruction of Soviet
cities by building an ever increasing offensive force to overcome the Soviet ABM
system. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, may have moved to a concept of
indeterminate outcome deterrence. This would give the Russians an opportunity
to act decisively in the diplomatic arena, whereas the United States would have to
respond with much greater timidity. To be sure, any transition to a nuclear strategy
based on indeterminate outcome deterrence will be prolonged over time. This is
due primarily to the fact that, although the technology of defense has been advan.c-
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ing more rapidly than the technology of offense in recent years, it takes time to
incorporate this new defense technology into operational weapons systems. Secretary
of Defense McNamara has estimated, for example, that it would take the United
States seven years to develop and deploy the Nike-X into an operational ABM
system.
One of the great problems posed by any ballistic missile defense system is
whether it will work. So long as deterrence operates, the whole complex can never
be tested. It is the uncertainty as to how well a ballistic missile defense system would
work in the future-say, in 1975-that poses the most difficult problem for decision
making today. Even if we go to the expense of deploying such a system, we cannot
be sure that it would be effective.
Despite this uncertainty, however, it would be a very great gamble indeed for
the United States not to proceed with the development and deployment of such a
system. We cannot afford to run the risk that the Soviet Union would have uni-
lateral possession of both offensive and defensive systems in combination, that they
alone would have mastery of changing concepts of deterrence, and that we would
have to contemplate the destruction of American cities without the sure ability to
retaliate effectively. For we would be faced with uncertainty as to how well their
ballistic missile defense system of cities would work; while they, on the other hand,
would be confronted with no such system on our side, and they could predict with
some certainty the damage they could inflict on undefended United States cities.
An inevitable consequence of this would be the erosion of the American alliance
system, as our allies all over the world lost confidence in the American nuclear
umbrella, and perhaps eventually in the common sense and political wisdom of the
American nation as well.
But let us give thought to a world in which both sides are roughly in balance
with respect to offensive and defensive weapons systems. I would suggest that this
new world would be much more stable than the world we have lived through dur-
ing the past ten years. For example, it would provide a measure of protection
against psychotic or accidental launches, or against nth countries firings. In this
latter respect, the concept of indeterminate outcome deterrence represents insurance
against the probable failure of our policy on the nonproliferation of nuclear weap-
ons-at least with respect to Communist China.
It might also represent a major step in solidifying our relations with allied
countries by making possible the sharing of defensive ballistic missile technology.
This is very complex and costly technology. Sharing it with our allies would do
much to improve relations with them. But we have this opportunity only so long
as we do not lock ourselves into an irrevocable decision not to deploy an anti-
ballistic missile defense; or, if we deploy it, to determine nevertheless to keep it to
ourselves. Here the initiative is ours for a few years only. It is a major initiative
that could be taken to reform and rebuild NATO, and to give that alliance new
direction and new meaning.
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Another possible consequence of such a world of indeterminate outcomes
might be to permit the selective transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to allies to be
used for defense against local aggression, and thereby to give a new dimension to
deterrence working at very low levels. Where the fear of escalation can be con-
trolled, the use of nuclear weapons for local defense may become a much more
realistic policy than to attempt to build up conventional forces.
I would suggest that it is necessary for the American people to gain a better
understanding of the rapid changes that technology is bringing about, particularly
with respect to military defense. Unless we grasp this problem, the United States
may lose its strategic superiority in the 1970's. We must quickly face up to the
problem of whether to proceed with our own ABM defense at a time when the
Soviets are already rapidly deploying theirs.
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THE FUTURE OF SOVIET CYBERNETICS
BY JOHN J. FORD
Summary of Remarks
Foreknowledge of what the next quarter century holds for science and technology
is as important in determining priorities for peace as it was 25 years ago in
mobilizing for war. Then, the prescience of Vannevar Bush, J. B. Conant, R. C.
Tolman, K. T. Compton, and others led to one of the most important prewar
strategic moves made by the United States: President Roosevelt's approval on
June 27, 1940, of the order establishing the National Defense Research Com-
mittee. During the eighteen months prior to Pearl Harbor, this organization devised
an unparalleled system of central laboratories for mobilizing America's scientists
for the then imminent conflict. When the attack came on December 7, 1941, the
NDRC was well along on a series of crucial projects: the potent explosive RDX,
radar, the proximity fuse, incendiary bombs, and on developments which led
eventually to Alamogordo: *
It is to the lasting credit of that handful of American scientists who made
their foreknowledge available to their government that they recognized not only
the imminence of hostilities but also the rapidity with which the face of war would
be changed by technology. They foresaw the movement of technology toward a
turning point in the broad history of civilization at which science would be applied
to destruction on a wholesale basis, thereby superseding warfare as it had been
waged for thousands of years by the direct clash of hordes of men.
The Germans, meanwhile, failed to recognize the signs of the times, and clung
to the old idea that no decisive new weapon could be introduced in the short war
they contemplated in 1939. Because of their existing stockpile of excellent weapons,
they felt no need of any great organization for the development of new weapons,
no mobilization of their vast resources of scientific personnel, no requirement to
ensure an atmosphere of scientific freedom for wide ranging experimentation within
the meshes of their huge military system. German academic scientists could be left
to their peacetime researches. Even in the military laboratories, fundamental re-
search was greatly curtailed if not entirely dropped. Basic research on radar, for
example, was stopped on Hitler's orders in 1940, and was not renewed until 1942.
The Germans made a belated effort after the false hope of a short war had
gone glimmering. Professor William Osenberg, of the Technische Hochschule at
* Following the declaration of unlimited national emergency by the President on May 27,
1941, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 8807 on June 28, 1941, establishing the
Office of Scientific Research and Development in the Executive Office of the President, which
took over the contracts of the NDRC for scientific and medical research.
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Hannover, became head of a committee to review the availability of academic and
research personnel for war problems. In January :1943 he was assigned to the
Reichsforschungsrat, an organization similar to OSRD but long inactive. Just be-
fore the German surrender, Osenberg complained that "Germany lost the war
because of incomplete mobilization and utilization of scientific brains."
'T'his capsule history of the scientific front in World War II should be recalled
in attempting to forecast what the future holds for science and technology, and in
determining the priorities for peace. Foreknowledge based on an awareness of "the
signs of the times" is as critical to survival in 1966 as it was in 1940. If we are to
profit by the wartime mistakes of Germany, we must maintain-as the Germans
failed to do-that vital rapport between scientists and government which is the basis
of anticipatory-adaptative responses to the patterns of profound change in the world
about us. For those changes portend another turning point in the broad history of
civilization at which the outcome of international political competition will be
determined by the relative capabilities of the contestants for the application of
science to social development. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and
Lieutenant General James M. Gavin have discussed these portents in recent pub-
lications.
From the USSR come indications that the Soviets share this interpretation,
and that, in consequence, Soviet scientists and technologists are being mobilized
rapidly. The Soviets give a somewhat unique characterization to this new turning
point in history, and describe it as a shift from dependence for security upon
instruments which magnify the power of the human fist to reliance on means which
multiply the power of the human brain. This new stage in applied rationality is said
to imply international competition in the development of such means, and in their
employment in a new type of conflict in which victory will go to that social system
with the greatest proclivity toward, and most advanced techniques for, the develop-
ment of its own and foreign societies;, and not to the contestant with a super-
abundance of destructive power. The novelty of this strategic concept, with is strains
of "peaceful competition," heightens its insidiousness. With a beginning unan-
nounced by bugles or bombs, it could. go undetected to an end marked, in the
words of T. S. Eliot, "not with a bang but with a whimper."
One of the many signs signifying the mobilization of scientists in accordance
with this strategy was the establishment by a small. group of Soviet scientists in
1959 of the Cybernetics Council under the Soviet Academy of Sciences. That
group, directed by Admiral A. I. Berg, includes 13 academicians, 30 correspond-
ing members of the Academy, more than 200 doctors of science, and 400 candi-
dates of science. Similarly, the number of research projects planned and supervised
by the Cybernetics Council has risen from 170 in its 1963 program to more than
400 tasks currently programmed.
The goal of this cybernetics program is to provide scientific and technological
neans for the optimal control of complex, purposive systems. "To control," in this
context, means simply to combat: the disorder or disorganization toward which
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large systems tend when they fail to interact appropriately with their external en-
vironments. Such interactions involve information processes, so that as the quantity
of "control" information increases, the disorder of the system decreases. For this
reason, top priority within the Soviet cybernetics program is assigned to studies of
information processes in living systems, machines, and societies, for the purpose
of finding methods and equipment which will increase the effectiveness of human
activity in the sphere of information processing. This sphere is taken to include
education, management of the national economy, defense, transportation, science,
electrical power distribution, law and government, industrial production and dis-
tribution, and the other complex activities of human societies.
To those in the USSR who foresee the advent of a cybernetic era, social
change is inevitable. But the rate and direction of these transitions are subject to
human influence. Their argument goes on to postulate that these changes will be
evolutionary or devolutionary, progressive or regressive, developmental or atrophic,
depending upon the degree of success achieved by any transitional society in apply-
ing cybernetics or other media of applied rationality to engineering the organization
of the emergent states. The task of the Cybernetics Council is to insure that a sys-
tem of social organization will be devised by the USSR which will prove to be the
optimal variant in this evolutionary struggle involving total social organisms, and
not just their military arms.
If the National Strategy Information Center convenes a conference in Decem-
ber 1991 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Pearl Harbor, our successors at
that time will be better able than we to evaluate whether Admiral Berg and his
coterie perceived the "signs of the times" correctly in 1959, and if the consequent
adaptive organizational changes were as appropriate as was the creation of the
National Defense Research Committee in anticipation of the entry of the United
States into World War II.
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CYBERNETICS IN THE SERVICE OF COMMUNISM
BY RAYMOND S. SLEEPER.
Summary of Remarks
Colonel Raymond S. Sleeper, USAF, has command of the Foreign Technology Division,
Air Force Systems Command.
In Russia, cybernetics seems to offer the means to optimize the continued develop-
ment and growth of the power of the Soviet Union, the subversive capture of free
nations, and the establishment of worldwide educational, technological, military,
and space superiority. But more important? cybernetics is now seen by some Soviet
authorities as the means of facilitating the optimum (Communist) control of the
complex system of states, peoples, and resources of the world which the Coin-
utunists hope will result from Communist world domination.
in practice, the Soviets appear to be classifying almost any subject that has
to do with information and control in man, machine, and society as cybernetics.
Cybernetic systems, as opposed to automatic devices, are capable of responding
in a predictable, orderly manner to changes in the environment. An example of a
crude cybernetic system is the home furnace that responds via thermostatic control
to changes in temperature for the purpose of maintaining a reasonably constant
temperature in the home. One of the first: complex cybernetic systems developed
was Norbert Wiener's design of a system to link radar through a computer to a
battery of automatic anti-aircraft guns.
Wiener's great achievement was to synthesize existing technology and ideas
into a basic conceptual framework that unified this technology to produce a high
degree of control in any type of complex dynamic system. The basic elements of
this concept are:
(1) A well defined goal or end state to be achieved,.
(2) Sensors to detect changes in the environment, such as temperature, veloc-
ity, chemical reactions, learning states, and so forth.
(3) Communications nets concerning all elements of the system to assure
information flow.
(4) Logic units to process the information flow according to criteria con-
tained in the goal.
(5) Control units that are responsive to decisions from the logic center (4),
which adjusts system units to the desired states as information from (1),
(2), (3), and (4) changes.
Cybernetics, as it developed under Wiener and in the USSR, imposes a rigid
discipline for clear thinking upon both the theorist and the practitioner. If a true
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cybernetic approach to problem solving is adopted, the planner must first define
his goals and the criteria for their achievement as clearly and with as little ambiguity
as possible.
The Thrust of Cybernetics in the Soviet System
The thrust of cybernetics in Russia extends from the microbiological to the
macrocosmic dimensions of man's relationship to the elements of the universe. The
volume of Soviet literature on cybernetics is monumental. A. I. Berg, chairman of
the Soviet Cybernetics Council, refers to over 5,000 articles in 1961 alone on "the
problems of the application of mathematics, electronics, and cybernetics to biology
and medicine." Since 1961, the volume of literature and research on this subject
has continued to increase.
Soviet cybernetics includes, in addition to biologic and physiologic control
techniques, a broad program of research in neurology, psychology, and related
fields, especially those areas which have the potential for technological application
and behavior control. The USSR is planning for rapid development of automation,
and encourages cybernetics at the highest level of government and party. Social
adjustment to automation is planned through the preparation of students to accom-
modate to the "cybernated society." And, according to the Soviets, the change will
therefore .be more orderly in Russia than in any other country.
At the machine level, the applications vary from guidance systems for missiles
to automated power distribution centers for controlling the flow of electric power
between widely dispersed nets so as to eliminate costly, redundant power generation.
But it is at the socio-economic level that one sees the major innovations being
attempted in the Soviet Union. A cybernetics center is planned for each state.
Several are already being built, and the first one at Kiev is nearly finished. These,
together with the Cybernetics Council in Moscow, the Moscow information storage
and retrieval center (VINITI), the Moscow computer center, the developing na-
tionwide unified information network, some 350 computer centers, and over 100
institutes that are working in cybernetic science and technology, will constitute the
physical structure of the program.
It helps us to take a serious view of these Soviet activities when we realize
that such large scale modeling, and similar attempts to structure society, are
actually beginning here in the United States. San Francisco is using an operating
mathematical model of the city in terms of its land, buildings, peoples, jobs,
amenities, and so forth, for forward planning purposes. Other American cities are
now developing their own models. But the Soviet scheme involves all of Russia and
promises to involve the world.
Probably the key to the major difference between the Soviet purpose of
cybernetics and the purpose in the West is that the Soviets seem to be aiming at
complete social reconstruction. It is not so much that the Soviets are already begin-
ning to apply cybernetics to the optimum control of the entire Soviet society, but
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rather that they are aiming to reconstruct society through the widest possible appli-
cation of cybernetics, and eventually to employ it as the principal system of Com-
i,i.unist: control of the world. And there are indications of steady Soviet progress.
"Soviet science is ahead in the analysis of random processes of shooting and random
process representation; Soviet science is generally superior to U. S. science in the
fields of detection theory, parameters, prediction and estimation, and the analysis
of phase-keyed systems in the presence of fading; and Soviet science can be said
to be slightly ahead of the U.S. sciences in the overall fields of cybernetics,
logic algebra, automated theory, and pattern recognition." Cybernetics seems to
have given the Russian leaders a new vision of the utopian future of Communist
social progress. They now see in cybernetics (or so they think) a means to stimulate
progress and to integrate advances in all fields of science. Again, the most funda-
mental and overriding point is that through cybernetics the integration of scientific
progress now enables the construction of the ideal Communist society in Russia as
well as throughout the world.
To reconstruct Russian society. to establish a system for the optimum control
of Russia, and to embark upon the study? planning, and implementation of a con-
trol system aimed at restructuring the societies of the world so that they will dovetail
into a cybernated Communist Russia, is a fantastic task. A model of how this
world social structure will be achieved has been developed by the Communists.
From a Communist viewpoint the whole process of "national liberation" and
revolution involves the restructuring of capitalistic institutions and the development
of Communist institutions in a purposeful mode.
The Transition of "Capitalist Societies" to "Socialist Societies"
This restructuring of "capitalist societies" to "Socialist societies" is the cen-
tral aim of world communism. It is the object, the content, and the substance of
Communist activities across the world.
There are Communist parties in some 105 natioias in the world. In certain
countries there is more than one Communist party; but for our purposes we shall
assume that these parties are factions, and that ultimately these factions either
coordinate, cooperate, or are controlled by the dominant party in their struggle to
take over the specific country. Some 16 of these 105 nations are now controlled by
the Communists. Each of these 16 nations. is in fact ruled. by the Communist party
therein. It is generally accepted that the world Communist movement is no longer
monolithic, but that polycentralism and a kind of "world commonwealth of Com-
munist nations" is evolving and expanding through subversive aggression. In spite
of these and other, doctrinal changes, a Marxist-Leninist model exists for the stages
of Communist penetration and takeover in a target country. The doctrine elaborates
the following steps (called "stages" in Marxist-Leninist terminology) in the "transi-
tion" to a Marxist-Leninist society:
1. Step one is infiltration into the target country and the formation of a Com-
munist party.
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2. Step two is the infiltration of Communist party members into the target
country's key institutions.
3. Step three is the decision to seize power
4. Step four is to seize power.
5. Finally, step five is to consolidate Communist control of the nation. This
involves the progressive elimination of all anti-Communist, uncooperative
control and influence in the nation.
Thus one sees the total social, economic, and cultural restructuring of a
target country to fit the Communist model. And the Communist model appears to
be moving toward a cybernetics model. This may lead to increased rationalization
of Communist subversive aggression against free nations. Under a cybernetics
scheme, the Communists need not export traditional ideology. Instead they need
only to export "scientific social changes" which fit the cybernetic model of the
economy and social structure of scientific Marxism-Leninism which is now being
built in Russia.
The Drive for Military Superiority
The Soviets have consistently pushed for worldwide military superiority. Stalin
supported this goal, and so did Khrushchev, on balance.
Some top American nuclear scientists believe that Soviet nuclear weapons
technology is at least equivalent to, if not ahead of, the United States, in some
areas. In the area of high yield weapons, it is conceded that they have the edge.
They have detonated a device of 60 megatons which we believe could be
weaponized or turned into a weapon of about 100 megatons. In the area of aero-
space weapons, we were somewhat surprised in 1948 that the Soviets copied our
B-29's (which they called TU-4's). More surprising was that they built a significant
number, and built them at the expense of more rapidly rejuvenating the wartorn
civilian economy. Through the 1950's the Soviets built modern fighters in large
numbers, and also bombers, and then moved into building and deploying ballistic
missiles. There is no question that the American Minuteman and Polaris missiles
remain superior to those of the Soviets, but the Russian weaponeers are not resting
on their laurels. They are continuing to develop and deploy large numbers of new
weapons of widely varying types.
One of the primary strengths of the Soviet research and development and pro-
duction programs is the use of scientific planning (cybernetics) throughout their
weapons programs. Scientific planning, gaming theory, optimum solution of com-
plex problems, development of block-aggregate computing systems, creation of the
scientific basis for the synthesis of automatic control, and hundreds of similar sub-
jects, all relevant to the most modern techniques of scientific planning and develop-
ment of aerospace weapons systems, appear in Soviet cybernetics literature. The
hypothesis is suggested that analysis of overall Soviet power must now take into
account the increased efficiency of the early applications of integrated cybernetic
systems optimized for the strengthening of Soviet military and national security.
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The Thrust in Space
Similarly, the impact of cybernetics can be seen in the Soviet space effort.
Soviet work in space probably started in the early 1940's with the work of
i'silkovskii, the Soviet Goddard. In the late 1940's and early 1950's, it appears that
the basic technologies and vertical firings of components were accomplished. In
the late 1950's, we saw the first Sputnik and the beginning of the Soviet space
spectaculars. There has been little direct: evidence that any of these spectaculars
will lead directly to Soviet military space capabilities, but there have been repeated
Soviet references to the military uses of space.
In the United States, we argue variously that space offensive nuclear delivery
forces are less efficient than ICBM's, less accurate, and less credible. But when the
Soviets are dedicated to aggressive political objectives on a world scale, the posses-
sion of space military offensive forces may appear very useful for purposes of
prestige, terror, persuasion, coercion, pressure, psychological warfare, and demoral-
ization. The sight and sound of Soviet military orbital, forces in the free skies of
the world day and night, and Communist satellite TV and propaganda tuned into
Free World sets around the world-all in the service of' Soviet goals of worldwide
Communist domination, would not be attractive to contemplate.
Such major steps in space could not be taken except for the progress that the
Soviets are seeking through cybernetics. 'This has been recognized by Soviet sci-
entists and has been openly stated by several of them. A description of the impact
of Soviet cybernetics on their space program is included in Cybernetics and the
Cosmos by V. Denisov, published in. 1962. Denisov describes the working of the
cosmic ship in detail, and then projects developments into the future, saying: "It
can be that the foot of man will not take the first step on other planets, . . . but
the foot of a cybernetic automaton may." He then goes on to extend man's influ-
ence into the cosmos through travel and communications, basing his predictions on
progress in cybernetics, as well as in astronautics and related sciences.
Summary
There is not much question that cybernetics is seen by the Soviet elite, not
only as the path to Communist utopia, but also as the road to development of a
worldwide system of Socialist states under Communist control. This view is reflected
even by the American Communist party: "Is there an inner compulsion in tech-
nological development which will transform the private: appropriation of profit in
America and the immense, unprecedented political power it brings, into an inno-
cent surplus managed for the whole of society by the same small top group wearing
different hats? ... No . . . Once the profit motive is no longer a sacred absolute,
the machines can be controlled, and, especially in the centralized society of today,
cybernation can be developed and applied at a rate and in a manner that is in the
interest of society as a whole ... and this will come .... only when the American
people make a daily struggle in a progressive direction" towards communism,.
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If we wish to follow events in Soviet Russia reasonably intelligently, and
developments in worldwide communism as well, we should begin to view them in
terms of the changes wrought by the massive cybernation program in Russia and
in the worldwide Communist movement. Moreover, if cybernation promises such a
"paradise" for Socialist countries, and makes possible, in effect, a technological
penetration of free nations, it behooves us to define the parameters of the possible
impact, and the promise and direction of national and international automation in
free societies as a counter. There is no doubt at all that American computer tech-
nology, program theory and applications, and automation lead the world. But even
as this is recognized, we should also take note of the proliferation of computers, of
computer languages, and of computer centers in the United States. We have become
truly an electronic Towel of Babel. In Russia, by contrast, the computer centers,
languages, and networks are planned and programmed to optimize control of the
entire country. Does this lead to an efficiency of resource utilization that enables
the Soviets, with a gross national product of $303 billion compared to $664 billion
for the United States in 1965, to challenge us for world leadership and military
superiority? Surely the redundancy, flexibility, and free choice in the American
system are much more attractive to us. But is it too wasteful of resources? And is
this American redundancy and flexibility optimized to meet aggressive, purposeful,
international competition? Will widespread redundancy, flexibility, and choice invite
penetration and restriction by a centrally controlled, integrated, and optimized
system, a system optimized for the stated, announced purpose of world domination?
These are interesting questions that only time and intensive analysis will an-
swer. Surely most Americans, if given the choice, will vote for redundancy, flexibil-
ity, and optimization of private opportunity as opposed to centralized, imposed,
optimized control. However, the parameters of redundancy, flexibility, control,
optimization, purposefulness, and private opportunity may have to be subjected to
the crucible of public discussion and definition in the light of national interests
before we have a full understanding of both the benefits and penalties of the promise
of cybernetics. Nor can we begin to discuss and understand the national and inter-
national potential of cybernetics unless we devote adequate effort to the job. This
we are not now doing, at least not at a level of effort that is competitive with the
Soviets.
The level of effort and the progress made in Russia are a definite technological
threat to the United States, because the multi-discipline attack taken by the Soviets
on major problems has no counterpart in this country; and the broad, intensive
effort of the Russians simply must produce, in due course, significant breakthroughs
in sociological, economic, governmental, and military areas that we must be pre-
pared to meet. This challenge is, therefore, a challenge to military superiority, to
social control, to economic and industrial advance, and to world power.
Unless we Americans as a people understand these momentous trends, we
may not have much choice. The system could be imposed upon us by a centralized,
cybernated, world command and control center whose central cortex turns out to
be located in Moscow.
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SOME REFLECTIONS ON CYBERNETICS
BY HARRY D. GIDEoNSE
Summary of Remarks
Dr. Harry D. Gideonse is Chancellor of the New School for Social Research.
What does the term cybernetics mean? This is a legitimate question, especially
since the Russians use it in a somewhat different context than we do.
The Russians feel a need, when dealing with a new thought or concept which
is deviant from the dominant intellectual climate, that is, from the currently ac-
cepted interpretation of dialectical materialism, to dress it up in such a way as to
make it appear compatible with the dominant ideology. Fortunately, we do not
have to do this in the United States. If a Harvard professor of physics wants to try
out an idea which has not been explored by a colleague at Yale or Columbia, he
can do so without reference to anybody. He does not have to wait until his idea is
accepted as congruent with the prevailing party line before he is allowed to pursue
his work. But such is not the case in the Soviet Union. Let me recall for you that
when the Russians began to work seriously (and somewhat belatedly) on the
physics of atomic energy, they had to confront some real conflicts between their
research and the prevailing dogmas of dialectical materialism. For a number of
years, some of the leading Russian. physicists had their necks dangerously far out,
simply because the philosophers of the official ideology disapproved of Einstein's
physics. It took years of struggle before this problem was worked out through the
development of some aesopian verbal formulas that would permit the physicists to
go forward with their work even while:, the party line seemed to disapprove of
Einstein's physics.
In a similar way, when the Soviet regime began to place heavy emphasis on
tdectronics and the use of computers in the implementation of Soviet planning,
there were great ructions within the Soviet intellectual community. Much literature
was devoted to the question. of whether or not this emphasis was compatible with
the official ideology. Eventually a solution had to be worked out on the basis of
some obscure passage in a pamphlet by Lenin which seemed to justify so much
work on electronics and computers. Then, after the problem had been resolved
after literally years of controversy (only part of which is apparent in the printed
literature), the Russians proceeded to create a myth around the word cybernetics
which is quite unlike the more sober concept which that term implies in the Amer-
ican scientific community. To put it briefly, in the Soviet Union the concept of
cybernetics seems to suggest that the solution of economic and social problems,
with respect to which we would consider cybernetics simply as a useful tool, would
be generated within the social and material process itself. There is an implication
here that somehow or other cybernetics plays a role in the Soviet Union that it does
not play in the American scientific community.
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We have a much more limited notion of this concept. In the American setting,
cybernetics is simply the science and the scientific reasoning that governs the
construction and use of computers. In this country, the term is not used in the more
mystical sense that the Russians seem to imply.
But this is not to minimize the importance or complexity of cybernetics in
the United States. As for complexity, we should remind ourselves at once, for
example, that the important thing about a computer is what is put into it. Who
programs the computer? It should be remembered that when a computer is pro-
grammed, one does not simply put all available data, all the vast information
explosion of contemporary science, into the computer. The result would be simply
chaotic. One must have a sophisticated selective principle in the back of his head,
a yardstick which indicates what is vital, what is merely significant, and what is
irrelevant. For the validity of what comes out of a computer depends entirely upon
the validity of what goes into it. Among computer people, there is a stale pun that
nevertheless makes this point most effectively. It is expressed in the formula GI =
GO. GI stands for garbage in, and GO for garbage out; or, in other words, garbage
in results in garbage out. There is a great reality here which must be kept in mind
when evaluating the relevance of cybernetics to American life.
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MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND S(O)CIAL CHANGE
BY EDWARD L. KATZENBACH
Summary of Remarks
Dr. Edward L. Katzenbach is Vice President and General Manager of the Education
Division, Raytheon Company.
`The technology of war has always been closely related to the organization of society
and its value system. But whether the nature of society has determined military
organization, or military necessity our social values, is ,a moot question. Suffice to
say that. the relationship between the military and society was well recognized by
historians of ancient times. But as war has become more important to society, as
has certainly been true of the past century, historians have tended to ignore this
relationship. In a sense, they have put war in a parenthesis in time with "causes"
at one end and "results" at the other. As a result, not enough thought has been
given to the relationship between military technology and social change. Perhaps
some illustrations, through time, will indicate the nature of my view of the problem.
The castle was the first technologically sound defensive unit. Was medieval
society organized around this technology? Or was it the organization of society
which caused the castle to be built? The coming of gunpowder destroyed the castle
as a viable military unit. Science and the study of ballistics and engineering then
made the town the lowest common denominator as an element in defense. More-
over, gunpowder changed military virtues. Bravery, heroism, and the like remained
as qualities of leadership; but brains, in the form of both engineering skills and
organization, were added to the list of military necessities. What effect, then, did
military technology have on the rise of a middle class, on new forms of govern-
ment, new habits of thought?
Civil-military technology, a good road system, and later the railroad made the
nation the viable unit of defense, and steam transport over the seas made it possible
for wars to be much larger in geographic scope, and to be fought by broad alliance
systems. Again, human organization learned to conform to the demands of military
technology. And so did human value systems. Are not both nationalism and inter-
nationalism largely the by-product of changes in military technology?
Barbed wire and the machine gun brought stalemate to the Western Front in
World War 1. But the organization of industry and people behind the lines brought
a whole new look to national organization. Governments became larger and man's
view of government changed. So, finally, did his view of. war. World War II, fought
as it was in four dimensions--on and under the sea, on the surface of the earth and
over it---again changed social values and, indeed, all of society. Almost for the first
time, men, women, and children were considered legitimate targets for the new
weapons of war.
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I make these points because until this moment in time military technology has
been a great moving force in society. But now technology has reached an impasse.
It is manpower, with only limited technology, that is fighting the wars of today's
world, in Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam. Time, therefore, has a new value in war
that is closely related to human patience. In other words, it is the human will which
today is of overriding importance in war. There is a paradox here. Technology no
longer limits war. People do, and for the first time in history.
There is another paradox, however, which derives from the first one. It is that
in a democracy, we have always believed that what we do best is to arrive at an
agreed consensus. This we do, we believe, because of the freedom of information
and opinion that characterizes our society. But there has never been more informa-
tion available than on the issue of Vietnam, and yet on no war since the American
Revolution has there been less consensus.
The first essential to a forward strategy is, therefore, to resurrect a sense of
respect for the role of consensus in democracy. This is our most precious heritage.
The new role of protest in our society can destroy it. In a time when man's will is
in fact man's destiny, surely a respect for consensus is the first law of survival.
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THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FREE
LABOR DEVELOPMENT
BY WILLIAM C. DOHERTY, JR.
Summary of Remarks
Mr. William C. Doherty, Jr., is Administrator of the American Institute for Free Labor
Development.
The labor movement in Latin America is one of the most important catalytic
agents in that dynamic continent. But it is also one of the most vulnerable to totali-
tarian influences. The workers have new expectations and they are determined to
fulfill them. They are seeking change and determined to get it. The primary question
is, will they choose the chaos of violent revolution or the course of peaceful com-
petition? The free, democratic labor movemnt in Latin America must be strength-
ened and expanded so that it can compete both with the established interests of
society, and with the forces of totalitarianism which threaten to control and manipu-
late the power of labor.
The democratic labor unions of Latin America have three basic needs: to
increase union participation in economic planning; to strengthen union resistance
to totalitarian influences; and to bolster union independence from government,
political parties, and from industry.
To help the labor sector attain these goals, the American Institute for Free
Labor Development has been developed as a unique organization which reflects the
pluralism of American society. Initiative for the foundation of AIFLD in 1962
came from the American labor movement, and today prominent labor leaders
serve on the Board of Directors. Each year since 1962, the AFL-CIO has made a
substantial contribution to help support AIFLD. In addition, more than 60 en-
lightened business firms make yearly contributions. And AIFLD's overall effort is
increased far beyond what the private sector can support by means of United States
government funds under the Alliance for Progress. Finally, many distinguished
Latin American leaders serve on the Board of Directors, men such as Oscar Gale
of Honduras, Gonzalez Navarro of Venezuela, and others.
AIFLD has two main fields of activities: trade union education; and social
projects such as housing, workers' banks, campesino service centers, small "impact
projects," and community services. These extend to every Latin American country
and to the English-speaking Caribbean nations as well. The only countries outside
the program are Cuba, Haiti, and Paraguay.
In AIFLD's educational programs, more than 50,000 trade unionists have
participated in one or more levels of classes since June 1962. These programs
begin with basic courses on trade unionism, and advance to intensive seminars on
techniques of union organization and collective bargaining. Where possible, the best
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students are brought to the most advanced level of training, the Front Royal School
of Virginia, where they are given instruction in teaching methods, social project
design and implementation, and leadership development. A new program in labor
economics has recently been started in cooperation with a university consortium in
New Orleans. There the students are given intensive training for an academic year
in order to enable them to assist their unions to participate in national economic
planning.
In its social projects work, AIFLD seeks to give those unions which have
already been strengthened through training the means to fill the tangible needs of
their members. One of the most critical needs is low cost housing and savings
institutions to serve the worker. AIFLD has helped to build over 3,400 housing
units in five countries, and has established the first workers' housing bank in Latin
America, called ASINCOOP. Opened in 1964, the bank now has more than
$1,256,000 in workers' savings. Feasibility studies have been completed for similar
banks in other countries.
AIFLD feels that agricultural workers, small tenants, and sharecroppers are
among the most neglected elements of Latin American society. These are the people
to whom the Alliance for Progress is unfortunately mere rhetoric, not reality. For
the vast majority, integral land reform, necessary for both the economic and
political health of their countries, is still unheard of.
The AIFLD program for campesinos in Northeast Brazil is the most extensive
of all our rural programs. It was set up in response to one of the most explosive
situations in the hemisphere. In cooperation with the Federation of Rural Trade
Unions, the Agency for International Development, a Catholic priest (Padre
Crespo), and other agencies, AIFLD developed a plan for a series of campesino
service centers. These centers would provide focal points for trade union activity,
and also a measure of vocational and literacy education and medical services. Thus
far, three service centers have been built and are in service in the state of Pernam-
buco. Classes in cooperatives, manual arts for men and women, home economics,
and agricultural improvement have begun. These centers have become tangible
evidence to the workers of the region of the concern of the North American labor
movement for their plight. Even more importantly, they symbolize the possibilities
for continued union growth in this area.
AIFLD is a unique organization that combines the talents and resources of
the American labor movement with those of business and government, and then
brings them to bear on one of the most critical problems of this hemisphere, namely,
to assist the labor movement in Latin America to play a leadership role in social
change, and to direct this dynamic process toward the goals of freedom and
democracy.
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AMERICA'S THIRD FORCE
BY RICHARD C. CORNUELLE
Summary co f Remarks
Mr. Richard C. Cornuelle is Executive Vice President for Program Development, National
Association of Manufacturers.
The expanding role of the federal government in almost every aspect of American
life is a familiar but alarming, phenomenon. While public uneasiness over the grow-
ing role of government is increasing rapidly, many American consider this develop-
ment to be both inevitable and uncontrollable. It is, in short, something we must
learn to live with.
I do not believe this is so. For many decades, this country managed success-
fully to contain big government. We did so because we had found another way to
deal with many of our public problems. In his perceptive volume Democracy in
America, Alexis de Tocqueville long ago commented approvingly on this country's
governmental institutions, which afforded the citizen a :maximum degree of political
participation; and on American private enterprise, whiich gave the widest possible
scope to private initiative. But the really unique aspect of American life was a
third sector of society, neither governmental nor commercial, which he believed
would enable the United States to accomplish, almost for the first time in human
history, a society that was at once free, prosperous, and humane. This force was
the propensity of Americans to work together in volunteer organizations for the
accomplishment of public purposes. Today, de Tocqueville's third force has taken
on enormous dimensions. Almost a million organized nonprofit activities now func-
tion in this country, and contributions toward them approximate $20 billion a year.
Perhaps the largest element in this third force is the 320,000 churches of our coun-
try; but it also includes countless private foundations, fraternal and service organ-
izations, funds, special crusades, and hospitals and nursing homes.
But the creative power of this tremendous third force now seems in danger
despite its truly impressive size and its immensely rich complexity. Here, too, the
role of government is rapidly increasing. At the present time, government operates
and finances at least 90 percent of all organized welfare activities. By the year
2000, higher education, too, will be almost completely the responsibility of gov-
ernment. The evidence seems to suggest that we are losing confidence in the crea-
tive value of the American experience that de Tocqueville praised so highly. It
seems obsolete, relevant only to a more simple period of our history. We have
come to act as if only the government can deal today with such overwhelming
contemporary problems as crime, urban life, and transportation.
But I would argue the opposite point of view. I would urge that private, non-
governmental organizations can deal with many of the problems confronting con-
temporary society more effectively than government ever will. The trouble is that
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they have grown old-fashioned, even antiquated. Their techniques and methods
are a generation old. They can never realize their enormous potential unless they
drastically modernize their operating procedures.
Happily, I think we are beginning to see a renaissance in this respect. Let me
cite some illuminating examples. Take, for instance, the relatively small but intract-
able problem of making loans to college students who do not meet conventional
credit requirements. An independent organization, the United Student Aid Funds,
has recently been organized to deal with this problem, and has been so successful
that it operates today in all fifty states through 8,000 banks. Or again, there is a
private group in Indianapolis that has taken bold initiatives to deal with the prob-
lem of urban redevelopment. Financed by loans from Indianapolis banks to meet
the cost of land and materials, it employs the techniques of the prefabricated hous-
ing industry as one way of dealing with the problem. Groups of slum dwellers are
organized into teams of 12, given training in building, and then put to constructing
prefabricated houses in slum areas. The amazing thing is that it works. Finally, the
National Association of Manufacturers has organized a highly successful program
to cope with hard core unemployment, especially through the re-education of school
dropouts and even incorrigible delinquents. The program has been so successful
that NAM hopes to encourage its imitation all across the country.
These are only a few examples of private organizations turning their vast
potential to the solution of contemporary social problems. And the potential is
truly unlimited. If the enormous, and still largely untapped, reservoir of the Amer-
ican spirit for free cooperation in private undertakings of all kinds could only be
set free, there is almost no limit to what could be accomplished.
Indeed, I would make a prophecy in this respect. The first third of the twentieth
century was a period during which the commercial sector of American society took
on its great strength and productive capacity. But the business community could
not by itself accomplish the realization of the American dream. During the second
third of the century, we resorted to government action for the solution of social
problems, only to realize that this was no all-embracing panacea. I believe that the
last third of our century may be marked by the renaissance of the third force in
American life and its astounding capacity for problem solving through voluntary
cooperation. Once this begins to happen, we may yet bring into being the humane
society which de Tocqueville foresaw and which all Americans still aspire to.
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APPENDIX
Editor's Note
Following are summaries of two lectures prepared for the National Strategy Semi-
nars, 1967, which were co-sponsored by the National Strategy Information Center,
Inc., at Town Hall, New York City, in winter and spring of this year. The subjects
of these lectures seemed so relevant to the discussions at The First Interprofessional
Forum on Priorities For Peace that the two synopses are included here as being of
interest to participants in the Forum. Descriptive material concerning the Seminars
was distributed to all participants at the Forum, and it was indicated that the
Seminars would be, in effect, a continuation of the Forum itself.
VIETNAM: THE CONTINUING FIG: iT FOR FREEDOM
BY FRANK N. TRAGER
Summary ca f Remarks
Dr. Frank N. Trager is Professor of International Affairs at New York University.
While Southeast Asian nationalist movements, in no small measure stimulated by
indigenous cultural factors (such as Buddhism, Islam, and Confusianism), antedate
World War I, they were also influenced by Western education, by variants of Marx-
ist ideology and by the collapse of Western rule with. the advent of the Japanese
occupation of the region during World War II. Thus, anti-colonialism, nationalism
and the desire for economic and technical modernization have been and are key
factors in the area. However, the intensity of various nationalisms, the differences
in historical background, and the diversity of ethnic, linguistic, and religio-cultural
factors have until recently worked against greater regional unity.
Every one of Southeast Asia's states has been and is still today the victim and
the target of Communist insurrections inspired and aided by Moscow, Peking, or
both. Whether the Southeast Asian state has sought its security in neutralism or
alliance, in socialism or capitalism, whether its government has tried to be friendly
to all blocs or behaved with due caution :in the United Nations, it has suffered since
independence from Communist attempts at coups, revolts, insurrection, and always
infiltration and subversion. Vietnam today is the most dramatic and tragic example
of this protracted warfare.
In the mid-1920's there emerged in Vietnam two fundamental, partly under-
ground revolutionary tendencies which under one Vietnamese name or another oc-
casionally united but more often contested against each. other for leadership against
the French. These two tendencies are today symbolized by the Communist victors
in the North (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam--DRVN) and the Nationalist
victors in the South (the anti-Communist Republic of Vietnam).
The leader of the Communists, from the time their party was organized in
Hong Kong in 1930 and admitted to the Comintern. in 1931, has been Ho Chi
Minh. During World War II, French Indochina remained under the control of
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Vichy and made its "peace" with Japan. During this period Ho Chi Minh offered
to supply "intelligence" and to harass the Japanese.
The United States, the Chinese Nationalists, and the allies generally accepted
his offer and supplied his forces. It was this war experience which enabled Ho Chi
Minh to seize the leadership of the anti-Vichy French, anti-Japanese forces, and
to proclaim on September 2, 1945, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
By this time the Free French under de Gaulle were on their way back to
"French Indochina." In the years 1945-46, Communists and Nationalists fought
alongside of each other against the returning French. Only when the Nationalists
in the North recognized the spuriousness of the Communist-led Vietminth "united
front" did they then break with Ho and his Communist-controlled organization.
But then it was too late. Eight years of warfare followed. The Communists against
the French; the Nationalists against the French; and the French against both.
Toward the end of this disaster the Paris government, heading toward the
1954 Geneva Conference, signed or initialed treaties of independence with the
kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia, and the State of Vietnam. But between March and
September 1946-before the shooting began-France had already recognized the
DRVN as a state "within the French Union." Obviously, therefore, there were now
two states in the territory of Vietnam, with no fixed boundary between them; and
both of them were present at the 1954 Geneva Conference.
That conference settled nothing, except the withdrawal of France from Viet-
nam. The Geneva Declaration, which called for elections "within two years" (Arti-
cle 7), was signed by no country at Geneva. The United States issued its own
declaration in support of the "statement" of the State of Vietnam and its willingness
to accept the end of hostilities. The State of Vietnam in its statement opposed the
terms of the Declaration and called then for free elections, supervised by an inter-
national body in a non-partitioned country.
But the country was partitioned by terms of the cease-fire signed by the French
and the Communist North. France, the defeated power, forced to withdraw from
North and South Vietnam, yet agreed to terms with Hanoi which, except for its
own withdrawal, it would not be able to guarantee or fulfill. South Vietnam accepted
the end of hostilities and to abide by the terms of the cease-fire provided there was
to be in fact a genuine cease-fire between the Communist North and the Nationalist
South.
This never occurred. Warfare began once again during the winter of 1954-55.
Initiated by the Communists, it has continued ever since. It started below the mili-
tary level of direct confrontation. It took shape as assassination and terror, with
external assistance to the rebels and guerrilla-type action. It mounted as the major
Communists powers, Russia and China, gave support and material aide to Hanoi;
and Hanoi in turn has guided, directed, controlled, supplied, and led the war against
Saigon.
In 1955 the United States decided to aid the Republic of Vietnam. Presidents
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson continued this policy. The Congress each year
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has passed appropriations in support of this policy. The Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization, created by the Manila Conference of :1954, calls for and validates
such support against Communist aggression, subversion, and infiltration.
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of August 1964 reaffirms this policy-and it
was overwhelmingly re-endorsed a second time when it legitimate but ill-conceived
effort was made by Senators Fulbright and Morse to withdraw our commitment. And
since February 1965, the United States and South Vietnamese forces have mounted
a campaign to stop the enemy on his soil. (For ten years he had enjoyed the unique
luxury of striking but not being struck.) The 1966 Manila Conference, bringing
together the seven allies in 'Vietnam who have forces there, supported this policy.
However much the Communist adversary has zigged and zagged in Peking and
Moscow recently, he still presents--in one form or another--the major threat to
the continuity of independence for any of the still free Southeast Asian states. There
is no genuine detente with Moscow; there has been ri,one for the past 49 years of
its regime. Communist China, if anything, is more verbally belligerent, though so
sorely beset by its own political contest for Communist Party power that it is less
effective as a supporter of Hanoi.
To blunt this threat to the free Asian nations, we are waging undeclared war in
Vietnam. United States post-World War II policy in Asia was reshaped in the heat
of crisis following the Communist 1949 victory in China and the outbreak in June
1950 of the Korean War. In the latter, the United Nations determined that Com-
munist China was an aggressor state. The system of bilateral and collective security
and defense treaties begun in 1951 with Japan and culminating with SEATO in
1954, together with aid and related aggreements with every state in free Asia, and
with United States military forces and bases under the United States Pacific Com-
mand, provide the framework of United States security policy in Asia in general,
and toward the Republic of Vietnam in particular.
Since 1950 there has been little doubt that the United States has resolved to
maintain a position of strength and interest in Asia. We sought to create and insure
it defensive shield of anti-Communist power which would guard against further
large-scale overt Communist aggression. The 1966 Manila Conference pointed up
the fact that, in addition to the United States forces in Vietnam, our allies there are
making increasingly important contributions: the Koreans with 40,000 troops; the
Australians, 4,500; New Zealanders, 1,200; the Filipinos, 2,000; the Thais, un-
counted but large scale support, including provision for the new B-52 bomber bases.
On October 23, 1964, former Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies of Australia
pointed out that the Phillipines, Thailand, Britain, Canada, Malaysia, India, Re-
public of Korea, Iran, Republic of China, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan,
Israel, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Netherlands were giving aid of some kind to South
Vietnam. Since then, some 13 additional nations, making 31 in all, have responded
to the call for assistance from Saigon. Not all those giving aid have endorsed United
States and allied policy in Vietnam, but none has withdrawn its aid since the shift
in strategy and tactics which began in earnest on February 7, 1965. Interestingly,
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these facts of international cooperation in and for Vietnam are rarely if ever noticed
by the American press.
It is this mutuality of interest which provides the basis for at least two im-
mediate and two long range propositions. The immediate ones are:
1. The risks of upward escalation against the Communist North are real
but acceptable, provided the object is confined to the defense and security
of the Republic of Vietnam,
2. South Vietnam must continue to receive military and other aid until
it can restore political and economic stability and viability to its life as a
small, responsible sovereign nation. Neither the "essentials" nor the "speci-
fics" of Geneva 1954, nor the neutralization and coalition government
policies applied to Laos in Geneva in 1962, offer positive guides to the
future security of South Vietnam. Its land and sea borders must be made
secure and guaranteed-this is the subject for a cease fire and negotiated
treaty or other, ad hoc arrangement-while its friends and allies help a
legitimate nationalist government establish and maintain domestic peace,
stability and improvement of living conditions.
Successful outcomes to these two propositions will probably have an early and
salutary effect on the policies of the states of Southeast Asia. Our friends in Asia
will know that we are standing firm against the contemporary form of warfare at
the lower end of the spectrum-today the hallmark of Communist aggression-the
so-called "wars of national liberation" which are neither "national" nor liberating.
The long range propositions stemming from the active programs in Vietnam
1. They can nurture the growth of genuine Asian regionalism. With aid
from the Free World, bilaterally and multilaterally, such regional coopera-
tion can then sponsor a massive free Asian development program compar-
able to the Marshall Plan. The current Mekong Basin program, to whose
support President Johnson pledged $1 billion when peace comes, is an
example of what can and should be done.
2. The resultant security, improvement in the conditions of living and,
hopefully, the encouragement and spread of representative institutions of
government will be the best counter-defense to the enemy's strategy and
tactics, including his "wars of national liberation." These will serve to deny
him his target: the Himalayan rimlands, the Irrawaddy and Mekong val-
leys, and the mainland Southeast Asian rice bowl.
This represents the beginnings of a policy for Southeast Asia. It is in effect a
determined two-pronged policy of containment, military and socio-economic, ap-
plied successfully in Europe and now, belatedly, in Southeast Asia, under the vigor-
ous leadership of President Johnson. It is based on the unconditional recognition
that the Communist adversary still presents-in the form or another-the major
threat to the continuity of independence for any of the still free Southeast Asian
states. Prudence, as well as self-interest-and, above all, belief in the value of the
ever continuing fight for freedom-justify this policy.
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STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF SPACE ACTIVITIES
BY CHARLES S. SHELDON II
Summary of Remarks
Dr. Charles S. Sheldon II is Acting Chief of the Science Policy Research Division, Legis-
lative Reference Service, Library of Congress.
The Space Age is an important new factor of national strategic concern, not
just a side show which from time to time takes the headlines. Although space flight
first burst upon the public scene with the flight of Sputnik in October 1957, its
beginnings go back many centuries in the common heritage of all nations. For
space flight is built upon almost all other scientific and technical knowledge: from
an awareness of the sizes and distances of heavenly bodies; to the laws of motion,
gravity, action and reaction; chemistry; materials and their manufacture; guidance,
computation, and communications science.
The Soviet application of this knowledge brought a critical reexamination of
the relative pace of technical progress in different parts of the world, the state of
education, and assumptions about relative military strength. There was much con-
fusion; and shifts of world opinion, even if inaccurate, were consequences to be
considered in making strategic assessments.
Effects of Space
The United States space program takes about:. one percent of our gross
national product, ten percent of our scientific and engineering talent, and is a third
of all Government-funded research and development. Over a million jobs are
provided, and such areas as southern California and the Gulf crescent are highly
dependent upon this economic activity.
Subcontracts are spread all over the country, and hundreds of colleges are
affected. NASA alone is funding graduate training to the extent of providing 1,000
new Ph.D.'s a year, without requiring these students to work for the agency, and
thereby replenishing in numbers the complete amount. of advanced degree holders
taken by the program from the national stockpile.
The space program is not only replenishing our storehouse of basic scientific
knowledge, but is rapidly being translated into practical applications which pay a
direct dividend in a higher GNP for the nation. For example, only communications
satellites offer us an easy prospect for meeting the swelling demand for over-ocean
communications channels, and soon may be used as a more economical way to
distribute TV programs even domestically. A five-day accurate forecast of the
weather would bring estimated annual savings to the United States economy of over
$5 billion. Satellites are an essential element to such accurate prediction, and may
later play a role in even more significant weather modification.
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Every month is disclosing new possibilities for natural resource discovery,
mapping, and management from space. A recent study of all these potential applica-
tions suggests annual savings to our economy within fifteen years of $38 billion.
The international savings could be even greater, although the policy questions of
space applications may prove exceedingly complex when it comes to sharing costs,
benefits, and controls.
Some studies suggest that the indirect spinoffs of space activity, in terms of
the growth of our technical and industrial capabilities, will be even more important
to us than the direct applications. But few existing statistical series are now capable
of measuring these changes in a cause-and-effect sense. Typical of such new spin-
offs is the attention being paid to aerospace industry systems techniques for solving
a host of earthbound problems such as pollution, crime, data management, and
transportation.
Space technology is already an important direct military factor, not in the
aggressive sense, but in its provision of a host of supporting services linked to com-
munications, weather reporting, navigation, and early warning. For the future,
inspection systems using space methods, whether national or international, may be
further forces for stabilization of the world military situation, to the advantage of
both ourselves and other powers.
International Competition
Although our space program is important to us on its own merits, we cannot
help but be aware that the Soviet Union also has a large program, surprisingly
similar to ours in scope and size. Through February 28, 1967, we had orbited or
sent to the Moon and planets 471 payloads. The Soviet Union had done the same
with 224. However, the Soviet Union has held a definite lead in weight of payload,
just as we hold the lead in number of spacecraft. Both countries have had space
failures, too, although now the success rate is better than 90 percent. There is not
much difference between the two countries in this respect, as they use the same
world technology.
Two thirds of American launches are for the Department of Defense; but this
obscures the dominant role of NASA, the civilian agency, in our total space effort.
Our program is dedicated by law and by action to peaceful ends, including preser-
vation of the peace. The Soviet program also claims to be entirely peaceful, but
they less readily admit the obvious fact of a heavy military flavor to what they do.
A better appreciation of the two major programs is provided by a review of their
major elements.
The Russians got off to an early start in flying scientific missions. These have
ranged from spectaculars like the orbiting geophysical laboratory in 1958 and the
more recent Proton shots carrying 27,000 pounds of cosmic ray experiment payload,
to 32 Kosmos-class payloads which receive a minimum of publicity and are equiva-
lent to the 33 NASA Explorers. The Russians have not neglected science, and they
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publish many findings; but probably they do not do quite as well as NASA across
the whole spectrum of such interest.
]Both countries have similar sized programs for unmanned exploration of the
Moon, and both have had many failures. Our first 13 lunar attempts did not
succeed, but since then we have had brilliant successes with 'Ranger, Surveyor, and
Lunar Orbiter. The Soviet Union failure record is not all in the public domain. But
after their success in taking pictures of the far side of the Moon in 1959, there were
nothing but failures until Luna 9 soft ;landed in 1966; and since then four other
shots have also been successes. A measure of the difficulty of comparison is the
following. We announced that Surveyor would land on the Moon in 1963. It did
not fly until 1966, when its first attempt was a stunning success, returning 11,500
pictures. The Russians started soft landing attempts in 1963, but every one failed
until 1966, when they beat us to a soft landing. Their ship returned only 27 pictures,
and we are left with a debate as to whether essentially these few panoramic views
did the same job as our thousands,,, in terms of the most fundamental questions of
judging the nature of the surface.
The Soviet unmanned interplanetary effort has been far greater. They made
attempts to Mars and Venus at every "window" launch opportunity from 1960 to
1966, and even their 1960 payload weight will not be surpassed by this country
before 1973. But not a single one of the 17 flights returned any planetary data. We
made only four launch attempts, and a Mariner returned data from Venus and
another Mariner pictures and data from Mars. These were astounding successes,
but detractors are not sure what new facts they proved. So how does one strike a
balance between the two countries in this field? Probably only in an arbitrary way.
The United States has had a clear lead in weather reporting, communications,
:.ind navigation from space. Now the Soviet Union has altered its priorities and has
Programs in all three fields, but still. is not up to our level of performance, particu-
larly with respect to electronic reliability. Each of their programs does have some
special advantages over ours, while being weaker in other respects.
The United States rarely comments officially any more on its military support
flights, although the satellites concerned are hardly different from civilian ones
except in terms of the customer using the data. The Soviet Union does not admit
to any military flights. But 65 heavy Kosmos satellites in the better-than-10,000-
pound class fly low circular orbits from which they are usually recalled after eight
days. It is hard to find any plausible mission other than observation, and this sus-
picion is confirmed by private remarks made by former Premier Khrushchev to a
few Westerners. One can argue that a greater awareness of what is going on is a
step toward stability, and will discourage rash actions which might lead to war.
Surprises and miscalculations are harder. Further, we may be pointing toward a
day of open skies, since we now have many years of: acceptance of overflight in
space which can hardly be confused. with. the legal problems surrounding air flight.
The real worry of people about the military use of space is the question of
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orbiting weapons of mass destruction. The major powers have pledged not to do
so, and such agreement was easy to reach mostly because majority opinion today
discounts the significance of such systems. Nuclear weapons in silos or in sub-
marines are far easier to maintain and control, and can be pointed to more targets
than weapons in orbit. If a few weapons were put up for blackmail, they might
invite a pre-emptive strike by ICBM's against the offending country. If a few were
put up in secrecy, they would neither have the blackmail use nor be decisive in
countering the total deterrent strength of a major power. If large numbers were
planned for secret deployment, there are several ways in which their presence would
quickly be deduced by modern technology. And again, since they probably could
not reach all the counter forces, they would risk the destruction of the launching
country, quite aside from the difficulties of guaranteeing reliable performance. This
assessment may not remain true for all time, and consequently military authorities
have a responsibility for continuing to study the problem and to have contingency
counter plans.
So far I have not compared manned space flight and speculated on future
plans. The Russians held a strong early lead which was completely overcome by
our successful Gemini program, with its use of fuel cells for long stay times, its
use of maneuver, rendezvous, docking, and added propulsion to high orbit. But we
must be careful to avoid overconfidence; the two year Soviet pause is probably just
a time of preparation for far more ambitious missions. Through most of the time,
the Soviet Union has held a strong lead in the lifting power of its operational launch
vehicles. We are close to having man-rated the Saturn IB, which can put about
40,000 pounds in low orbit. But now the Russians have a new launch vehicle whose
first stage thrust is close to double that of Saturn I. When it gets upper stages it
would be capable of supporting manned orbital laboratory operations, manned
circumlunar flight without assembly in orbit, or unmanned planetary landers of
some complexity.
We have a still larger Saturn V coming which is the basis of our lunar landing
program and other advanced missions. Newspaper speculation is that the Russians
have something even larger, but there is no way to assess these stories from open
sources. If the Russians are to beat us to the Moon, as they sometimes have claimed,
we must soon see a resumption of their manned flight activity. This is because they
are as conservative as we in trying to check out equipment before committing men.
Since there have been repeated stories of Soviet cosmonauts killed in orbit,
it is necessary to repeat that neither country has suffered such losses in actual flight,
and we do not know either way how the Russians have fared on the pad. This
assertion is supportable both in terms of official United States testimony and in
terms of simple logic. Every announced flight has succeeded, and been advertised
while in progress. Every so-called failure has been part of a supposedly secret pro-
gram which is never detected by official tracking stations, but which is "followed"
by amateur radio listeners.
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Future Prospects
Parametric studies show that even. without new scientific discoveries, better
engineering will bring the costs of space flight down by orders of magnitude in the
years ahead. The Soviet Union for many years has pledged itself at all levels of its
government to explore the whole solar system with men. They and ourselves are
capable of doing this. As costs fall, it will be within the reach of other countries as
well. As our command of power increases, we can confidently expect to see the
Moon. and perhaps at least Mars and Venus made into habitable, interesting, and
economically useful places for mankind.
In a sense, we are at the threshold of a new civilization. What are the chances
that only Earth has intelligent life? We are one tiny planet among many billions
of galaxies made up of many billions of stars. Probably only the distances and our
insignificance have shielded us from possible contacts with life from far away. Not
knowing where ultimate destiny will carry us, there are still finite goals within the
solar system which may determine whether America continues to hold a position of
leadership among men or whether it slips into one of the backwaters of history. A
broad strategic concept of our nation and its position in human affairs requires an
awareness of the costs, problems, and potential rewards of space flight.
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NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER $~ INC.
130 ~ Fi $a? G&W, I.gA7W548-.0 p7( q~7 61-s260
 Approved For Release 200
THE FIRST
INTERPROFESSIONAL
FORUM
ON PRIORITIES
FOR PEACE
THE PLAZA
NEW YORK CITY
DECEMBER 6, 1966
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THE FIRST
INTERP.ROFESSIONAL
FORUM
ON PRIORITIES
FOR PEACE
THE PLAZA
NEW YORK CITY
DECEMBER 6, 1966
NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER, INC.
130 EAST 67th STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10021 ? TELEPHONE [phone]
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Why Tlnr Forum
December 6th is the 25th anniversary of Pearl
Harbor Eve - that moment when America slept,
indifferent to the strategies of foreign dictators,
taking false comfort from the assumed security of
her great ocean moats, unaware that the carriers
of Imperial Japan were readying a first strike,
and ignorant also of the ideology and global war
plans of Nazi Germany.
In the nuclear age, it is imperative that Americans
never again misread the intentions, or under-
estimate the capabilities, of totalitarian Party
elites. It is vital that civilian opinion-leaders under-
stand the complex formulae of national defense
and international security affairs which include
factors of technology, diplomacy, economics and
national will.
Overall Purpose
The purpose of this Forum is not to look back-
ward towards December of 1941, but to focus on
the requirements of a sophisticated "forward
strategy for freedom" that will enable the U.S.,
in the next 10-15 years, to (a) keep aggression at
bay, whether through insurgency or space-war-
fare, and (b) help less fortunate nations build the
institutions required for genuine peace and human
betterment. We seek educational substitutes for
Pearl Harbor and search for new organizational
skills by which the private citizen can more ef-
fectively answer the question: "What can I do
for my country?"
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Cardinal I.rruer
? HOW REAL THE DETENTE?
? NATO AND THE CHANGING
BALANCE OF POWER
? GEOPOLITICS IN THE CONTEXT
OF TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISE
? CHINA'S STRATEGY OF TERROR
? IS THERE AN ANTI-BALLISTIC
MISSILE GAP?
? THE CHALLENGE OF SOVIET
CYBERNETICS
? THE PRIVATE SECTOR
AND PREVENTIVE INSURGENCY
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December 6th, 1966
9:00A.M. -5.'00PM.
Grand Ballroom, The Plaza
5th Avenue at 59th St., New York City
Forum
Co-Chairmen
Honorable Theodore C. Achilles
Vice Chairman, Executive Committee
The Atlantic Council of the United States, Inc.
Joseph D. Ardleigh
President, The Research Institute of America, Inc.
Major General Alfred G. Tuckerman, USAR (Ret.)
Administrative Partner, William E. Hill & Company, Inc.
Forum
Honorary Co-Chairmen
Dr. Samuel Belkin
President, Yeshiva University
Dr. Albert H. Bowker
Chancellor, The City University of New York
Dr. Bernard E. Donovan
Superintendent of Schools, The City of New York
Dr. Harry D. Gideonse
Chancellor, New School For Social Research
Dr. Richard H. Heindel
President, Pratt Institute
Dr. R. Gordon Hoxie
Chancellor, Long island University
Rev. Leo McLaughlin, S. J.
President, Fordham University
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Committees
Bruce Jacobs, Chairman
Vice President, The Chalmers Company
Paul Bradley
President, Paul Bradley, Inc.
William H. McGaughey
Vice President, Public Relations Division
National Association of Manufacturers
Arthur R. McQuiddy
President, Deadline Club, Sigma Delta Chi
D. Thomas Miller
General Manager, North American
Television Associates
Norman Ross
President, Ross-McElroy Productions, Inc.
PROCEEDINGS and
PUBLICATIONS
Paul E. Feffer, Chairman
President, Feffer & Simons, Inc.
John C. Neff
Vice President, National Strategy
Information Center, Inc.
Robert R. Richardson
President, North American Television
Associates
LUNCHEON and
DISTINGUISHED GUESTS
Lloyd W. Stearns, Chairman
Executive Assistant to the
Executive Vice President
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
Rear Admiral John J. Bergen
USN (Ret.), Honorary Chairman
Hotel Corporation of America
Lorrin C. Mawdsley
Partner, Van Alstyne, Noel & Company
NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON
EDUCATION FOR INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
James A. Bentley
Industrial Consultant
Robert G. Burke
Partner, Chapman and Burke
William J. Casey
Senior Partner
Hall, Casey, Dickler and Howley
Howard Chase
Howard Chase Associates, Inc.
John J. Ford
The American University
J. William Hickman
Editor, THE GENERAL ELECTRIC FORUM
John R. Lehman
Partner, Lehman Brothers
Morris 1. Leibman
Senior Partner, Leibman, Williams, Bennett,
Baird & Minow
Charles S. Maddock
Clifford B. O'Hara
Past President, New York Chapter
National Defense Transportation Association
John S. Pink
President, New York Chapter
American Ordnance Association
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.
President, University of Virginia
Major General Alfred A. Tuckerman
USAR (Rot.)
Partner, William E. Hill & Company
Robert G. Welch
President, Steel Service Center Institute
Harry R. White
Executive Director
Sales Executive Club of New York
Peter C. White
Executive Secretary
Education for Freedom, Inc.
INTERPROFESSIONAL COUNCIL
FOR OVERSEAS
PUBLIC AND CIVIC AFFAIRS
William F. Leonard, Chairman
Director of Corporate Relations, OLIN
C. Stewart Baeder
Boyden International, S.A.
Gene E. Bradley
Manager
International Government Relations
General Electric Company
Jay H. Cerf
Manager, International Group
Chamber of Commerce of the United States
Richard C. Cornuelle
Executive Vice President
National Association of Manufacturers
T. J. Diviney
Director of Public Affairs
National Industrial Conference Board
William C. Doherty, Jr.
Administrator, American Institute
for Free Labor Development
Byron Engle
Director for Public Safety
Agent" for International Development
Department of State
William Henderson
Manager, International Government Relations
Mobil Oil Corporation
Arthur E. Klauser
Pfizer Corporation
Bennett E. Kline
Assistant to the Chairman
Corn Products Company
Isaac Patch
Director of Special Projects
Radio Liberty Committee
Gerald L. Steibel
Director of Foreign Affairs Research
The Research Institute of America, Inc.
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Forum Co-Sponsors
PROFESSIONAL & EDUCATIONAL
? The Center For Strategic Studies, Georgetown University
? Education For Freedom, Atlanta, Georgia
? The Institute of Fiscal and Political Education
? New York Chapter, American Ordnance Association
? New York Chapter, National Defense
Transportation Association
? New York Committee, National Strategy Seminars
? Radio Liberty Committee
? The Research Institute of America, Inc.
? Sales Executive Club of New York
MILITARY
? American Order of the French Croix de Guerre, Inc.
? Association of Ex-Members of Squadron A
? First Region, Association of the United States Army
? New York Chapter, Association of the United States Army
? The Military Order of World Wars, New York Chapter
? New York Commandery, Military Order of Foreign Wars
of the U.S.
? New York Commandery, Naval Order of the United States
? New York Naval Militia
? New York Society Military & Naval Officers World Wars
? USO of New York City
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 Morning Session
9:00-11:45
Opening Remarks: FRANK R. BARNETT
President, National Strategy Information Center, Inc.
Chairman: MAJOR GENERAL ALFRED G. TUCKERMAN, USAR (Ret.)
Administrative Partner, William E. Hill & Co., and
Former Commanding General, 77th Infantry Division
Speaker: ADMIRAL ARLEIGH A. BURKE, USN (Ret.)
Director, The Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetawn
University
"MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISE: THE LESSON OF
PEARL HARBOR"
Introduced by: Morris I. Leibman
Chairman, American Bar Association Standing Committee on
Education About Communism and Its Contrast With Liberty
Under Law
Speaker: GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER, USA (Ret.)
Former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe
"IS NATO OBSOLETE?"
Introduced by: Dr. Bernard E. Donovan
Superintendent of Schools, New York City
Speaker: AMBASSADOR THEODORE C. ACHILLES
Vice Chairman, Executive Committee, The Atlantic Council
of the United States, Inc.
"THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE"
Introduced by: Dr. Richard H. Heindel
President, Pratt Institute
Speaker: DR. RALPH L. POWELL
Professor of Far Eastern Studies, The American University
"RED CHINESE MILITARY CAPABILITY AND THE STABILITY OF ASIA"
Introduced by: Herman W. Leitzow
President, Sales Executive Club of New York
Speaker: DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
Professor of Government, Harvard University
"PRIORITIES FOR U.S. POLICY IN EUROPE"
Introduced by: William J. Casey
Chairman, Exec. Committee, International Rescue Committee
PANEL DISCUSSION OF MORNING SPEAKERS
Moderator: AMBASSADOR ACHILLES
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31gpe NJo06-8
Afternoon Session
1:15-5:00
Chairman: MAJOR GENERAL A. C. O'HARA, NYANG
Chief of Staff to the Governor of New York
Panel Discussion: "THE CHALLENGE OF SOVIET CYBERNETICS"
Introduced by: Gene E. Bradley
Manager, International Government Relations
General Electric Company
Moderator: Dr. Frank Fremont-Smith
Director, Interdisciplinary Communications, Program
The New York Academy of Sciences
Panelists: Colonel Raymond S. Sleeper, USAF
Commander, Foreign Technology Division
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Dr. John J. Ford
Professor of Cybernetics, The American University
Panel Discussion: "FORWARD STRATEGY: ESSENTIALS FOR
SECURITY AND FREEDOM"
Introduced by: Clifford B. O'Hara
Past President, New York Chapter, National Defense
Transportation Association
Moderator: Honorable Edward L. Katzenbach
Vice President and General Manager, Education Division
Raytheon Company
Panelists: William C. Doherty, Jr.
Administrator, American Institute for Free Labor Development
Richard C. Cornuelle
Exec. Vice President, National Association of Manufacturers
Introduced by: George Field
Executive Director, Freedom House
Moderator: Dr. Harry D. Gideonse
Chancellor, New School for Social Research
Panelists: Dr. Richard B. Foster
Director, Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute
Howard S. Turner
President, Turner Construction Company
Closing Remarks: Frank R. Barnett
"Conclusion and Next Steps"
ADJOURNMENT
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What is NSIC?
The National Strategy Information Center (NSIC), organized in 1962,
assists professional societies, associations and the general public to study
the relation of military power, geopolitics and communications theory to
national goals. It has organized forums on comparative ideology, eco-
nomic warfare, and propaganda analysis for such groups as the Young
Presidents Organization, the Steel Service Center Institute and the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce. For four years, it has worked with a Standing
Committee of the American Bar Association to support some 20 university
summer institutes for high school teachers on "Democracy vs. Com-
munism."
NSIC's first major book, a symposium of twenty-six authorities, is
entitled PEACE AND WAR IN THE MODERN AGE; Frank R. Barnett,
William C. Mott and John C. Neff (editors); Doubleday; 1965. Contributors
include Dean Acheson, Arleigh Burke, Allen Dulles, Dwight Eisenhower,
Dean Rusk and scholars who lecture to the War Colleges and write for
the military and foreign policy quarterlies.
In 1964, the Center distributed to high school debate teams in 30
states 7,000 gift copies of an analysis of the semantics and security
implications of "peaceful coexistence" as used in Communist journals
and Party memoranda. The 126-page abstract and commentary was pre-
pared for the American Bar Association by scholars at The Center for
Strategic Studies at Georgetown University. In 1965, NSIC distributed
5,000 copies of a panel discussion on "Detente and the National Security"
conducted before the joint student body of The Industrial College of the
Armed Forces and The National War College, and published in THE
GENERAL ELECTRIC FORUM. Other contributors to this issue of the
journal included foreign correspondent Roscoe Drummond, Under Sec-
retary of State George W. Ball and General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman,
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Since 1962 the New York Committee, National Strategy Seminars has
called upon NSIC to suggest topics and provide speakers for its annual
series of 12 lectures. These seminars, held each year since 1958 at Town
Hall in New York City, are organized by New York alumni of field courses
conducted by The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, under the
chairmanship of Frank A. Vanderlip, Jr. Because of the high quality and
intrinsic educational value of this program, the Department of Defense
has officially sponsored and certified it for reserve point credit for all
services.
Currently, NSIC is organizing national security briefings for mass
media personnel co-sponsored by universities.
NSIC is supported by grants and gifts from foundations, corporations,
individuals and associations. All grants are tax-deductible to the donor.
Officers and Directors of NSIC
FRANK R. BARNETT FRANK N. TRAGER
President Director of Studies
JOHN C. NEFF
Vice President & Treasurer WILLIAM J. CASEY
GENE E. BRADLEY
Washington Vice President ARTHUR E. KLAUSER
ROBERT G. BURKE
Secretary & Counsel MORRIS I. LEIBMAN
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Conference Participants
ACHILLES, Theodore Carter is Vice Chairman of the Ex-
ecutive Committee, The Atlantic Council of the United
States, Inc. Ambassador Achilles joined the Foreign Ser-
vice in 1931 and served in a number of the world's major
capitals. From 1947 to 1950 he was at the Department
of State, occupied primarily with negotiation of the North
Atlantic Treaty. In 1950 he was assigned to London as
Deputy Permanent Representative on the NATO Council,
to Paris as Minister in 1952, to Peru as Ambassador in
1956, and subsequently to Washington as Counselor of
the Department of State. After his retirement in 1962,
Ambassador Achilles joined The Atlantic Council, an
educational organization devoted to the development of
Atlantic unity.
ARDLEIGH, Joseph D. is President of The Research In-
stitute of America, Inc., the world's largest industry-sup-
ported business advisory organization. After early experi-
ence with the Hoover Company of North Canton, Ohio,
and with his own business, Sales Methods incorporated,
he first joined The Research Institute of America in 1939
as Membership Director. Appointed Executive Vice Pres-
ident in 1951, he was recently elected President and Chief
Executive Officer of the corporation. Mr. Ardleigh is rec-
ognized nationally as an authority in the fields of modern
sales and personnel practices.
BARNETT, Frank R. is President of the National Strategy
Information Center, Inc. A former Rhodes scholar, college
professor, and military government official in Berlin, he
is a lecturer, writer and co-editor of Peace and War in
the Modern Age (Doubleday), a sypmosium on problems
of national defense. From 1955 to 1962, Mr. Barnett was
Vice President and Director of Research of The Richard-
son Foundation, Inc. In 1958-9, he helped to initiate the
Defense Strategy Seminar for reserve officers at The
National War College and has served on the faculty of
that summer session since then. He is also the consult-
ing program manager of a Committee of the American
Bar Association which publishes analyses of Communist
tactics, strategy and objectives and encourages teacher
training in the contrasts between totalitarianism and lib-
erty-under-law.
BELKIN, Samuel is President of Yeshiva University. After
taking his Ph.D. at Brown University in 1935, Dr. Belkin
joined the staff of Yeshiva as Instructor in Greek. He rose
swiftly through academic ranks and was named Dean of
the school's Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary
in 1940, and President of Yeshiva in 1943. Under Dr.
Belkin's leadership, Yeshiva has carried out a broad aca-
demic and physical expansion program, has become a
university, and has established a liberal arts college for
women and several graduate schools in various disci-
plines. Yeshiva is today America's oldest and largest
university under Jewish auspices.
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BOWKER, Albert Hosmer is Chancellor of The City Uni-
versity of New York. He began his professional career at
MIT in 1941. After wartime service with the government,
Dr. Bowker joined the staff of Stanford University in 1947,
and was appointed Director of Applied Mathematics and
Statistics Laboratories in 1951, Professor of Mathematics
and Statistics in 1953, and Dean of the University's Grad-
uate Division in 1958. Dr. Bowker assumed his present
post in 1963. One of this country's leading mathemati-
cians, he has published numerous books and papers on
mathematical statistics.
BURKE, Admiral Arleigh A., USN (Retired), is Director of
The Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University.
He was graduated from Annapolis in 1923, and served
with great distinction in a variety of posts during his
forty-two year naval career. Admiral Burke was an out-
standing combat commander during World War II and the
Korean War. For several months he was assigned as a
member of the United Nations Truce Delegation to nego-
tiate with the Communists for a military armistice in
Korea. He was named Chief of Naval Operations in 1955
and served in this post until his retirement in 1961.
CORNUELLE, Richard C. is Executive Vice President for
Program Development, National Association of Manu-
facturers. Prior to joining NAM in 1966, he served with
a number of foundations, most recently with the Founda-
tion for Voluntary Welfare, which he established to de-
velop, test, and launch new public service programs by
non-governmental agencies. Before this, he was asso-
ciated with Princeton Panel, Inc., the William Volker Fund,
the Small Business Economic Foundation, and the Na-
tional Industrial Conference Board. Mr. Cornuelle was
also founding director of United Student Aid Funds, Inc.
He is author of Reclaiming the American Dream.
DOHERTY, William C., Jr. is Administrator of the Amer-
ican Institute for Free Labor Development. He has devoted
his career to the labor union movement, and has had
especially rich experience in Latin America. Mr. Doherty
has held important posts with the International Confedera-
tion of Free Trade Unions and with the Postal, Telegraph
and Telephone International. He joined the American In-
stitute for Free Labor Development in 1962, and is now
in charge of its program of trade union education and
labor social projects.
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PHOTO,
NOT
AVAILABLE
AT
PRESS
TIME
DONOVAN, Bernard E. is Superintendent of Schools of
the City of New York. He has served in the New York
City school system since 1930, first as a teacher, then as
an administrator in successively more responsible posi-
tions. He was appointed to his present post in 1965. Dr.
Donovan is a Commander in the Naval Reserve, and has
taken a leading part in a wide variety of civic activities.
FORD, John J. is Professor of Cybernetics at The Amer-
ican University. Dr. Ford is also Executive Director of the
American Society for Cybernetics.
FOSTER, Richard B. is Director of the Strategic Studies
Center at the Stanford Research Institute. The Center is
engaged in analyzing and evaluating United States mili-
tary policies, strategies, and programs. Before joining the
Stanford Research Institute in 1953, Mr. Foster was asso-
ciated with Marquardt Aircraft, and was also a partner
in the management consulting firm of Foster and Derian.
He has served in various government agencies, and was
recently director of the strategic, economic, and cost
studies of the Department of Army Nike-X Threat Analysis
Study.
FREMONT-SMITH, Frank, M.D., is Director of the Inter-
disciplinary Communications Program of the New York
Academy of Sciences. A graduate of Harvard Medical
School, his early career was devoted to research and
teaching there and at nearby hospitals. In 1936 Dr.
Fremont-Smith joined the Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation as
its Medical Director. In this post, which he held until 1960,
Dr. Fremont-Smith did outstanding work on the theory of
interpersonal communication techniques. After retirement,
he served four years as Director of the Interdisciplinary
Conference Program of the American Institute of Bio-
logical Sciences prior to accepting his present post.
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GIDEONSE, Harry D., Chancellor of the New School for
Social Research, is one of this country's most distin-
guished educators. After a teaching career at Columbia,
Rutgers, Chicago, and elsewhere, Dr. Gideonse was
named President of Brooklyn College of The City Univer-
sity of New York in 1939. He retired from Brooklyn in
1966, and has recently become Chancellor of the New
School. He has written and lectured widely on various
problems and public policy.
GRUENTHER, General Alfred M., USA (Retired), was grad-
uated from West Point in 1918. After a variety of peace-
time assignments during the interwar years, he achieved
an outstanding record in World War II, notably as General
Eisenhower's Deputy Chief of Staff in London, and later
as General Clark's Chief of Staff in Africa and Italy. In
the postwar years, he has served as Deputy Chief of Staff
for Plans, Department of Army; Chief of Staff at SHAPE,
Paris; and, during the years 1953-1956, as Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe. After his retirement, he became
President of the American Red Cross, 1957-1964.
HEINDEL, Richard Heathcote is President of Pratt Insti-
tute. During a long and distinguished career, Dr. Heindel
has held important educational posts with a number of
colleges and universities, foundations, and government
agencies. From 1950 to 1954, he was Deputy Director,
Staff, United States National Commission for UNESCO,
Department of State. In 1954 he became Dean of the Col-
lege of Arts and Sciences at the University of Buffalo,
and Vice Chancellor of the university two years later. He
was named President of Wagner College in 1958, and
appointed President of Pratt Institute in 1961.
HOXIE, R. Gordon is Chancellor of Long Island University
and President of C. W. Post College of Long Island Uni-
versity. A teacher of American history, geopolitics, and
political science, Dr. Hoxie has taught or lectured at a
number of colleges and universities. As a reserve Air
Force Colonel, he has attended the Defense Strategy Sem-
inar of The National War College. In 1954 he became Dean
of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at Long Island
University. He was appointed Dean of C. W. Post C9Ilege
in 1955 and Provost in 1960. Two years later he was
named Vice President of the university as well. He be-
came President of C. W. Post College in 1962, and con-
currently Chancellor of Long Island University in 1964.
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KATZENBACH, Edward L. is Vice President and General
Manager of the Education Division of Raytheon Company.
Before joining Raytheon this year, Dr. Katzenbach was
associated with the American Council on Education, where
he directed studies on college and university budgeting,
and on the educational needs of business and industry.
For the preceding three and a half years, he was Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Education. From 1955
to 1959 he served as Associate Director and then as
Director of the Defense Studies Program at Harvard Uni-
versity. Dr. Katzenbach served during World War it and
the Korean War, and is a Colonel in the Marine Corps
Reserve.
KISSINGER, Henry A. is Professor of Government at Har-
vard University and a staff member of its Center for
International Affairs. One of this country's most thought-
ful and prolific commentators on foreign policy, his books
include Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy and The
Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Al-
liance. He is a frequent contributor to "Foreign Affairs."
Dr. Kissinger has served frequently as a consultant to
various government agencies, including the Department
of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and
the National Security Council. He is Director of the De-
fense Studies Program at Harvard.
McLAUGHLIN, Rev. Leo, S. J., is President of Fordham
University. Ordained a priest in 1945, he has had a dis-
tinguished career in Catholic higher education. In 1950
he was assigned to Fordham University as Director of
Station WFUV-FM. Three years later he was named Dean
of Fordham College, and in 1959 he became Dean of
Saint Peter's College in Jersey City. He was made Pres-
ident of Saint Peter's in May 1965, and moved to his
present post several months later.
O'HARA, Major General A. C., NYANG, is Chief of Staff to
the Governor and Commanding General of the New York
Army National Guard, which posts he has held since 1959.
General O'Hara was an outstanding company and battal-
ion commander in the Pacific Theatre in World War II,
where he planned and led the first night attack of U.S.
forces on Okinawa. After the war he served in staff and
command positions in the 27th Infantry Division, becom-
ing Commanding General in 1957. As Chief of Staff to the
Governor he directs the activities of 35,000 troops of the
State Military Forces.
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POWELL, Ralph L. is Professor of Far Eastern Studies at
the School of International Service, The American Uni-
versity. He has also taught at Princeton University and
The National War College; and was Counselor for Public
Affairs and Director of USIS at the United States Embassy
in Taipei, 1956-1958. Dr. Powell is author of The Rise of
Chinese Military Power 1895-1912 and Politico-Military
Relationships in Communist China. He is also a consultant
to the Department of State.
SLEEPER, Colonel Raymond S., USAF, has command of
the Foreign Technology Division of the Air Force Systems
Command. A 1940 graduate of West Point, he has also
studied at Harvard University and the Air War College.
He served in the Pacific Theater during World War II, and
subsequently held a variety of command and staff posts
of increasing responsibility. In 1955 he was named Com-
mander of the 7th Bomb Wing, H (B-36), and two years
later was assigned to CINCPAC as Chief of War Plans.
He was first posted to the Air Force Systems Command
in 1960, and assumed his present command this year.
TUCKERMAN, Major General Alfred Girard, USAR (Retired)
is Administrative Partner in the management consulting
firm of William E. Hill & Company, Inc., with which he has
been associated since 1954. Prior to joining this firm, Gen.
Tuckerman had extensive experience in the import-export
business and in commercial banking. In addition to active
duty throughout World War II in the Pacific Theater, Gen-
eral Tuckerman served in the National Guard and Reserve
for twenty-nine years. He retired in October 1957 as Com-
manding General of the 77th Infantry Division.
TURNER, Howard Sinclaiir is President of Turner Con-
struction Company, one of the world's largest engineering
firms. His business career began with E. I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., and he has also served with Pittsburgh
Consolidation Coal Co., and Jones & Laughlin Steel Cor-
poration. Dr. Turner has frequently served various govern-
ment agencies as an advisor on technical and research
problems. He became President of Turner Construction
Company in 1965.
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