ISRAEL AND THE BOMB: [ ] PROVOKED A STO[ ]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400060011-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 2, 1978
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R0004000V011-3
FEARED f ' i--; H ,. S N
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By John Flalka
Washington Star Staff Writer
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THE WASHINGTON STAR (Green Line) C ( - `' 2- 4
March 1978 C, XA NIkJ
War rages on adequacy of nuclear safegu
employees in the nuclear safeguards
area, begins in 1975 with James Con-;
ran, an intense, 37-year-old nuclear
engineer who was given the mission
to put together a history of the na-
tion's efforts to protect nuclear
materials since the Atoms for Peace
program of 1954 allowed it to be
placed in private hands. - -
As Conran soon discovered, this
was not easy. The NRC was formed
in 1975 by Congress to separate what
many people believed to be an inher-
ent conflict of interest in the old
Atomic Energy Commission, which
-housed the efforts to regulate and
promote nuclear power under the
same organizational roof.
Most of old AEC, including the
promotional end, was spun off into
another agency, the Energy Re-.
search and Development Administra-
tion, and it soon became clear that
ERDA officials considered the NRC
to be an upstart agency, one that
could not be trusted with all the se-
crets. (ERDA has since been merged
-; into the Department of Energy.)
IN HIS RESEARCH among the old
AEC records at ERDA in October
1975, Conran discovered one file was
missing.
;? The file involved a company called.
-Nuclear Materials and Eauioment
Corp., of Apollo. Pa., and its presi
dent, a former AEC chemist named
"' Zalman M. Shapiro. It was so secret
s that it was kept apart from the other
classified files. Conran was nqt al-
lowed to see it. ? , ..:
He 'protested the -refusal to NRC's
top safeguards official; then Kenneth
R. Chapman, who called Edward B.
Giller, one of ERDA's top intelli-.
pence officials.
Giller, a former Air Force major
general, said Conran had `.'no need to
know" the information, adding thaw'
ERDA would supply it if ChaPmdft
Cu an a former? Air
m
f Conran decided to go further, and-
In In December he confided in Edward.
Mason, then one of the NRC's five
commissioners, his worries about the
NUMEC files. -.'.:% -,-: -- -,
Mason, in turn, was concerned !
about what he called the "Bonnie and l
In late 1975 a young analyst from
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
a man who had a top security clear-
ance, was told that he had "no need
to know" about what may be. the
most serious nuclear safeguards case
the United States has ever faced..
The incident proved to be the spark
that eventually ignited a secret but
sizable war between two factions in
the community of intelligence and
energy officials "with,. the exotic and
f sensitive assignment.. of preventing
any material for an: atomic bomb
from falling into the hands of terror-
1_ ists or a non-nuclear Hower.:.- -_ . -.-
It was a war between the. believers,
and the skeptics, a war that alarmed
the "Secret Seven" and two presi-
dents, a war that cast doubt on the
value of "the Bonnie and Clyde Syn-
drome," a war that had some of the
nation's most respected energy offi-
cials conspiring to make statements
designed to mystify the press and
confuse Congress.
It was a conflict that eventually led
to the disclosures that the CIA had
evidence both that Israel had the
atomic bomb by 1968 and that the
bomb material may have been di
,verted from a U.S. plant.. . . .
It was a collision - between execu
'tive branch and Congress that re-
sulted in thee.: admission n that. two-
federal agencies had misled Con-
press with-an: optimistic "party:
line."
ALL OF THIS surfaced this "week
in three heavily censored documents
released by' the NRC? entitled "In-
-quiry Into the Testimony of the
Executive Director For Operations."
Collectively, they offer an unprece-
dented public view of the bureauc-
racy that is supposed to prevent nu-
clear proliferation..
The story., drawn' from NRC
investigators' interviews with 31 past
,.or present, government officials and.,
Clyde syndrome, which he said
tended. to dominate U.S. safeguards,
policy. It was the assumption that
and diversion-of nuclear- material.
was an assault- on a facility by
heavily armed terrorists,".:: : ; r. t ?:_
Mason, an engineer, felt a more
probable diversion threat 'was one
that would go through ."the back,
he evidently,- had problems convinc
- ing former military people of that-.- : 4.-
HE TOLD William A.- Anders, the .
former astronaut who then served as
the NRC's chairman, that if there
was CIA material about NUMEC, as
Conran suspected, the NRC was enti
tled t o a briefing.. --6 -
So it was that in February 1976, the.
CIA's top-ranking expert in techno-
logical matters. Carl Duckett, came
to the NRC to tell them what the CIA .
knew about the case. -
Because of the potential for? se--.1
curity leaks,, NRC confines matters,
known as the "Secret Seven. The;
group then included Anders and the-
with. Chapman and Carl. Builder,,
enlarged to include a-few. other.,
had a variety-of evidence pointing to!_
the agency had: formed a:
and that
.
"strong opinion, " based on. circum-
insisted. ap
Force general, declined
[Shapiro. has called this story ?_'ridic
IAa.4 L.Vauv.--v..- -_---,_T
reported a`loss': of 20Z pounds of"
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