SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400130063-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 63
• Publication Date: July 28, 1964
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 200J
8@?~l t,- 88-013.1;5RQ0,0400,3->
JUL 2 8 1964
t
ba
"Cu
Sanctions gains
The sanctions voted against Castro Cuba
;represent the strongest action so far by the
Organization of 'American States, but their
strength lies in imponderables.
For example, the sanction by the American
'.republics against trade with Cuba (excepting
food and medicines) is not likely to have any
great effect. Chile, Uruguay and Mexico are
the only republics trading with Cuba, and_?.
their trade of $15,200,000 is largely in food-
stuffs.
The outright warning to Fidel Castro that
further efforts at intervention and subver-
sion would allow the republics, individually
or collectively, to use armed force in self-
defense is not the "hunting license" against
"Cuba that some diplomats predict it will be.;';
Any of the republics could use armed force?-
now if threatened with Castro aggression.. fi
Venezuela naturally fought back against Gas-
tro subversion though it did not choose to go .
to war with Cuba.
A good -deal depends on.how Castro him
self accepts this warning. If he decides to''!,
halt his export of revolution, the result may.,.'
be a new approach to Cuba by the OAS: It
reserves the right to discontinue the sane
tions. But Castro's first reaction is defiant;,
and we doubt that any republic expects him.i
to become more peaceable very quickly.
What seems more likely is a weakening of
the popular basis for Castro-inspired subver-
sion. The Cuban dictator has been branded
collectively as an aggressor and an interven- ; .
tionist. He no longer seems the liberator or
the emancipator to Latin Americans, except
perhaps to his devoted Marxist following.,;
His loss of face and popularity has been
gradual, owing more to his own actions than
to those of the OAS, but sanctions signed on
the eleventh anniversary of his 26th of July
Movement reduce the cause for celebration
in Havana.
Since Castro may prove to be his own
worst enemy, when it comes to exporting
revolution, the United States was wise riot
to force upon the OAS its proposal for collec-,
tive air, land and sea surveillance of Cuba. 1
As Secretary of State Rusk said, such- sur
veillance goes on anyway; it would have!' been a mistake for the United States to try
to dictate harsher terms than the Latin states
were willing to accept.
Mexico's position, along with that of Chile,,'
:remains puzzling. For Mexico, Vincente San-
chez Gavito said that Cuban activities against
Venezuela did not demonstrate a violation of
the litter's territorial integrity or political in-
dependence. It is true that Castro did not
invade Venezuela, but his forces there cer-,
tainly threatened ? the independence of the
government and of the people who elected it.
Castro subversion represents a different
kind of intervention than the use of troops by
.'.
traditional colonialism, but it is outright in.
terven ' 1 es t '
Approved For RelpppA
~91;e 00400130063-8
i lective action of the republics.
That is the
4 answer of the sanctions.