FORMER CIA ANALYST WARNS OF SOVIET SALT II DECEPTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350020-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: November 19, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88-01315R000q,D035002~0-1
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SOVIET AEROSPACE
19 NOvember 1979
FORMER CIA ANALYST WARNS OF SOVIET SALT II DECEPTION.
Says SS 18 Capability Can Be 'Expanded Under Treaty
A former analyst of Soviet strategic military affairs in the Central Intelligence Agency
Wednesday said the Soviet Union can deceptively test the SS-18's capability to carry more
than 10 warheads under the SALT II Treaty, as part of an overall Soviet program of
concealment and physical camouflage involving "all their strategic forces. "
David S. Sullivan, a military affairs assistant to Sen. Gordon Humphrey (R-N. H. ),
said the Soviets can, by testing various payload combinations on different flight tests,
develop the capability to deploy more than the 10 M1RV warheads allowed under SALT 11.
The Soviet late last year tested a 12-14 payload dispensing capability with the SS-18
post-boost vehicle. And, on April 26, an encoded overland flight of the SS-18 demon-
strated the capability to dispense 20 packages from the post-boost vehicle.
-Sullivan, at a news conference held by the Coalition for Peace Through Strength,
stressing that his analysis is based upon "a highly classified CIA study, " warned that as
a result of Soviet negotiating deception in SALT II, Soviet strategic programs are being
.developed and "will soon be tested using physical.camouflage and telemetry encryption
to conceal their vital characteristics.
"If the past is any guide to the future," Sullivan continued, "it will take the U.S. at
least 5 years 'to discover that we have again been deceived by tale Soviets in SALT II;
just as it took us 5 years to belatedly discover that we had been deceived in SALT I. "
SALT 1 Deception
The former CIA analyst said the Soviets in 1972 negotiated deceptively "on all of the
important issues of SALT I in order to allow their new ICBM and SLBM programs to
escape constraint under SALT I. "' Sullivan cited:
Soviet "false statements" about the size of their new large, heavy SS-19 ICBM;
"false statements" that the SS-19 could be banned, "despite their then secret plans to
deploy it widely;" repeated Soviet "false statements" that the U. S. already knew about
the characteristics of new Soviet ICBMs;
* Soviet "false claim" to having, 48 submarines operational or under construction
in May 1972, carrying 768 SLBMs (Sullivan says Soviets now have 65 "countable" SLBM
subs in violation of SALT I's 62-sub limit);
Soviet "falacious" geographical asymmetry argument allowing them a huge
superiority over the U. S. in SLBMs;
* "False Soviet pledge" not to build mobile ICBMs, and the false Soviet statement
that they did not have an ongoing mobile ICBM program (Sullivan says the Soviets now
have a stockpile of over 100 mobile ICBMs);
"False Soviet claim" that SALT I avoided a new arms race and contained no
Soviet unilateral advantages;
"The massive, expanding Soviet nationwide camouflage, concealment, and
deception program involving all their strategic forces. This physical camouflage and
'deception was harnessed to negotiating deception, and its expansion during the years
of SALT I represented a circumvention of SALT I's ban on deliberate concealment."
Approved For Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350020-1