ISSUE AND DEBATE OUTLOOK ON DEPLOYING OF THE MX MOBILE MISSILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350045-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: October 15, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

ON F.G
,
pproved For Res
mi~
issue and Debate
Outlook on Deploying of the MX Mobile Missile
By RICHARD BURT
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Oct. 14 -- In early
September, President Carter made
what many military and foreign policy
officials believe was the most impor-
tant decision affecting American
strategic nuclear forces in a decade.
He approved a Defense Department
proposal to build a force of 200 mobile
intercontinental missiles, known as the
MX, that would be placed aboard a
fleet of huge launcher vehicles de-
signed to roam around the American
Southwest.
The decision to endorse the Penta-
on's $33 billion plan was not an easy
one, and White House aides acknowl-
edge that, before Mr. Carter's action,
the proposal for the mobile missile sys-
tem had aroused an intense, year-long
controversy within the Administration.
bir. Carter's primary aim in finally ap-
proving the MX, officials report, was to
lessen the possibility that the Soviet
Union, in the coming decade, could
achieve the ability to destroy American
land-based missiles in a "first-strike"
nuclear attack.
However, it is clear that Mr. Carter's
decision was also guided by a desire to,
win the support} of Senate conserva-
tives for the proposed strategic arms _
treaty with Moscow.
While the debate within the Adminis-
tration over whether to proceed has
come to an end, a wider controversy,
involving the Congress and many non-
Governmental experts on strategic
issues, is only now getting under way.
But pressures are building for Mr. Car-
ter to reverse or modify his September
decision.
Some critics of the MX contend that
the Administration's plan for the mis-
sile is so costly and complex that it will
never be built. Other opponents are
worried that if the MX is deployed, it
could undermine the stability of the
American-Soviet nuclear balance. So-
far, the Administration has responded
to these criticisms by stressing that it
is committed to moving ahead with its
existing plan for the weapon.
The Background
In addition to long-range bombers
and submarine-launched missiles, the
United States, since the 1960's, has de-
ployed a force of 1,054 land-based rock-
ets in concrete underground silos.
While the rockets have remained im-
pervious to attack for 15 years, mili-
tary analysts have continually worried
that Moscow's deployment of highly ac-
curate missiles could alter this. There
is now a consensus in-military circles-
that a new generation of missiles being
introduced by the Soviet Union will
give Moscow the ability to threaten
American land-based missiles with de-
struction in the early 1980's.
In recent years, strategic experts
have debated a number of alternatives
for coping with the vulnerability of
land-based missiles. Proponents of
arms control suggest that the United
States should abandon land-based rock-
ets and place more reliance on bomb-
ers and strategic submarines. 'T'his
course has been resisted, however, by
the Air Force and by many Pentagon
civilians who argue that American
bombers and submarines could also be-
come vulnerable at ? some point to
Soviet attack.
Instead, the Air Force late last year
asked Mr. Carter to approve a plan for
protecting land-based missiles from a
Soviet strike by shunting them among
thousands of empty silos. The Air
Force also urged the White House to au-
thorize development of a new missile,
the MX, that, for the first time, would
give Washington the ability to threaten
large numbers of Soviet land-based
rockets.
In late May, Mr. Carter approved the
Air Force's request for 200 MX mis.
siles, each with 10 highly accurate war-
heads. But he objected to the idea of
hiding the missiles among empty silos
because he feared that it would compli-
cate the monitoring of future arms con-
trol accords.
- Finally, in September, Mr. Carter
approved a modified approach to bas-
ing the missiles, known as the "race
track." In this plan, each of the 200 new
missiles would be hauled around sepa-
rate circular roadways to be built in
southern Nevada and Utah. In the
event of a Soviet attack, the large vehi-
cles carrying the missiles could be
driven into any one of 23 concrete shel-
ters on each roadway and launched. In
this way, it is contended, Moscow
would be able to count but not precisely
locate each of the MX missiles. -
For Revising Decision
Critics of the MX "race track" con-
tend tend that the proposed system will be
far too expensive and is unlikely to pro-
vide the degree of protection for Ameri-
can missiles desired by the Air Force.
Some opponents also believe that con-
struction of the missile roadways will
pose serious environmental problems
in the Southwest.
For example, Sidney Drell, a Stan-
ford University scientist who has ad-
several administrations on 1
vised 1
strategic matters, recently called the
Air Force's proposed basing system a
"Rube Goldberg scheme." At a meet-
ing of the Arms Control Association, a
private, prodisarmament group in
Washington, ::Mr. Drell argued that
Moscow could threaten the MX in the
coming decade by simply adding war-
'heads to existing missiles so that it
could attack every shelter around each
MX "race trai;k."
Rather than deploying the "race
track," Mr. Drell and several other ex-
perts have suggested that MX missile
be put on a new generation of small
submarines that would patrol in waters
off the country's East and West Coasts.
Unlike the Navy's existing, long-range
missile submarines, the coastal vessels
would not be nuclear-powered and, ac- i
cording to Mr. Drell, they would be cheaper and cause less environmental
disruption than the land-based "race
track."
Another alternative would be for the
United States to protect its existing
force of land-based rockets by deploy-
ing anti-ballistic-missiles weapons, or
ABM's. Although Moscow and Wash-
ington in 1972 agreed to severe limits on
antimissile weapons, Steven P. Rosen,
a researcher at Harvard University,.
has said that the treaty should be'
amended to allow both parties to de-'
fend their existing rocket forces with.
ABM's.
A third group of critics is not opposed
to the "race track" basing design, but-
believes that the missile itself is much
too lethal. These experts argue that by
giving the United States the ability to
destroy Soviet missiles, Moscow would
be inevitably led to build a mobile sys-,
tern of its own, a step that would pose'
grave obstacles for Washington in veri-
fying new arms agreements. .
Against Revising Decision
Proponents of the Administration's')
"race track" proposal maintain that it
Approved For Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88-01315R001MWaped areas of Utah and;
g n aides contend that a: }
CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350045-4
new fleet of coastal submarines would
be far more damaging to the environ
.,,ter
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MX advocates argue that a new fleet,_
would also be more vulnerable than the
"race track." They contend that com-
munications with the submarines could;,]
lx, disrupted and that Moscow, by deco
r,atnng nuclear explosions in coastal,
?. acera, could destroy most small mis-
sile boats.
While many Pentagon aides favor a
revival of the country's antimissile pro-
gram, most believe that this is not?
politically feasible in the near future..
Deploying ABM's to defend land-based.
missiles would require new negotia
tions with Moscow and-this step, de-
fense aides indicate, would probably be:
resisted by the Soviet Government as,
well as arm control advocates in the
American Government.
MX proponents concede that less `
costly and elaborate schemes exist for`
basing a mobile missile than the "race-
track." But they insist that all of these:
alternatives would. create verification-
difficulties for arms control. By spend-`
ing extra money to insure that Moscow
would be able to count American mis-
siles, it is suggested that Washington is
setting an example that the Soviet
Union might follow if and when it de--~
cides to deploy a mobile rocket of its
own.
The Outlook
Although the Administration is ask-
ing Congress this year for more than $1.
billion to begin work on the MX, the.
first of the 200 missiles would not be de-
j
ployed until 1988. Thus, there is plenty
time for the MX decision to be thor-
oughly examined and perhaps altered. 4'
However, the Administration is un-
likely to review its plans for the NIX in
the near future. MYIr. Carter urgently
needs the support of conservatives on
Capitol Hill for the arms treaty with
Moscow and many promilitary sena-
tors are skeptical of Mr. Carter's com-
mitment to proceeding with the MX. As
a result, any sign that the Administra-
tion was reassessing-its MX decision
would be viewed by suspicious senators
as a move to cancel the project.
In the longer term? several develop-
ments could lead Mr. Carter or a new
President to reverse the MX decision.
Technical problems in building the sys-
tem would lead to excess costs that, in
turn, could prompt Congress to cancel .
the weapon. Alternatively, Moscow, in
future arms talks, might agree to limit
its ability to threaten existing Ameri-
can missiles, making the MX program
.unnecessary.
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