TIME TO RATIFY SALT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350048-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: October 13, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

r ~l ?4ppr-veadiFor Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350043- .
C 1 PAGE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
13 October 1979
Time to ratify SALT
The Senate Intelligence Committee
has reported SALT II will make it easi-
er for the United States to find out what
the Soviets are up to than would be the
case if the Senate rejects the treaty.
The report is another forceful argument
for speedy ratification.
Knowledge of the size and capability
of the Soviet strategic. arsenal is critical
to U.S. defense planning. Take- for ex-
ample the mobile missile system de-
signed to respond to concerns that in a
few years U.S. land-based ballistic mis-
siles would be theoretically vulnerable
to a Soviet first strike.
The idea of the mobile system is to
increase the number of targets the Sovi-
ets would have to destroy before they.
could be confident they had demolished
the main part of the U.S. land-based
missile fleet. If there are many more
targets than the Soviets have warheads
to bit, a first, strike would not be deci-
sive. The U.S.. would still be able to
render a devastating counterstrike.
But the system now favored by the
administration, costly as it is, would be
useless if the U.S. were not sure wheth-
er the Soviets had increased the number
of their warheads so as to be able to
strike all the new targets.
SALT H's prohibition of measures of
"deliberate concealment" is a useful de-
vice for making sure the Soviets are
living up to their end of the bargain and
for determining, through vigilance, the
true size of their arsenal. We cannot
afford, with or without SALT II, to rely
solely on Soviet assurances. We must be
able to see for ourselves. And the "de-
liberate concealment" ban makes it pos-
sible for the United States to insist that
the Soviets cease and, explain any ques-
tionable or ambiguous behavior that
could be camouflaging a secret buildup.
The Senate committee report gives
due weight to the importance of knowing
what the Soviets have in the way of
strategic arms. This point cannot be ov-
erstated. It shapes the whole U.S.. de-
fense strategy.
The -Carter administration plan for
mobile missiles, for for example, was de-
signed not only' to comply with. the
SALT' II provisions against concealment.-.
The goal of the elaborate technological
exercise. of creating.and evaluating vari
ous alternative plans was to produce a
mobile missile system which, if the So-
viets deployed a similar one, would not
make it possible for them to increase
their nuclear arsenal secretly. The pre-
cariou& stability .of the nuclear age de-
pends not only on an - even balance of
strategic strength but also upon mutual
confidence that the balance exists.
The Senate Intelligence Committee re-
port is the last piece of information
needed by the Senate in making its deci-
sion on SALT II. Any further delays are
unnecessary. The debate has been tho-
rough and vigorous [though sometimes;
as during the silliness over Soviet troops
in Cuba, well off the point]. The argu-
ment has gone decisively in favor of
ratification. No real issues remain in
doubt. The Senate should move quickly
to ratify the treaty.
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350048-1