EMPHASIS ON VERIFICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350055-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: October 11, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

,.RTICLE .'E.D ~IF, C: ~c C
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3.1 0004003500
ut~ PAGE Bred For ReI~se WUMI 12 :-UTAI 1
11 October IQ70 _.
emphasis on verification
The well-laundered public version of the Sen
ate Intelligence Committee's secret, report on
U.S. capacity to "monitor" the SALT II accord is a
blandly ambiguous document, whose guarded
phrases are delicately calculated to bridge
rather than aggravate disputes.
Pro-SALT senators will doubtless draw comfort .. fication has been all but washed out as an issue
from the committee's findings that "in most on which final judgment of the treaty will be
cases, monitoring requirements were given high : based."
priority during treaty negotiations"; that "under - This is a curious reading, in view of the com-
current Soviet practices, most counting provi- mittee's explicit statement (page 8, paragraph 2)
sions [i.e., of launch vehicles] can.be monitored that "the -capability to determine whether the
with high.. or moderate: confidence,"' as with Soviets had violated the SALT" II agreement
slightly. less confidence may be "qualitative limi- 4.. would be of little consequence? if' at the same
tations oirrweapons-'systems",`and; finally, that time the U.S. did "not. have the will and determi-
.. the treaty on the- whole "enhances the ability of nation to pursue an aggressive verification
(its) limitations'" In fact, the burden of the. Intelligence Commit-
Anti-SALT senators, however, are not denied" tee report of October 5 -- at least as we read it --
cautionary conclusions. There is, the admission is that "aggressive" verification (the will to.
that certain loopholes: in the first SALT accord press any suspicion of cheating or exploitation
allowed the Soviets to.spring some. unanticipated of the treaty terms before the Consultative Com-
and unpleasant "surprises," such as the emplace- mission) is as essential to the nation's security as
ment of. the larger SS-19 missiles in enlarged SS- merely counting or measuring .launch vehicles.
11 silos, in circumvention of "safeguards the U.S. anu missues. . ,; . ;
thought 11 had obtained in SAL,A I. Anothe ZIu1- ,- If the intelligence, agencies are too bureau-
prise?the committee reminds. us, was that "the cratic to assemble and, report suspicions
range of. the SS-N-8 missile on the Delta class promptly and fully to the president and others-:
Soviet :. submarine was greater than expected," who need to know; or if the evaluation of intelli
and thus enlarged concessions given the Soviets Bence data is not constantly checked by politi?-
under., a different estimate. And there is the dis- cally independent assessors, as the committee
turbing`admission that "intelligence of possible suggests it should be; or if the president himself,
-Soviet violation of the (SALT I) treaty was, in and the National Security Council are too keen"
some cases, and for a time, withheld from execu- to vindicate their judgment that the treaty is. a
rive branch officials who had a need for such good bet to make a potentially disruptive issue of
information." suspected violations, then not even the most so-
The.report, then, is a mixed one, faintly, tilting phisticated monitoring: devices will count fore
-
and that"i der the pending treaty they would 'Verification,. in short, reinainsa political act i,
easier to discharge j.:z .And like all political acts it requires judgmen
But. beyond that, even if serves to allay unrest - , choice, wisdom and the courage to rock the boat.
about monitoring capability; the report raises Verification,. in fact, is not 'washed up" as ax
understated but important questions about, our determinative issue in treaty ratification. The,;
determination and ability to exploit that capabil- report gives it renewed - and entirely appro=,
Some of our colleagues, we are intrigued to
see, soft-pedal that point. They suggest, remark-
ably, that the committee not only "does not pro-
nounce on verification(,) it does not even men-
tion the word," and that "the tone of the debate
about the new report . ... indicate(s) that veri?
Approved For. Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350055-3