AN ARMS CONTROL TREATY BUILT ON AMERICAN ILLUSIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350060-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: October 7, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

N I A'GE
d For ReleaseTMOPAG
7 October 7
*A8-O1315ROQ0
.~i ~lrmsControlTreaty
AthArkan'lliusio~s
B !j Ttiehard Perle
HAVING COME to office with virtually no experi-
ence in foreign affairs, President-elect Carter drew
around him a small circle of senior officials whose faith in
the efficacy of arms control is exceeded only by their ab-
horrence of military power and their dread. of confronta-
tion with the Soviet Union.
So the acquiescence last week-m- a. Cuban status quo
declared only days ago to be unacceptable is wholly in.
keeping with the animating spirit of an administration
which describes the U.S.-Soviet relationship as one of
"cooperation and competition" but cannot tellthe differ-
ence between them. .; ,;.
The fact-is that' since 1972, but especially since the
Carter administration took office, the United States has
been faced with unceasing Soviet. global adventure. ac-
companied,. despite the "limitations" of. -the. SALT I
agreement, by a massive buildup of Russian theater and
strategic air, ground and naval forces. .
In Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iran,
Vietnam and Yemen, among the Russian-trained terror-
ists of the PLO or the expeditionary forces mounted
from Cuba, the Soviet Union, our partner in detente. has
been fomenting turmoil, inciting bloodshed and fueling
In response, the Carter - administration' (which was
helped. to power by the impression that it would under-
stand Soviet foreign policy better than. President Ford
was- thought to understand the Polish political system)
has chosen to take arms control against this sea of tro-
ubles:
? The Soviets and their Cuban proxies have intervened
militarily and politically throughout they troubled Third
World; exploiting ethnic and racial tensions and the fra .
gility of new nations and weak governments.- The admin-
istration responded by initiating negotiations with
Moscow, proposing that we limit the sale, of arms to our
respective friends and allies - an unverifiable and unen-
forceable proposal which : would threaten the' supply of'.'
essential. arms to our friends at precisely the moment
that our friends are being threatened..
The Soviets are engaged in a
broad effort to encircle the oil fields
of the Persian Gulf, fomenting trou-
ble in Iran, intervening in Ethiopia,
inciting war in Yemen.:._ ..:;
The Carter administration re-
sponse: proposals to freeze and then
reduce the U.S.-and Soviet-military
presence. in the Indian Ocean. If ac-
cepted, ' thew U.S proposalr would
leave the Soviets, whose- air forces
are within easy range of, the Indian
Ocean and the Gulf, in a command-
In recent years,-the Soviets have
deployed no fewer than- four new
theater nuclear missiles,! two- new
calibers of nuclear artillery and sev-
eral new nuclear-capable aircraft.
Partially to redress- the. resulting
theater imbalance in Europe, the
United States developed a family of
"neutron" weapons whose destruc-
tive effects can. be better confined to
the battlefield, thus sparing nearby
civilians. When the- Soviets mounted
a menacing political and propaganda
campaign against our deploying
these less indiscriminate weapons,
the Carter administration.response>:
was to defer their production while
ciprocal restraint.:' Now,,, after two
more years.of,Soviet military expan
straint, the_ neutron weapon deploy;
ment remains'`deferred,,;probably.
? While the Soviets continue to
conduct.-,,a massive nuclear: testing,;;
program several times moreexten-
sivethan ours and some ofitalmost`
certainly in violation- of the_: current
threshhold testing tireaty,''thie.Carter,
a comprehensive;' innverifiable ban '
on even .very low yield nuclear tests;
and it `has done thiswhile sharply';
reducing the US testing program
COL,r~S1~~~~
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350060-7
 . So cardinal is it to the administra-
tion's outlo@&filR
tiply many times these examples of
its faith, unsupported by reason or
experience, that the. Soviet-threat to,
our security (and that of our,.alliies)
is best - moderated by negotiating
arms control agreements. It is a faith
that flows easily from the premise,,
intoned as a conclusion by Paul
Warnke, that the United States and.
the Soviet Union are .merely "apes
on a treadmill," with America pro-
viding the model of senseless weap-
ons building that. the hapless, blink
ered Soviets have mechanically iini-
tated. It is a view, ignorant of history
and resistant to fact, that rules. out
even the suggestion that the Soviets
might. plan their military forces in-
dependent of our plans or that they
might pursue what they. know to be
a politically useful military, superior
ity with which to coerce those states
not already, responsive tooSoviet de-
sires
Committed to the notion that our
relations with the Soviets are a mix---
ture of "cooperation" as , well as
"competition," the Carter admin-
istration sees SALT. U as the princi-
pal. cooperative: enterprise between
us. The presumption., seems to be
that the mere act . of concluding a
treaty on strategic -weapons,. what-
ever its terms, is by itself an-act of
"cooperation" to be contrasted with,
such episodes of "competition" as_:
the insertion of Mig 23s or a combat
What is missing-is. any=concept of
what, "cooperation" entails.. Is any
transaction between a buyer and
seller an example of cooperation
In the case of the SALT II treaty,
2?13 All iM12 :iCt ffi'~131~# ~
acquire fewer. weapons with the
treaty than without it. It is an illu-
sion curiously: immune-to experi-
ence. That it persists despite the les--
son of SALT I, following which the
Soviet strategic . buildup continued
with undiminished fury, must amuse
Henry Kissinger the historian even
as it undoes Kissinger the diplomat.
For after more than a month of Sen
ate hearings on SALT II, it has be-
come abundantly clear that our ne-
gotiators failed to obtain those con-
straints -- on the Soviet capacity to
attack our deterrent forces -- that
As thin has become increasiiigl}i
004WQ3&QQ6G+1e senators have said:
that the treaty ought not to be rati-
fled unless it is accompanied by an
increase in defense spending large
verse the dangerously adverse trend
that began a decade ago. --I as the;
first SALT negotiations got under-
way in Helsinki.
But beyond a fleeting tactical ac-l'
commodation there is little hope
that they will get their increase. For
as the last 10 years have., shown,
SALT has served principally to ease,
the apprehensions of the West:while
would have given substance to the
misty dream of "cooperation."
In some cases the Soviets simply"
told us to get lost - 'as when we sup,
gested that 150, heavy missiles for
them -and 0 for us seemed fairer than
the, 308. to 0 the' treaty ultimately
provides. In. other cases the Sovie
held out for ?-- and got -- treaty lan-,
guage replete withloopholes and
ambiguities calculated' to' permit
their strategic weapons programs to
go forward unperturbed. A prime ex-.
ample of this has to do with the de-
ployment of "new" types of ICBMs.
By the time the dust had settled
over the negotiating table at Vienna,
the term "new" had been defined so=y
as to permit the Soviets to complete
the very fifth generation of ICBMs-
that it had been our original purpose:
to halt. Finally, in still other cases,,.:
the Soviets were willing to trade cost,,
metic "assurances" for. U.S. acquies-
cence - as when we gratefully re
ceived a Soviet statement of .. the,
range/payload : of.. the Backfire
bomber that our own intelligence es-
timates showed to be false.,,-
All these points have been estab
lished in the. Senate. hearings. To
Lloyd Cutler's self-serving assertion
that the Senate critics of the, treaty,,
"failed to lay a glove on. com
mend the record of hearings before
then Armed Services. .Committee-..
wherein it becomes, clear that the
treaty has failed. to lay a glove on-the,
continuing Soviet stratetic buildup * .
or, does it depend on- the -circum-
'stances and the terms? Is a security
treaty between the Soviet Union and
Finland a.. sign that. those two. coun
ply an expression of Soviet strength-"
In fact, SALT'is really something
quite ::different: from-: the ordinary..
sense of cooperation.; It. is a bizarre-
symbiosis . between our tendency to ?,
practice of nurturing them.,. :.-
the military forces' of the : Soviet ;
able advantage.The impression. of
atmosphere, of detente. without. sub-
stance,the rhetoric of peace-and. sta,-'
bility- as our ,defenses decline - all
'an adequate defense effort.,,Thei
clash. between: that 'simple;;Lact and.
the . administration's - faith in :,: arm.
control:-` cannot -be reconciled: The
Senate'*i11 have to choose; and the
sooner the.better.
Richard Perle is a Senate staff member who special
izes in arms control and foreign policy issues., ,
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350060-7