REJECT SALT, BUT SEEK GENUINE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350079-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 79
• Publication Date: September 22, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

iRTICLE pprA pl$pproved For RefIEGTS ff QV :CIA-RDP88-013158000 03
On Po : ___ 22 SEPI' ER 1979
CHARLESTON, S.C. - Americans
should be concerned about what action I-We the Government will take to offset the
I N. C;
J
Soviet Union's large-scale military
buildup in both nuclear and conven-
tional forces. As I observe the SALT But Seek.Genuine
i providing for an adequate defense and
encouraging international stability
would be enhanced by rejection of Nuclear Dis ar e
SALT lI and its protocol. At the same ." .
time, I suggest that we-accelerate.ef-
forts toward achieving, genuine nu-
clear disarmament. By William C. Westmoreland
Backfire bomber or the problems of i under extreme pressure. Therefore, a
compliance, verification that concern . national strategy must be developed
me. Nor,am? I deeply disturbed by that will provide adequately for our
some inequity in numbers. I am con-,..,? defense and be prepared to protect our
cerned ,. about the principle that the.; global interest at lowest cost. The cur
missile launchers as we are prohibited:
from developing a similar capability..:
rent treaty will not satisfy that re-,.
quirement.
a uvuu~ uia~ qua:} viiuwi sya~c~ii wu1
But my major concern is the restraint.. I
imposed by the treaty and particularly have the wisdom and courage to resist
the protocol. on the exploitation of our the temptation to substitute SALT II
technology-" an area where we have ,,for the cost of providing an adequate
been pre-eminent.... defense posture. Our political democ-
racy will be more prone to react posi
Restraints on technology force us to . tively, to global realities if not con-
follow a pattern that..will probably not strained by an agreement that is more, be the most economical way to provide cosmetic than constructive.,
a deterrent to nuclearwar.-.Without . Specifically, if SALT IT is ratified,
the restrictions of the treaty and its there.will be, and should be, political
protocol, a.? more effective and prob pressures to go to the limit of the
ably less-expensive system could be-" _. agreement. However, that - may not
developed by, the use of the now-re- - provide a military capability consis-
strained cruise-missile technology, the tent with the several threats to our fu=
development of mobile ,:land-based.. lure national' well-being. Thus, we
missiles, and the deployment of more. ..could be competing in an arms race
.launchers at.sea. :. within boundaries controlled in consid-
Future - Federal budgets will be ; ?? . erable degree by an aiiversary.-.Full
,.
f
strained because of the energy crisis, . ? ,
lexibility of action, will be denied us. J Such an overture could not credibly
likely persistent inflation, and the ris- In this connection, the SALT process 11 stamp us war-mongers.' If the Soviet
ing cost of our "welfare.. state.'.: .So, has admirably served the psychologi- . ' Union truly wants. to decrease the pos
inevitably, military budgets will,"-be cal programs of the Soviet Union by sibility of nuclear, war; it will accept.
giving dramatic, visibilit}r worldwide
to its military might.
It should be obvious that there'are '
military threats to our national inter-
est that are more likely than nuclear,
war. There are-large and well-armed'
forces of the Warsaw Pact threatening:
the security of Western Europe. and
our interests there. Our most vulner- .
able area in the long run Is the growing'..
problem of raw materials to stoke our
industrial society Hence, the arena of'+
potential, conflict is global, and''thei
means of dealing with it-involves con.
ventlonai:,military forces - land, sea
and air =: coupled with skillful dlplo
matic action
The threat to our economic life is far
more real than the threat of nuclear
.war or an attack against Western Eu-
rPPe;.itis inevitabie:;.SALT,II estab-,
lii?hes an overriding priority to forces
mat could have little influence on
.Soviet initiatives in areas of tradi-
tional interest to us.; (Witness the most
recent disclosure.: of Soviet troops in
Cuba. ll~. '? '- i funAing pro-
grams to reduce the risks of nuclear
war, we must not.neglect those forces
that can influence a' threat to our eco-
nomic well-being forces that . are
flexible in their use and become visible
to both friend and foe. An element of
Soviet strategy, it seems, is to divert
us from attending to that area.
Before we, can safely disarm, we
must rearm. Before we dare negotiate
further with the Soviet Union, we must
put ourselves in a stionger military..
Meanwhile, the Senate should reject.
`SALT II and its protocol with a man-
_'.date to the Administration to reopen
talks designed genuinely to reduce nu-
clear weapons on an equitable basis,
such a proposal. If riot. indeed its Gav
eminent' is to, be-.viewed with even
greater suspicion::
Concurrently,- the Senate should
commit itself to sponsoring military,
programs=:focused on the ? Several-
threats facing our nation
Finally, the Senate should setup a ?,
watchdog committee to, monitor our -
military capability and report .-each
year to the Administration; and the",
public.
Soviet leaders are using the bargain-w" ing table as a weapon against us. They';;
have - been ; playing games with our ,;-
political democracy and winning. '.
Myopic,.vote-begging politicians have,
created for us: a perplexing security
problem. Only .far-sighted statesmen
whoa put the national . interest above all
William C.' Westinoreland,:U.S.'Army;.:
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 CIA-RDP88-013i4~~edtates forces
a 988 and was.
later Chief of Staff of the Army and a:.
member of the Joint Cluefsof Staff. .~