RIGHT MISSILE TRACK, WRONG HORSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350090-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 90
• Publication Date: September 11, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

ARTICLE EARLDpproved For Rs M 5r/AJ?S2 IA-RDP88-01315R000U450090A t -T
ON FACE 11 SEPTEMBER 197
Right Missile Tiack, Wrong Horse
President Carter's choice of a new basing. system The racetrack system finally chosen uses only 25
to make American missiles mobile and invulnerable to square miles, a quarter as much land as the trench sys-
surprise attack removes the only real obstacle to rati- ' tem, criticized by environmentalists. Yet It has the
troops in Cuba, or whether spending on conventional minutes it would take a Soviet missile-to reach the
forces will be increased next year by 3 or 4 percent. The .: United States. Even if the Russians figured. out which.
crucial issue is whether SALT enhances American se- .. 4F: shelter held the missile, it would do them little good. By
curity and permits action to keep our land-based mis- contrast, many hours would be needed to move mis-.:
at $33 billion, best meets the President's requirements, SALT. Otherwise, the Russians might add warheads
of "survivability, verifiability, affordability, environ- faster than the United States could build new shelters
mental soundness and a plan consistent with arms con-
goals." Each of 200 missiles would have its own
trol
racetrack with 23 underground bunkers at half-mile in- A question remains. Did President Carter choose
-tervals, spaced so a single Soviet warhead could de- the right missile for the racetrack--the 190,000-pound
stray only one bunker. A roof could open occasionally to MX? . It would carry 10 big accurate warheads. and
let Soviet satellites see that each. complex contained . threaten Russia's land-based missiles. Is it'really in
only one missile. Yet all 4,600 shelters would have to be America's interest to force the Russians to build their
destroyed to take out the 200 missiles a:impossible own mobile system? Can we be sure they will choose
A trench system with missiles on rails-was favored The existing Minuteman III could be deployed
until it suddenly was discovered to be vulnerable to 'faster and more cheaply Ina mobile mode than the MX,
blast waves. The, Air Force's alternative was a "shell restoring American ICBM invulnerability without de-
game" system of vertical shelters, about 20 for each stabilizing the strategic. balance. But there is time for
missile, to deceive an attacker. But it raised arms-con- the debate that this Issue requires. There was no more
trol problems. If Russia chose such a system, the time to demonstrate that our. land ''missiles would be-
United States could never be sure how'many missiles come mobile under the SALT treaty. The same race-
were hidden in each set of 20 shelters. The Administra- track, system could initially accommodate a smaller
tion's next preference was for an air-launched missile missile and then the larger MX later, - providing a
an attractive stopgap but one subject in the long chance for missile reductions in SALT III to make the
run to the vulnerabilities of the strategic bomber. MX unnecessary.
-Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350090-4