THE POLITICAL POTENTIAL OF SOVIET EQUIVALENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350098-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 98
• Publication Date: January 1, 1979
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350098-6
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ARTICLE ; ~? INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
ON FALL 1979 X1,1, r _ l t,3
The Political
otenti of Soviet
Equivalence
Benjamin S. Lambeth
When the dramatic
expansion of Soviet strategic forces first became apparent to Western ob-
servers during the latter half of the 1960s, considerable debate arose over the
objectives of that effort and its consequences for American security and
international stability. Some analysts saw the buildup as manifest evidence
of a Soviet determination to achieve strategic superiority over the United
States and warned that with such a margin of advantage, the Soviet leaders
might become emboldened toward a more adventuresome foreign policy,
attempting to use their new-found strategic leverage to exact political conces-
sions from the United States in coercive tests of strength around the world,
much as the United States did against the Soviet Union during the Cuban
crisis of 1962. Other analysts, perhaps the majority, questioned whether
asymmetries in strategic power short of a decisive first-strike capability af-
forded either side any appreciable political utility under conditions of mutual
deterrence. Those of this persuasion tended to interpret the Soviet buildup
as merely a testament to the Soviet leadership's desire to eradicate the
embarrassing legacy of inferiority inherited from the Khrushchev incum-
bency. Underlying their judgment was an implicit belief that the Soviets,
nothwithstanding the persistent ideological bombast of their declaratory rhet-
oric, generally shared the logic of prevailing Western strategic philosophy,
which held that a stable deterrent balance based on mutual vulnerability was
the only feasible solution to the contemporary East-West security, dilemma.
By and large, these individuals voiced expectations (with varying degrees of
confidence) that once the Soviets acquired an inventory of weapons sufficient
to place them on an acknowledged footing of strategic equality with the
United States, they would become willing to moderate the pace of their
deployments and enter into arms control negotiations aimed at solidifying
their newly-acquired status of parity with the West.
Subsequent events in Soviet-American relations have tendered mixed re-
turns on the relative foresightedness of these opposing prognoses. There is
little doubt in the minds of most observers that whatever their ultimate
strategic calculations and goals might be, the Soviets were resolutely bent on
catching up with the United-States in all significant aspects of strategic power
and regarded the attainment of numerical equality as n indispensable pre-
Benjamin S. Lambeth is a senior sta ff member of the Rand Corporation, specializing in Soviet political and
military affairs. He served previously in the Office of National Estimates and Office of Political Research,
Central Intelligence Agency.
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350098-6