2 QUESTIONS ON SALT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360009-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 21, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

ARTICLE 'AL
()ii PAGE
Approved For
12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R00040036Q~~r , 5 /1 LT
2 Questions on SALT
By Arthur B. Krim or, take the argument that our
Minutemen missiles will be vulnerable
To those millions of Americans to . in the early 1980's. No one can argue
whom evaluation of the strategic- that this is in any way due to, or
arms treaty has become lost in techni- caused by, the terms of SALT II. How-
calities and conflicting generalities, I ever, any steps to counteract this vul-
suggest that you ask your Senators two nepwli eare made much IIi hat r by under SALT basic questions. You will be amazed g
by the extent to which the answers will threat tto abe counteracted nd known number comes from
cut through to the bottom line,?not only a
for yourself, but also for your Senators missiles.
as they approach their-own. moment of You may be surprised to find that
truth in making one of the most.crucial your Senator, if he is. opposed to the
decisions in our country's life. treaty, may not be-able to point to a
1: Which of your. objections to the single substantive, objection - that
terms of SALT 11 would be satisfied or would be remedied to any extent by a
alleviated by . a. repudiation of. the defeat of ratification.
treaty? 2:- What do you propose be done to
The fact is that the principal argu- enhance our security that cannot be
ments against the treaty would actu- done under SALT 11?
ally in most instances be exacerbated The fact is that whatever is being
if the treaty were not to be ratified. credibly proposed to improve our se.
As an example? take the argument purity or the security of our allies in-
that the treaty allows the Soviet Union volves questions for broad national de-
the unfair advantage of the 308 heavy bate that. are not inhibited by SALT H.
missiles now in place. If there were no Should we deploy the MX missile and,
treaty, this limit would be lifted; even If so, how? Should we enlarge our nu-
more, the Soviet Union could then arm clear forces in the European theater?
each of these missiles with up to 30 You may again be surprised to find
warheads, instead of the .limit of 10 that our choices on these and the other
provided by the: treaty, an overall important issues of security. remain.
potential increase of 6,000 warheads or the same, SALT II or not. The differ-
more, which would otherwise, be,pro- ence is that under SALT II we can
hibited under SALT II. make these choices with greater cer-
Or take the argument that the Soviet tainty of the extent of the strategic
Backfire bomber is not counted within . forces deployed against us.
the treaty ceiling. If there were no The argument that SALT II. should
treaty, the Soviet Union could increase not be ratified unless and until these
the range of the Backfire and its pro- choices are made, even though .they
duction rate without limits. Instead, in are unrelated to any SALT. II restric-
assurances that are integral to the tions, in effect says that one-third in.
treaty, the Soviet Union has specifi- stead of a majority of our Senators,
cally agreed to restrict the capacity.of should control our defense decisions..
the Backfire to less than intercontinen- . , These two questions recognize that.
taI range and to limit its production to your Senator's decision cannot turn on
no more than 30 a year. :, ., what an ideal treaty might be but on
Or, take the argument that compli- -whether we are better off under the
ance with the terms of the treaty is not - terms of this treaty or by opting for the
adequately verifiable. If there were no foreseeable future to go our own way
treaty, we would be required to jely without restraints on either side. If
entirely on our, ability to' penetrate . you insist on satisfactory answers, the..
what is happening. in a closed society . bottom line becomes clear.
In order to know what missiles the
Russians were testing or deploying. Arthur B. Krirn, a lawyer and motion-
Instead, under the treaty the Soviet picture executive, is a member of the
Union is required to take affirmative General Advisory Committee on Arms
steps to aid us in monitoring these Control and Disarmament, which
same developments. counsels the President.
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360009-3